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
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
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
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HISTORY
OF THE
VENETIAN REPUBLIC.



VOLUME II.

HISTORY
OF THE
VENETIAN REPUBLIC.

VOLUME II.

H I S T O R Y
OF THE
VENETIAN REPUBLIC:

HER RISE, HER GREATNESS,

AND

HER CIVILIZATION.

BY W. CAREW HAZLITT,
OF THE INNER TEMPLE.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
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1860.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER IX.

A.D. 1202-1205.

	PAGE
Siege of Zara (11 November, 1202)—Its Fall (18 Nov.)—Difference between the Pope and the Pilgrims—Arrival of an Embassy from the Emperor of Germany (December, 1202)—Change in the Destination of the Expedition—Departure of the Latins for Constantinople (April, 1203)—Stay at Corfu—Departure from Corfu—Description of Constantinople—Its Siege (1203-4)—Fall of the City (April, 1204)—Partition of the Empire—Bulgarian War (1204-5)—Siege of Adrianople (1205)—Reverses of the Latins—Death of Dandolo (June, 1205)—Marino Zeno, First Venetian Podesta of Constantinople	1

CHAPTER X.

A.D. 1205-1249.

Pietro Ziani, Doge (1205-29)—The Consequences of the Fall of Constantinople—The Treatment of their new Conquests by the Venetians—The Revolts of Candia—The Affairs of Constantinople—War with Padua (1214)—The Famous Debate in the Great Council respecting the Transfer of the Seat of the Republic to Constantinople (1222)—Abdication of Ziani (1229)—His Character—The Correctors of the Ducal Promission—Giacomo Tiepolo, Doge (1229-49)—Fresh Disturbances in Candia (1241-66)—The Affairs of Constantinople resumed—Victories of the Venetians over the Greeks and Bulgarians—Deplorable State of the Lower Empire—Pawn of the Crown of Thorns (1237)—Its Redemption by Saint Louis—The Affairs of Italy—Frederic II. at Venice—The Campaigns of 1236 and 1237—Execution of Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's Son, by order of the Emperor—The Vengeance of the Republic—Siege and Fall of Ferrara (1240)—Hostile Attitude of Frederic toward the Venetians—Revolts at Pola and Zara at his Instigation—Their Suppression—Abdication	
--	--

	PAGE
and Death of Tiepolo (1249)—His Character and Legal Reforms—The Statute—The Promissione del Maleficio—The Nautical Capitulary	107

CHAPTER XI.

A.D. 1249–1268.

Marino Morosini, Doge (1249–52)—Reniero Zeno, Doge (1252–68) —Fresh War with Genoa—Victory of the Venetians near St. Jean d'Acre—Campaign of 1258—Second Battle of St. Jean d'Acre —Total Defeat of the Genoese—Destruction of their Factory at Acre by the Venetians—Fruitless Attempt of the Holy See to effect a Reconciliation between the Belligerents—Overthrow of the Courtenay Dynasty at Constantinople, and Recovery of the Empire by the Greeks (1261)—Treaties of the Venetian and Genoese Factories with Palæologus, the new Emperor—Successive Removals of the Genoese to Heraclia and Galata—Recommencement of the Genoese War—Victory of the Venetians at Sette Pozzi (1263)—Battle of Trapani (1264)—Great Joy of Venice at the Announcement of the Second Defeat of the Genoese—Overtures of Palæologus to the victorious Commonwealth—Truce between the Republic and the Empire—Affairs of Italy—Succession of Conrad (1250)—State of Parties in the Peninsula—Siege and Fall of Padua—Death of the two Romani—Civil Disturbances at Venice—Treaty of Venice with Saint Louis—Death of Zeno (July, 1268)—His Character and Legal Reforms .	195
---	-----

CHAPTER XII.

A.D. 1268–1280.

Changes in the Ducal Elections—Lorenzo Tiepolo, Doge (1268–75) —Alterations in the Constitution—Creation of a Grand Chancellor—Corrado Ducato, First Grand Chancellor of Venice—Festivities of Tiepolo's Coronation—Conclusion of a Truce between Venice and Genoa for Five Years (1270–5)—Famine at Venice—Venice declares herself Sovereign of the Adriatic (1270)—Imposition of the Gulf Dues—Considerations on the Claims of the Venetians to the Dominion of the Gulf—War between Venice and Bologna—Retreat of the Venetian Troops on Volano—Defeat of the Bolognese—Conclusion of Peace—Giacomo Contarini, Doge (1275–80)—War with Ancona—Revolt of Capo D'Istria—Chastisement of the Patriarch of Aquileia—Reduction of Almissa—Mission of Marino Pasqualigo to the Court of Rodolph of Hapsburg (1277)—Abdication of Contarini (1280) .	259
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

A.D. 1280-1289.

	PAGE
Giovanni Dandolo, Doge (1280-9)—Treaty of Peace with Ancona (1281)—Earthquake at Venice (1283)—Coalition between Aquileia, Gorizia, and Trieste against Venice—Preparations of the latter for War—Siege of Trieste—Successes of the Venetian Arms—Sudden Reverse of Fortune—Sack of Caorlo and Malamocco by the Triestines—Establishment of Peace between the Republic and the League (1284)—Preparations for a New Crusade—Triple Alliance between the Republic, the See, and Charles of Anjou (1285)—Revolutionary Movements in Sicily—The Conspiracy of Giovanni Procida—His Secret Negotiations with the Courts of Arragon and Rome—The Sicilian Vespers—Dissolution of the Triple Alliance—Excommunication of the Republic—Reconciliation with the Holy See, and Establishment of the Inquisition at Venice (1286)—Restrictions on the Authority of the Holy Office—Concordat of 1289—The Death of Dandolo (November, 1289)—His Singular Character—First Introduction of the Gold Ducat (1284)	305

CHAPTER XIV.

A.D. 1289-1302.

Popular Tumult at Venice after the Death of Giovanni Dandolo—Irregular Election of Giacomo Tiepolo—Its Annulment—Accession of Pietro Gradenigo (Nov. 25, 1289)—His Entry into Venice (Dec. 3)—Antecedents of Gradenigo—Last Days of the Crusades—Views of the Republic in respect to the Holy War—Renewal of the Armistice with Genoa (June, 1291)—Fresh Rupture with the Lower Empire (1291-2)—Expeditions of Pancrazio Malipiero and Giacomo Tiepolo—Effect of the Disasters in the Holy Land on the Relations between Venice and Genoa—Abrupt Termination of the Armistice of 1291—Preparations at Venice and Genoa for War (1294)—First Encounter between the Belligerents at Aias—Disadvantages of the Venetians and their Defeat—Campaign of 1295—Excesses of the Genoese—Expedition of Ruggiero Morosini to Constantinople—Siege of Constantinople (July, 1296)—Destruction of the Genoese Emporium at Caffa (1296)—Proposal of a Peace—Congress by the Pope—Departure of a Fleet under Andrea Dandolo from Venice (August, 1298)—Battle of Curzola—Victory of the Genoese (September 8)—Suicide of Dandolo—Tremendous Losses of the Republic in Prisoners—Almost entire Destruction of the Fleet—Marco Polo and 5,000 of his

	PAGE
Countrymen conducted to Genoa, where Polo dictates his Travels to Rustichelli—Firmness of the Venetians under the blow—Organization of a New Fleet—Exploits of Domenico Schiavo—Distracted Condition of Italy—Internal Troubles at Genoa—Their pacific Influence—Mediation of Matteo Visconti—Treaty of Milan (May, 1299)—Temporizing Policy of the Republic toward the Lower Empire—Eventual Rupture—Expedition of Belletto Giustiniani to Constantinople (1302)—His Successes—Concessions of Andronicus II. — Treaty of Constantinople (October 4, 1302)	338

CHAPTER XV.

A.D. 1286–1309.

Fresh Changes in the Constitution—Irregularities in the Election of the Great Council—Statistics of the Great Council—Its Aristocratic Complexion—Defeats of the Aristocratic Party during the late Reign (1286)—Renewed Attempts (1296)—Manœuvres of Gradenigo and his Party—Elections of 1296—Proposed Reformation—Its Character—Its Provisional Adoption—Its Permanent Adoption—Farther Changes between 1297 and 1317— <i>Serrar Del Gran Conseio</i> —Conspiracy of Marino Bocconio (1300)—Its Instantaneous Suppression—Considerations on the Revolution of 1297–8—War with Padua (1301)—Its Origin—Conclusion of Peace (1304)—Arrival of the Prince of Portugal at Venice (1304)—Relations of the Republic with Candia and the Byzantine Court—Treaty between Gradenigo and Charles de Valois for a new Crusade against Constantinople (1306)—Affairs of Ferrara (1308)—Espousal of the Ghibelline Cause by the Republic—Consequent Rupture with the Holy See—Siege of Ferrara by the Venetians—Its Progress—Threat of Anathema—Preparation of the Bull (October, 1308)—Firmness of the Venetians—Debate in the Great Council on the Ferrarese Question—Its Stormy Character—Unprecedented Scene of Tumult—Continuance of the Siege—Capitulation of the Ferrarese (December, 1308)—Fulmination of the Bull (March, 1309)—Unshaken Fortitude of the Venetians—Their Critical Situation—Attack of the Venetian Garrison at Ferrara by the Plague—Consequent Abandonment of Ferrara (August, 1309)—Public Discontent—Character of the Venetian <i>Opposition</i> —Marco Quirini—Bajamonte Tiepolo—Pietro and Jacopo Quirini—Organization of a Conspiracy against the Government—Influence of Private Causes in this Movement—Meetings of the Conspirators—Sentiments of Jacopo Quirini—His Departure for Constantinople—Plans of the Conspirators—Their Progress toward Maturity	394
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HISTORY OF VENICE.

CHAPTER IX.

A.D. 1202-1205.

Siege of Zara (11th November, 1202)—Its Fall (18th Nov.)—Difference between the Pope and the Pilgrims—Arrival of an Embassy from the Emperor of Germany (December, 1202)—Change in the Destination of the Expedition—Departure of the Latins for Constantinople (April, 1203)—Stay at Corfu—Departure from Corfu—Description of Constantinople—Its Siege (1203-4)—Fall of the City (April, 1204)—Partition of the Empire—Bulgarian War (1204-5)—Siege of Adrianople (1205)—Reverses of the Latins—Death of Dandolo (June, 1205)—Marino Zeno, First Venetian Podesta of Constantinople.

THE fortress of Zara, situated at a distance of fifteen miles from the ruins of the old Roman Colony of Jadera, was accounted, at the period of the fifth Crusade, the strongest place in the Venetian dominions. A girdle of massive and enormous ramparts divided, at regular distances, by towers of colossal height, secured the citadel from surprise or assault; and a lofty wall, recently reared by Hungarian engineers on the side of the harbour, effectually sheltered it from the invasion of a maritime enemy. It was

seventeen years since the last Venetian Podesta was expelled from their town ; during that space, the Zaratines had enjoyed, to a certain extent, a state of independence, having alienated themselves from the Republic, yet not formally acknowledging the sovereignty of King Bela ; and they had therefore been in an excellent position to make all necessary preparations for the impending struggle. The magazines were full ; the store of arms and ammunition was calculated for a long siege ; and the garrison, which was composed, partly of the inhabitants, partly of Hungarians, was in the highest state of discipline and efficiency.

These circumstances justified, in some measure, the hope of the Zaratines, that the Republic would be foiled in the attempt to recover her dependency ; but, at the same time, they did not shake the determination of the Crusaders ; and on the day of their arrival before the place, a Venetian galley having forced the boom, which was planted across the mouth of the harbour, the Latins entered, and established a blockade. The evening of the 10th November passed without any movement being made on either side. On the morning of the morrow the besiegers prepared for action. Their lines were formed ; their artillery was drawn up in position ; and the general assault began. The Zaratines had vainly endeavoured to oppose the entrance of the fleet and the landing of the troops ; and the overwhelming numbers of the French and Venetians, whose alliance in such a cause they had little anti-

cipated, speedily convinced the rebels that resistance was fruitless. Still they maintained the unequal struggle during several hours ; and it was not till the morning of the 12th, that a deputation of the principal merchants and magistrates of the City waited on the Doge in his pavilion, and offered to him, in the name of the municipality, the immediate cession of the place, provided that the lives of the inhabitants were spared, and that their personal freedom was uninfringed.

This was the fifth¹ revolt of Zara during the lapse of a century and a half. Each had been marked by generosity on the part of the Republic and by treacherous ingratitude on the part of the Fief. The latter attempted to extenuate such frequent defections by alleging the impossibility of resisting the aggressions of Bela and his predecessors ; but the Venetian Government had reason to think, that a place which had defied its authority from 1185 to the present time, was capable of withstanding the forces of the King of Hungary, at least until the Republic could pour in adequate supplies and reinforcements ; indeed so strong were its defences, that Dandolo himself, who might almost remember the year 1117, when the perfidy of Zara cost his country an army and a Doge, had not hesitated to express an opinion that, should the pilgrims not be inclined to co-operate with them in the recovery of the City,² it was highly probable that they would

¹ The first was in 1050 ; the second and third in 1115-17 ; the fourth in 1172.

² Villehardouin (lib. i. p. 20).

“lose it altogether.” The Doge, however, briefly informed the Deputies that he was personally favourable to their request, and that he was willing to consult his Allies on the subject; but that, without the consent of the Barons, he did not feel justified in giving them a definitive reply. The old man then, having desired them to wait his return, immediately repaired to the quarters of the other Chiefs, to learn their sentiments, and solicit their adhesion.

Very shortly after the departure of the Doge, the Abbot Guy of Vaux-Sernay, who now represented the Court of the Vatican in the camp of the Crusaders, and a few others who, growing dissatisfied at the slow progress of the expedition, were beginning to tax the Venetians with their worldly ambition, sauntered into the Ducal pavilion, and engaged in conversation with the delegates of Zara. They interrogated the latter touching the object of their visit and the nature of their mission; and the answer, which he received, appeared to afford Vaux-Sernay perfect amazement. “Why do you surrender your City?” inquired he; “your lives will not be spared! As to us, our obligations to his Holiness preclude altogether our interference; and surely you can resist now those Venetians, whom you may remember that you have so often resisted!” This forcible appeal was not without its effect on the delegates, who were completely entrapped; they confessed that they viewed the matter in an entirely new light; they admitted that it was foolish to capitulate under such circumstances; and when

Dandolo, having obtained the assent of his colleagues to the proposal, returned to his quarters, he found in the place of his late visitors, who had vanished, the agent of the Holy See and a few companions. The old man at once suspected some mischief; and his suspicions were speedily substantiated. For scarcely had he entered the pavilion when Guy, who held in his hand an open letter from the Pope, advanced toward his Serenity and, in a dictatorial tone, exclaimed: "Sir, I prohibit you, in the name of the Apostle, from attacking this City: for it belongs to Christians, and you are a Pilgrim!" Dandolo was furious. His indignation at the gross affront which, as he conceived, had been offered in his person to the great country which he represented, was plainly legible in his changing countenance; and, as the last words passed the lips of the speaker, he suppressed with difficulty his rising ire. At the same time, the slanderous reports, which the emissaries of the Vatican seemed to be disseminating through the ranks of the army, and which were daily gaining strength, filled him with anxiety; he felt that these seditious cabals seriously imperilled the success of the undertaking, in which his confederates and himself were engaged; and, without pausing to take notice of the apostolic prohibition, the Doge determined to retrace his steps immediately, and to communicate the strange scene of which he had been an eye-witness, to the other leaders of the Crusade. The Barons, who had not unnaturally expected that the articles of capitulation

were already in course of signature, fully reciprocated the displeasure and astonishment of Dandolo at the proceeding of Vaux-Sernay, whose conduct could be excused only on the ground that he was simply the instrument of the Holy See; and they also united with him in lamenting that a spirit of disaffection should have arisen among the troops. But they earnestly disclaimed any collusion on their part, or any intention of abandoning their ally; and in proof of their sincerity they cheerfully declared, that they were ready at all times to act in concert with him and the Republic. In conformity with these assurances, they announced their willingness (should his Serenity advocate the adoption of such a step) to break off the armistice at once, and resume the offensive without farther delay; and the Doge having assented, the siege of Zara, after an interruption of twenty-four or thirty hours, was reopened on the morning of the 13th of November.

The operations lasted only five days. On the 18th, the Zaratines were compelled to implore the clemency of the Latins. The treatment which the vanquished experienced was unusually gentle. Their lives were spared. Their persons were protected from outrage. But their town was given up to pillage; and the booty, having been collected and valued, was divided between the French and Venetians. The movements of the victors seemed to indicate an intention of occupying the place for a considerable period. Stabling was provided for the horses; bar-

racks were selected for the troops ; and with a view to the preservation of order and discipline, the Islanders were quartered in the neighbourhood of the harbour, while their confederates were located principally in the town itself. Even this judicious precaution proved itself insufficient as a barrier between the irascible pride of the French and the intolerant jealousy of the Venetians ; and on the evening of the 21st of November,¹ three days after the fall of Zara, a slight difference between some soldiers and sailors, both of whom insisted on installing themselves in one particular barrack, led to an angry altercation and a bloody affray. Night darkened the scene without parting the combatants, who had speedily procured arms and assistance ; and great numbers had fallen on both sides, before the chiefs could subdue the violence of the tumult. Dandolo had reason to blush at the issue of the quarrel : for his countrymen, although far more numerous than their opponents, were thoroughly worsted in the conflict ; and it was fully eight days before they regained their composure. A fortnight after this scandalous conflict the Marquis of Monteferrato, who had down to the present time remained at Venice on the plea of ill health, joined the army, of which he assumed the chief command. The generalissimo was accompanied by Matthew, Baron de Montmorency, and some others who had lingered behind on a similar ground. There were not a few who whispered a belief that Boniface himself,

¹ Villehardouin (lib. i. p. 27).

at all events, had been deterred from sanctioning by his presence the participation of the French in the siege of Zara from a dread of apostolic censure, and who consequently discerned, beneath the shallow and convenient pretext of illness, the scruples of a weak mind.

It was while Monteferrato was still at Venice, that Innocent discovered that a letter, which he had addressed long since to the Pilgrims, was intercepted by their commander. Boniface, in frankly confessing the omission of which he had been guilty, attempted to palliate it by shewing that his sole motive had been a solicitude for the welfare and success of the enterprise. His feeling was that it was utterly impossible to prevail on Venice to forego her scheme for the recovery of Zara; he reminded the Pontiff, that the Pilgrims considered their honour pledged to a co-operation in that undertaking; and he concluded by expressing an opinion that had he communicated to the troops the apostolic charge, as his Holiness enjoined, it would under the existing circumstances have exercised a most injurious effect. But Innocent was far from being satisfied with this explanation; he signified in no measured terms his displeasure at the course which Monteferrato had presumed to pursue,¹ and he commanded the Marquis to make known forthwith his sentiments to the Crusaders.

In this correspondence with Monteferrato, Innocent

¹ *Literæ Innocentii III.; Rerum Gallicarum Scriptores* (vol. xix. p. 367, et seq.)

had dwelled, at some length, on the cruel sufferings of the earlier Crusaders. He depicted in glowing colours the urgent distress of the small band of hero-martyrs, who were still maintaining in Palestine a desperate struggle with the infidels. He lamented the delay which had occurred in the departure and progress of the expedition; and he ascribed the blame, in principal measure, to Dandolo and the Venetians, whom he placed accordingly out of the Christian communion. He intimated to the Barons that he had addressed a letter to the Greek Emperor, praying him to welcome their arrival at Constantinople with a copious supply of stores and provisions for the troops; and his Holiness went so far as to suggest that, should that prince neglect or refuse to comply with his request, the Crusaders might seek the means of subsistence *in the name, and for the sake of the Redeemer*, wherever there was abundance. He directed them to make restitution of their portion of the pillage of Zara, which belonged (as his Holiness pretended) to the King of Hungary, like themselves a Christian and a Crusader; and in concluding his epistle, from which he withheld the usual benediction, Innocent charged Monteferrato and the other chiefs to proceed at once to Palestine, *turning neither to the right nor to the left*; and to hold no converse with the Venetians, *except it were of mere necessity, and then in bitterness of heart*. By these expressions some of the Barons were startled, and some were abashed. Others were simply annoyed at the reproachful tone in which the pontifical letter

was couched. At the same time, all acknowledged that it was their duty, or felt that it was their interest, to conciliate his Holiness; and accordingly a message was immediately sent to Rome from the Camp at Zara, detailing on the one hand the solemn nature of the obligations of the Pilgrims to the Republic, and declaring, on the other, their perfect and unanimous desire to defer in all points to the judgment of the Pope. Innocent was not untouched by this sign of contrition and respect; the envoy of Monteferrato brought back the blessing and forgiveness of the Holy Father; and the Barons, when they learned the happy result of their mission, felt as if a heavy weight had been removed from their hearts. The Venetians, on the contrary, were deaf alike to threats and solicitations; their share of the spoils of Zara was rigidly appropriated; the Hungarian rampart, contiguous to the harbour, was levelled with the ground by the order of his Serenity; and Dandolo, without deigning to ask pardon, declared to the Nuncio in language courteous but firm that, in the affairs of the Republic, the Holy See could hardly feel an interest, and surely had no concern.¹ The Doge went a step farther. He represented to his allies the lateness of the season, and the length of the voyage which they were about to undertake. He pointed out the risk which necessarily attended a passage to the Holy Land over a precarious element

¹ Marin (*Storia del Commercio de Veneziani*, iv. p. 40, *et seq.*); Giacomo Diedo (*Storia di Venezia*, lib. iv. p. 72, *et seq.*)

in inclement weather.¹ He reminded them, that they were going into a distant and hostile country. Finally, he shewed them how infinitely more judicious it would be to winter at Zara, where there was spacious stabling for the horses and convenient barracks for the troops, and to resume their pilgrimage in the early part of 1203. This novel proposition was at first vehemently combated. Some of the chiefs declined altogether to listen to it. Several were not unreasonably afraid that, by such a wide and manifest deviation from his injunctions, they would draw down on their heads the severest displeasure of Innocent. Yet on a calm survey of their position and prospects, there appeared to be in reality no alternative; without the means of transport, it was obvious that their movements were paralysed; the madness of starting for their destination during the present year was clearly demonstrated by the Doge; and they felt assured, that the latter would not be easily shaken in the resolution which he seemed to have formed, to extend the period of their stay at Zara till the spring. The result was, that after an angry altercation with the papal Cabal, which urged a literal adherence to the commands of the Holy See, Dandolo succeeded in bringing the majority into his views; and instead of embarking for the East, the Army was ordered into winter quarters. The Doge himself occupied a palace which had belonged to one of the principal merchants of the place; the Marquis Boniface, Count

¹ Da Canale (sect. 40).

Baldwin, the Count of Blois, and the other leaders of the Crusade, were likewise lodged in a manner suitable to their rank and dignity; and their followers, distributed through the city and its environs, had already begun to indulge in speculations on the probable course of events in the spring, when an incident occurred which gave an entirely new turn to affairs (December, 1202).

At the opening of the thirteenth century, the crowns of the Eastern and Western empires were alike worn by usurpers. In Germany, Philip, Duke of Suabia, swayed the sceptre which belonged by right of descent to Frederic, the son of Henry VI. At Constantinople, Isaac Angelus Comnenus sat upon the throne, which he had polluted with the blood of his kinsman and predecessor Andronicus. A matrimonial alliance knit together those two royal Houses: Irene, the daughter of Isaac, shared the fortunes of the Duke of Suabia. In 1195, Alexius (the elder), the uncle of the Byzantine princess, and whom his brother Isaac had redeemed from captivity, imitated the barbarity of his benefactor; the latter was, in his turn, divested of the purple, exoculated, and condemned to languish in a gloomy dungeon, where he was for some time inaccessible even to his nearest kindred. After some time, he was permitted to receive the visits of his wife Margaret and of her little son Alexius (the younger); the child, whose innocence disarmed suspicion, served as a messenger and a spy; and through him Philip and Irene conveyed to the aged prisoner

an assurance of sympathy and a promise of succour. It was on one of his visits to the Court of Verona, where his brother-in-law resided, that Prince Alexius heard how a large army of Crusaders had congregated at Venice, with the object of delivering Jerusalem and the Holy Places from the Mohammedans; and the royal youth, animated by a faint hope of forming, in concert with the Chiefs of this expedition, some project for the restoration of his father, determined to make overtures to Dandolo and the Barons. The impression which the Prince made on the minds of those to whom he addressed himself, was not, however, extremely encouraging. The Cabal quoted once more the pontifical letter, which distinctly prohibited the slightest aberration from the path of assigned duty. They were followed, and to some extent supported, by others who cherished a persuasion that the Holy See, looking upon the brother as no less legitimate than the son of an usurper, and finding that both were equally ready to restore the papal supremacy, would prefer the claim of the elder Alexius; and even those who had now begun to incline to the opinion, that it was unsafe to march on Jerusalem without first possessing the keys of Constantinople, naturally regarded with distrust the extravagant promises of an exile.

Fortunately, however, for Alexius, it happened that the Doge and the Marquis of Monteferrato were led by different motives to view the matter in a light more favourable to him. Boniface, connected by marriage

with Isaac Angelus,¹ was personally well disposed to espouse the cause of his royal kinsman, toward whom he entertained a feeling of affectionate sympathy ; and Dandolo, who foresaw the great commercial advantage which his country might derive from the friendship of the Greek prince, joined the Marquis in supporting the appeal of Alexius, and in urging the expediency of ascertaining from Philip whether, if the Pilgrims consented to uphold the pretensions of the Angeli to the imperial throne, he was willing to treat with them on behalf of his youthful relative. The views of Monteferrato and the Doge ultimately prevailed ; a few weeks antecedent to the embarkation of the Latins at Lido, an embassy was sent on this important mission to Verona ; and it was the return of that embassy, accompanied by one from the German Emperor, which now arrested the attention of the conquerors of Zara.

The representatives of Philip were at once admitted to an interview with the Chiefs, at the residence of Dandolo ; and they hastened to deliver their instructions. If the French and Venetians succeeded in reinstating the legitimate prince on the throne of Constantinople, the King of the Romans stipulated in the name of his brother-in-law that, on his accession to power, Alexius should restore the antient unity of the Church, and acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Holy See ; that he should pay to the Republic of Venice a sum of 200,000 marks of silver, which had been owing to her by the Byzantine

¹ Gibbon (vi. p. 545) ; Michaud (v. p. 48).

Court since the year 1174;¹ that he should either accompany the Pilgrims to Palestine in person, or defray the cost of maintaining for one year an auxiliary corps of 10,000 men; and that he should keep on foot, during his life, a guard of five hundred knights for the protection of the Sepulchre. The envoys of the Emperor, having specified these as the conditions which their master was prepared to subscribe on behalf of Prince Alexius, withdrew; and a fierce and angry controversy at once began between the emissaries of the Vatican and the supporters of Dandolo. On the one hand, the Cabal, inculcating implicit submission to the Pope, vehemently decried the new proposal as diametrically opposed to the wishes of Innocent; and Vaux-Sernay expressed himself firm in the belief that the curse of Heaven would be upon them, if they hearkened to it. On the other hand, the Abbot de Loces, who was Venetian in his mode of thinking, contended that the deliverance of the Holy Places must be achieved in Greece and in Egypt; and that, so long as the Mohammedan influence predominated in the latter country, and a prince, who sought to disguise his weakness by lavishing subsidies on the infidels, reigned at Constantinople, it was futile to think of saving Palestine, or of recovering Jerusalem. By these two opinions the Council of Zara was divided. That of Vaux-Sernay was seconded by the Count of Montfort, Martin Litz,

¹ Nicetas (*De Alexio Comneno*, lib. iii. p. 713); *ibid.* (*De Manuele Comneno*, lib. v. p. 226).

and a few other eminent Papists ; that of the Abbot de Loces was shared by the Doge of Venice, by the Marquis of Monteferrato, and by several of the French Barons, whose impulsive nature led them to embrace the views of Dandolo. The former represented a party, bold and skilful in argument, eloquent and ready in speech, but narrow-minded, prejudiced, superstitious ; the latter was the organ of one at least, who hated the reigning dynasty at Constantinople as the enemies of his country, and of many who suspected and reprobated its collusion with the Mohammedans. Thus, with the exception of the Cabal the members of which announced their intention—should the proposal of Alexius be adopted—of returning to their homes, or of embarking at other ports, the Latins agreed in regarding the new scheme from a favourable point of view ; and it was consequently soon decided that the terms which had been offered by the Emperor of Germany should be accepted, and that the expedition to the Holy Land should be postponed, until the Pilgrims had prepared the way for the conquest of Jerusalem by reinstating the two Angeli on the imperial throne.

It has now become proper to consider, by what motive the Republic was led to entertain so favourably the project of Prince Alexius for deposing the reigning branch of the House of Comnenus, and for restoring the exiled line, by which she was led to engage with such zeal and alacrity in an undertaking, of which the ultimate effect might be to revolutionize Romania,

and to establish a new power at Constantinople. Her motive was of a mixed nature : it partook of the avarice of a trading community, and of the ambition of a great maritime State. It has been already seen how, during the ninth and tenth centuries, the Ducæ and Theophili vied with each other in lavishing honours and favours of every kind on the colonists of the Adriatic lagoon, who shewed themselves polite courtiers, and might prove themselves useful allies ; and it has been seen how, before the rise and aggrandizement of Genoa and Pisa, relations of the closest intimacy subsisted between the Venetians and the Lower Empire. The case was now very different. In requital for the services which they performed under the imperial flag, the Pisans and Genoese had been gradually admitted to a participation in the inestimable advantages of Oriental commerce, which the Islanders once enjoyed almost as a monopoly ; the new-comers failed not to ingratiate themselves with the Greek Government ; nearly 3,000 of them occupied at present separate quarters in the Capital, where they pursued their callings in freedom and security, and where, like the Venetians, their own laws were dispensed by their own magistrates ; and although the merchants of the Republic still claimed to a certain extent the patronage and protection of the Byzantine Court, they found that their rivals largely trespassed on the precious privileges, which they had formerly shared only with the merchants of Amalfi. They were perhaps apt to consider that the decline of their

influence was a just source of complaint, a reproach to the jealousy or pride of the successors of Valens. Yet the cause of this decline was sufficiently obvious. The truth was, that the position of their Factory at Constantinople had long been, in one leading respect, a false one. So long as the Lower Empire preserved, in a degree however slight, her antient splendour and glory, and the Republic on the other hand remained an obscure and second-class State, the tone of the Venetian residents had continued to be obsequious, and their bearing, to be modest and respectful. But when, in the effluxion of time, the empire sank into decay, and the Republic acquired importance, the conduct of those opulent traders underwent a material change. Their demeanour became haughty and overbearing; their insolence was soon unmeasured; and their behaviour was in frequent instances such as the Greeks, not forgetting that they had once been a great nation, found it difficult to tolerate. It was not to be accounted strange that the latter, peculiarly sensitive in their weakness, should revolt at the authoritative interference of the Venetians in their internal affairs; it was quite natural that they should harbour animosity toward those who were attempting, as it seemed, to establish a foreign protectorate; and while the commercial privileges of Venice still remained in full force, the relations between the two Powers grew every day more formal. There was one circumstance that particularly tended to weaken the ties of a friendship, which had, at

one time, appeared to the most far-sighted to be indissoluble.

It may be remembered that, when the Emperor Emmanuel Comnenus renewed, in 1174, the trading charter of the Republic, he promised that a sum of 1,500,000 marks of silver should be paid in periodical instalments to the Ducal Fisc, as an equivalent for the losses which he had inflicted during a series of years on Venetian commerce. Of this large amount, Emmanuel himself discharged only 1,300,000, leaving on his demise in 1180 a residue of 200,000 marks (400,000*l.*) payable by his son and successor Alexius. But that unhappy Prince, who had not yet attained the age of puberty, speedily fell into the power of a crafty and ambitious relative; and during a protectorate of three, and a reign of two years, Andronicus Comnenus, a cousin of the late Emperor, continued to evade the just claims of the Venetians. In 1185 the usurper was in his turn poignarded by a kinsman, Isaac Angelus; and the Government of the Republic, acting on a hope that the new Emperor would be more amenable to reason than his predecessor, sent Pietro Michieli and Ottaviano Quirini in the same year to Constantinople to procure at once the recognition of the chrysobole and the payment of the debt. But Isaac, without demurring to the terms of the charter, declined to acknowledge the obligation; and a messenger was despatched to Venice to seek farther instructions. The Doge, having taken the opinion of his Councils, decided on sending Pietro Cornaro and

Domenigo Memo to the Byzantine Court, to join in representing the justice of the demand, and in urging its immediate fulfilment. The whole embassy obtained an interview with the Emperor. The Venetian deputies exerted all their diplomatic skill. They laboured to present the question in the most forcible light. They argued. They expostulated. They threatened. At last Isaac, worn out by their importunity, affected to yield the point, and promised to accede to their wishes (February, 1188). This feint, which only served to postpone the settlement of the difference, tried the forbearance of the Republic till 1195; and during that period, she continued to bring her claims from time to time under notice. In 1195, however, Isaac himself was dethroned, and was cast into prison by his brother Alexius Angelus; and Arrigo Dandolo, who had then succeeded to the dogate, anxious to bring the matter to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, accredited Reniero Zeno and Marino Malipiero, the son of his predecessor, to the Court of Constantinople, in order that it might be ascertained, how far the recent political change affected the prospects of his country. Zeno and his companion found Alexius affable, bland, and ambiguous. He stated that he did not object to renew the chrysobole; but, at the same time, he exhibited a strong reluctance to adopt the liability, which he was taught to consider that he had inherited with his crown. His Majesty was disposed, however, to suggest certain modifications, which he purposed to submit through

his ambassador, Johannes Cataflorus, to the Venetian Government. The terms, of which Cataflorus was the bearer, met with little favour; a second attempt on the part of the Republic to effect an amicable adjustment of the point at issue was equally unsuccessful; and at length, Dandolo, growing weary of these paltry and quibbling evasions, sent back Quirini and Michieli with a plain intimation that, should the Imperial Government persist in its refusal to comply with the fair demand of the Venetians, the latter had determined to support the not unfounded pretensions of the son of Isaac to the throne of the Lower Empire.¹

This ultimatum seemed, at first, to produce the desired effect. Alexius promised to liquidate the debt, as well as to investigate any other claims, either of a private or public character, which the Republic might think proper to advance. Moreover, he offered of his own accord to introduce several additional clauses into the charter of 1188; and by a new chrysobole, bearing date November, 1198, a free trade was established between the Lagoon and all Greek ports from Candia to Durazzo, and from Durazzo to the Golden Horn.¹ This important concession was unaccompanied, however, by any removal of the existing ground of complaint; 1199 and 1200 passed without producing a fraction of the 200,000 marks; the difficulty did not even approach a solution; and so imminent was a rupture between the Empire and the

¹ Marin, III. *Documenti*.

Republic at the period of the publication of the fifth Crusade (had not other causes supervened to accelerate the crisis), that, almost concurrently with the arrival of the Marshal of Champagne and his companions, the Ducal Government, desirous of obtaining some equivalent for the contingent loss of the Greek Connexion, accredited the patrician Jacopo Badoer to the Court of Leo I., King of Armenia, with instructions to solicit at the hands of that prince a trading charter in favour of the merchants of Venice.¹

The Venetian Government could not on any account view otherwise than with satisfaction the new turn which the Crusade had unexpectedly taken. For it was also extremely anxious to avoid a rupture with Syria. At present the Emir Malek-Adel was its ally; in all the ports of Palestine which lay within his dominions, the Republic already enjoyed many valuable privileges and immunities; and by closing those ports against the Venetian flag, Malek was in a position to strike a terrible blow at her Oriental trade. On the other hand, the relations of Venice with the empire of Constantinople had long been ambiguous and uncertain; the perfidious policy of the Byzantine Court had been gradually estranging the two Powers from each other more and more; and it may be believed that, while Venice aimed at maintaining her amicable relations with Malek-Adel,

¹ Dec. 1201. "Privilegi commerciali concessi ai Veneziani da Leone I. Re d'Armenia, a richiesta del Doge Enrico Dandolo, e del ambasciatore Veneto, Jacopo Badoaro." (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* App. 29.)

she embraced with eagerness an opportunity of regaining her former position in the imperial capital, and of obtaining, at the point of the sword, that redress, which had been denied to her repeated solicitations.

Having decided, then, on the expedition to Constantinople, the Latins left Zara, after a stay of almost five months, on Monday, the 7th April, 1203. The weather was clear and fine, and the fluttering sails were soon wooed by a mild and propitious wind.¹ The palanders, the carricks, and the transports, led the way; and the galleys, bearing the soldiers and their chiefs, were on the point of following in the wake, when a loud and general shout, accompanied by the blasts of trumpets, announced the unexpected arrival of Alexius himself. The Prince, who had travelled from Verona through Venice, was received by Monteferrato and the Doge with affectionate courtesy; and that unhappy youth, whose wrongs were serving as a ground and a pretext for the armed intervention of foreign Powers, embraced with the passionate fervour of reviving hope the knees of a kinsman and a benefactor. Boniface at once presented his ward to the troops, who welcomed him with acclamations; and Dandolo, having given him an escort suitable to his rank and dignity, signified the intention of the Pilgrims to await his arrival at Corfu, where the whole armament would assemble in the course of a fortnight. The departure of Alexius, whose reason

¹ Da Canale (sect. 43).

for separating so soon from his allies was his wish to visit Durazzo, was closely followed by that of the French and Venetians; and, as the last galley cleared the mouth of the harbour, the eye distinguished the form of the venerable Doge, who stood erect in the prow, and grasped the banner of Saint Mark.

The Zaratines watched the movements of the Crusaders with anxious impatience; and the fleet was hardly out of view, when they enlisted in their service a few armed galleys belonging to Gaeta, expelled the Venetian authorities, and proclaimed the King of Hungary. Steps were promptly taken, however, to suppress the revolt; and the rebels who, in their precipitation, had not allowed sufficient time even for the repair of their ramparts, were forced to yield without a struggle to the Vice-Doge. The mere recovery of a place which had seceded from her allegiance six times in the course of a century and a half, and which in a few months might become an impregnable fortress, was considered scarcely a sufficient security for the future; it was felt to be of high consequence that the relations between the Republic and her dependency should now be established on a better footing; and in April, 1203, a treaty was dictated by Venice to the Zaratines, by which the latter engaged to take a fresh oath of allegiance to Venice; to pay in perpetuity to the Ducal Fisc an annual tribute of 150 *perperi*; to elect, in all cases, as their Count or Podesta, a Venetian citizen whose nomination should in every instance be subject to the

final approval of his Serenity ; to acknowledge the obedience, which was due on the part of their archbishop to the Metropolitan of Grado ; to furnish, in the event of war, an armed contingent of thirty galleys, or, should the scene of action extend beyond the city of Ragusa, as large a number as they might be in a position to equip ; to select, as a material guarantee, thirty noble hostages, the cost of whose maintenance at Venice during the pleasure of the Government was to be defrayed by their own townsmen ; and lastly, to refrain from rebuilding their fortifications, until the Republic signified her assent to such a measure.

Meanwhile, Alexius, having received the allegiance of the Governor of Durazzo, had joined the French and Venetians at Corfu toward the close of April. The inhabitants of that Island, exasperated at the weak tyranny of the Court of Constantinople, welcomed the Pilgrims as their liberators, the Prince, as their sovereign ; and this augury of future success tempted the Latins to pass a few days in a fertile spot, where forage and provisions were plentiful, and where they might have farther leisure to consider their undertaking in its various bearings. The delay nearly marred the whole scheme. Some days after their arrival, a report reached Corfu, that sixty knights under Walter de Brienne had, in the course of a few months, overrun the whole of Naples and Apulia ; and the fame of this achievement which ought on the most superficial observation to have

dwindled into the partial and proportionately rapid success of a small band of adventurers, rekindled the ardour of the soldiers, and refreshed the hopes of the Cabal. The powerful contrast between their own dilatory conduct and the brilliant exploit of the Count of Brienne, gave colour to a complaint that, while Walter had subdued to his sway a rich province, and was now preparing to fulfil his engagement in the Holy Land, *they* had done nothing, and were besides on the point of engaging in an undertaking, of which the cost was enormous, the perils evident, the result uncertain; and it soon appeared, that these sentiments, if not openly avowed, were secretly shared by a moiety of the army. The emergency was pressing. The spirit of disaffection was rapidly spreading through the ranks. Nor was the impending danger obviated without a promise on the part of the chiefs that, whatever might be the destination of the remainder, the malcontents should be placed in a position to embark for the East, under any circumstances, on Michaelmas-day ensuing. This difficulty having been removed, the Latins sailed from Corfu, where this untoward incident had detained them nearly three weeks, on Monday, the 14th of May. The weather was favourable; the sky was cloudless, and the sails of three hundred vessels were speedily filled with a south-easterly wind.¹ From the poops and masts floated an infinite variety of flags and streamers; the sides of the galleys were covered with the broad

¹ Villehardouin (lib. i. p. 37).

and emblazoned shields of the knights, displaying their escutcheons and armorial devices; and the dazzling brightness of the helmets and cuirasses was reflected by the warm rays of a Grecian sun. The Fleet passed the islands of Cephalonia and Zante, doubled Cape Matapan and Cape Saint Angelo, and arrived toward the close of May at Negropont, where a few days were spent in procuring fresh water, and in an expedition to the neighbouring Isle of Andros, which yielded to the power of the Latins. Leaving Negropont and Lemnos on their left hand, the Crusaders entered the Hellespont, and cast anchor off Abydos, which surrendered to Alexius. The harvest was then ripe for the sickle; the soldiers spent eight days in gathering it, and in surveying the town. Pursuing their voyage, the Latins passed Lampsacus and Gallipoli; and, entering the Propontis or Sea of Marmora, they arrived on Sunday, the 24th June, at the Abbey of Saint Stephen, situated on a promontory at a distance of seven miles and a half, in a westerly direction, from Constantinople. Here the chiefs held a council of war, for the purpose of considering what course it was now most expedient to pursue. Many were of opinion that the troops should disembark at or near the point which they had already reached, and where they would command a peculiarly fertile district. But the Doge, who claimed a more intimate knowledge of the country, shewed his companions that it was unwise to choose a spot where the fleet, exposed to the squalls pre-

vailing at that season of the year on the Sea of Marmora, would be precluded from acting in concert with the army. "Besides," said Dandolo, "this region is very densely populated; if we land here, the inhabitants will be constantly harassing and cutting off our foraging parties; and so far from being lavish of our men in such a difficult enterprise, we should bear in mind, that we have already too few for our purpose. It will be more prudent to collect provisions, and form magazines, in the Isles which you see yonder. There we can deliberate, and when we have fully organized our plans, and completed our stores, we can return to the City. Adopting this course, we shall be in a position to advance with confidence, or to retreat without danger." The advice of the old man was accepted by the Barons; and on the morrow, at sunrise, the Latins directed their course toward the cluster situated at the mouth of the Bosphorus known as the Isles of the Princes. But the wind, which was now blowing strongly from the south, drove the vessels far eastward, despite the efforts of the Venetian pilots; and a few, which came in too close contact with the walls of Constantinople, were slightly scorched by the Greek fire. The rest, instead of casting anchor off the Isles, as it had been proposed, veered toward the coast of Asia, and entered the port of Chalcedon, where the Barons were at liberty to enjoy the luxury and ease of an imperial palace. The baggage and horses were landed in safety; the soldiers disembarked; and, while the

mariners took charge of the vessels, the army slept securely in the tents which they pitched along the shore of the Propontis. On the following day (June 26th) the Latins proceeded, the Venetians in their ships, the French by forced marches, so far as Scutari where they spent nine days in procuring necessaries; and from that point many surveyed for the first time the lofty spires and gilded domes of innumerable palaces and churches, painted by the rays of the sun on the surface of the waters. During this halt, a foraging party of fourscore French put to flight 500 Greeks under the orders of the grand-admiral, a brother-in-law of Alexius the Elder; and this exploit, which formed their earliest opportunity of testing the courage and temper of the inhabitants of the country, was regarded by the Latins as a farther presage of success.

It now seems natural to inquire, how it happened that the sovereign of a City, which was said to contain four millions of souls, forbore so long to check the progress of a force, which hardly exceeded 19,000 men.¹ Five years had elapsed since the second visit of Quirini and Michieli to the Byzantine Court. Alexius the Elder still sat on the throne. His brother Isaac still languished in a dungeon. Blinded by this long continuance of prosperity, the usurper wildly plunged into every species of debauchery, delegating the irksome task of government to unscrupulous ministers or unworthy favourites. The

¹ Ducange (lib. i. p. 23).

subjects of Alexius were on a par with their rulers. Indolent, unwarlike, licentious, corrupt, the Greeks were living in the shadow of their former greatness. They possessed a considerable share of industrial wealth; but trade was a monopoly, speculation, a system. The grand-admiral had amassed a princely fortune by the sale of the helms, masts, rigging, and cordage of the Imperial marine; abuses of every kind crippled the strength of the State, and exhausted its finances. The eunuchs were the guardians of the prince and the oppressors of his subjects; and the Varangians, who inherited the power of the Prætorian Guard, often controlled the election of the chief magistrate of Constantinople, while they despatched him frequently at their pleasure or whim.

Yet while his senses were steeped in sensuality, the Emperor had long been aware of the approach of the Latins, of whose purpose he could scarcely be ignorant, and whose power he had such just cause to dread. But the fears of the royal voluptuary were ridiculed by his parasites; and every night at the banquet Alexius was greeted by the pleasing assurance that a handful of barbarians would never dare to insult the majesty of the Roman purple. The ears of the Emperor, drugged by flattery, were deaf to the relation of the fall of Zara, of the defection of Corfu, of the surrender of Negropont. But when he was informed that the enemy had reached Scutari, he could not suppress an uneasy sensation; and awaking from his lethargy, he proceeded with

unwonted energy to concert measures for the defence of the capital. All the extramural buildings were at once demolished. An enormous boom, supported on piles, was planted across the mouth of the Horn. Along the inner side of this chain were ranged twenty galleys, the wreck of the Greek navy, to oppose the entrance of the Venetian fleet. The garrison, of which the Varangian Guard and an auxiliary force of 2,000 Pisans formed the flower, was ordered to make every necessary preparation for the approaching siege; and the Emperor, having placed Constantinople itself out of danger, hastened with an army of 70,000 men to take up a position on the left shore of the Bosphorus, where he was prepared to repulse any attempt on the part of the Latins to effect a landing. At the same time Alexius did not neglect to open negotiations for peace. On the 6th of July, Nicolo Rossi, a native of Parma, and an old servant of the Byzantine Court,¹ was sent to Scutari, where the Allies had established their head-quarters, to inquire the motive which could have led a Christian army to assume so hostile an attitude toward a Christian people; to assure the Pilgrims that his imperial master was perfectly ready to supply their wants and to relieve their poverty; and that, although it was in his power to do so, had they been twenty times as numerous, he was loth to inflict any injury on them, so long as they did not refuse to evacuate his dominions. The ground which Rossi took was somewhat high; the Latin chiefs listened to

¹ Villehardouin (lib. i. pp. 43, 44); Ducange (lib. i. pp. 8-9).

him in silent astonishment; and when he had terminated his harangue, he was briefly informed that the sole hope of the uncle lay in the clemency of the nephew, who was now seated among them; that, if the elder Alexius chose to resign the crown in favour of the rightful heir, they would recommend the Prince to grant him a free pardon and a liberal pension; and lastly that, unless he himself happened to be the bearer of a more reasonable message, he would act wisely in not repeating his visit. The ambassador was then dismissed, charged to convey to his sovereign the sentiments of Dandolo and the Barons. The latter, observing no prospect of a peaceful settlement of the question at issue, proceeded, without loss of time, to make dispositions for the passage of the Bosphorus.

Constantinople is built on seven hills, in the form of an unequal triangle; and the gentle promontory on which it rests terminates the continent of Europe. The capital of the East marked the site of a small colony, which a Megarian¹ adventurer had planted long before the beginning of the Christian era on the borders of Thessaly and the sea. But the splendour of an imperial court effaced the humble limits of antient Byzantium; and again, in later times the Ottoman conquest corrupted the name, and changed the aspect, of the City of the Cæsars.

Two lines of ramparts, running the whole length of

¹ Bandurus (*Imperium Orientale*, lib. i. ch. v.); Corneille de Bruyn (*Voyages au Levant*, vol. i. p. 121, *et seq.*; ed. 1725).

the trigon, inclosed a deep moat, five-and-twenty feet in width, and formed a circumference of twenty-three miles.¹ The southern side of the sea-wall, extending from the Castle of the Seven Towers to the Acropolis,² met the waves of the Bosphorus; the northern lay toward the land; the western side was bathed by the waters of the Sea of Marmora; and the east side, extending from the Acropolis to the Palace of Blachernæ, adjoined the harbour of Constantinople, on which the commercial prosperity of the Greeks had bestowed the name of Chrysoceras, or the *Golden Horn*. Two hundred and fifty towers, each of which afforded shelter to a large number of archers, slingers, and arbalisters, were placed, at regular intervals and alternate distances, along the double line of bulwarks; and above the inner wall, which rose twenty feet from the summit of the outer one, the eye of the stranger was attracted by the spires of a hundred churches and the swelling dome of Saint Sophia. Beyond the Horn, in an easterly direction, lay the suburbs of Pera and Galata, where the Emperor Alexius had drawn up his 70,000 Greeks; and on the other shore of the Propontis, that of Scutari, where the Latins were already concerting their plan of attack.

After the departure of Rossi, the Chiefs had held a second council of war, to determine how and where they should open the assault. The Doge himself expressed an opinion, that the siege should be purely

¹ Tournefort (*Voyages*, vol. i. pp. 464–5).

² Now called the Seraglio Point.

a maritime one ; and that, considering the fewness of their number, and the gigantic nature of their undertaking, the Army ought to act in strict unison with the Fleet, which would shelter the French from the dense masses of the Greek cavalry. The views of Dandolo were just and sensible ; but the Barons, who suspected their partiality, urged on their side the unusual fatigue of a long voyage on a strange element, and demanded a fair trial of their knight-hood either on foot or on horseback. The result of this difference was a somewhat injudicious compromise ; it was decided, that the Doge should besiege the City by sea, while his confederates invested it by land. The whole army was accordingly divided into six battalions : the first and vanguard, which comprised the flower of the French and Flemish chivalry, was intrusted to Count Baldwin ; the second, third, and fourth, were allotted to his brother Henry, the Count of Blois, and the Count of Saint Pol, respectively ; the fifth, to which the Marshal and Nobles of Champagne voluntarily attached themselves, was placed under the orders of the Baron de Montmorency ; and the command of the sixth division, forming the rear-guard and reserve, devolved on the Marquis of Monteferrato, General-in-Chief. The knights, cased in shining armour, embarked on the palanders with their chargers, bridled and caparisoned ; the other transports were assigned to the serjeants and esquires ; and each vessel was towed by a galley across the swift current of the Bosphorus. The Venetian oarsmen

were nimble and adroit; but their pace appeared slow to the impetuous French, many of whom leaped into the sea, where the water rose to their waists, and rushed forward, sword in hand, to attack the Greeks, who lined the opposite shore of the strait, and covered the Tower of Galata. His commanding position and superior numbers might have prompted Alexius to crush a few hundred stragglers, as they landed in disorderly precipitation, and in such a manner to cut off without difficulty or danger a considerable portion, perhaps the flower, of the French vanguard. But the craven heart of that Prince misgave him at this momentous juncture; and, in spite of the earnest solicitations of his son-in-law, Theodore Lascaris, who was serving under him as his lieutenant-general, and in whom might be discerned a faint gleam of pristine heroism, the Emperor set spurs to his horse, and fled in consternation, followed by the whole army, which turned a deaf ear to the rallying words of Lascaris. The disgraceful flight of the Greeks afforded the Crusaders ample time to form their ranks, and to join their leaders; and the French, having occupied the outskirts of Galata, soon became masters of the Tower itself.

At the eastern extremity of the harbour of Constantinople, and at the confluence of two small rivulets, the Barbyssus and the Cydaris,¹ the Crusaders had hoped to find a stone bridge, which connected the

¹ These streams are known to the modern traveller as the Kyal-Hanah and the Ali-Bey.

Capital with its suburbs, and faced the Gate and Palace of Blachernæ. But Alexius, at once perceiving the danger, had caused this channel of communication to be destroyed: the Latin engineers were obliged to spend a day and a night in re-establishing it, there being no ford; and so soon as the work was completed, the troops crossed the Sweet Waters, and took up a position in front of the gate of Blachernæ.

Meanwhile, Dandolo, having landed the troops of his allies in safety, undertook the formidable task of forcing the boom, stretched across the mouth of the Chrysoceras; for this purpose each galley was provided with a huge pair of shears, with which it was designed that the mariners should essay to sever the links of the chain; and that feat was accomplished, after some difficulty, by the crew of the *Eagle*. The fleet, which thus gained access to the Horn, was disposed in a single line along the eastern wall; the machines, which formed the artillery of those early times, were immediately prepared for action; and a brisk discharge of missiles soon commenced from two hundred and fifty catapults and other engines. The exertions of the Islanders were strenuous and unceasing, and their courage was stimulated by the presence and example of their venerable leader. Where the greatest danger was, the eye distinguished the gaunt and erect form of the Doge Dandolo. Before him was borne the great standard of the Republic; and the old man, always in the heart of the fight, in-

stilled his own spirit into those who were within reach of his voice or his eye. His energy overcame every obstacle. An unseen hand¹ planted the Lion of Saint Mark on the wall of Constantinople. Five-and-twenty towers fell almost simultaneously into the hands of the Venetians; and by sharp and continued volleys of arrows, stones, and combustible matter,² the Garrisons were dislodged. But, in their malice or despair, the Greeks had recourse to a terrible expedient. The whole Quarter adjoining the harbour, and lying between the palace of Blachernæ and the abbey of Evergetes, was soon observed to be inwrapped in flames; and moreover, while he played his own part with such brilliant success, the generous heart of Dandolo was chilled by the news that the French had been assailed, and would be overwhelmed shortly by the superior numbers of the enemy, unless they were at once reinforced.

Alexius, indeed, taunted and emboldened by the fewness of his opponents, had at last summoned resolution to resume the offensive; and under his orders, sixty battalions, each of which was far more powerful than a French division, fell unexpectedly on the thin and unwary van of the Count of Flanders. The distress of Baldwin, however, was instantly perceived. His efforts were nobly seconded by his brother Hénry and the other Chiefs; and the Emperor was already

¹ As Gibbon observes, the soldier was instantaneously slain, in all probability.

² Da Canale (sect. 45).

wavering between advance and retreat, when he beheld the Doge and a considerable body of men hastening toward the scene of action. Apprised of the perilous situation of his allies, Dandolo had chivalrously resolved to abandon his own conquest, and to proceed to their relief. His approach scared a legion of cowards. The Greeks fled in panic confusion, heedless, as before, of the rallying cry of Lascaris; and their precipitate flight afforded the Barons reason to marvel at their own preservation, as well as a farther opportunity of admiring the noble heroism of the Doge of Venice, who said "that he would die with them rather than earn, at their cost, undivided glory."

That very evening, Alexius, concluding that the fall of the City was inevitable, disclosed to a few of his nearer kindred his intention to consult his personal safety; and having collected a large sum of money, and appropriated the Crown Jewels, the usurper embarked at nightfall with his daughter Irene, for Zagora, on the Black Sea, where he purposed to watch the course of events. The intelligence of his flight was speedily conveyed to the eunuch Constantine, prefect of the Treasury; and this minister, averse on interested grounds from a violent change in the government, prevailed on the Varangian Guard and the Pisan volunteers to connive at the reinstatement of the late Emperor. With their aid, Isaac, after a captivity of eight years, was led from a dungeon to a throne; his wife, Margaret of Hungary, was placed at his side;

and a messenger was sent to inform the boy Alexius that his father awaited him at the Palace of Blachernæ. Alexius was enchanted at the intelligence. He at once proposed to obey the call. But the Barons suffered themselves to be swayed by the circumspect counsels of the Doge; and preparatory to the release of the younger Angelus, four deputies, Matthew de Montmorency, Geoffrey de Villehardouin,¹ and two noble Venetians, were instructed to repair to the Byzantine Court, to unfold the nature and demand the fulfilment of the engagements to which it might be fairly asserted, that the son owed a father, that father a sceptre and an heir. In the presence of the Emperor, of the Empress, and of the principal Ministers of the Crown, the embassy recounted the several terms of the compact existing between the Pilgrims and the Prince his son. Isaac listened with a rueful countenance to the enumeration of the hard conditions to which Alexius had pledged his honour and his country. Still, there being no alternative, he signified his approval of the Treaty; and before they took their leave, he even went so far as to assure the Deputies that, “in his opinion, the whole Empire was a scanty recompense for the services of the Latins.” The Chiefs of the Crusade then escorted Alexius to the Palace, where they were received by the Court with every mark of honour. The Emperor affected toward those bold and unwelcome intruders the most affectionate gratitude; and the coronation of the two Angeli, which

¹ Villehardouin (lib. i. pp. 58-9).

was solemnized on the 1st of August (1203) with unusual splendour and rejoicing beneath the spacious dome of Saint Sophia, appeared to complete the triumph of Dandolo and the Barons.

But the poverty and prejudices of the Greeks were alike opposed to the settlement of the claims, which were now brought forward by the Latins, namely, the payment of the 200,000 marks, the return of the papal supremacy, and recantation of the tenets of Photius, and the levy of the armed contingent of 10,000 men for the service of the Holy Land. The Doge and his allies soon found that the execution of the treaty was impeded by an inability to liquidate the debt, and a repugnance to the spiritual domination of a foreign priest; and a small instalment of the money which Isaac had designed as a convincing proof of his sincerity and good-will, mainly tended to diminish his power and popularity. Even this paltry dole was raised by the most desperate and scandalous methods; no respect was paid to the principles of justice or to the feelings of humanity; and the ministers of the Emperor, in collecting the money, did not hesitate to violate the public sanctuary. The holy vessels and the images of the Saints were melted into bullion. The jewels and effects of the late imperial family, which Alexius had not been able to remove, were declared forfeited to the State. In numberless instances, the property of individuals was summarily sequestered and sold.

The Greek Government appeared to be acting under

the influence of some strange infatuation. The cruel and iniquitous system of rapine and extortion which it pursued, was gradually spreading disaffection through every class of society. The people already began to sigh for a prince who *had eyes to see*, and power to avert, their impending ruin, without breaking so grossly every precept of right and religion. Although a few months only had elapsed since the pompous coronation of Alexius and his father, the Latins perceived that Constantinople was growing ripe for a fresh Revolution; and it was, perhaps, their true interest to allow events to take their natural course, to wait until a ground arose for interposing their authority as mediators between the Angeli and their subjects.

It may be recollected that, before the departure from Corfu, the Chiefs became parties to a treaty by which they bound themselves unconditionally to afford a certain number of their followers who were more particularly desirous of reaching the Holy Land, with the means of transport on (if not before) the 29th of September, 1203. The day named for the release of these men from their engagement was now at hand. The term of their service at Constantinople was drawing to a close. But the redemption of the pledge threatened more than to decimate the little army which at present supported the two Angeli in their precarious position; and Alexius, who was conscious that this defection would be fatal to the stability of his throne, and that the disbandment of the Crusaders would be closely followed by another domestic con-

vulsion, resolved to spare no inducement to prolong the stay of the Confederates at Galata. With this object the Prince often visited the Chiefs in their pavilions ; and, in order to popularize himself among the troops, he often deigned, as he passed the bivouacs, to join in a conversation or to take part in a carouse. On these occasions, the bounds of discipline and etiquette were overstepped sometimes by the boisterous gaiety of the Frenchmen and by the unconstrained licence of the camp ; in a merry fit, or in an unguarded moment, Alexius laid aside the majesty of the purple ; and in the freedom of discourse and action, the soldiers were too apt to forget that their guest was an Emperor. In one instance, a pilgrim snatched the rigol from the imperial brows, and adjusted it sportively on his own head, proffering in exchange the woollen cap of a trooper. This pleasantry provoked the sensitive petulance of the Boy-Prince ; and the soldier was sternly reprimanded. As he turned from the scene, did it occur to Alexius that, in his House, the crown had more than once passed in earnest from usurper to usurper as unceremoniously as it had just passed in jest from his own head to that of the Latin pilgrim ?

At the same time his negotiation¹ with the Chiefs of the Crusade was progressing rather favourably. The terms which he offered to their acceptance were sufficiently reasonable. He reminded the Doge and the Barons, that the day fixed for their departure

¹ Lebeau (xvii. pp. 114-15).

was approaching; and he conjured them not to forsake him in the hour of peril. He begged them to remember, that himself, as well as his father Isaac, had sacrificed to their friendship and alliance the national confidence and good-will; he assured them that they were now eyed askance by all classes; and it was his belief, that the people were deterred only by the presence of the Pilgrims from rising in open rebellion. An empty Treasury and a scanty revenue hardly admitted the liquidation of the large sum due to them within so short a space; and as to the submission of the Eastern Church to the Apostolic See, he said that that was a work of time. In the spring, however, he trusted that his power would be more consolidated, his finances more buoyant; and should they accede to his proposition, he promised scrupulously to satisfy their claims within that term; and they would then be at liberty to achieve their holy undertaking without difficulty or risk. On the other hand, he pointed out to them that, according to their present design, they purposed to perform a long voyage on a treacherous element at a bleak season of the year, and to brave the hardships of a winter campaign in a remote and hostile country. In conclusion, the Prince disclosed his intention of organizing, without loss of time, the contingent of 10,000 soldiers, as well as the guard of 500 knights, for the service of Heaven; and he announced his readiness to furnish the Pilgrims with necessaries, at his own cost, till the Passover. The Barons were mollified by the generosity of Alexius;

and the doubts or scruples of the Doge were removed by a promise on the part of the Prince to defray the entire expense of the armament, and to keep it afloat till April, 1204. The Latins accordingly consented to extend the period of their stay to the first week in that month. The objections of the Cabal, which protested against the base attempt of the Venetians to frustrate the designs of his Holiness, and to detain the Crusaders at Constantinople, were overruled; and the qualms of the devout were in some measure relieved by the formal abjuration of the heresy of Photius by the patriarch and clergy of the Greek Church. During this interval of leisure and inaction, the Count of Saint Pol and the Marquis of Monteferrato were tempted by a gift of 1,600 gold crowns, to place a portion of the Army at the disposal of Alexius, who was desirous of testing the loyalty of the imperial cities on the shores or in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus. Until the return of the expedition, the Count of Flanders was left at Galata with a body of picked troops to guard the camp, while the Doge remained in the harbour with his Fleet to protect the Capital.

The march of the army through Thrace assumed, at first, the form of a triumphal procession. The neighbouring cities yielded without a murmur to the power of Alexius and the Latins. But its advance was speedily checked by the news, that the Bulgarians, under the command of John their king, had lately debouched in great force from the Passes of

Mount Hæmus into the plains,¹ and were now rapidly approaching Adrianople for the purpose of opposing the progress of the Crusaders. The Bulgarian monarch, who affected to hold his crown of the Pope, had long refused to acknowledge the majesty of the purple or the suzerainty of the Byzantine Court; and a war of twenty years, which he waged with Emmanuel Comnenus, far from being favourable to the arms of the Greek Emperor, firmly established the position of John as an independent prince. The alienation of a large province, and the rise of a new Power, on the confines of Thrace, constituted a serious and formidable evil: the dominions of John were thickly populated and extensive; and that dangerous neighbour failed not to seize every opportunity of engaging in hostilities against a declining empire. On learning the proximity of the Bulgarians, the Latins, feeling their inability to cope with so large a force, resolved to proceed no farther than Ipsala. Retracing their steps, they regained Constantinople on the 11th of November (1203).

About a week after the departure of Alexis and the Barons, who accompanied him on the Thracian expedition, a party of Flemings and Venetians were to be seen carousing in one of the tents of the Camp of Galata. It was the evening of August 19, 1203. The wine was of Greek vintage, and it flowed freely. The spirits of the revellers rose high. As

¹ Lebeau (xvii. p. 117).

they gradually became flushed and crapulous with the fumes of the liquor which they quaffed, their senses grew confused, and their reason was disordered. Suddenly the idea of a drunken frolic suggested itself. There was a quarter in the same suburb, which was assigned by the imperial government to the Jewish and Arab factories in Constantinople. It was known as *Mitatus*. Those who inhabited it were for the most part mild and inoffensive men, whose chief study lay in the accumulation of wealth. The revelers resolved to make a nocturnal inroad into *Mitatus*. The defenceless character of their intended victims presented a temptation. Their religious nonconformity afforded an excuse. Everybody agreed that a misbelieving sect was a fair prey. The shades of night were already falling, and the scheme was at once carried into execution. The Latins rose from their cups, fetched their weapons, and, having communicated the design to a few companions, hurried in the direction of *Mitatus*. The work of pillage and destruction soon commenced. A synagogue was burst open. Every house and building of a private or public character, where they expected to find treasure or booty, was ransacked. A dim twilight assisted the operations of the marauders. The Jews, scared at the sudden noise and tumult, fled in utter dismay from pursuers, of whose power and purpose they were alike ignorant; and that lawless crew succeeded without loss of life or effusion of blood, in gaining possession of a rich spoil. But suspecting at last,

that their assailants were really few in number, the Jews went in search of aid. In a short time, they returned with a body of Greeks, whom they had probably bribed by the promise of a liberal recompense to espouse their cause. The encounter between the Latins and their opponents was fierce and sanguinary. The former, although unprepared for resistance, and numerically weak, were in the highest spirits. The merchants, naturally sedentary and peaceful in their habits, were roused to active exertion by the instinctive desire of self-preservation. The desperate efforts of the Jews, combined with the powerful aid of the Greeks, soon turned the scale of victory in their favour. After several hours' hard fighting, and considerable sacrifice of life, the Latins found themselves under the necessity of giving way: and some Flemings, alarmed at so unexpected a display of bravery, tried to cover their retreat by setting light to some of the adjoining houses. The flames spread with rapidity. In a few hours they reduced a large portion of the quarter to a heap of smouldering ashes. In a spirit of orthodoxy the incendiaries beheld with exulting delight the demolition of a mosque and a synagogue. Darkness lent new horror to the scene. A lurid glare, extending almost from Mitatus to the Sea of Marmora, burst across the murky gloom. Sparks and splinters flew in every direction. The fall of burning houses was preceded by the cracking of disjointed beams; and amid the clash and din of arms, the distracted ear distinguished the shouts of

frantic soldiers, the shrieks of women, and the screams of children. This shocking spectacle lasted till an early hour in the morning (August 20th). The flames were less easily subdued; and when their fury abated, at length, on the eighth day, several ships which had ridden at anchor in the Port were burned to the water's edge; and a third of Constantinople was one grim and hideous ruin.

During the progress of this frightful conflagration, the Crusaders had suffered neither the rules of discipline, nor the fear of treachery, nor the consideration of international enmity, to outweigh the dictates of humanity; several thousand Greeks of both sexes were rescued from a cruel death by their generosity and self-possession; and, after the extinction of the flames, Dandolo and Count Baldwin, the two Latin Chiefs who remained at the camp, sent a joint message to Isaac, in which they expressed their excessive sorrow at the recent occurrence, and their anxiety to detect and punish the offenders. But if the popular hatred had been less blind and indiscriminate, the Greeks were reluctant to forsake the pleasing conviction, that the incendiaries acted under the sanction of the Doge and his allies; and a wanton act of aggression, on the part of a few besotted and fanatical troopers, furnished a stronger handle than any antecedent event to national and religious antipathy. The entire community had reason to deplore the late catastrophe. Imprecations against the Barbarians of the West resounded in every quarter. The unexampled atrocity

of the outrage was in every mouth. In the streets of Constantinople rose a mingled cry of vengeance and despair; and so imminent was the prospect of a general insurrection, that no fewer than 5,000 Latin merchants, taking alarm, deserted their dwellings, and sought shelter in the French camp at Galata.

The flames were at last quenched on the 27th August. It has been already mentioned that the Prince and his companions did not return to the capital till the 11th of November; and in an interval of ten weeks, the passions of the multitude were in a large measure calmed, and their sufferings had been greatly alleviated. Alexius, who was shocked at the desolate aspect which the City presented, especially in those quarters where the conflagration had made most havoc, was received by the Doge and the Count of Flanders with the most considerate kindness. They extolled his courage, applauded his achievements, complimented him on the success which had attended his arms; and that weak-minded youth, not unnaturally viewing these extravagant praises as the homage justly due to his rank and merit, was thus led to imagine that his genius alone was capable of restoring the antient splendour of the purple. That Alexius actually harboured this foolish conceit, was to be collected from his behaviour in his visits to the Camp after the return from the Thracian expedition. His tone was now observed to be more grave, his manner more guarded; his bearing toward the troops became less familiar,

and toward their chiefs it became less friendly; and his later interviews with Dandolo and the Barons were embarrassed by an air of reserve. The Latins had every disposition to pardon the caprices of a weak and wayward boy. But it was clear that his estrangement proceeded, at least to some extent, from an anxiety to evade the fulfilment of his promises.¹ It was true that the Greek heresy had been formally abjured by the Patriarch of Constantinople and his clergy; and that so far the pledge to restore the papal supremacy had been in some sense redeemed; but, on the other hand, no farther instalment of the 200,000 marks had been received; and the demands of the Latins were treated with contemptuous indifference. The Marquis Boniface, who felt that he might use the freedom of a guardian and a friend, had repeatedly urged his youthful relative to lose no time in satisfying their claims; the other chiefs were equally earnest and importunate; and Dandolo himself, although he began to incline secretly to the opinion that a rupture with the Angeli might not be unattended by advantage to the Republic, insisted nevertheless on the prompt execution of the treaty of March, 1202. Alexius, however, either from an inability or an unwillingness to make a favourable response, turned a deaf ear to these appeals; the Crusaders at last quite lost patience; and in the early part of January, 1204, an embassy, consisting of Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Conon de Béthune, Miles

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi.)

de Brabant, and three noble Venetians, was despatched from the Camp of Galata to Constantinople with instructions to recall to the memory of Isaac and his son the services of the Confederates ; to remind them that the execution of the treaty was still pending ; and to intimate that, unless they were disposed to comply at once with the terms of that compact, the Doge of Venice and the Barons of France had resolved to obtain redress by force of arms. Béthune and his companions undertook a mission so full of hazard with alacrity. Quitting the camp on horseback, accompanied by a few attendants, they rode across the bridge of the Sweet Waters, and alighting at the Gate of Blachernæ, they repaired on foot to the palace. The path was hedged by a double line of Varangians ; it was a reception day ; and the Barons, having threaded this glittering file, introduced themselves into the august presence of the Angeli. They found Isaac reclining on a throne, supported by his son Alexius and his spouse Margaret of Hungary ; a brilliant throng of ministers and domestics filled the hall ; and a single glance assured the Deputies that they were in the midst of the Byzantine Court. Béthune therefore immediately delivered the peremptory message, of which he and his companions were the common bearers ; he announced in a commanding voice the high resolution on which the Doge and the Barons were prepared to act, should their legitimate claims fail to meet with prompt satisfaction ; and, their adventurous mission being thus at an end, the

ambassadors retired without pausing to observe the effect which they had produced. They fortunately succeeded in reaching without molestation the gate where they had left their horses and attendants ; and, springing to their saddles, they returned at full gallop to the camp.

The sudden appearance of the Deputies in the capital, and their equally sudden departure, had not failed to give rise to a general feeling of surprise and curiosity. Rumours were soon rife, surmises and conjectures were soon abundant, touching the object of the late visit. Every one presaged some new danger, or suspected some fresh affront. Few were aware of the real cause of the tumult : yet the whole City was thrown, in a short time, into a state of delirium. But the rage of the Greeks was ungovernable when they ascertained the nature of the message, and discovered that the Ambassadors had actually succeeded in escaping from their hands. In their phrenzy they turned instinctively from those who had offered so outrageous an insult, to those who had not resented it. The popular indignation against the Crusaders sought an outlet in a general cry, that Alexius had sold his country to the Western barbarians, that the Angeli were unfit to reign, and that it was full time to elect in their room a prince, who was capable of giving them freedom.

The greatest alarm now prevailed at the palace. Alexius foamed with rage. Isaac quaked with fear. The latter, apprised that the mob had already demo-

lished the colossal statue of Minerva, in the Square of Constantine, ordered the Caledonian Boar, a bronze which stood in the Hippodrome, and which was vulgarly supposed to contain some charm against sedition, to be removed to the precincts of Blachernæ. Every corner of Constantinople continued to reverberate with a confused din of sounds. By the intrusion of a few strangers into the city and palace of the Cæsars, the strongest feelings of human nature were awakened. The Greeks, while they lay spell-bound under the baleful influence of a profligate court and a bad government, could not help regarding the affront which the Latin embassy had inflicted on the throne as a national dishonour; their pride was stung to the quick by so gross and daring a violation of the Roman purple; and it was in a frantic outburst of loyalty and enthusiasm that they conceived the design of wreaking their revenge, if not of achieving their deliverance, by destroying that fleet, on which it might be said that the hopes of the Latins mainly rested.

One murky and gusty night in midwinter, a sentinel, planted at one of the outposts of the French camp, suddenly perceived in the distance a broad, but broken sheet of flame, which seemed to be approaching with rapidity that part of the harbour where the Venetian fleet was moored. The soldier instantly gave the alarm. The ship's crews were quickly on the alert. The practised eye of the mariners readily discovered the nature and proximity of the danger. The light,

of which the French vidette had given such timely warning, was found to proceed from a line of fire-ships, which had been ignited apparently by the Greeks at the southern extremity of the harbour, and had drifted down the Horn. The sailors threw themselves nimbly into their galleys, rowed at full speed toward the blazing vessels, seized them with long hooked poles, towed them to the mouth of the port, and there loosening their hold, suffered the ships to be swept by the current into the main. The intended victims of the plot thus escaped without sustaining any injury or damage. The incendiaries themselves lost a Pisan merchantman, which was burned to ashes.¹

The Crusaders, relieved from the immediate peril by the hardihood and tact of the Venetians, now began to suspect that the late movement was merely a cover to a more extensive line of operations, and that it was the intention of the Greeks to sally from the Northern Gate in force, and to attack the Latins both in flank and rear, while the latter were thought to be busily engaged in avoiding or extinguishing the flames. Anxious to provide for such an alarming contingency, the Barons ordered their followers to get at once under arms, and the camp consequently soon presented a scene of bustle and preparation. The surmise, however, proved itself false, and the precaution superfluous; and, no farther stir being made by the besieged, the troops were suffered to return to quarters.

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi.)

Scarcely had they separated, when a messenger arrived from Constantinople, and solicited an audience of Dandolo and his confederates; his name was Alexius Ducas; but owing to the singular shagginess of his eyebrows, he was commonly nicknamed by his countrymen *Murtzuphles*. This man had been instructed by the younger Angelus to express his deep regret at the recent occurrence, which he imputed to the blind and brutal folly of the populace; to declare that, so far as the Prince was personally concerned, he wished and intended to fulfil his engagements with them; and to announce, that he was prepared to place the palace of Blachernæ in the hands of the Latins, as a token of his good faith, and as a bond for the execution of the treaty. The recent plot, however, although perhaps justified by the liberal maxims of war, taught the Latins to be extremely guarded in their transactions with the Court of Constantinople; and the present proposal was from its nature and origin peculiarly liable to suspicion. Yet by his tact or importunacy Ducas contrived to overrule objections; and an arrangement was concluded on the spot, by which Blachernæ was to be given up to the Chiefs of the Crusade in the course of a few days. But, in the interval, a second messenger came to announce that an unforeseen circumstance had led the Angeli to change their views; amid the general fermentation and excitement which prevailed at present in the capital, they felt that the entry of the Latins into Constantinople might provoke an insurrection; and it

they gradually became flushed and crapulous with the fumes of the liquor which they quaffed, their senses grew confused, and their reason was disordered. Suddenly the idea of a drunken frolic suggested itself. There was a quarter in the same suburb, which was assigned by the imperial government to the Jewish and Arab factories in Constantinople. It was known as *Mitatus*. Those who inhabited it were for the most part mild and inoffensive men, whose chief study lay in the accumulation of wealth. The revelers resolved to make a nocturnal inroad into *Mitatus*. The defenceless character of their intended victims presented a temptation. Their religious nonconformity afforded an excuse. Everybody agreed that a misbelieving sect was a fair prey. The shades of night were already falling, and the scheme was at once carried into execution. The Latins rose from their cups, fetched their weapons, and, having communicated the design to a few companions, hurried in the direction of *Mitatus*. The work of pillage and destruction soon commenced. A synagogue was burst open. Every house and building of a private or public character, where they expected to find treasure or booty, was ransacked. A dim twilight assisted the operations of the marauders. The Jews, scared at the sudden noise and tumult, fled in utter dismay from pursuers, of whose power and purpose they were alike ignorant; and that lawless crew succeeded without loss of life or effusion of blood, in gaining possession of a rich spoil. But suspecting at last,

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of the outrage was in every mouth. In the streets of Constantinople rose a mingled cry of vengeance and despair; and so imminent was the prospect of a general insurrection, that no fewer than 5,000 Latin merchants, taking alarm, deserted their dwellings, and sought shelter in the French camp at Galata.

The flames were at last quenched on the 27th August. It has been already mentioned that the Prince and his companions did not return to the capital till the 11th of November; and in an interval of ten weeks, the passions of the multitude were in a large measure calmed, and their sufferings had been greatly alleviated. Alexius, who was shocked at the desolate aspect which the City presented, especially in those quarters where the conflagration had made most havoc, was received by the Doge and the Count of Flanders with the most considerate kindness. They extolled his courage, applauded his achievements, complimented him on the success which had attended his arms; and that weak-minded youth, not unnaturally viewing these extravagant praises as the homage justly due to his rank and merit, was thus led to imagine that his genius alone was capable of restoring the antient splendour of the purple. That Alexius actually harboured this foolish conceit, was to be collected from his behaviour in his visits to the Camp after the return from the Thracian expedition. His tone was now observed to be more grave, his manner more guarded; his bearing toward the troops became less familiar,

and toward their chiefs it became less friendly ; and his later interviews with Dandolo and the Barons were embarrassed by an air of reserve. The Latins had every disposition to pardon the caprices of a weak and wayward boy. But it was clear that his estrangement proceeded, at least to some extent, from an anxiety to evade the fulfilment of his promises.¹ It was true that the Greek heresy had been formally abjured by the Patriarch of Constantinople and his clergy ; and that so far the pledge to restore the papal supremacy had been in some sense redeemed ; but, on the other hand, no farther instalment of the 200,000 marks had been received ; and the demands of the Latins were treated with contemptuous indifference. The Marquis Boniface, who felt that he might use the freedom of a guardian and a friend, had repeatedly urged his youthful relative to lose no time in satisfying their claims ; the other chiefs were equally earnest and importunate ; and Dandolo himself, although he began to incline secretly to the opinion that a rupture with the Angeli might not be unattended by advantage to the Republic, insisted nevertheless on the prompt execution of the treaty of March, 1202. Alexius, however, either from an inability or an unwillingness to make a favourable response, turned a deaf ear to these appeals ; the Crusaders at last quite lost patience ; and in the early part of January, 1204, an embassy, consisting of Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Conon de Béthune, Miles

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi.)

de Brabant, and three noble Venetians, was despatched from the Camp of Galata to Constantinople with instructions to recall to the memory of Isaac and his son the services of the Confederates; to remind them that the execution of the treaty was still pending; and to intimate that, unless they were disposed to comply at once with the terms of that compact, the Doge of Venice and the Barons of France had resolved to obtain redress by force of arms. Béthune and his companions undertook a mission so full of hazard with alacrity. Quitting the camp on horseback, accompanied by a few attendants, they rode across the bridge of the Sweet Waters, and alighting at the Gate of Blachernæ, they repaired on foot to the palace. The path was hedged by a double line of Varangians; it was a reception day; and the Barons, having threaded this glittering file, introduced themselves into the august presence of the Angeli. They found Isaac reclining on a throne, supported by his son Alexius and his spouse Margaret of Hungary; a brilliant throng of ministers and domestics filled the hall; and a single glance assured the Deputies that they were in the midst of the Byzantine Court. Béthune therefore immediately delivered the peremptory message, of which he and his companions were the common bearers; he announced in a commanding voice the high resolution on which the Doge and the Barons were prepared to act, should their legitimate claims fail to meet with prompt satisfaction; and, their adventurous mission being thus at an end, the

ambassadors retired without pausing to observe the effect which they had produced. They fortunately succeeded in reaching without molestation the gate where they had left their horses and attendants ; and, springing to their saddles, they returned at full gallop to the camp.

The sudden appearance of the Deputies in the capital, and their equally sudden departure, had not failed to give rise to a general feeling of surprise and curiosity. Rumours were soon rife, surmises and conjectures were soon abundant, touching the object of the late visit. Every one presaged some new danger, or suspected some fresh affront. Few were aware of the real cause of the tumult : yet the whole City was thrown, in a short time, into a state of delirium. But the rage of the Greeks was ungovernable when they ascertained the nature of the message, and discovered that the Ambassadors had actually succeeded in escaping from their hands. In their phrenzy they turned instinctively from those who had offered so outrageous an insult, to those who had not resented it. The popular indignation against the Crusaders sought an outlet in a general cry, that Alexius had sold his country to the Western barbarians, that the Angeli were unfit to reign, and that it was full time to elect in their room a prince, who was capable of giving them freedom.

The greatest alarm now prevailed at the palace. Alexius foamed with rage. Isaac quaked with fear. The latter, apprised that the mob had already demo-

lished the colossal statue of Minerva, in the Square of Constantine, ordered the Caledonian Boar, a bronze which stood in the Hippodrome, and which was vulgarly supposed to contain some charm against sedition, to be removed to the precincts of Blachernæ. Every corner of Constantinople continued to reverberate with a confused din of sounds. By the intrusion of a few strangers into the city and palace of the Cæsars, the strongest feelings of human nature were awakened. The Greeks, while they lay spell-bound under the baleful influence of a profligate court and a bad government, could not help regarding the affront which the Latin embassy had inflicted on the throne as a national dishonour; their pride was stung to the quick by so gross and daring a violation of the Roman purple; and it was in a frantic outburst of loyalty and enthusiasm that they conceived the design of wreaking their revenge, if not of achieving their deliverance, by destroying that fleet, on which it might be said that the hopes of the Latins mainly rested.

One murky and gusty night in midwinter, a sentinel, planted at one of the outposts of the French camp, suddenly perceived in the distance a broad, but broken sheet of flame, which seemed to be approaching with rapidity that part of the harbour where the Venetian fleet was moored. The soldier instantly gave the alarm. The ship's crews were quickly on the alert. The practised eye of the mariners readily discovered the nature and proximity of the danger. The light,

of which the French vidette had given such timely warning, was found to proceed from a line of fire-ships, which had been ignited apparently by the Greeks at the southern extremity of the harbour, and had drifted down the Horn. The sailors threw themselves nimbly into their galleys, rowed at full speed toward the blazing vessels, seized them with long hooked poles, towed them to the mouth of the port, and there loosening their hold, suffered the ships to be swept by the current into the main. The intended victims of the plot thus escaped without sustaining any injury or damage. The incendiaries themselves lost a Pisan merchantman, which was burned to ashes.¹

The Crusaders, relieved from the immediate peril by the hardihood and tact of the Venetians, now began to suspect that the late movement was merely a cover to a more extensive line of operations, and that it was the intention of the Greeks to sally from the Northern Gate in force, and to attack the Latins both in flank and rear, while the latter were thought to be busily engaged in avoiding or extinguishing the flames. Anxious to provide for such an alarming contingency, the Barons ordered their followers to get at once under arms, and the camp consequently soon presented a scene of bustle and preparation. The surmise, however, proved itself false, and the precaution superfluous; and, no farther stir being made by the besieged, the troops were suffered to return to quarters.

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi.)

Scarcely had they separated, when a messenger arrived from Constantinople, and solicited an audience of Dandolo and his confederates; his name was Alexius Ducas; but owing to the singular shagginess of his eyebrows, he was commonly nicknamed by his countrymen *Murtzuphles*. This man had been instructed by the younger Angelus to express his deep regret at the recent occurrence, which he imputed to the blind and brutal folly of the populace; to declare that, so far as the Prince was personally concerned, he wished and intended to fulfil his engagements with them; and to announce, that he was prepared to place the palace of Blachernæ in the hands of the Latins, as a token of his good faith, and as a bond for the execution of the treaty. The recent plot, however, although perhaps justified by the liberal maxims of war, taught the Latins to be extremely guarded in their transactions with the Court of Constantinople; and the present proposal was from its nature and origin peculiarly liable to suspicion. Yet by his tact or importunacy Ducas contrived to overrule objections; and an arrangement was concluded on the spot, by which Blachernæ was to be given up to the Chiefs of the Crusade in the course of a few days. But, in the interval, a second messenger came to announce that an unforeseen circumstance had led the Angeli to change their views; amid the general fermentation and excitement which prevailed at present in the capital, they felt that the entry of the Latins into Constantinople might provoke an insurrection; and it

was, in their opinion, unsafe for Dandolo and the Barons to accept the recent invitation of Alexius. Hereupon, the negotiation, which had been opened without any precise object, was suffered to drop altogether, the besiegers determining, as they declared, to delay no longer in executing their threat by submitting the question to the arbitrement of the sword, while the besieged indicated an equally firm resolution to part at the dearest rate with their liberties and their lives. To the chivalric ardour of the French and the tried bravery of the Venetians, the Greeks opposed superior numbers, a more commanding position, and more copious resources; they opposed the talents of Theodore Lascaris and of Alexius Murtzuphles, the steady discipline of the Varangian Guard, and the active jealousy of the Pisan auxiliaries; and, moreover, they had on their side every motive to exertion, and every plea against inactivity. On the other hand, there were few among that large population who possessed the least singleness of purpose or nobleness of heart: corruption, venality, decay, was everywhere. Its wealth was absorbed by speculation and monopoly; and the masses, except when they were momentarily goaded to madness by some wanton act of aggression or despotism, were sunk in lethargy and stupor.

The character of Isaac Angelus Comnenus presented no feature which entitled him to the love or admiration of his subjects. At once weak and irresolute, capricious and arbitrary, timid and cruel, that Prince betrayed throughout his life a coldness of heart which

was equalled only by the hebetude of his understanding ; and, excelling only in the low arts of intrigue and dissimulation, he shewed himself utterly destitute of all those high qualities which should unite to form the sovereign of an independent country. The days of his reign and his empire were alike numbered, and each hour was pregnant with symptoms of approaching collapse : yet Isaac was persuaded to nourish a fancy, that a great and auspicious change was at hand ; and the sycophants, who surrounded this imbecile and drivelling old man, succeeded in deluding him with the notion, that his health and sight were about to be speedily restored, and that, at the head of his victorious legions, he would soon again compel the nations to acknowledge the majesty of Rome. The child was hardly less vicious and less despicable than the parent. Though not born in the purple, the former passed his infancy and boyhood in a Court, which had long ceased to be censorious : and at that period of life, when education should be most strict, Prince Alexius was an exile and a wanderer. The vicissitudes of his youthful career made an enduring impression on a fiery temper and a feeble intellect ; and, when he ascended the imperial throne in the autumn of 1203, his mind was already a prey to misfortune and neglect. Alexius was less apathetic, less fatuous, perhaps less corrupt, than his father ; but it was clear, that he was equally incapable of meeting a public emergency.

It is impossible not to treat the continuance in power of two such Princes as a striking exempli-

cation of the morbid torpor of a nation, which forbore to raise a voice, or to lift a hand, against a Government at once tyrannical and impotent. Even the eventual fall of the Angeli was due not to a general rising of the population, or to an open rebellion against their authority, but to the successful intrigues of a minister, who abused their confidence. Alexius Ducas Murtzuphles, their principal adviser, was a man of rude genius, of indefatigable energy, of unscrupulous ambition. In his high capacity of grand-chamberlain, frequent opportunities were afforded him of popularizing himself. By the exercise of great circumspection and tact, the crafty Domestic contrived to win the favour of his countrymen without forfeiting the confidence of his august employers; and he promoted the disunion, which already existed to some extent, between the Greeks and their rulers by every artifice, tending to lower the Angeli in the estimation of their subjects, to exalt them in their own. In their presence he flattered their vanity; behind their back he exposed their vices. He extolled their conduct in their hearing, while he was secretly traducing its motives. So ably concerted were all his plans, that those Princes became conscious of the decline of their influence and popularity only when it was too late to save themselves from destruction. So consummate, indeed, was his duplicity, or so strong had grown the hallucination in their minds that, when the people assembled, toward the close of January, 1204, in the church of Saint Sophia for the purpose of deliberating on the

question of introducing some change into the government, both Isaac and his son still refused to believe that any such design was in contemplation. Murtzuphles, however, had been whispering in the popular ear that Alexius was on the point of delivering up the City to the Pilgrims ; and the Greeks, maddened by the prospect of such an indignity, had at last gone so far as to declare that the Angeli were unworthy of their confidence.

Yet, while Alexius and his father were deservedly objects of general ridicule and contempt, the choice of their successors was far from being an easy task. All who were capable of filling that exalted station studiously shunned a dignity which offered no security for gentle natures, no scope for ambition ; and the Greeks, exasperated beyond measure at the unforeseen difficulty which they experienced in finding a master, went so far, in the pruriency of their rage, as to menace with immediate death those whom they considered competent, and who were found unwilling, to discharge the proffered trust. Yet with a single exception, the risk of life was accounted preferable to an empty and odious distinction ; and it was only under the utmost stress of intimidation, that Nicholas Canabes, a young man of noble birth and amiable disposition, yet wholly incapable of filling such a high and responsible position at such an extraordinary crisis, could be persuaded to accept the diadem.

What the nation really wanted, was the genius to form plans, and the courage to execute them ; and

these qualities were found united in Murtzuphles alone. During the period, which immediately preceded the election of Canabes, the Chamberlain had not ceased to observe the course of events with an anxious and vigilant eye ; this bold, bad man took everything into calculation and account ; and, under the mask of friendship or patriotism, he at last succeeded in removing all the obstacles to his own advancement. By his address he gained the ear of the Treasurer. The collusion of the Treasurer enabled him to tamper with the Varangians. Ducas judged that the rest might be safely left to his own exertions. On the evening of the 8th of February, 1204, the Chamberlain entered the Palace after dusk, accompanied by a few satellites. The latter had their instructions ; at a given sign they seized Canabes, and hurried him away to a dark and distant dungeon where his presence would be unsuspected, his cries unheard. On the same night, the younger Angelus was roused from his slumber by the sudden and startling announcement, that a revolution was taking place in the capital ; and that unfortunate youth, distracted by the noise, deceived by the obscurity of the hour, suffered himself to be led by Murtzuphles, for the alleged sake of greater security, into an adjoining chamber, where he was strangled in the presence of his pretended deliverer. In attempting to conceal his guilt, Murtzuphles aggravated it. The yet palpitating body of his victim was covered with bruises and scars, in order that, while the corpse lay in state,

it might appear that the Emperor had died from the effect of a fall. A few days afterward, the natural craving of the multitude for pageantry was gratified by the pompous interment of Alexius in the church of Apostoli.¹

The intelligence of the death of his son was a fatal shock to the feeble health of Isaac, who had been gradually sinking into helpless decrepitude; and that Prince was saved, perhaps, from a similar doom by a timely and a natural decease.² The melancholy end of the Angeli created in their favour a general, though momentary, feeling of sympathy; and the cord of the assassin seemed to reconcile the nation for awhile to the memory of the father and the son. It required no very extraordinary power of insight into human nature to foresee this transient reaction; Ducas was far too wary to keep aloof at such a critical moment; and few were louder than himself in their expressions of surprise and sorrow. As the Chamberlain had anticipated, the popular emotion quickly subsided, and although it was still gravely suspected in many quarters, that the blood of the Angeli was on the head of their late minister, Murtzuphles was permitted to take undisputed possession of the vacant throne. Thus was accomplished the third domestic revolution, which Constantinople had witnessed in the course of a few months. (February, 1204.)

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 192); Lebeau (xvii. p. 133).

² See Antonio Conti, *Proteo Idillio*, 22 (Compominenti Poetici in lode di Venezia di varii Autori, Ven. 1792).

On his accession, Ducas hastened to send word to the Latin Chiefs through a confidential agent, that *Alexius* desired them to sup and confer with him, on a certain night, at the palace of Blachernæ. Such a proposal, emanating from such a source, deserved to be treated with peculiar caution : its very authenticity could not altogether be free from doubt. Yet, in the air and tone of the individual who was the bearer of the message, there was something which threw the Barons off their guard, and which prompted them to accept the invitation : nor did the Doge himself—Dandolo, *the Prudent of the Prudent*—appear to entertain any misgivings. Dandolo, indeed, had forbore, from an instinctive feeling of delicacy, to express his opinion in the hearing of the Greeks ; but the old man failed not, so soon as the envoy had gone, to convince his companions that he was very far from viewing the matter in a favourable light. “ It was,” he said, “ the greatest folly imaginable to place reliance on the perjured honour of the Angeli ; there was no reason to doubt, that this was some new snare for inveigling them into ruin ; and he recommended them, if they set any value on their lives, to abstain from complying with the invitation of Alexius. Had they forgotten (he asked) the perfidious and ungrateful conduct of that Prince toward them ? Restored by their valour, loaded with their favours, so soon as he found himself in a position to dispense with their services, he had become their enemy, he had turned against them the very arms, which they

placed in his hands. In spite of solemn engagements, he opened hostilities. He attempted to destroy the Fleet. Already he had repeatedly deceived them with empty and insidious overtures. If they suffered themselves to be cajoled again by the same paltry and shallow artifices, it was their own blame. On the contrary, he urged them to be patient, and attempt to discover how matters stood in Constantinople, before they took any hazardous step." This wise counsel prevailed; the ill-considered project was abandoned; and on ascertaining the real posture of affairs, the Barons had perhaps the candour and generosity to own, that they were solely indebted for their preservation to the good sense and prudence of the Doge.¹

The signal miscarriage of his first scheme vexed without disheartening Murtzuphles; and that daring adventurer held himself in readiness to seize the next opportunity, which might present itself, of gaining an advantage over the Latins. This opportunity was soon forthcoming. Shortly after the frustration of his late plot, Ducas learned that a body of picked troops, about 1,000 strong, under the Count of Flanders, had gone on a predatory excursion to Phinea on the Bosphorus, for the purpose of obtaining a fresh supply of forage and provisions, of which the army and the fleet were beginning to feel a scarcity. The Emperor conceived that he might without much difficulty take the foragers by surprise as they returned home, incumbered with booty and elated by success, and in

¹ Lebeau (vol. xvii. p. 132).

this manner might weaken materially the forces of the French, who were reported to have been already reduced by various causes to between 5,000 and 6,000. The plan was simple; its execution seemed very feasible; and Murtzuphles set out for Phinea at the head of a powerful detachment of troops, with confident expectations of a favourable result.

Meanwhile, the French, having taken the town by storm, spent three days in sack and pillage; and fortunately for the Allies, Baldwin, instead of consigning the spoil, in the ordinary manner, to the care of his followers, caused it to be placed on board some Venetian vessels, which happened to be lying in the harbour, and to be transported by sea to headquarters. The foragers, therefore, though greatly inferior in point of number, were in a position to sustain with firmness the onset of the ambuscade, which Murtzuphles had planted in a wood near Phinea. The attack, however, was such a complete surprise that the struggle was at first exceedingly fierce. For some time the French failed to make any marked impression on the dense masses of the enemy. But the affair was at last decided by the dastardly behaviour of the Greeks who fled, after a few hours' fighting, in panic disorder, leaving behind them a miraculous Image of the Virgin, and Murtzuphles himself, who was saved from capture only by the fleetness of his horse.

This second defeat was highly mortifying to the Emperor. It shewed him without any disguise the

hollowness of the ground on which he stood, and the worthlessness of those with whom he was endeavouring to act. Already sensible of the difficulties with which he had to cope, he now learned to the full extent the inadequacy of the means which he possessed of coping with them. At the same time, Ducas could not help feeling that his life depended on the continuance of his power, and that it was necessary, under every circumstance of discouragement, to try some new experiment. To make any farther concealment of the death of the Angeli was clearly useless. It seemed equally nugatory to disclaim a knowledge of the murder of Alexius. He resolved to assume the character of their legitimate successor; and in that capacity he proceeded to invite the Chiefs of the Crusade to a friendly conference, where some plan might be concerted for the execution of the remaining articles of the treaty. But the Barons, who had now grown exceedingly circumspect, refused to fall into such an open snare; and some even harboured doubts, whether they were justified, as Christians and Crusaders, in holding any intercourse with an usurper and an assassin.¹ The Doge, in this instance, was of a different opinion. He thought that it was their duty to sacrifice private objections and scruples (however just they might be), to the public advantage, and that they were bound to reject no opportunity which might present itself of arriving at terms, provided that such terms compro-

¹ Lebeau (xvii. p. 132).

mised not, firstly, the honour of God, and, secondly, the honour of the Pilgrims. At the same time, if they were unwilling to accept the proposal, the old man offered to go alone, and to ascertain, in a personal interview, how far the death of the Angeli affected their prospect. The suggestion of Dandolo, though at variance with the views of the rest, was at once adopted; and His Serenity, embarking on his galley, met Murtzuphles, according to arrangement, near a point in the Golden Horn, where the union of the Barbyssus and the Cydaris formed the Sweet Waters.¹ The salutations, which passed between these two eminent personages, were chillingly formal. The Doge of Venice stood erect in the prow of his barge. The Emperor remained on horseback. The conversation was opened by the former. Dandolo spoke with the sternest reprobation of the horrible crime of which Ducas had been guilty. He pictured to him the difficulty of persuading the Latins to repose trust in a man who, in defiance of all laws, human and divine, and under circumstances of such atrocious perfidy, had taken the life of his sovereign. The Greek attempted to palliate, even to justify his conduct. Dandolo, turning a deaf ear to his apology, proceeded to recapitulate the several terms of the treaty concluded in the spring of 1203, between his predecessors on the one part, and the French Barons and his own Commune, on the other. Ducas acquiesced in every article, save one. He protested that,

¹ Gibbon (ch. lx. p. 562).

sooner than submit to the restoration of the papal supremacy, he would bury himself and his countrymen under the ruins of the Empire. It was in vain that the Doge expostulated, or that he pointed out that the Greek Clergy had already formally renounced the heresy of Photius. The resolution of the other was inflexible, and thereupon the two princes parted, the only result of the conference being, that Dandolo might now affirm with some truth that he had used his utmost exertions in the interest of peace.¹

After a second attempt to destroy the Venetian Fleet with fire-ships, which was not more successful than the first, Murtzuphles saw that it was impossible to defer hostilities any longer. He found that his resources were fearfully inadequate, and that the task which he had undertaken demanded all his firmness and energy. The Exchequer was empty. The shyness or false pride of Alexius and his father had rendered the Crown unpopular. The people were enervated by corruption and ease. All these evils were promptly remedied. The Treasury was replenished with the confiscated property of such as were accused of having amassed fortunes by malversation and other illegal modes during the reign of the Angeli. A new spirit was instilled into the nation by the example and encouragement of Murtzuphles. By his fascinating manners, imperturbable gaiety, and conciliatory tone, the Emperor won the affection and confidence of the

¹ Lebeau (xvii. p. 134).

Greeks. All the available and latent resources of the State were applied to the great work; every one, who was convicted of extortion or malappropriation, was compelled to refund his nefarious gains; all who were capable of bearing arms were required to participate in the defence of the country from the Barbarians of the West; and, under the immediate eye of Ducas who stimulated all by his presence, the Greeks recovered their antient spirit and powers of endurance. In less than two months, their combined exertions wrought the most prodigious results. It was conjectured that the eastern wall of Constantinople, which adjoined the Chrysoceras, and which had suffered most severely during the late siege, would be the point of attack: it was to that point, therefore, that Ducas directed his almost exclusive attention. The wall itself was not only strengthened and repaired, but it was wholly rebuilt in many places, and raised to such a height as to cover the movements of the besieged; and, at regular distances of fifty feet it was flanked by lofty and capacious towers of stone. Between these stone towers, were others constructed in wood, of which several were six stories in height, and none were less than three. Each of these stories became the seat of a numerous garrison, amply furnished with every implement of warfare; to the basement story was attached a drawbridge, which connected it at pleasure with the parapet of the rampart; and midway between each of the wooden towers was planted a mangonel of unusually large calibre, for the

purpose of projecting stones and darts against any convenient point of the enemy's line.¹

The Latins had been equally busy in preparing for action, and in making the necessary dispositions for the renewal of the Siege which was now, in conformity with the original plan of the Doge, to be purely a maritime one. The decks of the vessels were already covered with stores of missiles, and of machines of every size and description for hurling stones or for vomiting combustible matter. It remained only to determine when and where the assault should be opened.

This display of activity and zeal did not prevent the French from continuing to cherish certain misgivings touching the issue of the impending struggle; and at a Council of War, which met to settle all minor details, several of the Barons expressed an opinion that it was both foolish and vain to attempt the reduction of so strong a City with so small a force. It was proper to remember that they had now to deal with a prince who far surpassed the Angeli in talent, in experience, and in energy;² and they observed that, by ravaging the fields, by occupying the environs, by intercepting supplies, they might save a great risk, and secure an easy victory. This argument, however, although by no means without its force, savoured much too strongly of caution to satisfy or please the bold hearts and intrepid spirits in whose estimation want of judgment was preferable, in a high degree, to want of courage, and things nobly lost to things basely won. Besides,

¹ Lebeau (xvii. pp. 134-5).

² Lebeau (xvii. lib. 94, p. 138).

even granting that the course proposed was just and honourable, how could a handful of soldiers hope to reduce by famine a City, which commanded three seas? It was urged, too, by the Doge and his supporters, that their passed reverses had made too vivid and durable an impression on the minds of the Greeks to be removed by a recent change of circumstances. The apathy by which the latter were affected was neither transient nor partial. It was a taint which had been slowly ingrained by time in the national character, and which it was not in one man or in one generation to correct, much less to destroy. Moreover, the death of the Angeli changed the state of parties, and the nature of the question. From the moment of the accession of Murtzuphles to a bloodstained throne, the war might be justly considered as having assumed a different complexion. They had come to restore and uphold an exiled dynasty. They were now called to avenge a murder, perhaps to award a Crown.

The opinions of Dandolo and his partizans ultimately triumphed; and the malcontents, who had been mainly influenced in their judgment by the remaining members of the Cabal, were obliged to give way. By general consent, the assault was fixed for Friday morning, the 9th of April.

But the Latins, assuming that the city was in their power, the empire at their arbitrement, were justly apprehensive lest the undue pretensions of some, the ill-judged precipitation of others, should disturb the harmony which at present subsisted between the

several leaders of the expedition ; and preparatory to resuming the offensive. it was thought desirable to form a general plan for adjusting all claims which might subsequently arise. They resolved accordingly to frame at once a series of conditions, which might regulate the conduct, and restrain the ambition, of all parties. These conditions were to the following purport.¹ 1. The entire booty found in the city was to be collected in one spot, to be determined thereafter ; and no one was, of his accord or by his own authority, to abstract, secrete, or appropriate any portion of such booty. 2. It was to be divided eventually in two equal portions between the French and Venetians ; but the former were to pay at once, out of their share, the residue of the debt due to the Republic. 3. The Venetians were entitled to claim, throughout the empire, the same honours and privileges as they formerly enjoyed in the imperial dominions, both temporal and spiritual ; and they were to be governed by their own laws, both customary and statutory. 4. The choice of a new Emperor was to be intrusted to twelve electors, six French and six Venetian, who should be bound by a solemn oath to nominate from the Army or the Fleet the person, whom they conscientiously judged most capable of restoring in his dominions the purity of the Church and the dignity of the State, and of maintaining there piety toward God, and obedience to the Apostolic See. 5. The nation, which did not give an emperor, had a

¹ Marin (iv. p. 52).

consequent right to nominate a Patriarch of Constantinople. 6. Twelve Commissioners, six French and six Venetian, were to be appointed for the purpose of placing their respective owners in possession of the various provinces and principalities, which would necessarily accrue from the remodelling of the Feudal Tenure after the conquest. 7. In consideration of his high rank and extraordinary merit, the Doge of Venice was to be wholly exempt from the payment of homage for any lands or territories which he might hold in fief of the Byzantine Court. 8. Finally, should it be deemed expedient at a future period to enlarge or modify the foregoing conditions, the Marquis Boniface was to be furnished with authority to form a committee, to consist of himself, the twelve Commissioners for the redistribution of Fiefs, and six additional members eligible by him. Such were the principal articles of the Treaty concluded between Dandolo and the Barons at the Camp of Galata in March, 1204.¹ The instrument having been signed and sealed, the confederates hastened to the execution of their design of storming Constantinople. The final arrangements were completed during the first week in April; the French embarked on Thursday, the 8th of the month; and on the same day, the fleet, having been divided into six squadrons, was ranged at a safe but convenient distance in order of battle along the eastern wall of the Greek capital.

It was no unusual revolution during the middle

¹ Lebeau (xvii. p. 139); Marin (iv. p. 52).

ages, by which a large city was taken by a handful of adventurers, or by which the chief of a band of robbers subverted an antient monarchy, and became the founder of a line of Kings. But in the siege of an almost impregnable fortress, which was said to contain no fewer than 400,000 fighting men, by a force, which now hardly amounted to 19,000, there was something almost unprecedented; and if the besiegers paused to compare the magnitude of their project with the slenderness of their means, they surely had slight reason to feel surprised or disheartened at the failure of their first onset.

The assault, indeed, had begun early on the morning of the 9th. The Latins reposed confidence in their prowess and good fortune. The Greeks principally counted on their local and numerical advantages. The courage of both was sustained by the persuasion, that the justice of their cause and the favour of Heaven were sureties for their success. The former, however, had restricted their operations, in the first instance, to a brisk exchange of volleys with the Batteries. But of this languid and unknighly mode of warfare they quickly grew tired; the depth of water admitted, and their impatience urged, a nearer approach; and the vessels were soon brought by the Venetian pilots in juxtaposition to the foot of the rampart. A few of the foremost now endeavoured to maintain against fearful odds a footing on the parapet overhanging the Gulf; the greater part remained aboard, eager to seize the earliest opportunity of signaling themselves by

some deed of heroism. In the moment of danger, in the tumult of battle, the heart of the warrior was opened and the voice of sectaries was hushed ; and the generous ardour, with which each man bent his bow, or grasped his halberd, indicated his anxiety to preserve an old, or to earn a new, reputation.¹ The collision between the besiegers and the besieged was appalling. Every contrivance, which human art had formed for the extermination of human life, was employed on this memorable occasion with portentous effect. The air rang with the shouts of soldiers, with the blasts of trumpets, with the clash of arms ; and the sky, unless where for a few moments it was illuminated by a living stream of Greek fire, was darkened by the clouds of arrows and the showers of stones, which poured unceasingly over and against the walls. The embattled towers of Constantinople, bristling with steel, and teeming with life, extending full a league along the Golden Horn : on the other hand, the Venetian fleet with its lofty and garrisoned castles and its busy crews covering, in a long and parallel line, the surface of that broad and capacious basin, afforded a spectacle which made many a heart throb with admiration, not unmingled with terror. But after several hours' hard fighting and (considering the fewness of their numbers) great sacrifice of life, the Allies found that they were losing rather than gaining ground. Even the powerful fleet of Venice seemed to dwindle into insignificance before the

¹ Villehardouin.

huge ramparts and colossal walls of Constantinople. The followers of Dandolo, who had been bred to toil and inured to danger, were prompted to own that they had never engaged in so difficult or dubious an enterprise ; and many a gallant soldier, who had conquered with Ziani at Salboro, or who had fought at Jaffa and Tyre, hardly suppressed an uneasy sensation, as he eyed those stupendous fortifications, which appeared to defy alike the Ladder and the Ram. Still, for the most part, such sensations were transient and momentary : and save those few, who still continued to decry the siege of Constantinople as solely undertaken to gratify Venetian ambition and cupidity, and who consequently regarded the slightest reverse, sustained by the Latins, with inward satisfaction and affected despondency, all in that little army were prepared to accept the alternative of victory or death. The Chiefs were at heart equally disposed to run all hazards ; and the old Doge had much difficulty in checking their intemperate zeal. Dandolo advised his companions to act with caution and coolness ; and it was ultimately resolved to direct a temporary suspension of hostilities, in order that they might repair certain oversights in their plan of operations, and collect their breath for a fresh attack. The instructions were accordingly given ; the Latin trumpets sounded a general retreat ; and Murtzuphles, who had watched the progress of events from a scarlet pavilion, pitched on an eminence inside the city, beheld, with delight the retirement of the enemy to their ships.

The Latins, having taken this step, hastened to consider what line of conduct it was best to pursue. In their views a wide discrepancy existed. The Cabal was as averse from the renewal of the siege as it had been from its commencement. Some were inclined, on the other hand, to believe that it was in its discontinuance that their error lay. Others, again, were of opinion, that they ought to reopen the assault, not on the eastern, but on the southern side, of the capital, where the fortifications were known to be out of repair. In the last course there was certainly some reason and truth. But its adoption was quickly found to be impracticable. On reference to the pilots it appeared that the winds and currents, which were then prevailing on the Sea of Marmora, would render it out of their power to hold a fleet at anchor in that Strait; and it was asserted that, if the Chiefs persevered in such a design, the vessels would be infallibly swept by the tide into the Bosphorus.¹ Hereupon the proposed scheme was at once abandoned by the Latins, who finally agreed to alter their tactics without shifting their ground; and as the changes, which they contemplated in the former respect, were not calculated to occupy above two days, they decided on resuming the offensive on Monday morning, the 12th of April.

The confederates had gained from experience two useful lessons. They now perceived how necessary it was to strengthen their position and to economize

¹ Michaud (lib. xi. p. 288).

their strength; and the fewness of their numbers left them no other means of accomplishing this two-fold object but by contracting their line of battle, and by conducting their future operations on a narrower scale. Other changes of some importance were introduced. The vessels of the Fleet, instead of acting singly as on the former occasion, were now linked together in pairs. To each pair was assigned the duty of investing a tower;¹ and prior to the resumption of hostilities, the zeal of the troops was refreshed by a well-timed proclamation, that the first Frenchman and the first Venetian, who should scale the ramparts of Constantinople, would receive, as the meed of valour, a bounty of 100 marks of silver apiece.²

The morning of the 12th of April was rudely heralded by the shrill braying of the trumpets, which announced to the Latins that the day had broken, and that it was time to prepare for action. Several thousand warriors, many of whom might not live to see another sunset, responded cheerfully to the summons; they armed themselves in silence and haste; everything else was in readiness; and shortly after dawn, the Allies moved forward, at a steady pace, to the foot of the walls of Constantinople. They were greeted by a murderous tempest of missiles, which fell with fatal accuracy on the heads of those who sought to distinguish themselves by their valour and zeal. At such a momentous crisis, the Greeks displayed extraordinary courage and energy. A sense

¹ Sismondi (ii. p. 152).

² Michaud (lib. xi. p. 289).

of common danger healed natural infirmities ; a sense of common interests levelled the social distinctions of rank and quality. Peasants and senators were seen fighting side by side. Men forgot their constitutional timidity ; women lost their habitual reserve ; and tender and delicate females, mounting the ramparts, and finding courage in despair, hurled stones and aimed javelins at assailants, from whom they expected no compassion. The Latins behaved with their usual intrepidity and self-possession. By dint of combined hardihood and heroism, they succeeded in repulsing the onsets of the enemy with vigour. A love of fame or a prospect of reward diffused among them an active spirit of emulation ; they fought with admirable valour and discipline ; and their exertions were stimulated by the assurance that the treasures of conquered Byzantium would amply repay their toil, and would fully relieve their necessities. Nor, if the survivors reaped a speedier and more substantial recompense, was the welfare of those who perished in that arduous struggle overlooked. In their latest moments these found every consolation which our imperfect nature can receive or bestow ; and the priest, who administered to the dying soldier the comforts of religion, taught him to embrace the hope of immortality.

It was now on the verge of noon. The contest had lasted fully six hours ; and the Latins had hitherto lost much, and had gained nothing. The deadly and destructive fire of the Byzantine batteries did not abate for a moment ; the besieged continued to ply

the catapults and mangonels with unwearied energy and precision ; and the Barons could not help perceiving that, while the resources of Ducas appeared to be inexhaustible, their own numbers visibly diminished, and their own vigour steadily declined. Men of a sanguine temperament still indulged a hope that, by an auspicious turn of affairs, they might yet retrieve their fortune. But the more common belief was that, unless their prospect speedily improved, recourse must be had soon to that distasteful expedient, which had once already wounded their pride, and that they must seek safety in a second and a final retreat.

When the Latins were almost reduced to this humiliating extremity, a favourable change occurred. The wind veered round unexpectedly to the north ; and a strong gust brought the *Pilgrim* and the *Paradise*, the flagships of the Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, which formed one of the pairs, in close and sudden contact with one of the principal towers of the City. Such an opportunity was not thrown away. Without waiting to receive the word of command, André d'Urboise, a Frenchman, and Pietro Alberti, a Venetian, leaped ashore, scaled the wall, and cleared a path for their comrades, who promptly and ably seconded the gallant attempt. The sudden apparition of D'Urboise and Alberti on the rampart scared the Greeks, who were charged with the defence of that part of the fortifications ; they fled in utter dismay ; and their base desertion of the post of duty left five towers in the hands of their adversaries. The flight

of the imperial troops afforded the assailants a safe and secure footing on the parapet; and three gates, forced by the repeated strokes of the battering ram, admitted a confused throng into the ill-fated Constantinople.

The precincts of the ramparts were found to be entirely abandoned by their recent defenders. The Greeks, turning a deaf ear to the rallying cry of Murtzuphles, had fled in total disorder; and after several attempts to reassure them, the latter was obliged to take refuge in the palace of Bucoleon, where he succeeded in intrenching himself, and in collecting a garrison. The vile cowardice of his followers thoroughly marred the expectations of the Emperor. Yet he was barely justified in hoping for better things from a nation, which knew no medium between the most fanatical enthusiasm and the most abject despondency, and in whose eyes an ordinary French knight was magnified to a giant, and his scanty retinue was multiplied to a host.¹

The success of the Latins was glorious and exhilarating. But the Venetians heard with concern, that the valiant Alberti had fallen in the struggle, not by the hand of a foe, but by that of his partner in danger, André d'Urboise who mistook him, it was said, in the hurry of the moment, for a Greek; and the Doge himself had reason to regret, that one, who had acquitted himself so nobly of his duty, and had deserved so well of the Republic, should have come to so sad

¹ Gibbon (ch. lx. p. 565, ed. Bohn).

and inglorious an end. They were soon drawn from these reflexions by a matter of more vital and momentous importance. It was true that they had effected an entrance into the City. But the narrow streets with their spacious buildings, the large population, and the lateness of the hour, made the Chiefs apprehensive that the approach of darkness might suggest to their enemies the idea of a general massacre. Under this impression, they resolved to pass the night under arms. But their fears were wholly chimerical; they were left in undisturbed possession of their new quarters; and the morning of the 13th of April came to lay at their feet the untold wealth of the palaces and churches of Byzantium.¹

Still the Doge and the Barons felt that they were in a most trying situation. They perceived that they had taken the richest City and the strongest fortress in the world, that they had vanquished a people, reduced by eight centuries of bad government to the lowest degeneracy, and that they had overturned with comparative facility the throne of the Princes who wasted their hours and the public money in the pleasures of the harem and the chase, and who, in the figurative language of an old historian, “cheated time, and offended nature, by rearing flowers in winter, and culling in spring the fruits of the autumn.” They also

¹ That part of the story of the fifth crusade of which the scene was laid at Constantinople, has twice appeared in a dramatic form:—

1. *Isaccio, Tragedia di Francesco Contarini*, Ven. 1615.

2. *Alessio Comneni ossia i Venèziandi a Constantinopoli, Tragedia di Lucio Antonio Balbi*, Ven. 1791.

perceived, that out of this triumph had sprung another duty and another danger: the necessity of protecting the conquered, the risk of losing the conquest. They knew that the moment was at hand, when Constantinople, and all that contained it of beauty, of riches, and of sanctity, would be placed by the rules of war at the mercy of their followers; and they were conscious that it would require all their energy to curb the brutal violence of a profligate and covetous soldiery. The Marquis of Monteferrato was the model of virtue, the Count of Flanders, the mirror of chastity; and they, as well as Dandolo himself, contemplated with feelings of the deepest abhorrence the slightest violation of humanity or decorum. But the temptations were strong and many, while the restraints were few, and those mainly of a moral character. The Chiefs, however, exerted every means in their power of averting, or at least of alleviating, the terrors of a long siege and a hard-won victory. A proclamation was issued, in their name, calling upon the army to spare the helpless and the innocent;¹ and the gates of the city were thrown open by their direction, in order that every chance might be afforded the inhabitants of seeking safety in flight. Several high and wealthy Greek families availed themselves of the opportunity; and during the first night of occupation, while the Latins were wholly bent on consulting their own

¹ A knight, who was convicted of disobedience of this order, and of offering violence to a Greek woman, was hanged by the direction of the Count of Saint-Pol. His fate, no doubt, afforded an instructive example.

security, a large amount of property escaped in this manner through their hands. Among others, the historian Nicetas, trembling for the honour of a pregnant wife and the chastity of an only daughter, owed their common preservation to the dexterous management of a Venetian merchant, his intimate friend who, assuming the garb and air of a French trooper, escorted them through the City and the suburbs, until he thought that they were placed beyond the reach of danger. They were, indeed, often challenged on the way, and sometimes were roughly handled by prowling bands of pillagers, who were attracted by the beauty of the women. But the ready wit of their guide and protector, who pushed the assailants aside with gay petulance, claiming the party as his prisoners of war, overcame every obstacle; and even the soldier, who had turned a deaf ear to every other appeal, failed not to respect the portion of a comrade. The merchant who, in the friend of his youth, had forgotten the enemy of his country, having executed this stratagem, returned to Constantinople. The fugitives proceeded to Selybria, in Thrace, where they fixed their future residence, and where Nicetas employed his leisure in describing, under the influence of impressions by no means favourable to the authors of the recent Revolution, the last days of the Roman empire.

The Latins, while they received the usual licence for rapine, were enjoined under pain of death to deposit the fruits of their pillage in one of three churches,

which were specially set apart for the purpose. This order, though probably not without its effect, was very far from being rigidly observed. In not a few cases the thirst for spoil overruled the fear of punishment. The most precious articles of plunder were also the least bulky. Gems of the choicest water, vases of inestimable value, relics of odorous sanctity, were pilfered from the altars, the reliquaries, or from private dwellings, by rapacious soldiers who sold them at a paltry price; and, although these matchless rarities were recovered, partly by process of exchange, and the ignorance of art, no inconsiderable portion was irretrievably lost. Some, however, found a worthy destination. The proud monuments of human genius, sculptures, paintings, frescoes, mosaics, and minerals, which the industry and taste of ten generations of men had gradually amassed in that City of Cities, were scattered by this great Revolution among the palaces and churches, the castles and abbeys of Western Europe. Many of the Venetian public buildings were decorated with the trophies which fell to the lot of the Republic herself; and Venice accounted no treasures more precious than the four antique bronzes, which were afterward known as the *Horses of Saint Mark*.¹

In a letter, which he addressed to the Pope in the same year, the Count of Flanders asseverated, that “there was more wealth in the Greek capital than in

¹ Cicognara, *I Quattro Cavalli di San Marco*, 1815.

all the rest of Europe together ;” and the Marshal of Champagne has not hesitated to record a conviction that “ since the beginning of the world, never was so much riches seen collected in a single city.” It seems that the property divided between the two nations was computed at 900,000 marks of silver, or 1,800,000*l.* ; and if it be true, as it is stated by Gibbon, that “ the secret far exceeded the acknowledged plunder,” the total might represent a sum of 4,000,000*l.*, or 4,500,000*l.*

The zeal and pertinacity of the Crusaders may help to explain the accumulation of so vast a treasure. Every dwelling was explored by them. Every house was ransacked. Every corner was visited. Even the clergy mixed in the crowd, apprehensive lest the sacred vessels, the vases of gold and silver, and the cups of porphyry, “ should fall into profane hands ;” and little that was costly in Byzantium eluded the eye of cupidity. The Greeks beheld the excesses of their conquerors with mute indignation and sullen despondency ; but the women, trembling at once for their own honour and for the safety of their tender offspring, threw aside their natural coyness, and embracing the knees of the Latins, implored their compassion. The name of Monteferrato, who was allied by marriage with the House of Comnenus, was most familiar to their ears ; they even thought, as they hoped, that he was already their Emperor Elect ; and whenever they came in contact with straggling parties of soldiers, the fair suppliants pressed their crucifixes to their bosoms,

and ejaculated, "Holy marquis-king, have pity on us!"

Murtzuphles had already perceived the futility and danger of a longer stay in the capital, and that Prince, accompanied by his wife Eudocia, had left Constantinople by the Golden Gate. The garrison, which he had planted at the Palace of Bucoleon, surrendered to the first summons; and the edifice was assigned as a temporary residence to the Doge of Venice. The other public buildings were occupied in like manner by the Flemish and French chiefs and their followers, who thus took military possession of the City; and from this moment the Latins became the nominal masters of the Empire, the arbiters of her destiny.

Still, there were not wanting in Constantinople men who fondly believed that the star of Rome had not yet set; and, on the very day of the flight of Murtzuphles, Theodore Lascaris, who had so greatly distinguished himself during the siege by his courage and resolution, was formally declared his successor. Lascaris declined with becoming diffidence the proud title borne by his predecessors, announcing his intention to assume the humbler designation of *Despot*, until he had rescued his new dominions from a foreign yoke. The faintest hope of deliverance from their present situation was apt to force an incredulous smile from the lips of a timid and effeminate auditory. In a few weeks after the occupation of the throne by Lascaris, the Latin Chiefs met in the Palace of Bucoleon, to choose the worthiest among themselves to fill the *vacant* dignity.

The threefold task of completing the conquest, of sacking the city, and of dividing the spoil, had engaged the confederates during the greater part of the month; and the election of a new Emperor (the seventh since the death of Emmanuel Comnenus in 1180) did not take place till the second week in May. The duty of pronouncing a decision between so many noble and distinguished candidates devolved on twelve electors, six of whom were Venetians, six Frenchmen or Lombards. The former were Pantaleone Barbo, Vitali Dandolo (the Doge's brother), Ottone Quirini, Bertucci Contarini, Nicolo Navagiero, and Giovanni Michieli; the latter, whose sacred character would, it was considered, secure an impartial judgment, were the Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, of Bethleem and Halberstadt, the Archbishop of Acre, and the Abbot of Loces.¹ This Conclave having subscribed the oath usually administered on such occasions, withdrew into the Bucoleon Chapel to deliberate. It was natural that so grave a question should give rise to many guesses and conjectures as to the probable result of the conference, and it was to be expected, that each group, which collected on the morning of the 9th of May round the Bucoleon, should adjudge the sceptre by anticipation to the individual, whom it held, from whatever motive, in the highest esteem. Some, indeed, extolled the virtues, and asserted the superior pretensions of a chief or a kinsman; but with very few exceptions, the suffrages of the army and of

¹ Ducange (lib. i. p. 25).

the fleet were divided between the Count of Flanders, the Marquis of Monteferrato, and the Doge of Venice, whose rank and reputation seemed to lift them above all other competitors. Of that illustrious triad, the French exhibited a bias to Baldwin, the Lombards, a predilection for Boniface : while the Venetians expressed, on their part, an honest conviction, that their leader was most worthy to assume the imperial purple. “ That old man,” they exclaimed with pardonable vanity, “ has gained the wisdom and experience of age without losing the vigour and fire of youth ; his sight may be dim ; but his intellect is clear and strong,—it is he who took Constantinople.” The electors appeared to be of the same opinion. The Bishops of Soissons and Troyes, and five of his countrymen, declared for the Doge ; four only were inclined to vote for Baldwin or for Boniface ; and since the supporters of Dandolo formed a majority, they were proposing to make known their decision in his favour, when Pantaleone Barbo, the dissentient Venetian, breaking silence, spoke to the following effect : “ Sage Electors, I observe a strong inclination on your part to confer on our Doge the imperial crown, and I am disposed to join with you in thinking that, even among so many heroes, there is none more worthy of the high dignity, to which you would thus raise him. Yet, at the same time,—which may appear strange to you,—I feel that there are several, whose claim is preferable.” This somewhat contradictory speech excited, in fact, a general murmur of surprise.

“ Listen,” said Barbo in continuation, “ and I would that Dandolo himself were present to hear what I say, so much confidence do I repose in his magnanimity and good sense, that I heartily believe he would echo my sentiments. That empire, which you purpose to restore, is at present encompassed by so many enemies, that it will be impossible to save it from dismemberment and ruin without the aid of a large and powerful marine. It is no exaggeration to say, that the Venetians alone are in a position to furnish that aid. Our Republic took Constantinople: she can protect it. It will be far easier for her to send fleets from her dockyards than for the Count of Flanders or the Marquis of Monteferrato to draw armies from their estates. But, in taking possession of the empire in her own name, our Republic would commit an almost suicidal act. For, leaving out of the question the cabals and dissensions, to which the ambition of reigning would infallibly lead us in the end, how should we provide for the danger and risk, which would arise from the elevation of a fellow-citizen to the throne of Constantinople? Master of the whole of Greece, and of a large portion of the East, clothed with the power and swollen with the pride of sovereignty, will he remain subject to the laws of Venice? Will he not forget his country? Dandolo, from the loftiness of his spirit, and from the nobleness of his heart, would, as I am well assured, be far above such sentiments; but who shall answer for his successors? Who shall persuade us,

that Venice will not be crushed beneath the weight of the empire, that the seat of the Republic will not be transferred to Constantinople, and that our freedom will not be sacrificed? It is amid its native lagoons, that that Power has gradually risen, which now commands the respect of all Europe; detached from the soil which gave it birth, transplanted to the shores of the Bosphorus, it will decline indubitably, it will cease to be what it is. Venice, Queen of the Seas, would be thenceforth little more than a subject town, a dependency of the Greek empire. You may perhaps tell me, that Dandolo and his heirs will no longer, in fact, be Venetians, and that Venice will have the honour of having given masters to Greece. But that, I say, is a condition which Dandolo himself would not accept. More proud of being the first magistrate of a victorious Republic than the sovereign of a vanquished State, he would, if I mistake not, reject such an exchange. Consider again: this election will probably preclude you from achieving the leading object of the undertaking, in which you are engaged. You can hardly fail to recollect the peril, to which the jealousy of the Count of Saint Giles exposed Palestine, at the time, when Godfrey de Bouillon was crowned King of Jerusalem. Raymond, piqued at the preference which had been given to Godfrey, and not satisfied with depriving the latter of his own support, succeeded in drawing the greater part of the other Chiefs in his train; and it is certain that, but for the mercy of God, Jerusalem had been lost. To-day,

it seems to me that we incur a similar danger ; and, if you remain faithful to the oath, which was administered to you on assuming the Cross, you must at once relinquish the idea of nominating our Doge to the vacant throne, and allow your decision to rest between the Count of Flanders and the Marquis Boniface. Those two princes are equally capable, by their prudence and valour, of preserving the conquest of which we share the glory. Only let it be understood, in order that we may prevent the certain and deplorable effects of disunion, that whichever of the two is honoured by your suffrages, shall yield to the other the island and dependencies of Candia, as well as all the territory, which still belongs to the empire beyond the Bosphorus. By this means, you will attach them to each other by the ties of friendship and interest ; otherwise, it is to be apprehended that both will be lost, and with them, the hope of recovering the Holy Land."

The words of Barbo strongly impressed the minds of his colleagues ; his views were adopted ; and, leaving Dandolo out of the question, the electors resumed their deliberations. It remained for them to decide only between Baldwin and Monteferrato. But so equally balanced were the claims and qualifications of those two princes, that the choice appeared, at first, extremely perplexing. Venetian influence, however, ultimately turned the scale. Barbo and his countrymen failed not to perceive on reflexion, that the Italian possessions of Boniface would render him, as Emperor,

a troublesome neighbour and a dangerous enemy, and that, although he professed himself at present the friend of Dandolo and the Republic, other interests might lead him, at a subsequent period, to form other connexions. On the other hand, the Estates of Baldwin were more remote, his ambition less formidable; and the Venetians determined to throw their six votes into the scale in his favour. The Count of Flanders was declared the object of their choice. The decision was notified at midnight to the expectant throng without by Nevelon, Bishop of Soissons; and the stillness of the air was suddenly broken by an universal cry of "Long live the Emperor Baldwin." Dandolo and Boniface hastened to congratulate their noble companion on his good fortune, and to bear a part in the ceremony of raising him on the buckler; his solemn installation took place on the 23rd of May; and after that imposing spectacle, four-and-twenty commissioners, twelve of whom were Venetians, twelve Frenchmen, Lombards, or Flemings, were clothed by the Doge and the Barons with authority to assign to the members of the holy Confederacy the lands, which they and their heirs should hold in fief of Baldwin and his successors. This allotment necessarily proved itself, in many instances, an idle formality. The Byzantine Court still exercised a nominal sovereignty over the whole of Eastern Europe and over a considerable portion of Asia; and the Latins were often put in possession of provinces, of which they had yet to achieve the conquest, and to learn the names. By

virtue of the recent treaty, the Marquis of Monteferrato was invested with the sovereignty of Candia, and of all the territory lying beyond the Bosphorus; the Count of Blois became Duke of Nicæa; Regnier de Trit, Count of Philippopolis; the Count of Perche, Duke of Philadelphia. The Republic of Venice received the Morea, the Illyric Isles, a large portion of Thessaly, the Sporades, the Cyclades, the cities of Adrianople, Trajanople, Didymotichos, and Durazzo, the province of Servia, and the coasts of the Hellespont.¹

Still the Venetians were not quite satisfied with these large acquisitions. The truth was, that they had, from the outset, cast a longing eye on Candia, whose position and resources, while they offered such tempting and important advantages to the members of a trading community, appeared to be thrown away on a Prince, who possessed neither ships nor commerce. Nor was Boniface, on his part, disinclined to enter into negotiations for the transfer of his new possession; and by a treaty concluded on the 12th of August, 1204, the Island was sold to the Venetians for thirty pounds weight of gold.²

The Byzantine Court was remodelled. The offices of the new imperial household were bestowed on the friends or followers of Baldwin; and the nobles of France and Flanders consented to tarnish their bright

¹ Da Canale (sect. 56-7).

² These thirty pounds of gold may be estimated at about 10,800*l.* of our money, adopting at least the comparative valuation of Leber (*Essai*, &c., p. 103).

escutcheons with the empty and fantastic titles, which the pompous effeminacy of the Greeks had brought into fashion. Thierry of Loces was created Grand Seneschal; Conon of Béthune, Protovestiary; Macaire of Saint-Menehou, Grand Cupbearer; Manasses of Lille, Grand Cook; and Villehardouin, in addition to his marshaldom of Champagne, accepted the sonorous designation of *Marshal of Romania*.¹ Nor could the Doge himself refrain from seeking a share in these honours. To the respectable title of Doge of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia, Dandolo added the epithet of *Despot and Lord of One Fourth and One Half of the Romanian Empire*;² and moreover, as an indication that he was second to Baldwin only in rank, the old man claimed the privilege of tingeing his buskins with the imperial purple.

An event of far more genuine importance was the arrival at the Golden Horn of Tommaso, the son of Fiofio Morosini³ who, in pursuance of the Treaty of March, had been chosen by the Venetian Synod Patriarch of Constantinople. Morosini belonged to one of the oldest and the most illustrious families in Venice; he traced his descent in an unbroken line from her thirty-seventh Doge Domenico; and his talents and virtues procured for him universal esteem among his own countrymen. Yet, in holy orders, his present rank was that only of sub-deacon; and before he could assume the pallium, it was absolutely necessary that

¹ Ducange (lib. i. p. 28). ² Gio. Villani (*Cronica*, v. 28 : ed. 1823).

³ Flavius Blondus (*De Gestis Venetorum* : edit. 1481).

he should undergo a triple consecration as deacon, priest, and bishop. But it unfortunately happened that the Court of the Vatican, with whom it rested to grant such a rare indulgence, had been offended at the injudicious omission on the part of his electors to solicit its previous sanction: nor did it appear probable that the difficulty would be easily overcome. For, on hearing of the matter, Innocent expressed, through the mouth of his legate the Cardinal Peter of Capua, his unqualified disapprobation of the course pursued by the Latins, whose conduct he stigmatized as irreverent and uncanonical. He declared that, without his concurrence, the Venetian clergy were not warranted in making the appointment; and he announced that the election of Tommaso Morosini was consequently null. Yet out of a particular regard for the object of their choice, to whose merits he bore willing testimony, and likewise from a strong reluctance to disturb the peace of the Church, the Pontiff consented of his own free will to invest Morosini with the pallium; and he enjoined Baldwin and his subjects to treat him with all the love and reverence due to his high and sacred attributes. This material obstacle having been removed, the new dignitary proceeded to Venice to take final leave of his family; and during his stay in the capital, he received from the Government certain imperative instructions for his guidance in the choice of a successor, as well as in appointments or promotions in the Eastern Church. His successors were to be, without exception, Venetian citizens; and individuals

of Venetian extraction, or such as had naturalized themselves by a residence of ten years,¹ at least, in Venice, were to be alone eligible for preferment. Morosini promised to obey. At the same time he so far reserved to himself a discretionary power as to decline to adopt any course which might be justly construed into disrespect of the legitimate authority of the Holy See.

The triumph of Dandolo and the Republic was still barely complete; the second installation of Baldwin was required to perfect what the first had necessarily left undone; and this Prince who, in the absence of a Patriarch, had received the diadem from the Papal Legate, was once more conducted in state to the Cathedral of Saint Sophia, where he was anointed and crowned by the Patriarch Morosini.

But it was not to be expected that the French clergy would regard with complacency the growth in the East of a theocracy so exclusively Venetian; and the exaltation of Morosini, together with the severe restrictions which the Republic imposed on his authority, had raised in their minds the strongest feeling of jealousy. They loudly contended that the election of the Patriarch was wholly irregular; they said that the Venetian synod had no independent right to make the nomination; and they appealed from its decision to his Holiness.

After the fall of Constantinople, the Crusaders had hastened to make pacific overtures to the Court of

¹ *Vitæ Pontificum Romanorum*, fol. 543-4; Ap. Murat. iii.

Rome from which, by repeated acts of contumacy, they had estranged themselves more and more since the autumn of 1202. In language courteous and respectful, yet from its firm tone easily recognisable as the composition of Dandolo, they explained the various causes which had led them to change their original plan of operations, and to deviate so far from the line of conduct which they had not promised merely but proposed to pursue. In justification of the enterprise against Zara, they argued the right of the Republic to subjugate her own dependency; as an excuse for engaging in the siege of Constantinople, they hesitated not to plead the nature of the object which they sought to attain, and the character of the enemy whom they found it necessary to oppose. It was unfair to take exception to the exercise of legitimate authority in suppressing the revolt of an insolent and too powerful fief; and surely much was to be forgiven to those who had at once punished the assassin Murtzuphles, and had rooted out the heresy of Photius. Toward the French, whom he regarded as the dupes, rather than as the accomplices of the Republic, the Pope was inclined to be lenient. In their disobedience he had found the former more tractable; in their contrition he chose to think them more sincere; and so far as they were concerned, he was content to receive the foregoing explanation as an apology for the past, and as a pledge of future submission. But the Republic was less easily pardoned. The Court of the Vatican had always regarded the Venetians with a feeling of sus-

picion and dislike; of late they had rendered themselves peculiarly obnoxious; and Innocent, to whom the unruly arrogance of the islanders and the unbending nature of Dandolo were galling in the last degree, would have gladly imposed on them some penalty which, even though it might not be commensurate with the heinousness of their offence, would at least help to console his wounded pride. But, at the same time, Innocent was not unmindful of the stubborn temper of the people with whom he was dealing: he was aware that they had already set at nought the authority of his predecessors; he had reason to apprehend that they might without much additional provocation defy his own; and his Holiness decided that it was better to receive the penitent culprits back within the sacred pale than to force them to extremities.

Indeed, on the whole, recent events had disposed the Apostolic See to view the policy of Venice in a somewhat more favourable light than before; the restorers of the papal supremacy reconciled Innocent in some measure to the conquerors of Zara and Constantinople; and his Holiness took no notice of the protest of the French ecclesiastics against the elevation of a Venetian sub-deacon to the patriarchal chair beyond the despatch of the Cardinal of Saint Susanna with instructions to pacify the malcontents, to conjure them in his name not to endanger, by any ill-timed and unseemly dissensions, the peace of the Church, and to impress upon them that on mature reflexion his

Holiness saw no ground for interfering in the election of Morosini.

The Confederates, having completed their various dispositions in the course of the summer, spent the autumn of 1204 in excursions either of a foraging or exploratory character to the Provinces. But the winter necessarily suspended all operations; and during the cold season, the Latins indulged in the comfort and luxurious repose of the Eastern capital, while they awaited the reinforcements and supplies, which the Emperor was led to expect from Armenia. These reinforcements promised to place Baldwin in a position to achieve without risk the conquests, which he had in contemplation. But the impulsive nature of the Belgian prince chafed at so long a delay; and having received a small contingent from Nicomedia in the middle of March, 1205, he set out from the capital on the 26th of the month, reaching Adrianople on the 29th. Three days afterward (April 1) he was joined by Dandolo and all the Venetian troops, whose arrival doubled his numbers. Their combined attempt to take Adrianople, which adhered to the party of Theodore Lascaris, proved itself, however, unavailing; the lofty ramparts and large garrison of that once imperial City defied their utmost prowess and skill; and a report soon reached them that John, King of Bulgaria, had already advanced with a powerful army within two leagues of the place to raise the siege and cut off the besiegers. The flying squadrons of light cavalry, which now began to sweep the plain in front of

Adrianople, verified this startling news ; and the scouts brought word to the Latins that these troops formed part of an auxiliary force of Coman skirmishers, whom the Bulgarian prince had sent forward to reconnoitre the Camp of the Crusaders, to intercept stragglers, and to endeavour, by petty acts of annoyance, to entice Baldwin from his intrenched position. The Comans, whose force was estimated at about 14,000, were mounted on fleet steeds, and were armed with bows and lances, which they used on horseback with admirable ease and dexterity. In attack, they were far inferior to the Greek phalanx or the French battalion: their excellence lay in retreat, when the unerring sureness of their aim and the marvellous rapidity of their evolutions enabled them to inflict injury without receiving any, and to achieve a victory without risking an engagement.

The approach of the Comans within bowshot of their lines, the proximity of the main army, and the obstinate resistance of the Adrianopolitans, excited in the breasts of the Latins a painful and conflicting sensation ; their impatience made them pant for action, their weakness made them pause at the first step ; and during several days they watched the movements of their new foes with involuntary forbearance. But the taunts and gesticulations of those savage horsemen failed not to produce, in due time, the effect which the latter expected and desired ; every one soon grew eager to chastise the insolence of the barbarians ; even the Doge appeared to be in favour

of the proposition, as well as in ignorance of the risk which it involved; and on the 14th April it was decided that, while Dandolo, the Marshal of Champagne, and Manasses de l'Isle, remained with a reserve of troops in charge of the camp and siege-works, the rest should proceed to repulse the enemy.

The Comans awaited not the onset of the Latins. On the contrary, the advance of the latter seemed to form the signal for a general retreat; and Baldwin, deceived by the artful feint, was tempted to engage in a reckless pursuit. The barbarians fled, and the Crusaders followed closely in their track, fully two leagues; and neither drew rein until they came within a short distance of the spot where John had disposed his forces in order of battle. The Comans then wheeled round with the rapidity of lightning, and turned short on their pursuers, who found to their extreme dismay, that they had been lured into a snare. The Latins imagined that they were already on the point of victory, when they were oppressed by a host; the whole Bulgarian army was upon them; and they could choose only between utter annihilation and a precipitate retreat. They were sufficiently collected to adopt the latter alternative.

Meanwhile Dandolo, with Villehardouin and De l'Isle, were anxiously expecting the return of their comrades; and the old man was in his tent, speculating on the fate of the adventurers, when the Marshal, who was the first to learn from the foremost stragglers the unwelcome tidings, brought word to his

Serenity that the army was 'totally routed, that the Emperor was taken prisoner, and that the Count of Blois had fallen in the struggle. The announcement fell like a thunderbolt upon the Doge. It was clear that the danger was still imminent. Those who had managed to escape from the hands of the Bulgarians, and to regain the camp, concurred in a report that the King was advancing by forced marches on Adrianople; and the other chiefs joined with Dandolo in thinking that as all hope of reducing that place to submission, or of checking the progress of John, was now at an end, the only course which lay open to them was to remain under arms till dusk, and then to retrace their steps with all practicable celerity and secrecy to Constantinople.

In the face of a hundred obstacles and dangers this plan was executed; and after a rapid and toilsome journey of four days, the Doge and his companions reached their destination, prostrated by fatigue. Their dejected appearance, and the sad intelligence of which they were the bearers, overwhelmed all with astonishment and grief. The arrival of the Bulgarians was to be hourly expected; and, so far from being in a position to hinder their progress, there seemed to be no possibility even of barring their entry into Constantinople. No news came of Baldwin. The Count of Blois was dead. The flower of French and Flemish chivalry had been mowed down in that terrible retreat. With a very few exceptions, the neighbouring cities were occupied by the supporters of Lascaris. The

whole surrounding country was infested by the Comans; and the Latins learned that, in one of their excursions, those intrepid and indefatigable horsemen had intercepted, and destroyed to a man, the Armenian contingent, on whose succour they counted so much. Their numbers were scanty, yet provisions were scarce; and, while their expectations were not unpromising, their available resources were slender in the extreme; and it was to be anticipated that several months would elapse, before their appeals to the Courts of France and the Vatican for aid against the Bulgarians could be answered.

It might seem difficult to swell this dismal catalogue of misfortunes. Yet, in fact, the cruelest blow was in store; and in the hour of their extreme need, his colleagues were doomed to lose one who had been chiefly instrumental in conducting the enterprise so far to a successful termination, and whom, in spite of his feeble sight and of his growing infirmities, they still deemed most able to extricate them from their present dilemma. On the 14th of June, after a short illness, the Doge of Venice breathed his last at the Palace of Bucoleon. His complaint, which was dysentery, had been aggravated by the pressure of mental anxiety, and by the thought so mortifying to him, that an undertaking which had cost himself and the Republic so much labour and outlay, and from which they had augured the most favourable results, was destined, in all appearance at least, to end so ingloriously.¹

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 193).

The remains of the Hero were interred with imperial pomp in the crypts of Saint Sophia; and all who followed his hearse offered to his grave the tribute of a tear. The ashes of Dandolo, together with his armour, which was laid in the same vault, were suffered to remain untouched and unviolated till the middle of the fifteenth century: the sanctity of their repose was disturbed only by the conversion of Saint Sophia into a mosque during the reign of Mohammed II. But Gentili Bellini, the Venetian painter, who was held at that time in high estimation at the Porte, was so fortunate as to obtain from his august patron the helmet, the cuirass, and the sword which the Doge had worn at the taking of Constantinople in 1204; and the favourite of the Sultan felt a proud satisfaction in presenting to the Dandoli of San Luca these precious memorials of their great ancestor.¹

Dandolo is said to have been of lofty stature and of a ruddy complexion; his features, cast in a large and fine mould, were handsome and regular; his eyes are described as blue; and it seems probable that in early life his look had been keen, his expression of countenance singularly prepossessing. Even in his declining years, when his sight was dim, and his brow, furrowed with wrinkles, bore the impress of age, he still preserved a more than ordinary share of his youthful

¹ The subjoined *operette* have been published on the exploits of the hero:—

1. *I tre primi canti del Dandolo*. Ven. 1594.

2. *Enrico, ovvero Bisantio acquistato*. Ven. 1635.

3. *Enrico Dandolo: Tre canti di G. Piermartini*. Ven. 1844.

comeliness, and there still remained in the Ambassador of Sicily and the Conqueror of Constantinople some faint traces of what Dandolo had once been.

It was the fortune of Dandolo to die at a juncture when the position of the Latins was most critical. The Bulgarians were at the very gates of Constantinople, and seemed to be merely awaiting the signal for opening the assault; the Crusaders were destitute of resources, crippled in strength, and on the brink of despair. Such was their despondency that they already dreaded the vengeance of the conqueror. But John, on his part, was happily ignorant of their weakness, and at the same time distrustful of his own strength. On the approach of a warmer season, the Comans had left the royal camp and retired northward, unable to withstand the oppressive heat of a Grecian summer; and the monarch, having thus lost this valuable contingent, which formed the flower of the Bulgarian army, determined to abandon the siege of Constantinople, and to turn his arms against the new King of Thessalonica.

The Republic, on her part, was no loser by the recent change. She acquired thereby glory and renown, population and territory; it yielded scope to her commerce, and expanded her feudal dominion; and the fall of Constantinople planted the standard of Saint Mark on almost every maritime city and seaport town from Lido to Durazzo, and from Durazzo to the Golden Horn. A fourth of the imperial capital was set apart as a quarter where the Venetians might

reside under the government of their own laws and the protection of their own magistrates; the coins, weights, and measures of Venice were recognised throughout the Greek realm; and the merchants of the Republic were invited to resume the privileges and immunities which had been secured to them by the treaty of November, 1198. The Doge was, in future, to be represented at Constantinople by a *Bailo* or *Podesta*, who might act as a general Intendant of the legal and commercial interests of his country in the East; and on the demise of the late Doge, the members of the Venetian Factory at once chose in this capacity the patrician Marino Zeno, whom Dandolo had valued as a friend, and whom the Republic respected as the friend of Dandolo. The Venetian Government signified its approval of the selection; and, at the same time, three Councillors of State, a Treasurer, an Avogador (advocate), a Court of *Proprio*, a Court of Justice of the Peace, and, lastly, a *Constable*, or Commandant of the troops of the Republic in Romania, were despatched to assist or control Zeno in the exercise of his high and onerous functions.

CHAPTER X.

A.D. 1205-1249.

Pietro Ziani, Doge (1205-29)—The Consequences of the Fall of Constantinople—The Treatment of their new Conquests by the Venetians—The Revolts of Candia—The Affairs of Constantinople—War with Padua (1214)—The Famous Debate in the Great Council respecting the Transfer of the Seat of the Republic to Constantinople (1222)—Abdication of Ziani (1229)—His Character—The Correctors of the Ducal Promission—Giacomo Tiepolo, Doge (1229-49)—Fresh Disturbances in Candia (1241-66)—The Affairs of Constantinople resumed—Victories of the Venetians over the Greeks and Bulgarians—Deplorable State of the Lower Empire—Pawn of the Crown of Thorns (1237)—Its Redemption by Saint Louis—The Affairs of Italy—Frederic II. at Venice—The Campaigns of 1236 and 1237—Execution of Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's Son, by order of the Emperor—The Vengeance of the Republic—Siege and Fall of Ferrara (1240)—Hostile Attitude of Frederic toward the Venetians—Revolts at Pola and Zara at his Instigation—Their Suppression—Abdication and Death of Tiepolo (1249)—His Character and Legal Reforms—The Statute—The Promissione del Maleficio—The Nautical Capitulary.

THE memory of Dandolo was dear to a State of which his genius had long been justly considered the brightest ornament; and the intelligence of his death, which reached Venice on the 22nd of July, 1205,¹ diffused through the City a profound sensation of sorrow. The Republic was not insensible of the claim which that great man had acquired to her gratitude and love.²

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi.); Cigogna (*Iscrizioni Veneziane*, iv. 528).

² The house of San Luca, on the Canal di Qua, which was formerly inhabited by the heroic Doge Arrigo, and which was standing so late as 1781, no longer exists; and some modern buildings between the Casa Loredano and the Casa Bembo, are supposed to occupy the site.

The Venetians felt that the exploits of those brave and illustrious soldiers who had conducted so great and arduous an enterprise to a successful and happy termination, ought to leave some deep and enduring traces behind them, and that the story of the Fifth Crusade, which redounded so much to the glory of their country, ought to be handed down from generation to generation; and they naturally grew anxious to confide the fame of Dandolo, which they wisely identified with the national fame, to safer keeping than the imperfect and fading traditions of human memory. The revival of art and literature in the close of the thirteenth century, afforded the Republic an opportunity of carrying her wishes into effect. By slow degrees, the deeds of a less polished and of a less enlightened age were committed to writing and transferred to canvas; and on the walls of the Great Council Chamber, the gifted pencils of the Great Masters recorded in imperishable characters the mighty things which had been done in former days by the followers of the Doge Dandolo.

By the decease of his father, the functions of the Vice-Doge Reniero were brought to a term, and it became necessary to consider the question of electing a new Doge. It is natural to imagine that many were secretly inclined to vote for Reniero himself, who had now held the reins of government nearly three years. But the law of Flabenigo, which had been enacted in 1033 as a curb on the ambitious pretensions of the House of Orseolo, distinctly prohibited

the *direct* succession of the son to the throne of his father; and the late Doge's son was obliged to give way to a candidate whose claim, though of slighter foundation perhaps, was of older date. The suffrages of the forty electors, of whom Reniero was one, fell on Pietro Ziani, Count of Arbo, the eldest son of the former Doge Sebastiano, and at this period the wealthiest nobleman in Venice.¹ The succession of Ziani was proclaimed by the Procurator at the great altar of Saint Mark, on the 5th of August, 1205.²

The early youth of Ziani had been chiefly passed in Armenia, which was during some time the principal residence of his father Sebastiano;³ but on the elevation of the latter in 1173 to the Venetian throne, the son fixed his abode at Castello. In 1174, he divided with Marco Giustiniani the command of the Venetian troops before the walls of Ancona. Three years later (1177) he appeared⁴ as one of the four-and-thirty captains, who served under his father's banner at Salboro, where Prince Otho was so thoroughly discomfited by the Venetians; and, not long afterward, he acted as chief of the deputation which was chosen to invite Frederic Barbarossa to the Congress of Rialto. Between the years 1177 and 1201 Ziani exercised, first at Padua and subsequently at Arbo,⁵ the high and

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. 198); Dolfino, *Annali*, p. 33 (King's MSS. 149).

² Dandolo (lib. x. p. 333); Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 535).

³ Filiasi (*Ricerche Storiche*, p. 137).

⁴ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 301).

⁵ P. Giustiniani, *Chron. di Venetia*, p. 63 (King's MSS. 148).

responsible office of Podesta; and on the accession of Reniero Dandolo to his vicarious office he was appointed one of the Privy Council, in which capacity he continued to act till his election as Count of Arbo. The private character of Dandolo's successor was immaculate; his public life afforded a gratifying retrospect of upward of thirty years spent in the political and diplomatic service of the State. As a naval commander, as an ambassador, as a magistrate, Ziani had always acquitted himself efficiently and honourably: he was now summoned from Arbo by the voice of the nation¹ to undertake a still higher and a still more responsible duty, to assume the supreme direction of affairs at a period, when his country found itself placed by events of recent occurrence in a situation peculiarly anomalous and perplexing. The squadron, which was sent to Arbo to fetch Ziani, was composed of thirty galleys, of which the sides were covered with silk taffeta drapery.²

The subjugation of Constantinople had marked, in truth, a new era in the Venetian Annals. The Republic was no longer the same Venice, which Cassiodorus knew, or which in the ninth century had withstood with such wonderful spirit and success the extravagant pretensions of King Pepin. In the memorable days of Sebastiano Ziani, the Island-City had certainly attained a high degree of prosperity; her population then exceeded 65,000; her commerce had then received a stimulus and development, which the

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 191).

² *Da Canale* (sect. 63).

most sanguine and far-sighted contemporaries of the great Orseolo would have scarcely treated as possible; her Marine was, even at that period, the most powerful in Europe;¹ and her nobility was perhaps, as a class, not only the most opulent, but likewise the most polished and enlightened in the civilized world. Yet it is to be apprehended that the first Ziani would hardly have hazarded a prediction that, in six-and-twenty years after the visit of the Pontiff Alexander, his Commune would possess, by the undisputed right of conquest, the fairest portion of the Lower empire, and exercise at least a nominal sovereignty over some millions of souls. Still, surprising as the rapidity of the progress might appear, such was the reality; and the question whether by the utmost prudence and valour the Republic would be able to preserve for any length of time her new acquisitions, was one which engaged at present a very inconsiderable share of public attention. The leading topic of discourse on the Rialto, and the leading theme of debate in the Legislature, was the occupation of the conquests; and the main impediment to the attainment of such an object, was the financial embarrassment arising from the heavy expenses of the last war. But this difficulty was removed by contracting a fresh loan on the security of the Customs; the subscriptions were completed with a promptitude and facility, which indicated no want of capital in certain quarters; and, the neces-

¹ Formaleoni (*Saggio sulla Nautica Antica de' Veneziani*, 1783); Filiasi (*Ricerche Storico Critiche sull' Antica Marina de' Veneziani*, 1803).

sary funds having been thus raised on the public credit,¹ the Government despatched to the Mediterranean, in the course of 1207, a squadron of one-and-thirty galleys under the joint orders of Reniero Dandolo, the late Vice-Doge, and Ruggiero Premarino.² On their passage to the Ionian Isles, to which the commanders decided on directing their course, they fell in with Leone Vetrano, a Genoese corsair, who had long infested those waters, where he rendered himself terrible by the depredations and cruelties, which he committed on weak and timorous traders. On the present occasion, Vetrano had no fewer than nine privateers serving under his banner.³ His resistance was consequently manful and obstinate. But it was vain. The Genoese were constrained, after a sharp struggle, to strike their colours; and having achieved this exploit, Dandolo and his colleague pursued their course without interruption, ultimately reaching Corfu, where they planted a garrison and hanged Vetrano.⁴ Thence they proceeded successively to Coron and Modon in the Morea, where they hoisted the Venetian flag; and from Modon they pointed their prows toward Candia. The government of Corfu was vested in the hands of a *Bailo*, assisted by a board of ten Commissioners. The name of the first Bailo was Jacopo Dolfino. Each commissioner received as an inducement to settle in the island a free and liberal

¹ Romanin (ii. p. 195).

² *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 188); Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, 64).

³ Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 65, 66).

⁴ *Ibid.* (sect. 67).

assignment of land from the home government, on the simple understanding that he was liable, as a vassal of the Republic, to do service in the field at the shortest notice with twenty knights and forty esquires, and to pay an annual tribute of trifling amount to the Ducal Fisc.¹

The policy observed by Venice toward Corfu differed in some degree from that which she pursued in regard to the rest of her dependencies. In the latter cases, free leave was given to all Venetian subjects to conquer and colonize. Wisely conscious of her inability to constitute her recent acquisitions into an integral portion of her dominions, or into more than a feudal appanage, the mother-country reserved to herself, at present, merely the duty of protection and the right of suzerainty. Many wealthy or adventurous members of the Venetian nobility availed themselves, without loss of time, of the permission thus accorded. Andrea and Hieronimo,² the two sons of Marco Ghisi,³ did homage for Tinos, Mycone, and Scyros. Marco Sanudo, a nephew of the great Dandolo,⁴ and himself a scion of one of the most antient families in the Republic, acquired, in like manner, Paros, Antiparos, Naxos, Melos, and Nysos. Under similar circumstances, Andros was occupied by Marino Dandolo of San Tommaso. Ceos and Gallipoli were enfeoffed, the former to Pietro Giustiani and Domenigo

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 335); Marin (iv. 84).

² Dolfino, *Annali*, 33 (King's MSS. 149). ³ Ducange (lib. ii. p. 98).

⁴ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 547). Marco's father had married the Doge's sister.

Michieli, the latter to Marco Dandolo and Jacopo Viaro, jointly.¹ Jacopo Barozzi obtained Santorino, Marco Veniero, Cerigo. Anaphi fell to the lot of Leonardo Foscolo, Lampsacus, to that of Jacopo, the son of Pietro, Quirini.² All these feudal possessions were erected into duchies, with the single exception of Lemnos, assigned to Philocolo Navagiero with the imposing title of grand-duke, in consideration of certain services of an important character, which that nobleman had rendered to the Byzantine Court.³ At the same time, several of the great vassals within the old frontiers of the empire of Constantinople concurred in tendering their allegiance to the Republic; and the Prince of Achaia, the Count Palatine of Zante, the Despot of Argos and Corinth, and the Grand Feudatory of Negropont, afforded a substantial token of their fidelity in an agreement to remit an annual tribute to the Venetian treasury.⁴

These various dispositions had been completed with comparative facility: for both the Ionian group and those islands, which were scattered along the shores of the Morea, were too feeble to offer a protracted resistance to their new masters. But the reduction of Candia, placed, shortly after its transfer to the Republic, under the nominal government of Marco Sanudo, Prince of Naxos and Duke of the Archipelago, was a work, which presented infinitely greater

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, 33 (King's MSS. 149); Lebeau (lib. xcvi. p. 274).

² Romanin (ii. p. 183).

³ Ducange, *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ The tribute of the Feudatory of Negropont was fixed at 2,000 *perperi* a year, and a robe of cloth of gold to the Doge. See Marin (iv. p. 83).

labour and complication. In Candia, the whole of the upper class, and indeed the whole of the landed interest, were naturally disaffected to the Venetian dominion, which, as they foresaw, would not only operate to the prejudice of their dignity and importance, but would materially injure their feudal and agricultural prospects. They were filled with a just apprehension, that the Venetians would at once usurp all seigniorial rights, and would gradually supplant them in all their positions of honour and trust. They gloomily prophesied that they would be constrained to lay at the feet of foreign masters the fruits of a soil, unequalled throughout the world for its richness and fertility ; and they asked whether, for a people once accustomed to the enjoyment of a large share of liberty and independence, such a prospect was not painful to contemplate—whether such a yoke would not be hard to bear? The most distinguished of these malcontents were Agios Stefanitos, a member of a family of high consideration in Candia, and Arrigo Pescatore, titular Count of Malta, the latter of whom, holding, at present, by seigniorial right, no fewer than fourteen Castles and strongholds in the island,¹ was peculiarly vehement in his opposition to the new Government. Pescatore could hardly entertain a hope, that when the Republic had obtained a firm footing in Candia, he would be suffered to retain his extensive possessions ; such an obviously impolitic

¹ *Cronaca Altinate*, lib. vi. p. 194 ; Dandolo (lib. x. p. 336) ; Dolfino, *Annali*, 37 (King's MSS. 149).

step was hardly characteristic of her government ; and, on the other hand, he was perfectly conscious that, in resisting the Venetian arms, he would throw himself into collision with a mighty antagonist. Ultimately convinced that it would be simple madness to plunge into a single-handed contest with the Republic, he decided on seeking external support ; and the Count of Malta knew that he would be nowhere so welcome as at Genoa. The Genoese, indeed, lent a favourable ear to his solicitations ; with their aid, he succeeded in exciting a powerful insurrection among his adherents and tenantry against the Venetian governor ; and Marco Sanudo, having at present no regular troops at his disposal, was under the necessity of summoning to his assistance the Mediterranean squadron under the command of Dandolo and Premarino. The admirals responded with promptitude to so urgent a call ; by their powerful interposition the revolt of the Candiots was speedily suppressed ; and Pescatore, completely baffled in his object, was obliged to provide for his personal safety by a precipitate flight from the Island. But the prospect of tranquillity, which his defeat had naturally afforded, was deceptive. In a short time Stefanitos who, in the absence of the Count of Malta, became the leader of the Cretan Opposition, collected a numerous body of troops, and attacked Sanudo. The inconsiderable force, which the Republic was maintaining in the Island, was unable to offer an effectual resistance to the insurgents ; the castles of Temado and Mirabello were successively

taken by assault; and the Governor was ultimately compelled to have recourse once more to the Mediterranean squadron. The presence of the admirals had, as before, the speedy effect of coercing the rebels, and of restoring the authority of the Government. But this desirable result was not attained without a severe sacrifice: inasmuch as it cost the life of Dandolo himself who, as he was leading his troops to the attack in person, received an arrow in his breast, and fell mortally wounded. The remains of the hero were interred in the vaults of the church of San Giorgio di Candia (1209).¹ He was the second member of his great House who, within the short period of four years, had left his ashes among strangers.²

Shortly before the death of Dandolo, however, the marked and violent repugnance which the Candiots exhibited to bow to the Venetian yoke, had rendered it a question whether it would not be expedient to disarm their resistance and minimize the probability of future insurrections by dismantling the forts which had belonged to Henry the Fisherman, as well as all the other strongholds in the island. It was conceived in some quarters that by this expedient a few regular troops might easily overawe the native population, and thus supersede the necessity for the constant presence of a naval force on the Cretan station. The plan proposed, while it was advocated by a certain party,

¹ Flaminio Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, ii. 225).

² Dandolo (lib. x. p. 336); Muratori (vii. p. 133); Diedo (lib. v. p. 82); Romanin (ii. 195).

was opposed by many, and by none more warmly or stoutly than by Reniero Dandolo, who had communicated to the Executive at home his views on the subject with a manly boldness and freedom not unworthy of his father Arrigo. The admiral expressed his decided and unqualified disapprobation of the course which his country was about to pursue. He earnestly deprecated the adoption of the measure which he believed to be contemplated. He represented that the military stations in Candia, of which some wished to witness the demolition, would be of far greater utility to the regular forces of the Republic than to the undisciplined troops of the Insurgents; and he concluded by an intimation that, should his country be disinclined to bear the cost of maintaining those stations, he was prepared to defray it out of his own private resources. So sensible and generous a proposition, coming from such a source, had considerable weight with those to whom it was addressed. The offer of Reniero was rejected, but his advice was suffered to prevail.¹

Yet, while the Venetian Government consented to abandon their half-formed design of levelling the fortifications of Candia, they grew stronger in their determination to adopt some effectual means of quelling the mutinous disposition of the Candiots. This important question was brought before the Legislative Body, for the first time, at the sitting of the 15th September, 1211; but no arrangements of a final character were

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 335); Lebeau (lib. xcvi. p. 274).

made till the 20th of February in the following year. A resolution was then formed to resort to a general system of colonization as the sole practicable remedy for the evil, and thus to impart to the Venetian Element in Candia both social and political preponderance. That resolution was at once embodied in an Act of Settlement. With the exception of a small portion adjacent to the coast, which the Republic reserved to herself as the property of the Commune, and of another, which was allotted to the native proprietors, the whole island was now divided into 537¹ fiefs, of which 132 were designated *Cavallerie* (or knights' fees), the remaining 405, *Fanterie*.² The former were assigned exclusively to emigrants of the equestrian order and their families; the latter to burghers, or, as they were termed in Venice, *Cittadini*.³ Each tenant in fee of a Cavalleria was bound to hold himself in constant readiness with horses and esquires to do service in the field. The *Pedoni*, or proprietors of the *Fanteries*, were also liable to perform military duty; but their obligations in this respect differed both in their nature and extent from those which were imposed on the greater feudatories.

Thus the Republic hastened to lay the foundation in Candia, or, at least, in COLONIA VENETORUM, of a feudal system, with its prominent and characteristic feature of tenure by knight-service. The system was

¹ Filiasi (*Ricerche*, 71-2).

² Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, part iv. p. 251); Marin (iv. p. 80).

³ "Herein they followed the Roman usage of dividing the colonial territory between knights and plebeians."—Filiasi, (*Rich. Stor. ubi suprâ.*)

one which was by no means unknown to the Islanders themselves, although indeed in the case of the Parent City, it wore a shape and was presented under an aspect better suited to the peculiar chorography and constitution of Venice.

As a fair equivalent for the cost of emigration, which had, in many instances, been exceedingly heavy, the settlers were permitted by the Government to hold their lands on a free tenure for four years, within which space it was reasonable to conclude that they would recover their outlay, and bring the soil under general culture. In the fifth and all succeeding years in perpetuity, the Colony was to be required to pay a tribute to the Ducal Fisc of 2,000 *perperi*; and it was distinctly provided that all advantages which might arise from the discovery of gold or silver mines within the Venetian frontier were to be transferred without reserve to the Commune. In regard to the descent of property, a law was enacted which prescribed that, where there was a legitimate heir, he should succeed on the demise of the actual tenant in the usual course, and that where there was no such heir, or where he was still a minor, it was competent for the Legislative Body either to nominate a new feudatory, or to appoint a tenant during the period of minority. But under no circumstances was a bequest or conveyance of property to be sanctioned which had the effect of alienating any portion of *Colonia Venetorum* from the Republic. Moreover, the emigrants were enjoined to make no truce or treaty

with any Power, foreign or domestic, without the full concurrence of the Doge; to afford succour and protection to all Venetian traders and travellers who might henceforward touch at the Island or pass through it, and to hold them, so far as they might be able, harmless; to facilitate the commercial intercourse of their country with her Colony; and to consult at all times the interest and welfare of the Republic. They were exhorted to bear in mind that her allies were their allies, and that her enemies were their enemies.¹

Independently of its feudal divisions, Colonia Venetorum formed in itself, like the Parent City, six Wards or *sestieri*; for each Ward was elected a *Captain*; and these six captains composed the Privy Council of the Venetian Governor of Candia.²

Such was the act of the Great Council, by which the dominion of the antient island of Crete was transferred to Venice, and which certainly seemed to realise the worst apprehensions of the native proprietors. Yet surely the Candiots were, in some measure, to blame. Surely they could not fail to perceive that the restless and turbulent character of Pescatore and Stefanitos had powerfully contributed in bringing the country to this extremity: nor had the Republic taken the decisive step without grave and mature consideration. The plan originally adopted for the government of Candia had been altogether different in its character; it was only after seven years of severe provocation that

¹ Navagiero, fol. 988.² Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, lib. x. p. 186).

she had resorted to the colonizing system, and that her Government had enacted the sweeping measure, by which a large proportion of the Cretan feudatories were dispossessed of their lands.

The government of Candia under the early Venetian domination was of a mixed character: yet the Venetian element greatly preponderated. The doors of the Colonial Legislature were thrown open, indeed, to the native proprietors in common with the members of the Settlement. But all the higher and more responsible offices connected with the administration were filled by the latter; the Candiots were merely employed in subordinate capacities; and there were some functionaries, such as the Treasurer and the Public Prosecutors, whose appointment the Doge retained in his own hands.¹

Shortly after the foundation of *Colonia Venetorum*, Marco Sanudo was replaced by Giacomo Tiepolo who, a few years before, had been sent to relieve Marino Zeno in the onerous functions of Podestà of Constantinople. Tiepolo was recommended to the appointment by his tried abilities, and by his high legal attainments. In his hands it was hoped that the affairs of Candia would prosper.

On his expulsion from Candia, the Count of Malta had sought an asylum at Genoa. That State, thwarted in her recent attempt to acquire possession of the Island under the pretext of affording succour to Pescatore, harboured a feeling of the deadliest animosity

¹ Marin (iv. p. 83).

against the Venetians; to the jealous enmity, which had always subsisted between the two Powers, was now added the sharp sting of wounded pride and foiled ambition; and Henry consequently experienced slight difficulty in prevailing on those to whom he addressed himself, to lend him their aid in recovering his possessions. In conformity with its resolution to afford him such support, the Government of Genoa organized a squadron of thirty galleys, of which the destination was Candia. The expedition was accompanied by the Count of Malta.

These hostile movements did not long remain concealed from the Venetian Executive. It was soon known to Ziani and his advisers, that a fleet had left Genoa for the Mediterranean ostensibly with the simple object of reinstating Henry the Fisherman in his feudal rights, but with an ulterior intention of appropriating the Island. They felt, therefore, that no time was to be lost in warding off the danger, which threatened *Colonia Venetorum*; but the difficulty, in which they found themselves, rendered such a task one of no ordinary magnitude. Owing partly to the necessity which had lately arisen of maintaining small fleets in several distinct quarters for the protection of commerce, and partly to the practice of amalgamating the navy with the merchant service, the resources of the Arsenal were seldom equal to any sudden exigency. At the present moment the vessels, available for immediate use, were nine only in number. To wait, however, till others could be recalled, was clearly out

of the question ; and it was too late to communicate either with the Admiral on the Mediterranean Station, or with the armed cruisers, which were lying off the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. Under these circumstances, the Venetian Government decided on completing the equipment of nine carricks, which happened to be in an advanced stage of preparation, and on placing them under the charge of a naval officer of courage and ability, Giovanni Trevisano, who received instructions to press all sail for the Mediterranean, and at every risk to intercept the enemy, before they reached their destination.

The Republic could hardly have confided her honour to safer keeping. It was near the heights of Trapani, on the Sicilian coast, that the admiral descried the object of his search. The disparity between his own numbers and those of the Genoese was great indeed. The risk was tremendous. Yet the signal for attack was given without hesitation and obeyed without fear. The enemy sustained, in this trying moment, their reputation for bravery and skill, and during some time they maintained the contest, in which they had engaged under such favourable auspices, firmly and equally. But the extraordinary pertinacity of the Islanders, who seemed to be gifted with superhuman energy, soon proved itself irresistible. The efforts of their antagonists were gradually relaxed in a perceptible degree. Their apparent inability to hold their ground much longer inspired the Venetians with fresh ardour. The latter redoubled their exertions ; and

the intrepid Trevisano, recovering at last one of his carricks, which he had lost almost at the outset, directed a general attack against the Genoese line, broke it, drove the enemy before him, pursued them to the coast of Africa, gave them battle twice more on two succeeding days, and finally secured four-and-twenty prizes. The vanquished returned home with six ships only;¹ their arrival, and the intelligence of which they were the bearers, produced at Genoa the greatest terror. To effect a reconciliation with the victors appeared to be the only chance of safety which that Power possessed; and one of her subjects, Fra Girolamo of Viterbo, was charged with the task of opening the necessary negotiations. The Venetians, on their part, were too fully occupied by their recent acquisitions in the East to spurn these overtures; and a treaty was signed in the Ducal Palace at Rialto, of which the leading stipulation was, that Genoa should make good the losses, which the piracies of one of her great feudatories, Alemanno, Count of Syracuse, had inflicted on Venetian commerce.² The amount of this indemnification was fixed at six thousand *perperi*.

The Battle of Trapani, which Trevisano had won under such great disadvantages, probably saved Colonia Venetorum from falling into the power of the Genoese.

¹ Johannes Trithemius (*Cronicon Genuense*) attributes the defeat of the Genoese, in this and other instances, to their faulty method of naval discipline. He insinuates that his countrymen employed land-lubbers, instead of seamen, like the Venetians. Trithemius wrote in the latter part of the thirteenth century. He was Archbishop of Genoa in 1292.

² Da Canale (sect. 71).

But, at the same time, it kindled a fire in the bosom of the vanquished, which might sometimes smoulder and sometimes burn low, yet which was never extinguished, while Genoa remained a nation.

After the exchange of the ratifications, the usual intimation was made of the fact by the Government of the Republic to the Podesta of Constantinople, the Duke of Candia, the Bailo of Syria, and all the Venetian consuls or vice-consuls in the Levant, who were strictly charged to hold the provisions of the treaty in respect; and, at the same time, the other contracting party issued a similar circular to all the authorities throughout the Genoese dominions.¹

But the success of the Republic was hardly yet complete: for the Count of Malta, whose influence made him a formidable antagonist, still remained in the field. It was true that his old confederates, the Genoese, had been disabled from extending to him their protection, or from furnishing him any assistance in regaining his property. But, independently of them, Pescatore was quite in a position to render himself exceedingly troublesome by fomenting fresh dissensions among the Candiots. Under such circumstances, Ziani and his advisers acted with admirable judgment and tact. Flattering overtures were addressed to the Count. He was invited to come to Venice. He was invested with the rights of citizenship. The daughter of Giacomo Baseio, Podesta of Chioggia, was given in marriage to his nephew, with

¹ Marin (iv. p. 196).

a dowry of 15,000 *perperi*.¹ By such blandishments Venice disarmed an enemy, with whom violent measures were calculated to be less successful.

Subsequently to its formal partition by the Latins in 1204, the condition and aspect of the Byzantine empire had undergone several material changes. Two men, whose brows were once circled by an imperial rigol, had found an ignominious fate. One, the elder Alexius who, in the hopelessness of success, had sought an asylum shortly before the fall of Constantinople at Zagora on the Euxine, was now a close prisoner in a monastery in Asia; and the wretched Murtzuphles, betrayed by those in whom he reposed his confidence, and dragged from his place of concealment, had been precipitated by the victors, as the just penalty of his crimes, from the summit of a lofty pillar in the Forum of Taurus.² Theodore Lascaris was more fortunate. After a short retirement to Anatolia, that prince succeeded with the help of the Sultan of Iconium (Konieh) in uniting under his rule the territory lying between the banks of the Mæander and the suburbs of the capital.³ With the title of Duke of Trebizond, a son of Emmanuel Comnenus, a grandson of the tyrant Andronicus, reigned from Sinope to the Phasis. Michael, an illegitimate scion of the same House, established himself in Epirus,

¹ Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 544).

² One of the squares of Constantinople. *Cronaca Altinate*, vi. p. 193.

³ Ducange (*Constantinople sous les Empereurs Français*, lib. ii.); *Fragmenti di testi Arabi sulla Storia di Sicilia Musulmana*, trad. da Amari, p. 31 (*Arch. Stor. Italiano*, iv.)

Ætolia, and Thessaly. In Thessalonica (Saloniki), an Italian marquis held sway with a royal title; and, on his death in 1207, Boniface of Monteferrato was succeeded by his son Demetrius.¹ Greece appeared, in truth, to be to the first comer, and the fairest jewels had already been plucked from her brow. The Morea was in the hands of strangers. Leo Sgueros, a Peloponnesian nobleman, was paramount in Argos and Corinth. Attica and Bœotia were occupied by Otho de la Roche, a Burgundian. Achaia had fallen to the lot of a Champagnese. A Genoese pirate was Governor of Syracuse. A wealthy gentleman of Verona was grand feudatory of Chalcis, or Negropont.² The Ionian Isles were parcelled out into fiefs among a crowd of foreign adventurers. Corfu was in the hands of a Venetian garrison. Zante and Cephalonia belonged to the Count-Palatine of Zante, a vassal of the Republic; and two Venetian patricians, Marco Dandolo and Jacopo Viaro, held joint possession of Gallipoli, twelve miles distant from the Capital.

In the Annals of the Latin dynasty of Constantinople, the reign of Baldwin I. of Flanders occupies a very brief space. In the year immediately succeeding his election (1206) that virtuous and unfortunate prince fell into the hands of John, King of Bulgaria, who cast him into a dungeon. The royal captive enjoyed an opportunity indeed of regaining his liberty.

¹ B. de S. Giorgio (*Historia Montisferrati, ad an. 1207*).

² 1209—March. Concessione in feudo, con varie condizioni dell' Isola di Negroponte nella persona di Messer Ravano delle Carceri Veronese, fatta da Pietro Ziani, Doge di Venezia.—*Arch. Stor. Ital.* ix. App. 378.

The Queen importuned him with amorous solicitations, smitten by the manly beauty of his person. She pressed him to fly with her, and to abandon *that miserable empire of Constantinople* to the vain ambition of her barbaric spouse. But, in the trying hour of adversity, Baldwin remained true to the austere maxims of morality by which he had been guided through life, and he rejected the overtures of his fair tempter with firmness and scorn. The refusal of the Emperor awakened the fiercest passions in the bosom of the Queen. The object of her resentment was immediately denounced to the King as the author of a base attempt on her virtue; and the imaginary wrong was expiated by a cruel and lingering death. Thus, at the age of thirty-six, perished a prince who, as Count of Flanders and Hainault, had raised by his rare virtues the highest expectations: who had gone far to realise such expectations by the conspicuous and brilliant share which he bore in the late war: and who had sunk to an early and obscure grave a year only after his attainment of an object to which, even in his wildest reveries of ambition, he had probably never ventured to aspire. Baldwin I. was succeeded by his brother Henry of Flanders who, by the justice and liberality which he exhibited in his civil administration, as well as by his soldierlike qualities, secured to himself an honourable reign of ten years (1206-16).

The public life of Henry was very far from being spent in a state of luxurious or ignoble repose: on the

contrary, it afforded a constant scene of external warfare and domestic contention. Like the mythic warriors of Cadmus, the enemies of his crown appeared to rise up against him on every side; the indefatigable Emperor was always at the head of his troops, repulsing an incursion of the Turks or Bulgarians, or chastising some refractory and contumacious feudatory; and subsequently to his election, the brother of Baldwin rarely found leisure to assume the royal insignia.

Yet when the struggle which it cost Henry during the greater part of his reign to preserve his throne, is compared with the polemical disputes and theological controversies which scandalized the metropolis of the East in the same period,¹ the former sinks into insignificance. Since the abjuration of the Photian heresy, the Court of Rome had never ceased to urge the adoption of the Latin ritual by the clergy of Constantinople. But the latter, who, as a body, viewed in reality with extreme dissatisfaction the close of the old schism and the reconciliation with the Apostolic See, declared themselves strongly opposed to such a measure. The matter soon reached a climax. The papal legate, Pelagius, Bishop of Alba, attempted to enforce the obnoxious ritual on the people. The Greeks rose in revolt; and Henry thought it prudent to avoid a crisis by closing every place of Christian worship throughout the capital and its suburbs. This violent and unpopular remedy threatened to produce

¹ Ducange (*Hist. de Const.* lib. ii.)

effects infinitely worse than the evil itself: it became manifest that a domestic revolution would ensue, unless the Emperor rescinded his edict; and Henry was reluctantly obliged to bow before the storm.

Another cause of disagreement between State and Church lay in the payment of tithes. Very few members of the Eastern communion were exactly acquainted with the nature of their obligations in this respect. The Venetians, on their part, solved the difficulty by ignoring the claim altogether; and Innocent felt that it was out of his power to enforce it. The Republic was even inclined to the opinion that she ought to insist on a rigid adherence to the rule, that Venetian subjects only should be eligible for preferment to other benefices in the Eastern Church. But the Patriarch Morosini was disposed to consult in this particular the general wishes and feelings¹ of the Latin clergy, and the Venetian Government found it necessary, in many cases, to forego the invidious privilege. In fact, on the demise of Morosini himself in 1211, although the names of no fewer than three Venetian churchmen² were submitted to his Holiness by the Synod of Constantinople, the Pope set them all aside on the plea of unfitness, while he conferred the vacant pallium on a Tuscan. These and other points of difference agitated Constantinople during the reign of the Emperor Henry; and they were only imperfectly adjusted by a Concordat

¹ Ducange, *ubi suprâ*.

² The Dean of Saint Sophia, the Curé of Saint Paul's (of Venice), and the Archbishop of Heraclea.

(1209), in which the rights of the Church were acknowledged and restored, in which the abbeys and monasteries attached to the Greek communion were emancipated from temporal jurisdiction, and by which the payment to the clergy of fifteenths was established on a tolerably regular footing.

Henry died in 1216 without issue, and in the direct course of descent the crown belonged to his sister Yolande, a clever woman endowed with masculine energy. The provisions of the Salic Law precluding Yolande from the succession in her own person, she was forced to content herself with ascending the throne in the right of her husband, Peter Courtenay, Count of Namur, whom the Barons of Romania consented to invest with the imperial title. In the course of his journey through Epirus to take possession of his new honours, the Emperor, however, fell into the hands of Theodore Comnenus, Despot of that province, who cast him into prison ; and this unfortunate prince was released from his captivity only by a timely death. His gifted wife, who had reached Constantinople by another route, undertook the regency in his absence ; she dropped a tear over his fate without resigning her vicarious functions ; and, on her decease in 1219, she left the crown to her eldest son, Philip of Namur.¹ But the latter judiciously declined to exchange his broad acres on the banks of the Meuse for the skeleton

¹ Despatch of Giacomo Tiepolo, Bailo of Constantinople, to the Doge Pietro Ziani, dated 10th December, 1219, preserved by Romanin (vol. ii. *Documenti*).

of a distant empire. His younger brother was less wise; and the throne of Constantinople was occupied by Robert Courtenay from 1219 to 1228, in which year that weak and pusillanimous prince died in the Morea on his return from Rome, where he had vainly supplicated the Pontiff Honorius to afford him assistance and protection against his enemies.

The fact was that the power of the Baldwins and the Courtenays was, to a large extent, purely ostensible. The real master of Constantinople, during the first quarter of the thirteenth century, was the Venetian Podesta, who was entitled the Governor of One Fourth and One Half the Empire of Romania. This high and important functionary, who was selected by the Great Council from its own members, enjoyed¹ the privilege of wearing the crimson buskins in common with the Emperor himself, and was assisted, like the Doge, by a Privy Council in whose name he acted, and without whose sanction his acts were not strictly valid. The staff under his charge consisted of a Council of State, a Court of *Giudice della Pace*, a Court or Magistracy *Del Proprio*, a Public Prosecutor (*Avogador*), a Treasurer, a *Proveditor of the Sea* (whose commission was to assume the command of any naval forces, which the Republic might find it necessary to maintain on that station), and a military officer, who bore the title of Constable. The emoluments of the Governor were probably considerable. From the Jews of Mitatus alone he received a tribute of 52 *perperi* a year in

¹ Filiasi (*Ricerche*, 64).

money and kind ; and the colony at Mitatus also presented a purse of 10 *perperi* to every new Governor on his entry into office.¹

It was the province of the Podesta to exercise a general supervision over the Venetian Factory, of whose welfare and interests he was considered as especially the guardian and protector. All the Baili, consuls, and vice-consuls in Syria, Egypt, Persia, and the Levant, were amenable to his jurisdiction.² With him they communicated on all details connected with the discharge of their functions. To him they referred in cases of dilemma or emergency. Any vexed point of equity which might arise, any questions of a civil or criminal nature, on which the judicial bench was unable to pronounce a verdict, and, finally, any suits or litigations, which presented features of intricacy or peculiarity of circumstance, were submitted for his decision ; and from him the only appeal was to the Legislature of the mother-country. Moreover, in any matters of a weighty character or of general bearing, the Latin Emperor seldom omitted to consult the Venetian Podesta, and rarely failed to adopt his advice ; and as the power of the Courtenays declined, the Podesta acquired the habit of concluding with foreign princes treaties affecting the commercial and political interests of the Republic in the name of the Doge. No ordinary judgment and care were requisite in selecting an officer, in whose hands was vested such vast authority. It seemed to be necessary that the Venetian Podesta

¹ Filiasi (*Ricerche*, 65).

² Marin (iv. ch. 9).

of Constantinople should enjoy the entire confidence of those who were intrusted to his charge, or who acted under him in a subordinate capacity ; it was unquestionably necessary, that he should possess talents of the first order, that he should be acquainted with the maritime laws of Venice, and should be familiar with the leading provisions of the *Consolato del Mare*.

The year 1214 was long remembered in Italy as a year of jubilee in celebration of the general peace,¹ which happily prevailed at that epoch ; and in all the principal cities of the Peninsula the auspicious occasion was commemorated by fêtes and galas of every kind. The grandest spectacle was presented at Treviso, where tournaments, games, manly sports, sham-fights, and mimic representations were held ; and it was to Treviso therefore that the nobles and gentry of Venice and Padua came for the most part with their mistresses and serving-men to make trial of their knighthood, and to win favour in the eyes of those they loved best. The whole scene was overflowing with life, gaiety, and pleasure. By general assent, the leading attraction in these festivities was the Mock-Siege, which was formed on the Square of Spineda.² On this spot was erected

¹ Da Canale (sect. 72).

² *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 196). The three following works relate to this jubilee :—

1. Il Castello d'Amore, Festa Trivigiana ; Stanze di Don Giuseppe Gobbato, Arciprete di Postioma : Treviso, 1830, 12°.

2. Il Castello d'Amore, Novella del Secolo XIII. di C. F. Balbi, Nobile Veneziano : Padova, 1841, 8°.

3. El Castel d'Amor, festa Trevisana fata el secondo di del Pentecoste l'anno 1214, poemeto vernacolo (da Silvestro Zara) : Treviso, 1846, 8°.

a huge castle with its portcullis, its battlements, and its turrets; the Castle was called the *Castle of Love*; and it was garrisoned with the most beautiful ladies that could be found in all Treviso. The besiegers formed three companies. There was the Venetian Company, the Paduan Company, and the Trevisan Company. The ladies of the Castle of Love were the umpires of the exciting contest; and in such eyes each of the Companies naturally strove to perform the greatest feats of prowess. After a long trial of skill and strength the Venetians obtained the mastery; the guerdon of valour was awarded to them; and the Lion of Saint Mark was hoisted, as a sign of victory, on the highest tower of the Spineda. The Venetians were transported at their good fortune; and they did not care to conceal their intense gratification. Their exuberant spirits only increased the chagrin of their rivals, who maliciously attributed their triumph to unfair influences. "The Venetians," they said, "had gained the day by the presents, which they were known to have distributed with so lavish a hand among the ladies in the Castle;" and some of the Paduans, in a fit of childish and fretful passion, forced their way into the Spineda, and, snatching the Venetian banner from the hands of the ensign, tore it to ribands.¹ The victors were generous enough to leave this gross affront unchastised. But the authors of the outrage were not yet satisfied. In concert with the Trevisans, who readily extended to them their sym-

¹ Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 72-5); Dandolo (lib. x. p. 338).

pathy and support, the Paduans attempted to surprise the Venetian Fortress of Bebe, on the Brenta, which they selected as the nearest and most exposed point of attack.

The Doge, having received early intelligence of these movements at Treviso, and having learned the intentions of the disappointed competitors at the Siege of the Castle of Love, took prompt steps to strengthen the threatened position; and a considerable reinforcement of troops was despatched to Bebe under the orders of Marco Zorzano.¹ Zorzano, however, was not able during any length of time to maintain his ground against the greatly superior numbers of the Allies; and it was becoming more and more probable that he would be compelled, after all, to abandon the place, when his apprehensions were unexpectedly removed by the arrival (22nd October, 1215²) of a strong body of Chioggians under the orders of their own Podesta, Giacomo Baseio. The latter was not acting under any instructions from the Government; but, understanding the distressed situation of the Commander at Bebe, he had called out the Militia on his own responsibility, and had marched to his relief. With the assistance of Baseio, the enemy was speedily routed and put to flight, with a loss of four hundred in prisoners of rank alone.³ When the messenger came from the field of battle with the joyful tidings, he was immediately ushered

¹ Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 73).

² Dandolo (lib. x. p. 339).

³ Da Canale (sect. 75).

into the presence of the Doge. Ziani was perfectly wild with delight. He took off the rich mantle which covered his own shoulders, and threw it upon those of the courier; and, putting his hands into his pockets, he gave the lucky fellow more silver pieces than he could have earned in half a year.¹ After some difficulty and delay, a truce of five years was separately concluded between the Republic and the municipal authorities of Padua and of Treviso. The captives were subsequently liberated without ransom.

“When the Paduans,” writes an antient Chronicler,² “who were routed in front of the Tower of Bebe, returned to Padua, they assembled in council, and one of them said: ‘Signors, we have committed an outrage, inasmuch as on account of this Tower we have made war against the Venetians; and you know that the Venetians are men of so much prowess and ingenuity, that their tower would not have been taken or demolished by all those of Lombardy; and I will tell you why. In the first place, came against us the Chioggians, who dug a foss and filled it with water, and then followed the mariners of Venice, who brought the ropes and cordage of their ships, and enveloped the tower in such manner that no stone from an engine could do otherwise than recoil back on the Tower. And afterward Monsignor the Doge came, and reconnoitred, and then returned, and left his Captain in charge. And when all was ready, they began the assault, and the end was, that we were discomfited;

¹ Da Canale (sect. 76).

² Ibid. (*Cronaca Veneta*; sect. 77).

and very glad indeed were those whom the Venetians *deigned* to take prisoners, because otherwise they would have been drowned in the moat. As for ourselves, we were saved only by the fleetness of our horses.' "

The patriotic zeal of the Chioggians was not left unrequited. The Doge accorded to them the privilege of electing thenceforward their own podesta, and they were relieved from the annual poll-tax of three hens,¹ which they had been accustomed, from a period immemorial, to remit to the Ducal Fisc. The first Podesta of Chioggia, who was chosen in virtue of the new franchise by his own townsmen, succeeded Giacomo Baseio in 1218: his name was Marino Jacobe. Jacobe's successor in the magistracy was that Pantaleone Barbo, to whose powerful declamation it is said to have been owing, that the Doge Dandolo was not raised in 1204 to the imperial throne.²

It was not till a century later that Caorlo, Malamocco, Poveja, Pelestrina, and other Venetian towns, acquired to the full extent the franchise, which was granted in 1214 to the Chioggians.

The Tribuneship, which was, with the exception of the consular dignity, the oldest of Venetian institutions, had now become almost effete. It was to a small portion only of the attributes of the antient Gastaldi that the Podesta, or Mayor, succeeded. The jurisdiction of the latter, though sufficiently ample,

¹ Da Canale (sect. 74); Dandolo (lib. x. p. 339).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 538).

was local and temporary ; and its limits were defined with a precision to which the legislators of an earlier epoch were strangers. His prerogatives were circumscribed by a class of check, which was hardly known before the Era of the Lombard League. The Podesta was merely a municipal magistrate. The Gastaldo of the sixth and seventh centuries had been clothed with powers not much inferior to those of the Doge himself. To have conferred upon Marino Jacobo a moiety of the authority which belonged, by sufferance rather than by right, to the hereditary Tribunes of Malamocco and Equilo, would have rendered the Promise a dead letter, and have destroyed the balance of the Constitution.

The severest shock of earthquake of which the Venetian records speak, was one which was felt in 1221. The subterraneous convulsion shook from its foundations a large portion of the metropolis ; and the two islets of Amiano and Costanziaco, which had formed with others the earliest settlements of the Altinese in the fifth century, disappeared for ever from the surface of the earth ! It is not strange that such repeated misfortunes should have awakened the worst apprehensions in the breast of the Venetians, and that men should have begun to ask themselves, what prospect they could have of founding on a site so entirely at the mercy of the elements, a great and enduring empire !

Pietro Ziani lived to witness a fresh outburst of popular feeling in Candia which, partly from the

commercial and political monopoly which the Republic sought to establish in the Island, had become, under her domination, a hotbed of faction, and a nursery of turbulent agitators. The new movement was also instigated by Agios Stefanitos; and it was believed that, although the Emperor of Nicæa refrained on obvious grounds from lending its author any active support or open encouragement, it was secretly countenanced by John Vataces. The spirit of disaffection spread with rapidity; the ranks of Stefanitos filled fast; and Giacomo Tiepolo, who still retained the government of Candia, feeling himself unequal to the task of opposing the Rebels single-handed, applied for succour to his predecessor Marco Sanudo, Duke of the Archipelago, who was at present residing on his newly acquired property at Naxos. Sanudo responded with alacrity to the call; the aid required was promptly rendered; and the insurgents were already beginning to waver, when the Duke, taking umbrage from the supercilious air of Tiepolo, suddenly withdrew his support, and joined the ranks of the enemy. The result of Sanudo's defection was to be foreseen. The hopes of the Candiots revived under their new leader; they speedily recovered their lost ground; and the Governor was at last compelled to take refuge in his palace, whence he effected his escape shortly afterward in woman's clothes to the neighbouring castle of Temado.¹

But Tiepolo's despatch, apprising the Venetian

¹ Dolfino, *Annali*, 39 (King's MSS. 149).

Government of the posture of affairs in Candia, had, in the meantime, reached its destination ; and a large body of troops was at once sent to reduce the insurgents to submission, and to extricate the Governor from his perilous and unpleasant situation. The arrival of these reinforcements, which were under the joint command of Marco Quirini and Sebastiano Botanico,¹ restored tranquillity for a short space ; Sanudo and the Naxiots were forced to re-embark in precipitate haste, and Tiepolo was reinstated in his authority. But the courage of the Rebels was far from being quelled. Stefanitos still maintained an attitude of defiance ; and the troops of the Republic suffered severely before peace was thoroughly re-established. The late insurrectionary movement had proceeded from a general scarcity,² which prevailed in Candia at that juncture, as well as from the restless discontent with which the Candiots naturally viewed the plantation of a Colony of foreigners in the heart of their country. Tiepolo, whose conduct in this affair might have somewhat dissatisfied his employers, received shortly afterward an order of recal. Paolo Quirini was despatched to Candia in his stead. After the lapse of eighteen months or two years, Quirini in his turn was replaced by Guido Michieli ;³ and, indeed, about this period a general rule seems to have been established, by which a new Governor was sent out to Colonia Venetorum every second or third year.

¹ Romanin (ii. p. 197).

² Navagiero (*Storia Veneziana*, p. 999).

³ F. Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, ii. pp. 184-6).

The principles of Venetian colonization breathed a mercantile rather than a political spirit. The Republic regarded her colonies not so much as independent offshoots from the parent stock, as branch trading establishments. At an epoch when communication between distant points was neither speedy nor frequent, such establishments became of material utility. They were the schools in which the sons of the Nobles, after deriving the first rudiments of their education from domestic or academical tuition, learned practical lessons of commercial and political economy. There was no transfusing or assimilating element. The line of demarcation, which the Venetian settlement originally received, was preserved uneffaced. Intermarriages between the emigrants and the families of the country were always discountenanced, and sometimes prohibited. There was no naturalization. If the Republic formed a colony at Limoges, at Canea, or at Acre, the simple consequences were, that Limoges acquired its *Rue Venicienne*, Canea its *Colonia Venetorum*, and Acre its *Venetian Quarter*. But at a mile or two from Limoges, or at an equal distance from Canea and Acre, the Frenchman, the Candiot, and the Syrian, looked upon the Venetian cosmopolite as a person of a different race, of a different language, perhaps of a different religion.

Such a system presented more than one grave drawback. The settlers unavoidably laboured under many civil disabilities; but they fully participated in all civil obligations with the parishioners of Rialto, or with the

burghers of Chioggia. Geographically, and for all political purposes, they were removed perhaps a thousand miles from the Lagoon ; but in the contemplation of the fiscal laws they formed with the population of Venice one people. They had no constitution, and few municipal privileges. Their revenue was paid into the Ducal Treasury. Their treasurer was appointed by the Doge. Their Bailo, or Podesta, was sent from Venice, took his orders from the Home Government, and was recalled at the pleasure of his Serenity. All their other public functionaries, their Bench, their Advocate, their Court of Proprio, were similarly nominated, and were liable to be similarly displaced. In the declaration of a war they had no voice ; but from contributing their quota to its expenses they were by no means exempt.

In the meantime, the recollection of the earthquake of 1221 was still perfectly fresh in the public mind, and the wide points of inquiry which had been raised by that catastrophe were at present occupying a large share of attention in many influential quarters. It was shortly after the second revolt of Agios Stefanitos, and during the deplorable reign of Robert Courtenay (1222), that the Doge Ziani, having on one occasion invited the principal men in Venice to the palace, solicited them to give their earnest attention to a question on which he wished to seek their advice, and which he had been for some time revolving in his own mind. It appeared that it was nothing less than the transfer of the seat of the Republic from Venice to

Constantinople;¹ and the Assembly was naturally taken by surprise. Ziani represented, in support of his views, the great disproportion which existed between the mother-country and her new colonies; he cited the frequent revolts of Candia, the spirit of disaffection to the Venetians which reigned in the island, and the precarious tenure by which they held Colonia Vene-torum at the present hour. He ventured to foretell that the reverses which they had experienced in Candia would befall them, sooner or later, in their other dependencies. He drew their attention to the feebleness of the Latin dynasty, in which the seeds of decay had already begun to manifest themselves, to the imbecile character of Robert Courtenay, and to the unprotected situation of their mercantile emporia in the Levant. On the other hand, he enumerated the various and manifold advantages which would accrue from the proposed translation; and when the Doge had thus prepared the more thinking portion of his future auditory for the important measure which he was contemplating, and had taken their sense thereon, he convened the Great Council, where he opened a discussion on the subject.²

The Doge commenced by pointing out the value of the establishments which the Republic possessed at

¹ Marin (iv. lib. i.); Salverte (*Civilisation, Venise*, pp. 64-6), with the authorities quoted by him. Temanza (*Antica pianta di Venezia*, Appen-dice) prints the passage from the MS. Chronicle of Daniel Barbaro, termed by Foscarini (p. 189) "l'esattissimo Barbaro."

² Cigogna (*Iscr.* iv. p. 552).

present in the Levant, the strength and fertility of Corfu, the extent and advantageous situation of Candia. He pictured all the coast of Greece, the principal islands of the Archipelago, subject to the Venetian domination : those which remained, too glad to range themselves, should an opportunity be afforded, beneath the standard of Saint Mark. At the extremity of that Archipelago, he spoke of a proud and populous City, built on two seas. There existed not in the world a choicer or more attractive site. It was there that, with all the wants of life in plenty, they could live in perfect security ; it was there that, by an easy communication with the Colonies, they would be in a position to afford them assistance, or, if it became necessary, to seek it at their hands. These Colonies, besides, which were now ever rising in revolt against a country situated at the bottom of the Gulf of Adria, would, he felt assured, obey without a murmur that country when she had become, by the occupation of Constantinople, the mistress of the commerce of Europe and Asia.

“ It is my wish that you may be enabled to repulse your neighbours, to keep your subjects under proper control ; it is my wish that by commerce you may aggrandize and enrich yourselves. But how can you enjoy the fruit of your prosperity in these morasses, where you are destitute of all the necessaries of life ; where, at the ebb of the tide, the air is impregnated with poisonous vapours ; where those same waters threaten you, in their rising, with floods ? It is

but a little while since (alluding to the earthquake of 1221) that they submerged the two islands of Amiano and Costanziaco. It is well known that they have already destroyed Malamocco (1106), and that you were compelled to abandon it. Your dykes overthrown every year by the tempest, your islands laid under water, your harbours blocked up with sand, all these are symptoms that, sooner or later, these lagoons will fall a prey to the sea; and even if you are disposed to think that this danger is less imminent than I imagine, is there not another of which you have had such repeated forewarnings? It is in vain that you endeavour to settle on a shifting sand; the earthquakes, which visit you periodically, overturn your habitations. You have established yourselves on a soil against which all the elements seem to conspire: surely such a soil can never form the seat of a powerful empire. It is in your power now to exchange these arid shores, this tempestuous sea, these pestiferous swamps, for the finest and most enchanting site in the universe, where you can easily keep at a distance the Pisans and the Genoese, where you may hold sway over the islands of the Archipelago, over the whole of Greece, and over the coasts of Asia, and where you may command, against all rivals, the commerce of the world."

With these words the Doge descended from the tribune, amid a profound and impressive silence. But soon a general murmur, pervading the Hall, seemed to indicate that there was some diversity of opinion on

the subject under debate. Yet the rank and character of Ziani entitled his views to respect and attention; arguments, however specious and unsound, coming from such a high quarter, naturally carried weight with them; and a certain proportion of the Great Council seemed to be inclining to an adoption of the plan which he had proposed and advocated, when a venerable personage, Angelo Faliero, ex-procurator of Saint Mark, rose, and addressed the Legislative Body to the following effect:—

“Whatever repugnance I may naturally feel,” said Faliero, “to contradict the views of the Prince to whom I owe obedience and respect, I do so, on the present occasion, with less diffidence, inasmuch as I feel that I am about to plead before you the cause of my country. I should account myself, indeed, guilty of ingratitude toward her, toward that native land where my progenitors have always been held in honour, and where I myself have been bred, educated, and raised to high trusts, if I now consented to abandon her, and to go in quest of other advantages which are reported to be awaiting us in a distant and foreign country. And what is the value of those advantages, in reality? A purer air, a more pleasing site, a more fertile soil, a more extensive commerce, it is said, an ampler dominion. Ah! when the inhabitants of Padua first sought an asylum in the Lagoons, they were only too thankful that these shores were barren, uncultivated, deserted, that they were in the midst of the waters. If they had been rich, fertile, and populous,

our forefathers would not have found there a secure shelter; our Republic, our country, would not now exist. We should be, on the contrary, the subjects of one of the petty princes of Italy: nor should we be now considering whether it is expedient to forsake our Common Mother, that we may seek a new empire in the East. Did our ancestors think of quitting their lagoons when they found that they no longer needed an asylum? No. In grateful recollection of the benefits which they had received from them, they naturalized themselves on these shores; and during 800 years have they not laboured incessantly to fortify themselves against their enemies and against the elements? They have built up here sumptuous edifices; they have collected all the necessaries of life in this spot; they have erected temples, and those temples they have decorated with the trophies of their victories. We reproach our native land with its insalubrity: yet—blind that we are—we forget that the most terrible diseases and epidemics come from the East, whither they would have us go. We complain of the sterility of our soil, as if anything was wanting to our necessities, to our caprices! As if the waters, by which we are surrounded, did not afford us abundance of nourishment, and an unfailing source of industry and wealth! They speak of earthquakes. What country, I wish to know, is more exposed to them than Constantinople? They speak to us of safety and of riches. Is it not here that you have found your safety; is it not here that you have

acquired those riches which now make you ambitious? They speak also of Colonies. And from whom, I inquire, have you taken the greater part of those which you possess now? Did you not take them from that Power to which they were said to belong inalienably? Our Greek Colonies are important, undoubtedly; but are they the only dependencies of the Republic which she has to preserve? Have Istria and Dalmatia lost all value in our eyes?

“ One of two things,” continued Faliero: “ either you must go to the East in the character of conquerors, and then your political projects will be subordinate to the course of events; or you must go there simply with the intention of settling peaceably in one of the quarters of Constantinople. But how can we conceive it possible, that two independent governments should exist within the precincts of a single City? What security will there be in such a plan? How will our fellow-citizens be situated on this foreign soil? What will become of our kindred and parents, who are aged and infirm—of all, in short, that we should be constrained to leave behind us? Forsaken and abandoned, it is then that they will perceive, for the first time, that their native shores are barren and lonely. Commerce, wealth, and power will rapidly decay; an ambitious neighbour will annex these Islands; and we shall learn from afar, that what was our country has ceased to be the abode of a free people. Some Venetian traveller, perhaps, touching a few years hence at these parts, will find the canals choked with sand,

the dykes levelled, the lagoons infected with malaria. He will find, that our dwellings have been demolished, that their precious remains have been transported elsewhere, and that the monuments of our triumphs have been dispersed among strangers. He will observe a few Pilgrims wandering over the ruins of monasteries known to have been in former days wealthy and magnificent. He will behold a scanty population, without labour, without food; and the magistrate of some remote town will be in the very Palace, where we are now deliberating, dictating laws to what would still be called Venice. And history will tell, how the Venetians, hearkening to the promptings of a restless ambition, renounced the signal blessings of Providence, and, emigrating from their native soil to a remote land, destroyed one of the noblest and greatest fabrics of human industry !”

Faliero descended from the tribune, his eyes filled with tears. They proceeded at once to the ballot; and so equally divided was public opinion now on the point under discussion, that it is said to have been a casting vote merely which decided the fate of Venice. That vote was not inaptly termed the *Vote of Providence*.

The unsuccessful motion of the Doge for seeking a new country on the shores of the Bosphorus is supposed to have been made in the course of 1222.¹ The seven succeeding years of his reign were not distin-

¹ Compare Salverte (p. 656) with Leopold Curti (*Mémoires Historiques et Politiques sur Venise*, pp. 105-6).

guished by any event worthy of notice ; and in 1229, the cares of government had at last become so irksome to him that, toward the middle of February of that year, he intimated to the Legislative Body his desire to abdicate. The health of Ziani had been long on the decline. He was at present almost entirely bed-ridden, and took little or no active part in public affairs. The illness of the Doge obliged the members of the Privy Council to discharge the functions belonging to the Crown ; and the inconvenience of this course led his Serenity at length to decide upon placing his resignation in the hands of the Legislature. On the 26th February,¹ Ziani went with some difficulty through all the constitutional forms. Four-and-twenty years ago, the son of the Doge Sebastiano had been summoned from his private residence at Santa Giustina to assume the government of a great Republic : it was to Santa Giustina that he now returned to die.²

The Electoral College of Forty which was nominated by the Legislature, on the retirement of Ziani, with a view to the election of his successor, was equally divided between Giacomo Tiepolo, the late Duke of Candia, and Marino Dandolo, ex-procurator of Saint Mark, and an old servant of the Republic.³ During six days, the scrutineers continued to examine the ballot-box in the hope of obtaining a casting vote, but without success ; each of the candidates continued

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 345).

² *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 189).

³ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 346) ; Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 548) ; Dolfino, *Annali*, 38 (King's MSS. 149).

to have twenty suffrages ; and, at last, as there appeared to be no other method of solving the difficulty, the Senate sanctioned, as a special measure, a resort to the law of chance. This novel method gave as Doge to Venice Giacomo Tiepolo, whose elevation was solemnly proclaimed by the Procurator at the great altar of Saint Mark's Cathedral on the 6th March, 1229.¹

The first act of Tiepolo, on his accession, was to pay a visit of ceremony to Santa Giustina. His reception was by no means gracious. The old man, who was confined to his room, was testy in his manner, and laconic in his replies. Of the singular mode of election, to which his Serenity could not forbear to refer in the course of conversation, as fraught with such good fortune to him personally, Ziani expressed the strongest disapprobation, not hesitating to stigmatize it as *a dangerous and discreditable anomaly* ; and the Doge was probably glad to take leave of his host at the earliest moment.² It was, perhaps, the sense of his approaching end, which had rendered the invalid more than usually peevish. For, a few days after his interview with Tiepolo, he breathed his last (March 21). The remains of the ex-Doge were consigned to the vaults of San Giorgio Maggiore, where the ashes of his father Sebastiano had already found a splendid repose.³

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 345) ; Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 548).

² Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 553).

³ *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 10 (Harl. MSS. 3549).

Pietro Ziani had entered twice into the matrimonial state. In first nuptials he had espoused Maria, the daughter of Pietro Baseio, Procurator of Saint Mark;¹ and this lady left one son, Giorgio. His second wife was Constance, the daughter of Tancred of Sicily;² and by this marriage he had one son Marco, and one daughter Marchesina, of whom the former wedded the daughter of the Lord of Este, and the latter was united to the patrician Marco Badoer.³

By his will the Doge left 20,000 lire to be distributed in alms to the poor and in bequests to charitable institutions; and it was with peculiar satisfaction, that he had executed a clause in the testament of his predecessor Dandolo, which directed that a chapel should be erected to Saint Nicholas in Saint Mark's Cathedral, in eternal commemoration of the conquest of Constantinople by the Venetians.

In person Ziani was handsome and prepossessing. He had fine features, with an open and ingenuous expression. He was a man of exemplary piety, and of a kind heart; but his temper was violent; and he occasionally indulged in extreme ebullitions of passion. The mode in which he conducted the receptions at Saint Mark's was often highly eccentric. Trusting to a prodigiously retentive memory, he was in the frequent habit of admitting several ambassadors, on different missions, at one audience, and of bidding them speak

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 197); P. Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 65 (King's MSS. 148).

² Gio. Villani (*Chronica*, lib. iv. cap. 20; edit. Florence, 1823).

³ *Cronaca Altinate* (lib. vi. p. 197).

in succession what they had to say. Meanwhile, His Serenity leaned back in his seat, shut his eyes, and appeared to be dozing. When the strangers had finished their perorations, Ziani, seeming to recollect himself, took his visitors in the order in which they delivered their addresses, and gave each his reply. On one occasion, two and twenty envoys, from various parts of Lombardy, were received in this manner.¹

Of his singular irascibility of temper, which grew upon Ziani in after life, and which was probably due, in no slight measure, to the chronic delicacy of his health, the following anecdote supplies a striking illustration.² One day in the early part of his reign (1211-12), it came to the ears of the Prince, that his son Giorgio, while bathing in the neighbourhood of the Abbey of San Giorgio Maggiore, had been assailed by some savage dogs, belonging to the Brethren, and had been mangled beyond the hope of recovery. The anguish of the bereaved parent was unutterable. The unfortunate victim was the only child, which he had by his deceased wife Maria Baseio. But in the sorrow of Ziani there was an inherent proneness to phrenzy. In a paroxysm of rage, he ordered the monks, the monastery, and the dogs, to be committed at once to the flames. Nor did those, to whom the order was given, venture to demur; and so far, at least, as the building and the animals were concerned,

¹ *Cronaca Altinate* (vi. 197); Da Canale, 380.

² Sansovino (*Ven. Descr.* lib. v. p. 218, and lib. xii. p. 505); Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 548); Salverte (*Civilisation de Venise*, p. 86).

it was executed on the spot. No sooner, however, had Ziani regained his composure, than he was touched with remorse at the act of sacrilegious violence, which he had perpetrated. That ground, he felt, was peculiarly dear to Heaven ; in those vaults, he remembered with a shudder, reposed the honoured ashes of his father Sebastiano. The Doge hastened to make reparation for the double wrong by undertaking, in the first place, to restore San Giorgio at his own expense, and secondly, by instituting an annual *Andata* in commemoration of the circumstance.

The old mercantile charter, on which the Republic had, since the time of King Alboin, founded her right to trade under certain exemptions in the ports of the Peninsula, and with which clauses had been incorporated, at a later epoch, relative to her commercial relations with Germany, was twice renewed during this lengthened administration : first in August, 1209, by Otho IV. ; in the second instance, in September, 1220, by Frederic II., the grandson of Frederic Barbarossa. The period, during which this Doge held the direction of affairs, was also marked by the conclusion of treaties, highly favourable to the progressive pace of Venetian commerce, with the King of Hungary, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Emperor of Constantinople, the Emir of Aleppo, the Count of Beyrout, the Lord of Biblos, the Sultan of Egypt, and the Khan of Tartary.¹ In 1216, Andrew of Hungary, filled with pious compassion for the deplorable situation of the Christians of

¹ Marin (iv. lib. ii. and iii.)

Palestine at that juncture, negotiated with the Venetians the supply of vessels adequate to the transport of himself and a select body of troops to the Holy Land; and the Doge Ziani, prudently availing himself of the royal enthusiasm, stipulated that, independently of the contract, the King should cede to the Republic all rights, which he had unjustly acquired over her Dalmatian colonies, while she was engaged in establishing herself in her Oriental conquests. The success of the Sixth Crusade was very equivocal.¹

The death of Pietro Ziani in March, 1229, marked an important era in the Constitutional History of Venice. Before the election of his successor, two commissions were established: one of five persons, who were designated the *Correttori della Promissione Ducale*, and who were appointed by the Senate to investigate the nature and extent of the Ducal prerogative, and to suggest any changes or modifications, which it might appear to them expedient to introduce into the constitution of the Republic;² the other consisting of three members, entitled the *Inquisitori sul Doge Defunto*, whose province was to examine the acts of his late Serenity in connexion with the line of conduct laid down for his guidance in the Promission, to receive and consider complaints from persons, who might look on themselves as aggrieved by any arbitrary or illegal proceeding on the part of the Doge; to lay all such

¹ *Mémoires sur l'Histoire de France* (iii. p. 79); Extraits d'un Manuscrit Turc, intitulé *Annales de l'Egypte*, composées par Salib, fils de Gelaleddin.

² *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 10 (Harl. MSS. No. 3549).

complaints or accusations as might be just or well founded before the Great Council through the Public Prosecutors;¹ and lastly, to carry the decision of the Legislature into effect, by publishing a censure on the defunct, or by levying a fine on his estate.² Whether in this particular instance the Boards of Correction and Inquisition passed any strictures on the conduct of the Doge during his term of office, or whether the report, which they rendered to the Senate, bore any allusion to the singular misadventure at San Giorgio, and its still more singular consequences, there are no means of knowing. But, subsequently to 1229, these two mysterious Boards held their strange inquest on each demise of the Crown. Of such a class of impeachment examples are to be found even in modern history.

The reign of Tiepolo was stormy and unpropitious at its outset. Shortly before his accession, fresh disturbances arose in Candia, in which Constantine Sevastos and Theodore Melisinos were the active movers. They proceeded from a simple case of horse-stealing.³ Some horses belonging to Giovanni Scordillo, a man of considerable influence in the island, were carried off in the night by the servants of a neighbouring proprietor; and Scordillo instituted a legal process against the offender. Justice was not denied to him, but it was delayed; and the con-

¹ The Coronation oath of Tiepolo is given by Romanin in the documents to his second volume.

² Sandi (ii. p. 621); Romanin (ii. p. 244).

³ F. Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, ii. pp. 249–50).

sequence was, that a revolt was immediately framed against the Government, in which the whole family of Scordillo and its adherents, the Melisini and Sevasti, took part. The threatened danger was warded off, however, by the conciliatory policy of the Venetian Duke Domenico Dolfino without much difficulty, and without any bloodshed.

The year 1231 witnessed an outbreak of a graver character. The Scordilli and Melisini again rose against the Venetian power. They set the authority of Paolo Quirini, Dolfino's successor, at open defiance; and they invited the Emperor Vataces to emancipate them and their country from the galling yoke of despotism, and to annex Candia to the Nicæan crown. It could not be well doubted that Vataces would readily avail himself of the disposition which had thus been evinced by the Candiots in his favour. Meanwhile, the Scordilli and their adherents raised the standard of revolt in all the places where their influence happened to predominate; and their agents spread themselves through the villages and over the country, summoning the people everywhere to arms, and calling upon them to espouse the cause of liberty and independence. The whole island was soon in a state of commotion; thousands flocked to the banners of the rebels, who gradually swelled into a powerful army; and Quirini, seriously alarmed at the rapid progress of the sedition, and feeling that the troops at his disposal were insufficient to cope with the enemy even in the present stage of operations, de-

spatched an express to Venice to demand speedy reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Governor acted as the Doge himself had acted when he was placed in a similar situation, by calling to his assistance the Venetian Duke of the Archipelago. Sanudo did not carry his resentment against Quirini's illustrious predecessor so far as to decline compliance with the present request; and the arrival of the Duke with a strong body of troops afforded his countrymen considerable relief, while it tended to breed discouragement in the ranks of the enemy, who fell back reluctantly before the combined forces of the Venetians and Naxiots. The Allies followed up their advantage by strengthening their position, and creating several new works of defence.

But the brightening prospects of the Venetians were soon again overclouded. It was not long before a powerful squadron of thirty galleys, commanded by one of the generals of Vataces, and despatched by that enterprising prince to lend the required support to the Revolutionary party, arrived off the Cretan coast; the landing of the Greek troops, which appears to have been unopposed, restored the confidence of the insurgents; and the latter returned to the contest with renewed vigour and determination. The Allies were now outnumbered in their turn; and, no longer able to keep the field, they retired behind the line of towers which the Government of the Republic had, in 1208, wished to see dismantled. They were hotly pursued, and fiercely assailed, by their indefatigable foes; and

the commanders of several of the towers were compelled, after a severe struggle, to surrender at discretion. This course was taken by Marco Quirini at Fort Rettimo,¹ by Margarito Foscari at Milopotamos, by Castaldo Milenio at Castelnovo, and by Castaldo Avonal at San-Bonifacio; and it seemed highly probable that, unless the expected succour from home arrived very promptly, Colonia Venetorum would fall into the hands of the enemy. At this critical conjuncture it was, that a Venetian fleet reached Candia under the orders of Nicolo Thomisto; its presence at once restored the authority of Quirini and the Republic; and the troops of Vataces re-embarked in precipitation, leaving the rebels at the mercy of Thomisto. The latter was accompanied by a new Governor, Bartolomeo Gradenigo, who bore Quirini's letters of recal. Gradenigo was tolerably successful in calming the agitation; and while the leaders of the late insurrection, who had contrived to obtain possession of the Castle of San Nicolo,² were gained by a liberal grant of land on easy conditions, a fresh stream of immigration, sanctioned by an act of the Legislative Body, which passed on the 3rd March, 1233,³ swelled the population, and increased the preponderance, of Colonia Venetorum.

The courage of the Candiots was cowed, but not quelled. In 1241, two brothers, Georgius and Theo-

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 346); Navagiero (*Storia*, p. 991); Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 549); Lebeau (lib. xcvi. p. 300).

² Sanudo, *loco citato*, where he quotes the *Chronica Contarina*.

³ Navagiero (*Storia*, p. 991).

dorus Cortazzi, imitated the example of the Scordilli and their partizans; the Venetian Governor, Marino Zeno, perished in the attempt to vindicate his authority; and the insurgents were not disarmed until fresh reinforcements and a new Governor, Marino Morosini,¹ had been sent from Venice.² On the whole, perhaps, the revolt of the Cortazzi was far less serious in its character and result than many which preceded it; and it was appeased without any considerable spilling of blood.

One of the principal landed proprietors in Candia at this period was a man of noble and antient lineage, and distinguished no less by his talents than by his extraction; his name was Alexis Calergi; and the shining, yet solid qualities of his understanding, his singleness and tenacity of purpose, his commanding influence, his winning address, his strong love of independence, and his fierce detestation of the foreign domination, combined to render him the most formidable enemy with whom the Republic had yet had to cope (1248). The Venetian Senate was by no means ignorant of the great Candiot's movements and designs; a secret and well-concerted attempt had been recently made to remove him furtively from the island; it was frustrated only by the vigilance of his spies. Calergi effected his escape in a small vessel under cover of the darkness; and his flight became the recognised signal for the outbreak of a terrible in-

¹ Da Canale synchron. (sect. 322).

² Da Canale contemp. (sect. 312).

surrection. The storm, which discerning men might have plainly seen gathering in the horizon, had now burst; and a fire was glowing in its embers which it occupied the mother-country a period of eighteen years to quench. The Republic exerted all her energy and resolution; her Government was constantly sending out troops and other reinforcements to the Colony; and the Colony was as constantly nourishing a hope that victory was within her grasp. But so soon as the Venetian troops appeared in the field, the Rebels fled to the mountains. When the Venetians retired within their lines, the Rebels returned to the field. The former always sought an engagement, the latter always eluded it. This species of Guerilla warfare was to the last degree fatiguing and unprofitable; and the belligerents were sometimes induced to conclude an armistice, which not unfrequently ended in an attempt to negotiate for peace. But here the Colonial Government invariably gained a superiority, and Calergi, unwilling to accept any but the most honourable terms, invariably broke off the conference in disgust. At last, the Republic fixed on a different plan. The same course which she had pursued with such admirable success in the case of Henry the Fisherman, was now adopted toward Alexis Calergi. The most enticing overtures were made by the Doge to the great agitator. He was admitted, like the Count of Malta, to the rights of citizenship; a large and free assignment of land was promised to him; and the promise was accompanied by a solemn

assurance that no thoughts were harboured of ulterior resentment. Alexis, probably worn out by a contest which seemed interminable, met these pacific advances in a corresponding spirit; and the offer, perhaps too tempting to be easily rejected, was gladly, if not gratefully, embraced. But the Venetian Government, having thus removed the leading cause of its anxiety, did not care to act with similar lenity toward Calergi's minor confederates, of whom all were now evicted, and several were sent to the scaffold. In 1266-7, a fresh colony was sent out to take possession of the forfeited estates, and to extend the frontier of the original settlement; and it was to the anxiety which the Government of the Republic felt to render her communication with the interior more easy, and to afford more spacious accommodation for shipping, that the foundation was owing of the modern town of Canea, which was built by the Venetians, in the latter half of the thirteenth century, on the ruins of the antient Cydon.

But while the affairs of *Colonia Venetorum* had demanded such strained attention on the part of the home Government, those of Constantinople were also affording a prolific source of care and anxiety.

The Emperor Robert, on his decease in 1228, left one surviving brother, who was still a minor: his name was Baldwin. By the failure of Robert's issue, Baldwin Courtenay was acknowledged to be the legitimate heir to the throne. But the elevation of a child of ten years of age was wholly impracticable at a juncture

when the helm of State peculiarly required the direction of an experienced hand. The question of the succession consequently involved considerable embarrassment. The electors of Romania were anxious to consult the interests of the empire: yet they were reluctant to adopt any measure which might operate to the prejudice of Baldwin's contingent rights. They ultimately took a middle course. They determined that John, Baron de Brienne, and titular King of Jerusalem, should hold the crown during his life, and that, on his demise, it should descend to the heir of the Emperor Robert to whom, it was expressly provided, that Brienne should at once affiance his daughter Mary.¹ The new Emperor was already octogenarian. His hairs had whitened beneath the snows of eighty winters. Yet, like the illustrious Dandolo, his friend and companion in arms, Brienne still preserved, in an unusual measure, the vigour of greener age; and his manly character and high reputation as a soldier naturally endeared him to a people who, during nine years, had submitted with a pang to the feeble and odious rule of Robert Courtenay.

Brienne soon learned (1230) that a league had been formed against his crown between John Ducas Vataces, Emperor of Nicæa, and John Azan, King of the Bulgarians. The forces, which the Coalition would bring into the field, were reported to be barely calculable. The preparations, which were being made for the approaching campaign, were said to be immense.

¹ Ducange (lib. iii. p. 236); Lebeau (lib. xcvi. p. 350).

What was now the situation of the Latins? The bulk of their troops had either returned home, or deserted to the enemy, during the peace; the remainder had been recently disbanded, with very few exceptions, on the ground of economy; and to oppose a host, which was loosely estimated at 100,000 men, they had 160 knights and 400 foot. Brienne, firm and undaunted, had already concerted with the Venetian Podesta, Fiofio Zeno, a plan of defensive and offensive operations, when he received intelligence that Vataces, having disembarked at Lampsacus, and having effected a junction with the Bulgarian prince in the vicinity of that place, had now advanced within a short distance of Constantinople, while his admiral, Leo Gavalla, Lord of Rhodes, closed the Dardanelles with a fleet of 100 sail.¹ Shall it be told how Brienne, instead of intrenching himself behind the fortifications of the capital, issued forth from the Golden Gate to meet the countless swarms of the enemy? Shall it be related that eight-and-forty battalions were cut to pieces or put to flight by a single regiment of infantry and a single squadron of horse? Yet who shall presume to impeach the truth of a statement which all historians have agreed to vindicate? The only deduction which it appears possible to form is that, as the levies of the Allies had, in all probability, been unusually large, a considerable proportion of the recruits were raw in their discipline, and that they shared the influence of a panic.

¹ Da Canale (sect. 82).

In the meantime, letters having been received at Venice from Zeno and Brienne, portraying to the Doge the magnitude and imminence of the new danger, which menaced the capital of the East by land and sea, a fleet of five-and-twenty galleys had been sent by the Republic to the relief of Constantinople. It was at the moment, when the troops of the Coalition were just beginning to waver in the presence of a handful of Latins, that Leo Gavalla descried the Venetian fleet pressing all sail for the Dardanelles. Gavalla had scarcely time to prepare for action, when the enemy bore down upon him with that tremendous vehemence, which had gained their country the victory in a hundred battles. The shock was irresistible; the enemy's line was completely pierced; and the passage of the Dardanelles was forced. The loss of Gavalla, whose squadron, largely composed of the transports which had conveyed Vataces and his troops from Gallipoli, was more formidable in point of number than in point of strength, was very severe; a large proportion of his vessels was sunk or dispersed; four-and-twenty were taken; an equal number, which floated at anchor in the Chrysoceras, was destroyed; and the Venetian commanders, having achieved this signal success, made a triumphal entry into Constantinople, where they were warmly greeted by Zeno and Brienne. On their return to Venice, where the result of the contest had been anxiously expected, the victorious admirals were met at the place of disembarkation by Tiepolo himself, who complimented them on their

exploit in the most flattering terms, and thanked them in the name of the Republic.¹

The double victory of the Latins, so splendid, so timely, so largely partaking of the marvellous, thoroughly foiled the design of the Emperor of Nicæa. The inhabitants of the towns and villages, through which the discomfited and shattered battalions of the Allies were obliged to pass, harassed their retreat, and cut off all the straggling detachments which fell in their way ; and it was with extreme difficulty and hazard, that the squadron of Gavalla, which had been almost annihilated during the recent action, regained the harbour of Lampsacus. Vataces burned with rage and shame. He had counted on an easy triumph ; and there was every circumstance connected with his defeat, which could render that defeat galling to his pride.

Two years later, the sword was again drawn (1232), and Vataces resumed the offensive in concert with his steady ally, the King of Bulgaria, with undiminished zeal and activity. Since the termination of the last war, Azan had found leisure to equip a fleet of five-and-twenty galleys ; and the launch of these vessels from one of the ports of the Euxine offered the first instance in which the Bulgarian flag was seen to wave on that sea. The present campaign, which was almost exclusively maritime, was, however, scarcely less inauspicious for the Coalition than its predecessor. Brienne still cultivated with assiduity the Venetian

¹ Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 83).

connexion which, on the one hand, appeared to have become essential to the integrity of his crown, and on which the Republic could not but feel, on the other, that the importance and security of the Factory at Constantinople, and of her Levantine establishments generally, depended to a material extent. The Emperor found a second ally in Geoffrey de Villehardouin, Prince of Achaia, nephew of the celebrated Marshal of Champagne, and a man who with his soldier-like qualities seems to have combined no slight experience of naval affairs. On being apprised of the recommencement of hostilities, Villehardouin at once committed the government of Achaia to his brother William, and hastened to the succour of the Latins. The vessels at his disposal did not exceed six men-of-war, mounting a force of 900 picked troops. The enemy's ships, on the contrary, though reaching, it was said, a hundred and sixty sail, were reported to be both ill manned and ill commanded. The event fully answered to his anticipations. Villehardouin found the united fleets of Azan and Vataces lying near the entrance of the Dardanelles; they seemed to observe little order or discipline; and Geoffrey instantly perceived, with the searching eye of a soldier, that the allied commanders had perpetrated the egregious error of extending their line over too wide a space. Seizing this important advantage, the Prince pierced their centre, captured fifteen of their vessels, and, with these trophies in tow, triumphantly entered the Golden Horn. There he effected a junction with the suc-

cessor of Zeno in the podestat, Giovanni Michieli¹ who, with fifteen Venetian galleys and a few Pisan and Genoese, was on the point of debouching from the Chrysoceras; and the arrival of Villehardouin gave additional confidence to the Podesta. In the engagement which followed, the Greeks and their Ally were defeated with a farther loss of ten ships;² and Vataces was obliged to fall back on Lampsacus, eyeing with a look of bitter vexation, as he retired, those tantalising ramparts which he had constantly in view, yet of which it seemed that he was destined never to become the master.

The success of the Latins, however, was productive of few lasting fruits. Although their position was momentarily improved, and although Constantinople was placed for the present out of danger, the constant exertions which it cost her defenders to maintain their ground against so many enemies, were rapidly paralysing the resources of the empire. It was very true that the Venetians, if they brought their whole power to bear on a single point, might have easily sheltered the Latin dynasty from any dangers which could arise to threaten its stability. But it was to be remembered that the attention of the Venetians was perpetually diverted from the East by other interests of an equally weighty character. The affairs of Italy, of Dalmatia, of Candia, presented a constant source of solicitude and expense; and it was obvious that, unless a fleet was permanently stationed by the Republic in the

¹ Da Canale (sect. 84).

² Ibid. (sect. 84).

Bosphorus, Constantinople might be lost before she could afford it relief. These considerations induced the Emperor to reiterate his appeal to the other Crowned Heads of Europe¹ for succour and support; his son-in-law, Prince Baldwin, was despatched for this purpose to the Court of the French King; and at the same time the Doge Tiepolo sent an ambassador, Simone Buono, to Paris, to assist in concerting some effectual measures for preserving the integrity of the Byzantine empire.² The Pope lent his aid to the movement. A new Crusade was published against the enemies of the Latin monarchy; the same indulgences were proclaimed in favour of those who took the vow as had been accorded to the warriors who volunteered to defend the Holy Places of Palestine; and thousands soon ranged themselves round the standards, which were erected by the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Brittany, and other great feudatories in various parts of France. Matters were progressing thus favourably, when Brienne expired at Constantinople on the 23rd of March, 1237,³ and Baldwin was invited to return and take possession of the throne. But the prospects of the young Prince were not at present sufficiently encouraging to tempt him to embrace even the offer of a crown. The levies, which he was raising under the name and authority of the King, were far from being complete; and the Court of Louis afforded, at least, a safe and hospitable shelter.

¹ Tillemont (*Vie de Saint Louis*, p. 387); Matthew Paris (vi. p. 338).

² M. Paris (ii. p. 310).

³ Ducange (lib. iii. p. 232).

The reign of Baldwin II., the last and weakest of the imperial House of Courtenay, belongs to the History of the Lower Empire. The public career of Baldwin, which extended nominally from March, 1237, to July, 1261, was replete with disgrace and misfortune; and under his paralytic rule the empire of the Latins perceptibly declined to its fall.

At the period of the accession of John de Brienne (1228) to the imperial throne, the financial prospects of the State were very far from being prosperous. During the eight years this Prince remained in power, those prospects had become only more and more gloomy; the expenses of the war with Bulgaria and other Powers considerably more than absorbed a scanty revenue; and on the decease of Brienne in 1237, the resources of the Government were so straitened, that the Regency found it necessary to open subscriptions for a loan. The principal participators were Venetian and Genoese merchants, among whom occur the names of Alberto Morosini, Bailo of Constantinople, Nicolo Cornaro, and Pietro Ziani; the sum subscribed amounted to 13,134 *perperi*;¹ and, as a guarantee for the repayment, which was promised within a short and definite term, the Crown of Thorns was taken from its resting-place in the chapel of the Bucoléon, and hypothecated to the Bailo Morosini. On the expiration of the specified term, however, the money was not forthcoming; and the security was,

¹ Zanetti (*Dell' Origine e dell' Antichità della Moneta Veneziana*, p. 21).

in strictness, forfeited. The Regency was advised to avoid so grave a scandal by concluding an arrangement with some third party, by which the crown might be transferred to their custody, on the condition that they should advance the necessary amount, and grant the indulgence of a month for the repayment. Such a contract was accordingly made, in October or November, 1237, with Nicolo Quirini, a rich Venetian banker; the original obligation was cancelled; and, with Quirini's concurrence, the precious security was placed, for the sake of greater safety, in the church of Pantocrator. It had been provided that, should the Regency fail in the performance of its agreement, the banker was at liberty to remove the relic, and to lodge it for a farther term of four months at Venice; and finally, it was understood that, if the money was not paid within the stipulated period, or at the latest, on the 19th of June, 1238, the crown became the property of Quirini.¹

A report of this singular transaction reached in due course the pious monarch who then presided over the destinies of France; Saint Louis was severely shocked at the sordid profanity exhibited by those who had consented to negotiate a loan on such terms; and he instantly despatched two Dominicans to Constantinople to redeem the relic from pawn, and, if it was practicable, to secure it for their own country. But the debt having remained unliquidated, a ship was hired by Quirini, in the early part of August, to convey the

¹ Ducange, Dulaure, *ubi infrâ*.

crown to its new destination; and this vessel had sailed long since, when the Dominicans arrived at the Golden Horn. They tracked it, however, with all possible expedition to Venice, where they obtained an audience of the Doge; they explained to Tiepolo the object of their mission; and his Serenity conducted them to the Reliquary of Saint Mark's, where he pointed to a golden casket, carefully sealed with his own arms, as the repository of the treasure which they sought. The Envoys of the King, as they had been charged, delivered to the banker without delay the redemption money,¹ and claimed with the same breath the restitution of the guarantee. Quirini had of course no alternative; and the Government did not feel itself entitled to interfere. Louis, on his part, was literally transported with joy at his new acquisition. In all his ambitious reveries he had probably never dreamed that he should become the master of such a prize. A curious procession through the streets of Paris, headed by the King himself, barefoot and in his shirt, amply attested the genuineness of his devotion; and it was to contain this and other curiosities of a similar character, that the royal saint erected the Sainte-Chapelle at a cost of 20,000 marks, on the site of the antient chapel of Saint Nicole.²

Thirty-seven years had passed since the termination

¹ Leber (*Essai*, p. 103).

² Dulaure (*Histoire de Paris*, ii. pp. 227-8); Ducange (*Hist. de Const.*, lib. iv. pp. 263-4); Tillemont (*Vie de Saint Louis*, ii. p. 336 *et seq.*)

of the Great War of Independence in the Peninsula by the treaty concluded between Frederic Barbarossa and the Lombard League at Constance, in June, 1183, when the imperial throne was ascended, in November, 1220, by another Frederic who, in his exalted conception of the prerogative, in his intolerant jealousy of municipal or local privileges, in his ardent and irascible disposition, and in his haughty and overbearing character, closely resembled his grandfather Barbarossa. In both were found united, with talents and virtues¹ of a high order, a pride, which rarely stooped to please or persuade, and a fitful and fiery temper.

During the earlier part of his reign, the time of the Emperor was spent for the most part either in Germany or in Apulia.* But, in 1232, having occasion to visit the North of Italy, he suddenly expressed a desire to see the Venetian capital. The reception which he met at the hands of Tiepolo was, in the highest degree, splendid and honourable ;² and his bearing toward the great people, among whom he had come to make a short stay, indicated even an anxiety to maintain his amicable relations with the Republic. The affairs of the Peninsula were at that time occupying his Majesty's closest and most constant attention ; he had more than one conversation with the Doge on the subject ; and the latter could hardly fail to be forcibly struck by the justness of Frederic's remarks. It was much to be

¹ Gio. Villani (lib. vi. c. 1).

² Sismondi (ii. p. 188).

³ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 347) ; Romanin (ii. p. 223).

regretted (observed the latter on one occasion) that the Italian municipalities did not comprehend their true interests. With what advantage they might take Venice as their model ! What a proud, yet what a melancholy contrast her condition, peaceful and flourishing, offered to that of her neighbours and contemporaries, perpetually torn by intestine divisions and disorders. Tiepolo was possibly of opinion that, had the Emperor carried his inquiry only a little farther, he might have discerned one cause, at least, of the evil which he deplored so much. He might have perceived that it lay in his own overweening and restless ambition, and in his endeavour to check the development of the spirit of the age.

History taught Frederic, that the Venetians were dangerous and formidable enemies. On the other hand, by a prince who, as an Italian by birth and sentiment, set a much higher value on his possessions in the Peninsula than either his father or his grandfather, their alliance was, above all others, to be cultivated. For the lofty influence, which the Republic had acquired on the Terra-Ferma since the commencement of the last war, was still rapidly in the ascendant; her voice had weight in every cabinet; her flag was respected on every sea; and such was the high reputation which her patricians enjoyed for administrative talent, that the free towns of Lombardy, which had for some time been forced by the violence of party-spirit and by the jealous rivalry existing among their own governing class, to seek their podesta in

the person of some alien of note, most frequently chose that magistrate among the members of the Great Council of Venice. Thus, Pietro Tiepolo, the Doge's eldest son, was successively Podesta of Treviso and Milan, the latter the first of the Guelphic cities ;¹ Reniero Zeno held the same office at Bologna (1232-1240),² Michele Morosini, at Faenza,³ Marino Dandolo, at Treviso,⁴ Nicolo Quirini, at Reggio, Marino Badoer, at Padua,⁵ Stefano Badoer, at Ferrara ;⁶ a Marino Foscari is mentioned, whose services were so constantly employed in this capacity by the Lombard Republics, that he was commonly known by the name of *Foscarini the Podesta* ; and it was obvious that, wherever these appointments were made, they would carry with them, to a certain extent, the voice and influence of the Venetians.

Frederic was hardly a stranger to such considerations : nor can it be supposed that he was ignorant where his true interests lay. But the truth was, that he was too passionate and headstrong by nature to follow them at all times, or to cherish an Alliance, which might have helped greatly to promote the success of the cause so near his heart.

Eccelino the Monk, second Lord of Romano, left, at his death, two sons : the elder was christened, after his father, Eccelino : the name of the other

¹ Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 552) ; Sismondi (ii. p. 220).

² Da Canale (sect. 87). ³ Ibid. (sect. 97). ⁴ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 553).

⁵ Sismondi (ii. p. 214).

⁶ Sanudo, *ubi suprâ* ; Caffaro (*Annales Genuenses ad an. 1213*) ; Foscari (*Lett. Veneziana*, lib. i. p. 43 : edit. 1854).

was Alberigo. To the former the old Lord left all his castles between Padua and Verona; the latter received, as his share of the patrimony, all those in the vicinity of Treviso. Both the Romani were men of excellent understanding and superior acquirements. In both, great parts were associated with great vices. Eccelino himself was peculiarly one of those persons, so common in unsettled times, who join to a vast capacity and high mental endowments a seared conscience and a cold, depraved heart. It was not long before the Emperor, distracted by the Civil Wars of Germany, began to feel the want of such an instrument in the Peninsula. The Italian was easily gained by flattery and privileges; and what Reinold of Cologne and Christian of Mayence had been, in the preceding century, to Frederic I., such now to Frederic II. became Eccelino da Romano.

The campaigns of 1236 and the succeeding year were mostly favourable to the arms of Frederic. The Guelphs obtained, indeed, a few unimportant advantages before Padua and Treviso, where the Venetians lent some support to the cause of liberty. At the former place, more particularly, the Podesta, Marino Badoer, signalized himself by his brave resistance to the enemy. But he was compelled, at last, to retire before superior numbers; and both those cities fell into the hands of Eccelino. From Cremona, Pavia, and other Ghibelline cities, the Emperor received congratulatory addresses and reinforcements of troops. Mantua and the Count of San Bonifacio did him

homage. Vicenza, Brescia, and Faenza, were overpowered. Milan, however, the strongest fortress in Lombardy, where the Doge's son held command as Podesta, still remained untaken.

On learning the rapid and triumphant progress of the Imperialists, the Milanese, in concert with their allies of Vercelli, Novara, and Alexandria, advanced under the command of Pietro Tiepolo to oppose their redoubtable antagonist within a short distance of Manerbio, on the Oglio, where they took up a strong position, and prepared to dispute the passage of the river. They chose their ground so well, that the Emperor did not venture to attack them; and having received this unexpected check, Frederic was apparently desirous of closing the campaign of 1237: for it was already the 27th of November; and a winter, which promised to be severe, was fast setting in. In the mind of the Guelphs such a supposition was strengthened, when they observed Frederic to draw off his forces from Manerbio, and, crossing the Oglio at Pontevico, to march in the direction of Cremona.¹ Tiepolo and his officers consequently conjecturing, that operations would not recommence till the spring of the ensuing year, abandoned their position, and prepared to return to head-quarters through the Cremasque territory. But excessive was their astonishment, when they reached Cortenova, to find that the Imperialists were there before them! It was then for the first time, that Tiepolo perceived

¹ Sismondi (ii. ch. vi.)

how thoroughly he had been outwitted and outmanœuvred. This premeditated stroke on the part of Frederic, who had found it necessary to make a false movement in order to entice the Milanese and their confederates from Manerbio, was a stratagem which did much honour to his military talents. So soon as the Emperor gained a short distance from the Oglio, he had turned aside from the road to Cremona, and, marching with great rapidity across the country, had posted himself on the high road to Milan at a point, where his forces were concealed from observation by a wood. The troops of the League now suffered a total defeat; their loss was tremendous both in killed and in prisoners; and among the latter was the gallant, but incautious Tiepolo. The success of Frederic in humiliating the pride of the most formidable member of the League, elated his Majesty beyond measure; and he soon proceeded to resent the aid which the Republic had lent to the Guelphs at Padua and Treviso. A descent was made by his lieutenant Eccelino on Mestra and Murano; the whole district was swept by the invaders; the rich Abbeys of San Cipriano and San Ilario were pillaged, and the disciples of Saint Benedict were forced to seek refuge at Torcello. But the progress of the Imperialists was soon opposed by Giovanni Tiepolo, the Doge's second son, who had hastened with a considerable body of troops to repel the inroad; the Venetians successively recovered Mestra and Murano, driving back the aggressors at every

point; and the Lord of Romano was compelled to retire. The victory of Cortenova was the most important in the campaign of 1237. But it was sullied by one black and ill-judged act. It had been known for some time at Venice, that Pietro Tiepolo was languishing in the dungeons of Apulia,¹ when the afflicting news arrived, that Frederic had ordered him to be beheaded.² The most violent indignation was manifested at the atrocious outrage, which had been thus offered to the Venetian name.³ The Republic had reason to believe, that it had been at the instigation of the Lord of Romano that Frederic directed the execution of her citizen: and it was on Eccelino that the first weight of her vengeance fell. An armament was sent against Padua under the same Giovanni Tiepolo, who had already displayed his courage and abilities in the recovery of Mestra. The troops of Tiepolo obtained several advantages over those of Eccelino. They pursued those advantages with unrelenting perseverance. The territory of the Tyrant of Padua was reduced at many points to utter desolation.

The next blow of the Venetian Government was levelled at the Emperor himself. On the 5th of September, 1239, Stefano Badoer and Romeo Quirini, the Ambassadors of the Doge, signed a Concordat with the Pontiff Gregory IX., by which the Republic was bound—1. To equip, for the projected conquest

¹ Sismondi (ii. p. 220).

² Pugliola (*Cronica di Bologna, ad an. 1240*); *Chron. Estense*, Ap. Murat. xv. 308; Matthew Paris, *Historia Major* (ii. 556: edit. Lond. 1640).

³ Marin (iv. pp. 222–3).

of Sicily, a squadron of five-and-twenty galleys with full complements ; 2. To defray half the cost of such armament, the other half to be defrayed by his Holiness ;¹ 3. To entertain no propositions for peace, which might proceed from the Emperor, without the knowledge and concurrence of the court of the Vatican ; and fourthly, to forfeit a sum of 6,000 marks of silver, in the event of her neglecting to perform her contract. On the part of the Pope, it was stipulated—1. That he should place his new ally in the enjoyment of certain important franchises in the cities of Bari and Salpi, in Apulia, so soon as those places were reduced to submission ; 2. That he should accord to the Republic right of free trade throughout Sicily, subject to a similar contingency ; and 3. That he should assign to them in fief whatever acquisitions might be made by Venetian subjects in that island or elsewhere. The hopes and fears, however, which the treaty of 1239 had reasonably excited, remained alike unrealised : the naval campaign in the Mediterranean against Frederic, which in that treaty had seemed to be contemplated, dwindled into an expedition,² which committed great havoc on the coasts of Sicily and Apulia ; and it might be well suspected that this expedition was undertaken less with a view to the common interests of the League, than to avenge the death of the younger Tiepolo.

¹ Marin (iv. p. 223) states that the cost of each galley per month was 275 Genoese *lire*, and that this sum was payable six months in advance.

² Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sects. 98–9, 100–1).

Since the era of the Lombard League, the Roman Pontiffs had made it their policy to support the liberal party in Italy against the Crown; and the Holy See was consequently regarded at the present time as the Head of the Guelphic Federation. It was not surprising that the See should be thus zealous in espousing the cause of freedom. For it was unquestionably her true interest, that that cause should thrive, and that the patriots should be always looking, at least, toward a successful termination of the struggle. Assuredly then, although the provisions of the treaty of September, 1239, were not carried out to their full extent, it was of high consequence to procure the adhesion of the first maritime State in Europe to the League, and to prevail on a proverbially cautious Power to display so unequivocally her popular predilections. There was a second quarter where Frederic had long rendered himself obnoxious by his arbitrary proceedings, in which Gregory detected a similar leaning; and, through his instrumentality, a treaty offensive and defensive was ratified at Rome, for a term of nine years, between Venice and Genoa (1240). The conditions of the new compact were of an analogous character to those of 1239. The contracting parties engaged to afford each other aid by land and by sea, more especially in Sicily and Apulia, and to make no peace with the Emperor without the approbation of the Holy See; and those who remembered well the Battle of Trapani, and the effect which the victory of Giovanni Trevisano wrought at the time on

the national mind of Genoa, were astonished to find the bitterest of foes meeting on common ground, and joining their arms against a common enemy. The Emperor could not help perceiving now that he had gone a little too far.

It soon became evident that the alliance of Venice was of far more practical utility to the League than that of her old rival. Among the cities which now embraced the political tenets of the Ghibellines, Ferrara was justly considered one of the most important. Ferrara was formerly held of the Holy See by Azzo VII., Marquis of Este; but that nobleman had been recently dispossessed by the ascendant faction; and it was at present occupied by the Imperialists under Salinguerra Torelli.¹ It was shortly after the accession of the Republic to the Lombard Confederacy, that a design was formed for expelling the Ghibellines, and for reinstating the feudatory of the Holy See. Independently of any political considerations which she might entertain in common with her allies, Venice had other grounds for wishing to re-establish the Guelphs at Ferrara. The valuable immunities which the Venetian traders had enjoyed in that City since the time of the Countess Matilda, were ignored by Frederic, so soon as their country openly sided with the popular party; and the Government of the Doge insisted that the renewal of those immunities should form one of the express conditions on which the Guelphs now undertook to restore the Marquis Azzo.

¹ G. Diedo (i. p. 88).

Torelli, however, was too familiar with danger to feel embarrassment or uneasiness at his difficult position ; he viewed the hostile preparations of Venice and her allies with imperturbable calmness ; and the old soldier announced his readiness to defend the trust which Frederic had reposed in him to the last drop of his blood.

The siege of Ferrara was formed on the 2nd of February, 1240.¹ The army of the Coalition was composed of six divisions ; namely, the Venetians and Mantuans, under the Viskomino Stefano Badoer ; the Bolognese, under their Podesta, Reniero Zeno ; and the remaining four under the Marquis of Este, the Bishop of Ferrara, Gregorio di Montelongo, papal legate, and Eccelino's brother, Alberigo da Romano, who was at present a member of the League. The Allies had taken up a position on some meadow-land on the right bank of the Po ; and their encampment extended from the precincts of Ferrara to the Village of San Luca.

But, apart from the resolution which Salinqueria and the garrison under his charge exhibited in the face of the enemy, there were other sinister influences with which the latter had to grapple. The Governor, foreseeing the probable course of events, had wisely taken the precaution to lay the surrounding country under water by opening sluices from the Po ; by this

¹ Da Canale contemp. (*Cronaca Veneta*, sects. 90-96) ; Pugliola (*Cronica di Bologna*, ad an. 1240) ; *Chronicon Estense* (folio 309) ; Bartolomæus Saccus vulgò Platina (*Historiæ Mantuanæ*, lib. iii., Ap. Murat. xx. 713-16).

manœuvre he necessarily cramped and impeded the movements of the besieging force; and the difficulty of the position of the Allies was enhanced by a violent tempest, which arose shortly after the commencement of operations, and which involved numerous desertions. These causes combined with others to militate against the Confederates; their exertions remained during several months without any fruit; and at length the patience of the Apostolic Legate was thoroughly exhausted. In the course of July, 1240, his Eminence wrote to the Doge, reporting the slender success which had waited on their efforts, and demanding some naval reinforcement, which might act in conjunction with the army, and might enable them to accelerate the attainment of their object. Tiepolo was deeply vexed by the intelligence of the failure: for he rightly felt that the honour of the Venetian Flag was largely concerned in the issue of the present undertaking. In laying the despatch of the Legate before the Senate, his Serenity urged the expediency of bringing the siege of Ferrara to a speedy termination; he proceeded to recall to memory the excellent and worthy example of the princes his predecessors, who had ever deemed it their duty on similar occasions to do their utmost to uphold and exalt the dignity of the Venetian name; and he concluded by observing that, under the hope that fortune would be more propitious to him than she had been to the other generals, it was his desire at once to assume the command of the troops before Ferrara. The proposition of his Serenity was

warmly applauded; his son Giovanni was appointed vice-Doge during his absence,¹ and a squadron of sixteen sail having been manned with all possible expedition, Tiepolo arrived on the third day after his departure from Venice at the port of Ferrara. The presence of the Doge inspired the Allies with renewed confidence; and the double fire, which was now opened from the siege batteries, was to the last degree galling and murderous. It was now the seventh month of operations; but still Salinguerra continued to maintain his ground, and the Ferrarese to defend their ramparts with a courage and intrepidity worthy of such a leader. As provisions grew scarce, however, within the City, and as the ravages and depredations of the Allies gradually took a wider and more destructive range, the General was urged more and more strongly to propose terms to the enemy, which they thought that the latter would be too happy to embrace. One Ugo Ramberti, the proprietor of broad estates thereabout, advocated peace with marked earnestness. But, notwithstanding this pressure, the Governor remained immovable; it was only when he was reduced to the last extremity, that he consented to a capitulation, which was signed in the course of August; and the old soldier, repairing to the ducal barge, placed it and his own person in the hands of Tiepolo. Salinguerra was treated with every mark of respect; and after a brief stay at Ferrara, where the Doge reinstated the Marquis of Este, and established

¹ Da Canale (sect. 95).

the commercial affairs of the Republic on their former basis, his Serenity conducted his illustrious captive to Venice. There the Ghibelline Chief experienced the same kindness and courtesy; he was honourably lodged, with the customary restriction, in a house belonging to the Bosio family at San Tommaso; and at his death in 1244, a place was assigned to his ashes in the vaults of San Nicolo del Lido, where the inscription on his monument shews that Salinguerra of Ferrara expired on the 25th of July of that year.¹

The recovery of so important a place as Ferrara was hailed with delight by the Republic and the Guelphic faction generally; it was natural, that Tiepolo himself should seek in that event some solace for the wounded pride, and some balm for the lacerated affections, of a parent; and the Venetian commercial world were, on their part, overjoyed at a turn of affairs, which had the effect of restoring to them their local privileges. Nor was it less to be expected, that the result of the siege would afford an ample source of disappointment to the haughty and sensitive Frederic. The Emperor took umbrage more particularly at the share which Venice had borne in the late undertaking, because he felt that she was a Power to whose gratitude he had earned the strongest claims by mercantile indulgences. It was scarcely consonant with his temper and character to submit tamely to what he conceived to be an insult to his person and to his throne; and he endeavoured to make some

¹ *Archivio Stor. Italiano* (viii. p. 723, note 118).

reprisal by assailing the Republic in a point where he knew her to be more susceptible than in any other. A surreptitious blow was struck at her in Dalmatia, where the Venetian rule had never been consolidated; and where its stability was constantly impaired by Hungarian intrigue. Insidious overtures were made to Pola and Zara; both these places were urged to revolt against their masters; and a secret treaty was concluded between the Emperor and the King of Hungary, by which it was proposed to wrest the whole Province from the Republic.¹ But, like so many others which had been framed from time to time with a similar object, this scheme signally miscarried; the prompt and vigorous measures adopted by Venice stifled the spirit of disaffection in its birth; and the insurrections which had already broken out at Pola and Zara, were suppressed under circumstances humiliating to the insurgents. The walls of the former were rased with the ground; the latter was erected into a feud and granted to a colony of Venetians.

Shortly after this event, Frederic took an occasion to convey to the Republic, in a more direct manner and in plainer language, his views touching her policy in the affair of Ferrara. It having come to his knowledge that a Venetian embassy, on its return from the Court of Savoy, was expected to pass through his dominions, the Emperor gave an order that it should be arrested, and conducted to the place where he was staying. So soon as the Deputies had been ushered into his

¹ Da Canale contemp. (sects. 92-5).

presence, Frederic began to upbraid them with the ingratitude of their country which, after receiving at his hands the greatest favours and benefits, had ranged itself among his enemies; he affirmed that it had always been, that it was still, his sincere wish to maintain amicable relations with the Republic; and he concluded by inquiring what motive led her government to assume so hostile an attitude toward his empire. The ambassadors, thus challenged, could surely have been at no loss for a reply; but it is probable that they were uncertain what course to take; and all that they did was to falter out a few lame excuses. Frederic was not disposed to press them too closely; he felt that his leading object in bringing the Deputies of Tiepolo to an interview was already attained, since he had barely room to doubt that they would faithfully report to the Doge all which had passed between him and themselves; and, after a short detention, the prisoners received a gracious dismissal. The foregoing incident seemed to afford an illustration of two points. It shewed that the Emperor was fully sensible of the value and importance of the Venetian connexion, more particularly under the circumstances in which he was then placed; and it indicated how well that prince could feign ignorance of the considerations which had induced Venice to embrace the cause of the Popular Party in Italy. The chastisement of Pola and Zara was followed by the conclusion in May, 1244, of a fresh convention with Hungary, by which that Power renounced, for the third or fourth

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time, all its pretensions to the sovereignty of Dalmatia and the Illyric Islands in favour of the Republic ; and the perfidy of Zara was severely punished. The Zaratines were forced to exchange their old constitution for a new one, differing from its predecessor in the introduction of some additional articles of uncommon stringency. 1. It was required that, in future, the military, as well as the civil, governor of Zara should be a Venetian. 2. Five of those persons chiefly implicated in the late insurrectionary movement were to be surrendered as hostages for five years. 3. One hundred of the principal citizens were to be deputed at once to ask pardon of the Doge. 4. As often as the Doge might be pleased so to command, a select deputation of ninety members was to be sent to renew the oath of allegiance.¹ 5. Compensation was to be awarded by the Municipal Council for the losses sustained by Michele Morosini the late Count, and the other Venetian residents, during the sedition. 6. The Zaratines were prohibited from forming any alliances, matrimonial or otherwise, with the Slavonian families of Dalmatia, without the consent of the Senate.

The cogent necessity of submitting all matters connected, nearly or remotely, with Commerce, Navigation, and Police, to the cognizance of certain fixed regulations, had early impressed itself upon the rulers of Venice. In the antient chronicles the references are frequent to laws of various kinds which passed the Legislature, more particularly to the law of Shipwreck,

¹ Marin (iv. pp. 236-7-8).

the law of Evidence, the law of Insolvency, the law to control the traffic of the Brenta, Adige, and Piave, the Act for the Abolition of the Carrying Trade, the severe ordinances against the traffic in Christian slaves, and the strict rules observed for the preservation of the peace. Yet, until the eleventh or twelfth century, no Register or Roll appears to have been kept, and no Office of Records appears to have existed, in which the Statutes were preserved in the order of their enactment or of their promulgation; and Orio Malipiero, who reigned from 1178 to 1192, though not the first codifier, was in all probability the first Prince who undertook to compile out of the crude and undigested, yet ample, materials in the National Archives, anything at all approaching a consecutive and intelligible table of laws,¹ as well as to consolidate the antient usages of the Dogado. The Code of Malipiero consisted merely of a single part, the *Statuto*, or Statute, which was divided into five books,² comprehending the Canon Law. The useful and important work thus commenced, however, now steadily progressed. Amid the stirring events, which arose to occupy his time and attention, Arrigo Dandolo found leisure (1195) to revise and enlarge the five books of the Statute, concluding his labours by the publication of a new and

¹ Foscari (*Letteratura Veneziana*, loco *infra* citato).

² "Comenza il Primo Libro di Statuti et Leze di Venetia, i quali composti, reformadi et disgregadi, et redutti in uno, et di nuovo publicati sono, nel tempo dell' illustriss. M. Jacomo Theopolo, inclito Doze de Venetiani." Correndo l'anno della Incarnazione del Signore MCCXLII. A di 6 uscendo il mese Settembre; Inditione Prima. A copy of a later edition of the *Statuto* will be found in Harl. MSS. 4770.

distinct code of criminal law, termed the *Promissione del Maleficio*.¹ To these two collections the Doge Ziani added, in the year 1225, a short *Nautical Capitulary*,² most probably in consequence of the discrepancies between the *Consolato del Mare* and Venetian Maritime Law. Such was the state of jurisprudence, when the Doge Tiepolo ascended the throne (1229). Between 1229 and 1242, that eminent man, founding his title to fame on his achievements as legislator, collected and edited the whole body of the Venetian statute law; and, in the latter year (September 6), he republished it in a complete form. The valuable task which Ziani's successor imposed on himself and his coadjutors, was undoubtedly one of magnitude and difficulty; but at the same time the Statute of 1242 was declaratory to a principal extent.

Unlike the codes of other nations, which were composed for the most part in barbarous Latin, the Venetian *Statute* of 1242 made its first appearance in the Venetian Dialect. But nevertheless, in an illiterate age, a Collection, of which the copies were not multiplied, and of which the meaning was hidden from the mass of the people, was of questionable value as a security for the personal liberty and civil rights of the subject. The only pledges which could be expected to meet with appreciation or to inspire confidence at such an epoch, were oral pledges. When a Venetian

¹ See Cancianus (*Barbarorum Leges Antiquæ*, v.)

² *Leggi Criminali del Serenissimo Dominio Veneto, in un solo volume raccolte.* (Venezia) 1751.

burgher of the thirteenth century was told that a table of laws had been compiled by a few learned contemporaries, and engrossed on parchment in fair characters, whatever might be his respect and his admiration, his satisfaction was modified by the reflexion that, even should the Manuscript be placed within his reach, he was totally incompetent to master a syllable of its contents. But when he heard the Promission recited aloud in the Church of Saint Mark before the coronation, and when he heard My Lord the Doge engage by word of mouth to observe the laws and the constitution, to revere the municipal customs of the Republic, and to dispense justice without bias, he understood what was signified; and he felt that in common with the rest of his countrymen he had the most substantial safeguard against the corruption of judges, the tyranny of magistrates, and even the excesses of the Crown itself. Hence it unquestionably arose that the coronation oath was venerated by the early Venetians as the first and greatest of constitutional guarantees; and in the same fact lies the true explanation of the consequence attached to the solemn investiture of the Doge, which took place from a period of the highest antiquity in one of the metropolitan cathedrals before a multitude of persons who, although they might never have seen a spelling-book, had a sufficiently keen sense of their own interests and a tolerably correct estimate of their own rights.

In the early summer of 1249, the Doge, weary of that power which he had enjoyed during one-and-twenty years, imitated the example of his imme-

diate predecessor Ziani, and placing his resignation in the hands of the Legislative Body (May 20), retired to his own house at San Agostino in the Ward of San Polo. In addition to Pietro, whose tragical death flung a veil of mourning over his father's declining years, Tiepolo had several sons; he had also a brother Fra Alberigo upon whom, by a solemn deed under seal, he settled, in June, 1234, a small estate in the parish of Santa Maria Formosa, that Alberigo might build on the site a church in honour of Saint John and Saint Paul. In this church it was the express wish of Tiepolo, that his mortal remains should find their last repose; and they were consequently transferred thither, so soon as the new work was sufficiently in progress.¹ A few years passed away, and the crypts of Saint John and Saint Paul were opened to receive the ashes of a second Tiepolo; and, shortly after his sepulture, an inscription was placed on the family monument, in which was briefly traced the Story of Two Lives.²

¹ *Chronica di Venetia*, Anon. (Harl. MSS. 4820).

² Sansovino (lib. i. p. 57); Litta (*Celebri Famiglie Italiane*, vii.)

CHAPTER XI.

A.D. 1249–1268.

Marino Morosini, Doge (1249–52)—Reniero Zeno, Doge (1252–68)—Fresh War with Genoa—Victory of the Venetians near St. Jean d'Acre—Campaign of 1258—Second Battle of St. Jean d'Acre—Total Defeat of the Genoese—Destruction of their Factory at Acre by the Venetians—Fruitless Attempt of the Holy See to effect a Reconciliation between the Belligerents—Overthrow of the Courtenay Dynasty at Constantinople, and Recovery of the Empire by the Greeks (1261)—Treaties of the Venetian and Genoese Factories with Palæologus, the new Emperor—Successive Removals of the Genoese to Heraclea and Galata—Recommencement of the Genoese War—Victory of the Venetians at Sette Pozzi (1263)—Battle of Trapani (1264)—Great Joy of Venice at the Announcement of the Second Defeat of the Genoese—Overtures of Palæologus to the victorious Commonwealth—Truce between the Republic and the Empire—Affairs of Italy—Succession of Conrad (1250)—State of Parties in the Peninsula—Siege and Fall of Padua—Death of the two Romani—Civil Disturbances at Venice—Treaty of Venice with Saint Louis—Death of Zeno (July, 1268)—His Character and Legal Reforms.

IMMEDIATELY after the performance of the obsequies of Giacomo Tiepolo, the Commissions of the five Correttori and the three Inquisitori met, for the second time since their institution in 1229, for the purpose of examining the acts of the late Administration, and of qualifying themselves for the task of suggesting any revisions in the Promission, which they might judge to be necessary or expedient. The labours of these singular Boards of Inquiry were infinitely more

important in their result than in 1229, when their proceedings were of a purely formal character; and the report which they rendered clearly indicated the progress of the tendency to shorten the prerogatives of the Crown. A feeling was now growing up, that the Doge was rather too prompt to seize any opportunity which might arise of promoting the interests of his own family to the exclusion and prejudice of others. This was an extremely natural policy; and it was one which was incidental to every form of government. Nevertheless, in a State, where the Chief Magistrate was invariably selected from a particular section of the community, and where the members of the privileged class, to which he belonged, were exceedingly apt to forget that the object of the *national* choice ceased, on ascending the throne, to be one of themselves, it was always to be expected that an attempt, on the part of the Ducal family, to establish a political preponderance would be viewed with jealousy and dislike. In the plots and conspiracies by which the Venetian Annals of the ninth and tenth centuries are so strongly marked, and in the Revolutions of 1033 and 1172, there is every proof that such was the case. This feeling which, since the time of Flabenigo at least, had been constantly gathering strength, was at present so generally received among the upper class, that a resolution was formed, at the recommendation of the Correctors, to embody with the Promission a clause, by which the successor of Giacomo Tiepolo should be pledged to refrain from seeking, on behalf

of his children or kindred, any appointment within or without the Dogado, and to govern, for the future, in strict accordance with the laws and the Constitution.

The Oath having passed the Board of Correction with this addition, which was possibly of more ostensible than real value, steps were taken to supply the vacancy occasioned by the abdication of Tiepolo. At the last election, in consequence of the suffrages being equally balanced between Tiepolo himself and another candidate for the berretta, it had been found necessary to solve the difficulty by casting lots. To obviate a recurrence to this impolitic expedient, which had received at the time (1229) the unqualified censure of Pietro Ziani,¹ and to obtain the certainty of a casting vote, the number of electors was raised from forty to forty-one.² On the 13th of June, 1249, the Forty-One made known to the people that, after due deliberation, their choice had fallen on Marino Morosini. Morosini who³ had already reached his sixty-eighth year, was a person of venerable presence, of amiable disposition, and of irreproachable character; and he carried with him to the Throne a long experience of public affairs and a well-deserved popularity. It was chiefly as a diplomatist that the successor of Tiepolo had distinguished himself in the political arena. In 1245,⁴ he was sent, in conjunction with Reniero Zeno, late Podesta of Bologna, and Giovanni da Canale,⁵ to represent the

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 553).

² Sabellico, *De Venetis Magistratibus*, sign. b. 3 : edit. 1488.

³ Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 554).

⁴ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 356).

⁵ Da Canale contemp. (sect. 115).

Republic at the celebrated Council of Lyons. In 1241,¹ he had been selected to replace Marino Zeno in the government of Candia, at a time when that Island was still fiercely struggling for freedom. The House, to which the new Doge belonged, was one of the highest consideration in the Republic.

The reign of Morosini, which embraced merely the short term of two years and a half, enjoyed a profound tranquillity, for which, according to Da Canale,² the Venetians were indebted principally to the bold and nervous rule of the illustrious Tiepolo. It was, at most, a transitory and deceptive calm. "During his administration, the Venetians enjoyed peace and abundance," writes the same contemporary,³ "and their hearts were light and jubilant." The death of this excellent Prince occurred on the 1st January, 1252. His remains were borne to the church of Saint Mark, where they were interred with a pomp never known before, and where his shield of arms was hung after the exequies.⁴ Morosini was buried in his ducal habit, with the sword buckled round his waist, and the spurs indicative of his equestrian rank; and on his tomb, which was placed in the porch of Saint Mark's, on the northern side of the church, was written this simple epitaph: *Hic requiescit Marinus Morocenus Dux.*⁵

The forty-one electors who were appointed after the

¹ F. Cornaro (*Creta Sacra*, ii. p. 250).

² Sect. 127.

³ Da Canale, *ubi suprâ*.

⁴ Morosini offered the first instance in which such a distinction had been allowed (Harl. MSS. No. 4820; *ibid.* No. 8020).

⁵ Sansovino (lib. iii. p. 94).

obsequies of the Doge for the purpose of naming his successor, made unanimous choice of Reniero, one of the two sons of Pietro Zeno, and Podesta of Fermo, who had at various periods signalized himself equally as a soldier and a diplomatist (25th of January, 1252).

During the vacancy of the Crown, a somewhat remarkable feature was introduced for the first time into the already complex form of the Ducal Election.¹ Before the result of its present deliberations was divulged, the College deputed one of its members, Pietro Foscari, to bind over to its confidence a person as proxy for the Republic; and this individual, having been initiated by Foscari, and having formally demanded the consent and permission of those present, proceeded to swear according to the prescribed manner, in the name of the Venetian People, to accept and acknowledge as their ruler whomever the Forty-One should declare to have elected to be such, agreeably to the constitution and usage of the Commune. Hereupon Foscari signified that the suffrages of the College had united in Reniero Zeno.

This announcement was received with clamorous approbation; and, Marco Ziani, Count of Arbo, the son of the former Doge of that family, having been despatched with a squadron of four galleys to escort his Serenity from Fermo to the seat of his future government, Zeno made his solemn entry into Venice in the *Bucentaur*, on the 18th of February.² The day

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 360).

² Da Canale (sect. 129).

of the coronation was kept as a general holiday. On this occasion, the streets were festooned with garlands; the banners, bearing the family arms richly emblazoned, floated from the windows of the houses; from every balcony were suspended silken draperies; and a galaxy of beauty assembled at the casements and verandahs to see the cavalcade pass. In the afternoon, when the ceremony was concluded, a tournament was held on the Piazza of Saint Mark, in which many members of the equestrian order, as well as several strangers of distinction, bore a part; the tilters were principally, however, Venetian and Trevisan noblemen; and among the former were to be distinguished Marco Ziani and Lorenzo Tiepolo, who drew much admiration by their gallant bearing and knightly address.¹

Zeno, who had filled several high appointments at Bologna and elsewhere, and who has been seen commanding the Bolognese at the celebrated siege² of Ferrara in 1240, aspired to something beyond the narrow sphere of every-day politics. In earlier life, the successor of Marino Morosini had devoted considerable attention to the legal institutions of his country; and he determined to apply himself to the continuation of Tiepolo's great, though unfinished, task of reform. At his hands the five books of the Statute underwent a farther process of enlargement and revision; and, in the course of 1255,³ appeared an improved edition of

¹ Da Canale (sect. 129).

² See ch. x. of the present volume; and Bartolomeo da Pugliola (*Cronica di Bologna, ad annos 1232-40*).

³ Cancianus (*Barbarorum Leges Antiquæ*, v.)

the *Nautical Capitulary* which had been published in the first instance by Pietro Ziani in 1225. The present Capitulary was divided into one hundred and twenty-nine chapters.¹

But affairs of a very different complexion soon absorbed the attention of the Venetian Government. At the period² of the Crusades, it was usual in those cities or towns where the Christians held sway, to assign to each of the mercantile communities which had borne a part in the conquest or recovery of the particular district, a separate quarter where they might have their own mill, their own oven, their own bath, their own weights and measures, their own church, and where they might be governed by their own laws, and protected by their own magistrates; and this salutary rule was observed, with very few exceptions, in all the treaties between the Italian Republics and the early Kings of Jerusalem. At Saint Jean d'Acre, however, the church of Saint Sabbas was frequented by the Venetians and the Genoese in common;³ and it happened that, in course of time, both nations sought to found a right to the exclusive property of the building. The controversy at last grew so serious, that Marco Giustiniani, the Venetian Bailo of Acre, and Consul-General of Syria, wrote, in the course of 1256, to Alexander IV., explaining the circumstances

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 363); Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 558); P. Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 73 (King's MSS. 148).

² *Chronicon Estense*, Ap. Murat. xv. 324.

³ Da Canale contemp. (*Cron.* sect. 152 *et seq.*); Dandolo (lib. x. p. 365); Caffaro (*Ann. Gen.* lib. vi.); Gio. Villani (lib. vi. cap. 60).

in which such a difference had originated, stating the point which it had reached, and earnestly soliciting his interposition. At the same time, the Genoese consul at Saint Jean d'Acre, Simone Vento, addressed a letter to the Prior of the Hospitallers, from whom his republic pretended to have derived the disputed privilege, in which that officer denied the truth of the Venetian representations, placed the whole case in his own light, and concluded by begging at the hands of the Prior a formal confirmation of the right of his fellow-citizens to the disposal of Saint Sabbas's. The Bailo Giustiniani was so far warranted in considering the claim of his countrymen of superior validity, that in the treaties, into which the latter had entered at various times with the early Christian Kings of Jerusalem, it had been distinctly provided, that a third part of Acre, or Ptolemais, including the street in which the church in question was located, should be assigned to their factory as a free and separate quarter. At all events, Alexander at once decided in favour of Giustiniani, who was soon in a position to place in the hands of Vento a Brief, containing the decree of his Holiness on the point at issue. The Genoese, however, setting aside the pontifical award, still persisted in urging the priority of their claim; and the feeling of animosity, which the dispute had engendered between the two factories, became gradually so violent and bitter, that it seemed to be almost impossible, that an open breach could be long postponed. One day, a private quarrel arose on some

indifferent subject between a young Venetian and a Genoese of more advanced years; high words were exchanged; and at last, in a fit of passion, the young man struck his companion a blow.¹ This act fired the blood of the Genoese bystanders, who clamoured for vengeance; and the quarrel had already assumed an alarming aspect, when a certain Genoese captain, Bassoccio Malloni, arrived at Acre with his vessel, having another, which proved itself to be a Venetian, in tow. This second vessel was said to have been taken from a corsair. The Venetians, however, who had flocked to the spot, at once cast discredit on the man's statement, and, violently accusing him of buccaneering practices, they deprived him of his prize. The double insult thus offered to their country carried the indignation of the Genoese to an ungovernable height; they rose in a body, seized their arms, and, profiting by numerical superiority, broke into the Venetian quarter whence, in spite² of the remonstrances of their consul Vento, they drove the whole of the hostile factory, and committed the church of San Sabbas and other buildings to the flames.³

Intelligence of these excesses soon reached the Venetian Government in the shape of a despatch from the Bailo Giustiniani. The Doge hastened to demand full and immediate satisfaction. The deepest regret

¹ Caffaro (*Ann. Gen.* lib. vi.); Sauli (*Colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, i. p. 52).

² Romanin (ii. p. 262).

³ Da Canale synchron. (*Cron. Ven.* sect. 151-160); Caffaro (*Ann. Gen.* lib. vi.); Sauli (*Col. dei Genov. in Galata*, lib. i. pp. 51-5).

was at once expressed by the Genoese Government at the outrage which had been committed; ample indemnification was promised; and a conference was opened on the neutral ground of Bologna for the peaceable adjustment of the difference.¹ To this conference both Powers sent their representatives; and at first the negotiation proceeded smoothly enough. But, in course of time, so many unforeseen difficulties arose, and the diplomatists of the two Powers found themselves so much at variance on several of the points to be discussed, that Venice, losing all patience, withdrew abruptly from the negotiation, and expressed an intention to seek another solution. The rulers of Genoa, however, were most anxious to avoid a rupture; and, after the close of the Congress of Bologna, a formal embassy was accredited to Reniero Zeno, to convey to his Serenity the sorrow of the Genoese Government at the events, which had lately taken place at Acre, and to assure him of the willingness, which existed on its part to make any reasonable concessions. But it was too late. The Government of the Doge had already marked out a different line of policy, from which it declined to swerve; and the members of the Genoese legation were dismissed, after a brief audience of Zeno, with an intimation not to remain in the Venetian dominions after the expiration of three days, at their peril. Having taken this decisive step, the Venetian Government, toward the close of the same year (1256), despatched Lorenzo Tiepolo to Acre with

¹ Sauli (*Colonia*, &c. lib. i. p. 53).

a squadron of thirteen galleys. Tiepolo forced the boom, which lay transversely at the entrance of the harbour, destroyed all the enemy's shipping in the port as well as in the roadstead, and, landing his troops, reduced a considerable portion of their Factory to ashes. The admiral then proceeded to invest the castle of Mongoia,¹ which lay at a short distance from the city, and which was in possession of a Genoese garrison. The place fell after a somewhat lengthened siege quite at the end of 1256 ; and its fall compelled the enemy to demand an armistice for two months, which Tiepolo was persuaded to concede.¹

During the suspension of hostilities, both the belligerents were busily engaged in procuring reinforcements; the Venetians were joined by a small squadron from Candia under Jacopo Muazzo and Pietro Quirini, while ten galleys arrived to the relief of the Genoese from Cyprus, under the command of Pasquale Malloni. Having thus completed their preparations, they impatiently awaited the moment for resuming the offensive ; and, on the expiration of the truce, they hastened to measure their strength in a regular engagement between Acre and Tyre.¹ After a hard and sanguinary contest, the Venetians triumphed ; and five vessels, including the flag-ship which had the Genoese admiral on board, fell into the hands of the victors.

While Lorenzo Tiepolo was dealing so severe a blow at the naval power of Genoa on the shores of the Holy Land, a second squadron of ten galleys, under

¹ Da Canale contemp. (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 153).

Giovanni Doro, swept the waters of the Propontis, and spread the terror of the Venetian name to the very walls of Constantinople. The expedition of Doro, which the Republic had most probably fitted out as an afterthought subsequently to the departure of Tiepolo, extended its ravages along the whole Grecian seaboard, and inflicted dreadful havoc on the large mercantile establishments which had been formed by the enemy in the Levant. These disasters threw the Government and people of Genoa into the utmost dismay; the greatest perturbation prevailed in the capital; and the heart of that proud Republic momentarily failed her, as she beheld every effort attended by a reverse, and every point threatened by a victorious foe. But the maddening reflexion, that it was at the hands of a Power which of all Powers she most hated, that she had suffered this disgrace, soon inspired Genoa with courage to persevere; and, so soon as the elections of 1257 were complete, and the Council of Antients, which was specially designed to assist the new Captain, Guglielmo Boccanegra,¹ in the discharge of his onerous functions at this crisis, had been appointed, she plunged into the contest with fresh vigour.


Having received intelligence in the early part of the year, that the preparations of the enemy for the renewal of hostilities were approaching completion, the Venetian Government resolved to lose no time in reinforcing Tiepolo; and for this purpose twenty galleys, under the orders of Andrea Zeno, the son of Marco

¹ Caffaro (*Ann. Genuenses*, lib. vi. p. 523).

Zeno, the Doge's brother¹ and ten *Taride*, under Paolo Faliero, were despatched to Acre to join the Commander-in-Chief.

Tiepolo, whose squadron was raised by the arrival of Zeno and Faliero to upward of seventy vessels of all sail, now felt himself in a position to move with confidence against any force which might be opposed to him; and in the latter part of June, 1258, the admiral, having left the Bailo Giustiniani with some troops in charge of Acre, put out to sea in quest of the enemy, who was reported to have left the ports of Genoa early

¹ Da Canale contemp. (*Cron. Ven.* sect. 159); Caterino Zeno (*Commentarii del Viaggio in Persia, e dello scoprimento del Isola Frisland, &c. da due fratelli Zeni (Nicolo e Antonio)*). Ven. 1558 : 8°. At p. 44, appears a pedigree of the Zeno family, which is subjoined:—



in the year under the command of Roberto dalla Turca.¹ The Venetians had not proceeded far, when they came in full view of Dalla Turca's squadron; the two fleets encountered each other on the 24th of June, almost on the very spot which had formed the scene of Tiepolo's victory in 1256. Dalla Turca himself, who had become aware of the numerical superiority of the Venetians only when it was too late to retire, was desirous of avoiding a collision, until the reinforcements, for which he had applied to his Government and which he had reason to expect shortly, had joined him. The whole of the 24th of June and the succeeding night passed without bringing any important change. Occasionally, indeed, the Genoese commander, who appeared to be painfully conscious of the predicament in which he had been unexpectedly placed, essayed to weaken the large force opposed to him by segregating a few isolated Venetian vessels. Occasionally, he made an attempt to pierce the enemy's line by suddenly bearing with his whole squadron on one point. But these manœuvres were invariably unsuccessful; and, as the darkness increased, they were necessarily discontinued. At the same time, everything foreboded the approach of a general and perhaps conclusive engagement; and, early on the morning of the 25th, Tiepolo began to get in readiness for action. One of his first cares was to address his men, to prepare them for the probable event, and to animate their courage to the utmost extent. He told these brave hearts, his companions

¹ Da Canale (sect. 162).

in danger and in glory, that it was against those very foes, whom they had beaten only the year before, that he was about to lead them now; he impressed on them the importance of the undertaking, in which they were engaged, exhorting them to bear in mind that on the result depended the honour of Venice and the security of the seas; and he pointed out to them, that it was because their antagonists were sensible of their weakness that they evinced a reluctance to fight. The words of Tiepolo were not lost upon his hearers; from the determined resistance offered by the Genoese, the fortune of war was terribly fluctuating for some time; but the arms of the Republic were finally victorious. 2,600 of the enemy were made prisoners;¹ five-and-twenty of their galleys became prizes of war; the rest were dispersed and put to flight. After the battle, Tiepolo finding it necessary to refit the vessels which had suffered more severely, returned to Acre where his troops, not content with their splendid triumph, sullied their laurels by breaking into the Genoese quarter, demolishing all the public buildings and private dwelling-houses, ransacking the stores, and pilfering the valuable effects of the owners, or, in the excess of their wantonness and malice, scattering them among the bystanders. To such gross acts of violence did the rancorous hatred, engendered by commercial rivalry, hurry the two most civilized communities in the most civilized portion of medieval Europe.

Meanwhile, the war in the East between the Vene-

¹ G. Diedo (i. p. 93.)

tians and the Genoese was arresting general attention. A feud so deadly and protracted, arising on such trivial grounds between two nations which had formerly signalized their courage and valour as the champions of the Cross, fighting side by side in the same righteous cause, was naturally deplored by all Christian Powers; and the Apostolic See, peculiarly solicitous for the restoration of peace, at length succeeded, by an alternation of threats and intreaties, in prevailing on the belligerents to desist from their work of blood. After the second battle of Acre, in which the arms of Genoa had experienced such a terrible blow, there was an evident disposition on the part of that Commune to come to terms; and the Republic herself, whose attention was absorbed by the affairs of Italy, was equally disposed to listen to any honourable overtures which might be made to her of a pacific nature. At the same time, it was probably useless to expect that either would condescend to take the initiative; and his Holiness, observing the mutual tendency, now came forward as a mediator. The papal influence was exerted with effect. Both Powers consented to send plenipotentiaries to a second conference which, in conformity with Alexander's wish, was held at Rome. The Doge accredited Giovanni da Canale, Filippo Storlado, and Marco Quirini;¹ the Genoese Republic selected as her ambassadors extraordinary four of her leading citizens: while Pisa who had, in common with the Levantine factories of Pro-

¹ Da Canale contemp. (*Cron. Ven.* sect. 172).

vence and Marseilles, occasionally lent her assistance to the Republic during the war, and who had other interests to watch at the approaching congress, was represented by one of her most eminent jurists, Reniero Murzuppo, doctor of laws.¹ The result was, that a truce with exchange of prisoners was concluded between Venice and Genoa; that the latter acquiesced, however reluctantly, in the demolition of her principal strongholds at Acre; and that the Tyrians, the allies of Genoa, were prohibited from hoisting the banner of Saint George on entering the port of Acre, or from having a factory in that place.

The peace, however, was very ephemeral; and it is remarkable that it was an act on the part of the Holy See itself which formed the introduction to a fresh rupture. At a mixed council of laymen and clergy, convened about two years after the ratification of the Truce by the Bishop of Bethlehem, papal legate in Palestine, a demand was preferred by the Legate, in the name of the Pope, for the surrender to him, at the hands of the Pisan and Genoese authorities, of all the fortified places within the precincts of Acre. With this call the Consuls of Pisa and Genoa joined in a decided refusal to comply; and in that refusal they received the entire approbation of their respective Governments.²

Amid all the changes in the political aspect of Europe since 1237, Baldwin II. still continued to

¹ Caffaro (*Annales Genuenses*, lib. vi. p. 526).

² Romanin (ii. p. 266).

occupy the throne of Constantinople. Baldwin was one of those feeble, undecided characters, so common in history, whose misfortune it has been to be born to a throne. Since his accession, the Latin monarchy had been declining at a pace of increased rapidity; and the seeds of decay, sown in other days by vice and licentiousness, had at last come to ripeness. The situation in which the Emperor was placed was indeed truly deplorable, and the difficulties with which he had to cope were such as might well have appalled a man of far greater firmness and of far stronger nerve. The spirit of the Latin conquerors was effete, and their numbers were thinned by death or desertion. Few of those who joined the Fifth Crusade had formed permanent settlements in Romania. The exchequer was empty. The sources of revenue were intercepted or dried up. Private corruption and public misery were at their climax. Enemies, who were too conscious of its weakness, environed the slender remnant of the dominions of Baldwin of Flanders on every side.

It was about this period that Saint Louis, anxious to alleviate the distress of the Emperor, had ordered subscriptions to be opened at Constantinople in Baldwin's favour for a loan of 1,000 livres *tournois*;¹ and at the same time some members of the Cappello family at Venice commissioned the Bailo of the Republic to borrow in their name, and transfer to the imperial treasury, a sum of 3,000² *perperi*, for the repayment

¹ Romanin (ii. p. 268).

² Ducange (i. p. 339).

of the money, Philip,¹ Valet of Constantinople, remaining at Venice as a bond. But the relief afforded by these small advances was slight, as well as of a purely transient character: nor were the other expedients to which Baldwin had recourse more permanently effectual. The truth was, that the whole body-politic was distempered, and that the distemper was too deeply seated and of too old a growth to be cured by any ordinary remedies. Everything announced the approach of a crisis; and the crisis soon came.

It will be sufficient to glance at the Revolution of 1261, by which the Latin-Byzantine Empire, after a duration of fifty-seven years, was overthrown in a single day, and by which the empire of the Greeks was restored in the person of Michael Palæologus, Prince of Nicæa.

About two years anterior to the political convulsion, which proved itself fatal to the Courtenay dynasty, the proclivity of the Latin Empire to decay had become so marked, and its inability to maintain its ground against its enemies so palpable, that the Republic, perhaps with the concurrence of Baldwin, perhaps under the pretext merely of watching the interests of her own subjects, established a species of protectorate over Constantinople, by stationing a squadron in the Bosphorus amounting to thirty galleys-of-war. The present commander on that station was Jacopo Quirini.² It happened that Quirini was just now engaged, in conjunction with

¹ Ducange (i. p. 339).

² Dandolo (lib. x. p. 367); and Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 560).

Marco Gradenigo, Bailo of Constantinople, in an expedition, having as its object the reduction of Daphnusia on the coast of Thrace, at a considerable distance from the Capital; the admiral and his colleague were not apprised of the design of Palæologus, till it was already too late to avert the catastrophe; and they returned only in time to receive on board the Emperor himself and the Venetian Patriarch, Pantaleone Giustiniani. Baldwin had been deprived of the aid of Quirini, when it would have been invaluable; and the Republic was thus deceived in the hope, which she had fondly cherished, of retaining Constantinople in the hands of the Latins. Quirini and Gradenigo, abandoning the idea of resistance, sailed for Venice, where the announcement of the crisis raised a feeling of the most bitter vexation.¹ The ill-judged and fatal proceeding of Gradenigo, who had been the instigator of the expedition to Daphnusia,² was not suffered by the Venetian Government to pass uncensured; and his reception as well as that of Quirini by the country at large, more especially by the commercial world, was not of a very cordial or flattering description.³

Michael Palæologus made his solemn entry into Constantinople on the 26th of July, 1261;⁴ his presence had the effect of restoring order and discipline among the troops of his general Strategopulos, which had previously been guilty of the grossest excesses; and

¹ Sandi (ii. p. 660 *et seq.*)

² Ducange (i. p. 345).

³ Da Canale contemp. (*Cronaca*, sect. 175).

⁴ Ducange, *ubi suprâ*.

one of the points, which engaged the earliest attention of the Emperor, was the establishment of the relations of the Byzantine Court with the mercantile factories of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, on a footing nearly similar to that on which they had stood before the Revolution of 1204. The two former were at once confirmed in the enjoyment of their antient immunities, and the local jurisdiction of their Baili and Consuls respectively was allowed. But the Genoese, to whom Palæologus was under peculiar obligations, and to whose zealous co-operation the success of his undertaking was in some measure owing, received a more ample share of his favour. As a recompense for these and other services, the island of Scio, which had formerly belonged to Venice, was now made a Port, where the Genoese alone might be exempt from the payment of all dues or tolls; and the monastery, contiguous to the church of Pantocrator, which had, down to the present time, been the usual residence of the Venetian Bailo, was assigned to the Genoese Podesta. As, however, from their number and strength coupled with their litigious disposition, an apprehension arose that the continuance of the favoured merchants in the capital of the Empire would be productive of danger, they were shortly afterward transferred by Palæologus to Heraclea on the Euxine. Nor was it long before the headquarters of the Genoese factory were again shifted. For, either at their own request, or by a spontaneous act on the part of their patron, they were recalled in the course of a few months, and placed in

exclusive possession of the spacious suburb of Galata, while their rivals of Pisa and Venice, who were less numerous, and in consequence less formidable, were suffered to remain in their original quarter.

In the transformation of Scio into a Genoese trading station, the Republic was clearly a loser by the recent change. But the loss of Scio was not the only respect in which the fall of the Courtenays had operated to the detriment of Venetian interests. Negropont for which, since the period of the Fifth Crusade, the family of De Carcero had done the Republic homage and had paid her tribute, and which was commercially valuable, was also seized, shortly after the accession of Michael, by his favourites the Genoese, who expelled the Venetian local authorities. On these two grounds the Government of the Doge had strong reason to be dissatisfied with the Revolution and its authors: nor was it long before it lifted its voice in complaint and remonstrance. In the autumn of 1261, Marco Giustiniani, ex-Bailo of Acre, was again called into active employment by his selection as ambassador extraordinary to the Courts of France and Spain. His instructions were to detail all the circumstances connected with the usurpation of Palæologus, to communicate the unfair treatment which his country had experienced at the hands of that Prince, to represent the danger which might arise to Catholic Europe from the re-establishment of an heterodox Power at the Golden Horn, and to urge the adoption by the Western nations of some measures in concert with Venice for the restora-

tion of the exiled dynasty, and for the deposition of the schismatical Emperor.¹ Michele Doro was accredited by Zeno, for a similar purpose,² to the Court of the Vatican.

The reception of the Venetian ambassadors was sufficiently encouraging to presage a successful result. Their representations were appreciated. Their plans received every attention. But, whatever might be the inclination of Saint Louis and Urban IV. to enter into the views of Zeno and his advisers, or whatever might be their anxiety to reinstate the line of the Courtenays, neither was in a position to embark in an enterprise so vast and so dubious; and the Western Powers contented themselves with professions of a general and vague tenor. Part of the truth was that military pilgrimages were neither so fashionable nor so popular as they had been; *Crusade* was becoming a byword; and the spirit of enthusiasm, which animated the De Bouillons and the De Montforts, was now leading mankind in a direction more obviously suggestive of progressive civilization.

The Republic was not, however, to be thwarted in her object by the failure of her diplomatic efforts; and, as it appeared impossible to prevail on other Powers to second her in the vindication of her wrongs, she determined to take up the quarrel single-handed. Preparations for a Græco-Genoese war were accordingly begun in the winter of 1261 with characteristic activity; and, in the course of a few months, two naval arma-

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 370).

² Ibid.

ments were fitted out in readiness for the approaching campaign. The one, consisting of eighteen galleys under Marco Michieli, had orders to proceed to the Mediterranean for the protection of the Venetian flag in the Levant, which the ascendancy of Genoa had exposed to danger and insult. The other, composed of thirty sail under Jacopo Dolfino, pointed its course toward the Black Sea with a similar object. It was to the operations of the more powerful squadron that the Ducal Government attached chief importance; and in pursuance of a decree, which passed the Legislative Body in 1262, all the officers serving under Dolfino were selected from the Great Council.¹ For it was felt that with those who had the largest stake in its welfare, the honour of the Land was in safest keeping. The operations of the Mediterranean fleet were, indeed, few and unimportant; and at the death of Marco Michieli, which occurred in a sudden manner a short time after his arrival in the Morea,² a junction was effected between the two squadrons, the undivided command of which was allowed to devolve on Dolfino. The latter, whose force was thus raised to forty-eight sail, having received intelligence that the Genoese fleet had been seen in the direction of Thessalonica, made for that place, and invited the enemy to an action. But the Genoese commander, perceiving that the movements of his adversary had intercepted his expected reinforcement from home and his communication with the Greeks, and distrustful of his ability

¹ Navagiero (*Storia Veneziana*, p. 999).² Marin (iv. p. 315).

to engage with his present strength so large a force, declined to abandon the unassailable position which he had adopted in the port of Thessalonica;¹ and Dolfino, at last losing patience, hoisted sail for Negropont. That island was speedily recovered from the hands of the Genoese; and the authority of the local representative of the Republic was re-established with as little difficulty as it had been lately overthrown. This important result having been accomplished, Dolfino prepared to return to Venice. About the same period an expedition was fitted out by De Carcerò,² Grand Feudatory of Negropont, at the suggestion of the Venetians, against the Emperor Palæologus; it consisted of a few ships of war which were equipped, in all probability, either partly or entirely at the cost of the Republic; and so little vigilance was exhibited by the Byzantine Court, that it was suffered to extend its ravages without interruption within sight of the walls of Constantinople. But on their return to Negropont, the vessels of De Carcerò were intercepted by some Greek cruisers; no quarter was given; the greater part of the crews were murdered in cold blood; and the remainder were committed to the mercy of the Emperor, who at once caused them to be put to a cruel death.³

The next campaign was somewhat more fertile in incident. The Venetian fleet of two-and-thirty sail, under the command of Gilberto Dandolo of San Moisé, confronted the Genoese of thirty-nine strong, under

¹ Da Canale contemp. (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 175).

² Dandolo (lib. x. p. 370).

³ Romanin (lib. vi.)

the joint charge of Pietro Grimaldi and Peschetto Mallone, off Sette Pozzi in the Morea; the contest was fierce and terrible; the weather was exceedingly rough; the advantage of numbers was on the side of the Genoese; and, although the Venetians might counterbalance to some extent their want of strength by the valour and determination with which they kept their ground, the victory soon inclined to the foe. So precarious, indeed, did the result appear, that Dandolo began to grow uneasy, and even to contemplate a retreat. Affairs wore this sinister aspect, when five-and-twenty of the enemy's vessels were suddenly observed to bear off under the apparent influence of an impression that the Venetians were too much discomfited to renew the combat. The effect of this proceeding upon the mind of Dandolo was electrical; the rallying word was instantaneously given and as instantaneously obeyed; not a moment was wasted in expressions of astonishment; and the self-possession of the admiral, seconded by the heroism of those under him, retrieved the fortune of the day. Thinned in numbers, and taken completely by surprise, their late conquerors were unable to offer a protracted resistance to the forces of the Republic; and, after an obstinate struggle, they were compelled to retreat with the loss of four vessels out of fourteen, and of one of the Admirals, Pietro Grimaldi, who fell in the heat of the action.¹ The galleys which escaped took shelter in the port of Malvasia.

¹ Da Canale (*Cronaca Veneta*, sect. 180 *et seq.*); Sauli (lib. ii. p. 71).

In the battle of Sette-Pozzi, the Genoese lost about 1,000 men, of whom 600 had fallen. The victors themselves were sufferers to the extent of 20 killed and 400 wounded, exclusive of prisoners. It happened, however, that several hundred Genoese, who had been taken during the war, were already confined in the dungeons of the Ducal Palace; the late victory considerably swelled the number; and at the intercession of the Heads of several religious Houses in Venice and elsewhere, a complete exchange of prisoners was almost immediately effected.

But the triumph at Sette Pozzi was not one on which Venice was able, even had she been willing, to repose. The Genoese chafed too severely at their defeat to think of peace; and the mutual animosity was soon strengthened and embittered by the seizure of four Venetian storeships off Malvasia.

In the same year, the Mediterranean squadron was raised from thirty-two to forty-five sail; and Gilberto Dandolo having been sent, in the interval, to supersede Lorenzo Tiepolo as Bailo of Negropont, the post of commander-in-chief of the naval forces was assigned by the Doge to Andrea Barozzi, assisted by two civilians, Giovanni Tiepolo and Raffaello Bettano.¹

On leaving Venice, Barozzi made in the first instance for the coast of Sicily, where he had been led to suppose that he should find a Genoese fleet under Simone Grillo. But on arriving in the Sicilian waters, the Venetian admiral fell in with a small craft,

¹ Da Canale (sect. 194 *et seq.*)

from the crew of which he learned that the objects of his search had been seen in that neighbourhood, but that they had put out to sea three days since, and, as it was generally believed, had sailed for the Holy Land. Barozzi, not suspecting any deception, acted at once on the information received, and followed in the pursuit.

In the meantime, Grillo, having succeeded in eluding observation, again put out to sea, and directed his course toward Durazzo, where he was not without some expectation of falling in with a force with which he might find it less difficult to cope. It happened, indeed, at this juncture, that one of those caravans which set out annually from Venice for the Oriental trade, was making way for Saint Jean d'Acre under the conduct of the *Roccaforte* man-of-war, commanded by Michele Doro. The convoy consisted of twelve merchantmen, well armed and equipped: the *Roccaforte* was accounted the most powerful vessel in the service; and even if Barozzi had not already defeated the Genoese admiral, whose force was understood¹ by Zeno and his advisers to be in a very poor state of efficiency, the Venetian Government conceived that it had no ground of anxiety for Doro and his charge.

The Genoese commander, however, having ascertained that his more formidable antagonist was beyond

¹ Letter of the Doge to Michele Doro, Captain of the *Roccaforte* (8th September, 1264). The length of the keel of the *Roccaforte* was 110 feet. See Filiasi (*Ricerche Storiche*, p. 236).

reach, shifted his course, and bore down swiftly on his intended prey, of whose movements he had taken care to keep himself exactly informed. Doro, on his part, receiving information of the danger which threatened him in sufficient time to adopt proper measures of defence, at once prepared for action. But as the enemy approached, the captain of the *Roccaforte*, from ignorance of the actual inferiority of the Genoese considering that he scarcely possessed adequate means of resistance, expeditiously transferred the crews and the more valuable portion of the cargoes of the convoy to his own flagship, and, abandoning the traders themselves off the island of Saso, near Durazzo, set all sail for Ragusa, which he had the good fortune to reach in safety (July—August, 1264).

On his arrival at Ragusa, Doro at once addressed a despatch to the Government of Reniero Zeno, explaining the circumstance which had taken place, and attempting to vindicate his conduct. He farther desired to be instructed whether he should remain in his present position, or should resume his voyage to Acre. The letter of the Doge in reply,¹ which arrived toward the close of September, 1264, and was dated on the 8th of the month, was by no means of a flattering or satisfactory character. It was couched, on the contrary, in a tone of severe censure and bitter reproach. “This affair,” wrote Zeno, “is viewed here with a mingled feeling of sorrow and indignation.

¹ Zeno's letter, as above.

It is universally regarded as a disgrace to the Venetian name ; and there is no part of the world where it will not be speedily known that thirteen Venetian ships, including the largest which we possess, have retreated before sixteen ill-manned and inefficient Genoese. The step which you have taken admits no justification ; it is one calculated to throw the greatest discredit on your country, and to afford our enemies room for infinite ridicule and exultation. Assuredly, the examples of Lorenzo Tiepolo, of Andrea Zeno, of Gilberto Dandolo, ought to have inspired you and those about you with a better courage." " Although," continued his Serenity, " the Great Council has devoted several sittings to a consideration of the subject, that body is still unable to arrive at any decision, and much difference of opinion still exists as to the course which it may be most proper to pursue in the emergency. As you are there, however (*i.e.* at Acre), and must necessarily be better acquainted with the circumstances in which you are situated than any one not on the spot, we have concurred with our Privy Council in the expediency of allowing you to act, as regards your ulterior movements, according to your own discretion."

From the reports brought to him, Grillo was naturally led to expect a large and valuable booty ; and it may be imagined that he was not slightly disappointed to find in his new prizes little beyond the refuse of their former cargoes. But the Genoese commander was soon roused from his reflexions by the intelligence

that Barozzi was again on his track; and as he was not disposed to hazard dependence on the stratagem which had just succeeded so unexpectedly, and was far from anxious to risk an engagement, Grillo stood at once for the Riviera. Barozzi having swept the whole line of coast, and meeting with no sign of an enemy, had no course left but to retrace his steps; it was not till he reached the Sicilian waters, that he was apprised of the seizure of the convoy and of the escape of Doro, and that he saw to the full extent the error which he had committed, as well as the manner in which he had been duped by his antagonist. Surely he had ample ground for feeling dissatisfied with himself; and he might, perhaps, be already haunted by the consciousness that there were others at home who would not be too friendly in their criticism. If any opportunity had existed of palliating his fault, it now existed no longer; Grillo had vanished; the winter was setting in fast; and, as no object could be gained by remaining in his present position, Barozzi pursued his voyage direct to Venice, where it may be conjectured from the tone of the letter which Zeno had already addressed to Captain Doro,¹ that his conduct met its share of censure from the Government of the Doge.

But the decisive blow was soon about to be struck. Early in 1265, the Governors of Zara, Candia, and Negropont were commanded to take immediate steps toward furnishing contingents for the approaching war;

¹ *Vide suprâ.*

and the Republic prepared to resume the offensive. Barozzi, whose late conduct had excited general dissatisfaction, was not permitted to retain the post of commander-in-chief; his place was supplied by Jacopo Dandolo, a naval officer of considerable experience, who was recommended to notice by his intimate knowledge of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

Dandolo sailed from Venice with not more than four galleys in company; he was reinforced near Zara by three others, which had been sent by that fief as her contingent; an equal number joined him from Candia;¹ and, before the fleet reached Ragusa, it had received a farther accession of strength from the arrival of Marco Zeno, the Doge's nephew, with four galleys contributed by the Bailo of Negropont. At Negropont, Marco Gradenigo, ex-Governor of the Venetian factory at Constantinople, was awaiting the arrival of the admiral with ten men-of-war; and the whole squadron, thus raised to six-and-twenty sail, then pointed its course for the coast of Sicily. It was between Trapani and Val di Mazara,² ground already rendered historical by the great victory of Giovanni Trevisano in 1214, that Dandolo confronted the Genoese armament of twenty-eight galleys under Lanfranco Barborino.³ The combat, to which old recollections lent a certain degree of inspiration, was fierce, but short; it terminated in a signal triumph on the part of the Venetians; and the

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 372).

² Marin (ix. p. 320).

³ Johannes Trithemius, Archbishop of Genoa (*Chronicon Genuense* Ap. Murat. ix. 50).

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Republic. From his accession to the throne down to the present time, the Emperor had continued to exhibit a marked predilection for the Genoese, with whom he established friendly relations even before his usurpation of the imperial crown, and who had largely contributed to the success of that daring project. If his Majesty had courted the Venetians, it was because he feared their power; if he had cultivated the Pisans, it was because he had reason to apprehend the formation of a hostile league between Venice and Pisa. But the star of Genoa seemed now to be on the wane. One disaster, great and signal indeed, yet assuredly neither greater nor more signal than many which she had experienced in years passed, shook the faith of Palæologus in an old and steady ally; and it began to be forcibly apparent to him that Venice was the Power whose friendship it was most his interest to conciliate, and whose enmity he had chief cause to dread. Under such circumstances, the Emperor was not long in coming to a determination to abandon his former favourites, and to make pacific overtures to the Republic. In selecting an instrument to carry his newly formed purpose into effect, Palæologus fixed on Arrigo Trevisano, a Venetian of rank who had been kept in confinement for some time at Constantinople,¹ and by whose unsolicited enlargement he hoped to create a favourable impression in a quarter, where at present it was so much to be desired.

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But the propositions, of which Trevisano was the bearer, were hardly so favourably entertained as the Emperor, viewing the matter, perhaps, exclusively in its commercial aspect, had persuaded himself to anticipate.¹ The fact was, that these propositions had immediate relevancy to a question on which the public mind of Venice was still much divided. What course it was best, on the whole, to follow in regard to the Byzantine empire, was a point which still sorely puzzled Venetian politicians. Some had an undisguised predilection for the old Courtenay dynasty, and were impatient to witness its restoration. Others declared themselves favourable to the new one. A third party began to canvass afresh the half-forgotten scheme of 1222 for the transfer of the seat of the Republic to Constantinople. A majority in the Great Council, however, argued fairly enough, from the practical failure of the embassies of Doro and Giustiniani in 1261, as well as from other unmistakeable evidences, that, on the part of the Western Powers generally, there was either slight inclination or slight ability to co-operate in the restoration of the Courtenay line ;

¹ Romanin (lib. vi.)

they maintained that whatever might, from motives of interest or glory, be the readiness of the Republic individually to embark in such an enterprise, it was sheer madness to think of stemming the current single-handed; and they were tempted to inquire whether, should the deposed House be reinstated on the throne, it would prove itself more capable than before of defending its own possessions, and whether it would not constantly require external support.

On the other hand, there was still a class of statesmen who, in the face of all contrary experience, fondly cling to the chimerical notion that, by the rescue of Constantinople from the hands of the schismatists, their country would greatly benefit itself both in a political and commercial respect; and they indulged a romantic belief, that it was the high destiny of the Venetians, treading in the footsteps of patrician Rome, to become the founders of an Empire, which should extend from the Euxine to the Adriatic. If men of more cautious and sombre temperament proceeded to represent the vast difficulties of any such undertaking, arising from the apathy of the rest of Catholic Europe, objecting the impregnable situation of Constantinople, the reviving energy of the Greeks, the new-birth of the national spirit under the auspices of a better government, the personal talents of Palæologus, the disordered and precarious state of Italy, and lastly, the humiliating consequences of defeat, these bolder politicians ceased not to urge that the distinction and advantage, which must surely attend success, would

amply repay the risk and outlay ; that it had ever been the practice of the Venetians to hazard much where much was to be won, and that to play an inactive part in such a cause, was both unworthy of the national character and injurious to the national interests.

The more prudent counsels, however, ultimately triumphed ; the necessary steps were at once taken for opening a negotiation with Palæologus ; and a treaty was signed on the 18th of June, 1265. The ratifications, however, were not exchangeable until the sanction of the Doge had been obtained ; and it created some surprise at Constantinople, when it was announced that the Government of Zeno disapproved of the proceedings of its representatives, who had, as it pretended, exceeded their instructions, and ignored the instrument signed by Jacopo Dolfino and Giacomo Contarini. It was now made to appear that the Venetian Executive had never entertained a notion of concluding a peace, such as that to which the ambassadors were led to give their adhesion, and that it had simply intended to grant a truce for a limited term of years ; and the Republic remaining firm in her resolution, Palæologus was forced to yield. The question, however, was not finally dismissed, nor were all minor differences adjusted, without extraordinary difficulty and delay. Palæologus and his ministers, not particularly flattered perhaps by the manner in which they had been treated, or by the tone which Venice had adopted throughout the transaction, indulged their resentment by creating impediments where

none existed, and by raising paltry objections. At all events, the truce to which the Venetian Government pointed, as the utmost concession that it was disposed, at present, to make, was not concluded till June, 1268, precisely three years after the signature of the original treaty. The truce was restricted in its duration to a period of five years. By one of the articles, Venetian subjects were declared to be at liberty to export corn from the Lower Empire in every case, where the price fell below half a *perpero* a bushel; while by another the Genoese were admitted to a full share in all the advantages accruing from the armistice.¹

The Genoese, although they might, by a special arrangement, have been admitted to a participation in the advantages of the new armistice without otherwise committing themselves to its provisions, were far from disposed at present to restore the sword to the scabbard. The humiliating reverse at Trapani was still too vivid in their recollection to allow them to think of peace; and they were still writhing under a keen sense of the national disgrace. To wipe out the dark stain by prosecuting the war with increased vigour appeared therefore to be the only course which the Podesta of Genoa and his advisers could now follow, at all compatibly with the honour and true interests of the commonwealth; and they felt that such a policy might be pursued with the certainty of obtaining the hearty concurrence and support of the

¹ Romanin (lib. vi.)

that Barozzi was again on his track; and as he was not disposed to hazard dependence on the stratagem which had just succeeded so unexpectedly, and was far from anxious to risk an engagement, Grillo stood at once for the Riviera. Barozzi having swept the whole line of coast, and meeting with no sign of an enemy, had no course left but to retrace his steps; it was not till he reached the Sicilian waters, that he was apprised of the seizure of the convoy and of the escape of Doro, and that he saw to the full extent the error which he had committed, as well as the manner in which he had been duped by his antagonist. Surely he had ample ground for feeling dissatisfied with himself; and he might, perhaps, be already haunted by the consciousness that there were others at home who would not be too friendly in their criticism. If any opportunity had existed of palliating his fault, it now existed no longer; Grillo had vanished; the winter was setting in fast; and, as no object could be gained by remaining in his present position, Barozzi pursued his voyage direct to Venice, where it may be conjectured from the tone of the letter which Zeno had already addressed to Captain Doro,¹ that his conduct met its share of censure from the Government of the Doge.

But the decisive blow was soon about to be struck. Early in 1265, the Governors of Zara, Candia, and Negropont were commanded to take immediate steps toward furnishing contingents for the approaching war;

¹ *Vide suprâ.*

and the Republic prepared to resume the offensive. Barozzi, whose late conduct had excited general dissatisfaction, was not permitted to retain the post of commander-in-chief; his place was supplied by Jacopo Dandolo, a naval officer of considerable experience, who was recommended to notice by his intimate knowledge of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

Dandolo sailed from Venice with not more than four galleys in company; he was reinforced near Zara by three others, which had been sent by that fief as her contingent; an equal number joined him from Candia;¹ and, before the fleet reached Ragusa, it had received a farther accession of strength from the arrival of Marco Zeno, the Doge's nephew, with four galleys contributed by the Bailo of Negropont. At Negropont, Marco Gradenigo, ex-Governor of the Venetian factory at Constantinople, was awaiting the arrival of the admiral with ten men-of-war; and the whole squadron, thus raised to six-and-twenty sail, then pointed its course for the coast of Sicily. It was between Trapani and Val di Mazara,² ground already rendered historical by the great victory of Giovanni Trevisano in 1214, that Dandolo confronted the Genoese armament of twenty-eight galleys under Lanfranco Barborino.³ The combat, to which old recollections lent a certain degree of inspiration, was fierce, but short; it terminated in a signal triumph on the part of the Venetians; and the

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 372).

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great body of the people. For there were few circumstances, indeed, under which a war with the Venetians was otherwise than popular at Genoa; and such a war not unfrequently presented an additional feature of recommendation in the eyes of the government, as being among the most effectual methods of soothing internal agitation. In the present instance, there was scarcely room to doubt that the announcement of an intention to carry the struggle to a satisfactory termination would meet with a cordial welcome; and the Genoese authorities decided on resuming the offensive at the earliest period, and on endeavouring to repair the fortunes of their republic shipwrecked at Trapani.

The operations of the new campaign, however, consisted chiefly of a series of unimportant expeditions and petty acts of hostility. Sometimes the Venetians obtained a trifling advantage over the enemy with the capture of a few galleys.¹ The Genoese, in their turn, occasionally contrived to intercept an unprotected Venetian merchantman; and, in one instance, a Genoese squadron made a descent on the island of Candia, committed the metropolis to pillage, and carried off 350 prisoners.² But these desultory and piratical exploits mainly tended to embitter the international animosity, while they illustrated the excesses to which the two most enlightened nations of Europe were driven by the force of jealousy and pride.

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. ch. 7).

² Sandi (ii. p. 671); Vincens (*Histoire de Genes*. i. p. 342).

Yet it was impossible that the other Western Powers should fail to be struck by the wonderful vitality of Genoa, and by the alike surprising resources of her great opponent. The apparent facility with which two small States, almost equally inconsiderable in point of territory and population, had during the War fitted out fleet after fleet, and one expedition after another, was calculated to astonish Palæologus and his ministers hardly less than, in an earlier age, it had astonished the rude peasantry of Champagne and the courtiers of Philip Augustus.

The unrelaxed vigour and enthusiasm which marked the conduct of the foreign wars of Venice, was due in great measure to the thoroughly national character of a Navy, manned by seamen and commanded by officers who had the honour and interest of their country at heart, and who by the system of amalgamating the Navy and the merchant service in one body of mercantile marine, were at once enabled to familiarize themselves with every species of hardship, and to carry their professional knowledge to the highest perfection.¹

The Doge Marino Morosini dying in January, 1252,

¹ Thus, in time of peace, the merchant service formed an excellent nursery and training-school for the navy, the only inconvenience of the system being, that when war happened to break out, private traders sometimes placed an obstacle in the way of recruiting, by offering a premium to sailors. But the government usually obtained, in such cases, a prohibitive resolution of the Great Council, or the Council of Forty, of which the general form was:—" *Quod mercatores non possint dare majus soldum quam datur pro nostro Communi.*"—See Romanin (vol. ii. p. 332).

had outlived by more than a twelvemonth the Emperor Frederic II., who breathed his last at Ferentino in the Capitanate on the 13th December, 1250. With all his vices and faults Frederic was assuredly a great man and a great prince. He was not only one of the most illustrious statesmen, but one of the most highly cultivated scholars of the age.¹ His countrymen, whose veneration for his character and name partook largely of idolatry, received the first rumour of his death with an incredulous smile; the authentication of the sad intelligence drew a pang from the bosom of Germany, which found an echo in every loyal heart. When the hand, which had once wielded so much power, was cold and nerveless in death, the tyranny of the man, his arbitrary acts, his cruelties, his exactions, his arrogant and overbearing disposition, seemed to be forgotten. Nothing appeared to survive, save the memory of his genius, his courage, and his misfortunes. If any solace remained to the generation of Germans which had lost him, it was to be sought in the belief, which soon gained currency among the large body of the people, that their Emperor had gone for a while only to the resting-place of the mighty dead, and that he would return hereafter and unite under his equable and beneficent sway all the nations of the earth.

Frederic II. left four sons, of whom two, Conrad and Henry, were legitimate, and the remaining two, Henzius, titular King of Sardinia, and Manfred, Prince

¹ Gio. Villani, *ad annum*. ed. 1823.

of Tarentum, were natural. Manfred, in a greater measure than any of the other children of Frederic, inherited his character and genius. But Conrad, the elder, was declared his successor; and, in the event of a failure of issue, the heir presumptive was his brother Henry. But, from the rapid development which the Municipal System had received in the Peninsula, it might be safely predicted that the new emperor would not be allowed to assume the seven crowns which had glittered on his parent's brows without a struggle.

The successor of Frederic embraced an early conviction, that to sustain the undivided weight of the Septuple Crown was beyond his power; and the government of Naples and Apulia was soon suffered to devolve upon Manfred, while Henry took possession of Sicily. That it was not long before the viceregent power of Manfred in the south of Italy was consolidated, may be judged from the fact, that, shortly after his accession the Doge Zeno accredited to that Prince Pancrazio Barbo, for the purpose of obtaining at his hands a recognition and renewal of the mercantile treaties into which the Republic had entered with his father Frederic. The mission of Barbo was perfectly successful.¹

But while the Venetians sought on commercial grounds to cultivate the friendship of Manfred, the high considerations which led them at the outset to incline to the popular side, had gained rather than lost weight. The position, however, in which the

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 365).

Republic stood toward the Guelphs was somewhat anomalous and abnormal. Her alliance with them was more in the nature of a spontaneous adhesion than in that of a binding engagement; and, while she remained favourably disposed toward the League, she reserved to herself the faculty of free action. On the part of so great a State, such a line of proceeding was both natural and necessary. The Venetians felt that to have involved themselves by a closer connexion in every petty difference which might happen to arise between the Guelphs and their opponents, or between one member of the Guelphic faction and another, would have been eminently undignified, even though they could, without the danger of an open breach with the Emperor, have made a public declaration of their adhesion to the Democratic Union. At the same time, therefore, that the Government seldom neglected an opportunity of promoting the success of the liberal cause, and of lending its help to the erection of a large number of petty Municipal Boroughs on the ruins of the antient kingdom of Alboin, it was careful to adopt, in general, that cautious and far-sighted policy, by which it preserved a good understanding with both political sections, yet compromised itself with neither.

The successes of the Imperialists in Sicily and Apulia under Prince Manfred had the necessary effect of imparting fresh vigour to the Ghibellines in the North; and the same cause, combined with the death of Frederic II., tended to increase the personal in-

fluence of Eccelino. That heartless and infamous man who, in the course of a few years, had raised himself to a bad eminence by the basest expedients, stood at present almost on the loftiest pinnacle of his power; the terror of his name extended far and wide; and no disposition was evinced by him to renounce his projects of aggrandizement, until the whole Trevisan March, perhaps all Lombardy, was within his grasp. Romano already reigned paramount over Padua, Vicenza, and Verona. His brother Alberigo, a notorious trimmer, but with whom he was at present on friendly terms, was master of Treviso. The tyrant also counted, in case of emergency, on the support of several feudatories in the March with whom he had prudently contracted alliances, and who possessed considerable influence at Cremona, Piacenza, and Parma; and it was far from unlikely that the political contest, which was pending at Brescia between the two rival Factions, would soon wear an aspect sufficiently favourable to the Ghibelline interest to enable Eccelino to offer his mediation. Such were the prospects of the Imperialists. The strength of the democratic party, on the other hand, lay principally in Mantua, Milan, Ferrara, and Bologna.¹ The first-mentioned place was retained in a sort of feudal dependence by the Counts of San Bonifacio, who were devoted to the Holy See, and bitterly hostile to the House of Romano. Milan, the finest fortress in the kingdom, had at all times been distinguished by the zeal with which she fought,

¹ Sismondi (ii. ch. ix.)

and by the fortitude with which she suffered, in the popular cause. Bologna was a powerful republic, with a well-organized Militia ; and Ferrara, where the Marquis of Este, Azzo Novello, wielded an almost absolute authority, was inveterate against Romano and his family, by whom Novello had been denuded of the bulk of his hereditary possessions. The unhappy men, who had sought shelter at Venice and in the neighbourhood from the tyranny of the Imperialists, formed, besides, no inconsiderable accession to the ranks of the Guelphs ; and an additional source of strength, as well as an additional incentive to exertion, was to be found in a rational hope that the Holy See, whose welfare was so clearly identified with the success of the popular party, would soon address herself seriously, in concert with other Powers, to the task of bridling the lawless ambition of the two Romani. Much, too, depended, should a war break out in the Trevisan March, on the line which Venetian politicians might think proper to adopt ; that the Republic would remain neuter under such circumstances was barely probable ; and her adhesion to either side was quite sufficient to turn the scale.

It was in March, 1256, that Filippo Fontana, Archbishop of Ravenna,¹ the legate of his Holiness Alexander IV., arrived at Venice, charged with a mission of considerable moment to the Doge Zeno. Fontana had been desired to call the attention of the Venetian Government to the deplorable state of the peninsula

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 133) ; Vesci (*St. degli Ezzelini*, ii. 303).

generally, and more particularly of the Trevisan March; to bring under serious notice the cruel sufferings of the Lombards under the despotic rule of Eccelino and Alberigo da Romano; and to invite Venice to become a member of a projected Coalition against the tyrant of Padua and his almost equally infamous brother.¹ The representations of the Nuncio met with a favourable reception; he received permission from the Doge to preach the Cross against the common enemy before the assembled multitude on the Square of Saint Mark. In his sermon, the legate bore the most flattering testimony to the zeal with which, from time immemorial, the Republic had upheld the cause of religion and humanity; and, at the conclusion, a large number of persons of every class, yielding to the impulse of the moment, and impatient to enlist in the holy phalanx, took the new vow of devotion.² The place, selected as a point to which the various corps of the new Coalition might converge, and where they might effect a junction, was Bebe, the Venetian fortress on the Brenta. There the troops were to be organized, and the plan of operations was to be discussed.³

The forces of the Guelphs were composed of contingents from the several members of the Confederation, among which were some English mercenaries;⁴ the leading contributors were Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Ferrara, and Rovigo; and, each of her Allies having

¹ Sismondi (ii. p. 331).² Da Canale contemp. (sect. 134-5-6).³ Sismondi, *ubi suprâ*.⁴ Da Canale (sect. 138).

furnished its respective quota, the Republic herself engaged to provide, in addition to a certain proportion of troops, the means of transport from Bebe to Padua. In the distribution of commands, by far the larger share was allowed to fall to the Venetians, whom the Lombards were most anxious to propitiate. With the sanction of his own Government, Marco Badoer,¹ a Venetian nobleman, was named by the archbishop-legate Marshal of the Army; the charge of the two principal divisions was confided to Tommassino Giustiniani and Marco Quirini.² At the same time, as a mark of consideration for the services and misfortunes of the House of Este, which had been stripped of the flower of its inheritance by the Romani, the high and honourable post of standard-bearer (Gonfalonier) was assigned to Tito Novello, a kinsman of the Marquis, who still possessed, in the decline of his power and fortune, unbounded influence at Ferrara.

The operations of the Crusaders opened with the siege of Padua, the great stronghold of the Ghibellines, and the headquarters of Eccelino; and so sanguine and confident were the Republic and her new Allies of bringing their undertaking to a successful issue, that the Venetian general Quirini had been prospectively elected Podesta of Padua for the current year.

A short time prior to the arrival of the Venetian squadron in the Po and the disembarkation of the

¹ Da Canale contemp. (sect. 137); Verci (*Storia Della Marca Trivigiana*, ii. 330).

² Da Canale, *ubi suprâ*.

enemy in the vicinity of his capital, Eccelino himself, under the hope of reducing Mantua to his sway, had marched with a large body of troops in that direction,¹ leaving the defence of Padua to his nephew Ansedisius da Giudotti, a man of far inferior capacity. It was probable that the exploit which the tyrant contemplated would cost him considerable difficulty; and it was by no means unreasonable to anticipate that, before he could retrace his steps and could afford relief to the garrison, Padua might be reduced. It therefore became of the utmost consequence to act with promptitude; and, so soon as the Crusaders had made themselves masters of the suburbs of Conca d'Albero, Conselvo, and Piave di Sacco, a general attack was opened. The principal efforts were directed against the Porta Altinate; and there also it was that the greatest hardihood and resolution were exhibited in the conduct of the defence. Suddenly, a huge Vinea or Gatto,² which had been planted by order of General Quirini against the Altinate to assist the movements of his division, was observed to take fire; it had been ignited, as was supposed, by some of those on the ramparts. The flames gathered strength and volume; in a short time, the whole machine was consumed; and the manœuvre of the besieged seemed to be completely successful. But the wooden gate to which the Vinea was placed in juxtaposition was not

¹ Da Canale (sect. 141); Verci (*Storia Della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*, ii. 326).

² Verci (ii. 335).

proof against the intense heat of the fire ; and both were involved in a common destruction. The fall of the Altinate admitted a strong division of the besieging force within the walls ; the garrison was panic-stricken ; Ansedisius provided for his personal safety by taking horse, and galloping at full speed across the country ; and Padua was in the hands of the allies (20th June, 1256). The blood curdles at the recital of the spectacle which followed ; it was a hideous and appalling scene of slaughter, which presented itself to the eye ; all the rules of civilized warfare were contemned in the blind rage of lust and avarice ; military licence here wore its worst shape ; in every direction extended rapine and sacrilege ; and the Crusaders¹ were guilty of excesses, which would have disgraced Alaric the Goth, or Attila, the *Scourge of God*. In one respect the undertaking of the Venetians and their allies was productive of beneficial fruits. The dungeons of Eccelino, over which had hitherto hung such a terrible veil of mystery, were now thrown open,² and hundreds of human beings, who had wasted their existence year after year in those noisome cells in a cruel and, as it seemed, interminable captivity, were unexpectedly emancipated. Padua was at last effectually wrested from the hands of her Ghibelline oppressors ; the blood-stained annals of the reign of Eccelino were closed for ever ; and the standard of freedom, dripping as it was with gore and sullied with crime, floated once

¹ Sismondi (ii. ch. viii. p. 9).

² Verci (*Storia Della Marca*, ii. 338).

more over the walls of his former capital. The Guelphs, impatient to afford a substantial recognition of the large share which the Republic had borne in so important an enterprise, elected, on the expiration of Marco Quirini's term of office, Giovanni, the son of Stefano Badoer, chief magistrate and first citizen of the Commune for that year.

After the sack of Padua, the commander-in-chief having received strong reinforcements from his own and the other confederated governments, proceeded without loss of time to concert measures for opposing Eccelino who, on being apprised of the turn which affairs had taken in the North, had at once retraced his steps from Milan, on which he had advanced from Mantua, in the hope that he might, by a rapid countermarch, be able to raise the siege of Padua, and to bring the enemy to action. In this scheme, however, he was forestalled by the fall of the place on the 20th June; and, in the immediate neighbourhood of Cassano, his progress was arrested by the victorious Guelphs, who had hastened to meet him before he crossed the Adda. A Venetian flotilla had also ascended that river, had broken successively six strong booms placed as a guard to the bridge, and had finally destroyed the latter.¹ In the severe struggle which ensued for the passage of the Adda at that point, the Ghibellines sustained a total defeat; and the tyrant himself was so dangerously wounded with an arrow in

¹ Marino Sanudo Torsello (*Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, part iii. ch. iv.)

the foot,¹ that it was necessary to remove him from the field. He was carried to Soncino; and whatever hopes had been entertained of his recovery, he destroyed them by wrenching open his wound with his own hands. He almost immediately expired.² When Eccelino first felt that he was wounded, he had inquired of an attendant what was the name of the place where they were. The man replied: "Sir, this place is called Cassano." Eccelino, appearing to be in a soliloquy, said: "*Bassano, Cassano, Cassano, Bassano,*" and repeated the words several times in a musing tone. "There is little difference," he added at length, "between Bassano and Cassano." It subsequently transpired that an astrologer had foretold that he should die at Bassano, and he therefore imagined that the prediction was now fulfilled, "there being little difference," as he himself said, "between Bassano and Cassano."³

On the receipt of the intelligence of the fall of Eccelino, a thanksgiving and jubilee were celebrated at Venice; all the church-bells were rung; and at night the city was illuminated.⁴

The rumour having spread with rapidity that Eccelino of Padua had breathed his last, the Lombards, no longer overawed by the terror of a great name, and prompted by a general impulse, rose in revolt against the Romani; and Alberigo who had, down to the

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *loco citato*.

² Cagnola, *Stor. di Milano*, x.; *Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii.

³ Da Canale contemp. (sect. 147).

⁴ *Ibid.* (sect. 149).

present time, held sway at Treviso under the shadow of his brother's reputation and power, was obliged to consult his personal safety by taking shelter in the Castle of San Zeno,¹ where he did not despair of being able to maintain his ground against any comers. The Leaguers, however, emboldened by their victory at Cassano, as well as by the insurrectionary movement in Lombardy, followed closely in his footsteps; San Zeno, which was accounted by far the strongest fortress in the Marches, and might have been rendered capable of sustaining a systematic siege, yielded to the pressure of a strict blockade; and on the cession of the place, Alberigo and all his relations, who had accompanied him in his flight from Treviso, were put to death in a manner only too consonant with the usages of a barbarous age.² Nor can there be any surprise at the malignant pertinacity, with which the triumphant democrats pursued the surviving branches of the Romano family. The maddening sense of accumulated wrongs gave the nation but one heart of bitterness and one hand of retribution; and, until the cup of vengeance was full, there was no listening to voice or plea of mercy (August, 1259).

The preponderance which the Ghibellines had been gradually acquiring in the Peninsula since the assumption of power by Frederic II. terminated to a large extent with the downfall of the two Romani, both of

¹ *Hist. Cortusiorum*, lib. i. ch. 7; *Ap. Murat.* xii. 974.

² Da Canale (sect. 150); Ricobaldi Ferrariensis, *Historia Imperatorum*; *Ap. Murat.* ix. 134; Cagnola, *Storia di Milano*; *Ap. Arch. Stor. Ital.* iii. p. 11.

whom, from obvious motives of self-interest, had always been staunch upholders of the prerogative of the crown. After a lengthened season of fierce and feverish excitement, Lombardy began to feel a momentary calm; and many of the municipal boroughs, shaking off by a bold and convulsive effort the shackles of military despotism, resumed the exercise of their privileges by changing their executive governments. Marco Badoer, the late generalissimo of the Allied Army, was chosen Podesta of Treviso. The Paduans had already conferred a similar distinction on Giovanni Badoer, a member of the same family; and it was then that Mastino de la Scala, a wealthy gentleman of Verona, acquired in his native city by the popular suffrages, and under a popular appellation, a power scarcely inferior to that which Eccelino himself had enjoyed at Padua, and his younger brother at Treviso. At Brescia, on the contrary, the Ghibellines succeeded in preserving their political influence; and in returning, as Podesta of the borough for 1259, Oberto Palavicini, one of their leading men, they felt that they had gained an important advantage over the adverse faction.¹

In the overthrow of the Romani, the object with which the Crusade in the Peninsula was originally undertaken had been accomplished, and consequently no ground existed for prolonging hostilities. Assuredly, no member of the League was more sincerely glad to be rid of the obligations which the alliance naturally

¹ Verci (*Storia Degli Ezzelini*, ii. 22).

imposed on her, than the Republic. For, even before the Government of the Doge was at liberty to sheathe the sword in that cause, a necessity had arisen for drawing it in another. A petty quarrel between the residents of Venice and Genoa at Acre touching the exclusive possession of the local church of Saint Sabbas was destined to plunge the two Republics into one of the most bloody and expensive wars in which they had ever engaged, and which extended, with certain intermissions, over nine or ten years. The earlier part was distinguished by several severe engagements, in which the Venetians, though generally inferior to their foes in point of number, had uniformly the advantage; and these engagements were followed by the great battle which was fought between Trapani and Val di Mazara, on the Sicilian coast, in 1264, and in which the naval forces of the Republic, under the command of Jacopo Dandolo, won a splendid triumph.

The decisive character of that action bred a hope, that the vanquished would no longer hesitate to accede to the propositions of peace which the Government of Zeno, at the repeated intercession of the Courts of Rome and France, had as repeatedly offered to their acceptance without success. But the Senate of Genoa declined to treat. To open negotiations for peace with shame written on their brows, and with the sound of the Venetian victory still ringing in their ears, was pronounced unworthy of a great and free People; and Genoa turned with fretful and angry impa-

tience from suggestions for an accommodation on any terms.

The Republic, on her part, was not without excellent reasons for desiring to put an end to hostilities. The operations of the war had been glorious to the Venetian arms. But, at the same time, the pecuniary embarrassment in which two successive campaigns involved the State, had been quite beyond anticipation; all the ordinary channels of revenue, the salt-tax, the port-dues, and other sources of income, had been gradually exhausted as hostilities continued; and it was useless to expect that the Ducal Fisc would be able to satisfy the demands upon its funds, unless some steps were taken to relieve the increasing pressure. It was some time before the Government of the Doge could fix on the course which it might be most desirable to pursue; it ultimately determined to meet the financial difficulty by an augmentation of the duty on corn.¹ The expedient was more novel than happy. Irritated by war taxes, and wrought to a high pitch of excitement by the stirring nature of passing events, the nation was hardly in a fit temper to suffer without a murmur any addition whatever to burdens which were already too heavy to bear; and a protest was at once made from every corner of the Dogado against a measure which operated so injuriously on the price of a vital commodity. The cry of discontent became every day louder, and the symptoms became more alarming. Venice was the

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 564).

scene of a bread-riot. Seditious meetings took place on the Piazza, where wild projects were discussed by popular leaders and popular agitators. The Palace itself was more than once threatened by a mob. It was in vain that the Doge made a personal attempt to 'pacify the tumult and to assuage the general indignation by liberal promises; he was treated with a ridicule, which plainly denoted the fury of the multitude at the new Corn Law.

The advances of the Doge having been thus spurned and his authority braved, the Venetian Government hastened to quell the disorder by forcible means. The metropolis itself had no military establishment. But troops were immediately summoned from the nearest garrisons, from Bebe, Castello, Brondolo, and Chioggia; and, the insurrection having been repressed by the power of the sword without much difficulty, the ring-leaders in the late movement were, under the Law of Sedition which passed in the reign of Orseolo I. (976), sentenced to lose their heads between the Red Columns.¹ It is stated that the number of persons who suffered was very great.² Zeno was probably led to the adoption of harsh measures by the contemptuous manner in which his overtures had been rejected by the insurgents. At the same time, the people were ultimately permitted to have their own way; their rulers, having restored tranquillity to the capital, and having vindicated the ends of justice, thought it wise, perhaps, to concede the point under

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 374).

² Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 564).

dispute; and the additional duty, which had been imposed by the Doge in Council on all imported corn, was tacitly repealed.¹

During the recent disturbances, the Venetian Government acted upon the necessity of preserving, in the face of danger, a firm attitude and a placid demeanour. But the circumstances had been such as were calculated to awaken the worst apprehensions for the public repose. For while the mob assembled on the Piazza was madly clamouring for redress, cursing wars, war taxes, and war prices, and gathering from time to time in large groups round the palace with frightful cries and gestures of unmistakeable portent, a private quarrel, which threatened to involve the most serious consequences, had arisen between the two electoral Houses of Dandolo and Tiepolo. This domestic feud originally sprang from the recent change introduced into the Corn Laws. The Dandoli had long signalized themselves by the liberal bent of their opinions, and by the strong bias which they exhibited to the popular side; it was a line of politics to which the family was attached, in a certain degree, by its own convictions, but which we may also suspect that it embraced from other motives. The House of Dandolo was represented in the Great Council at this period² by Gilberto Dandolo of San Moisé, the celebrated naval commander in the Genoese war, who was subsequently

¹ Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 564).

² Sansovino (*Cronico Veneto*, p. 31).

Venetian resident at Negropont, and his two sons, Leonardo and Giovanni; these illustrious men seemed to be following only a traditional policy, when they espoused with zealous warmth the cause of their indigent fellow-countrymen, and denounced from their seats in the Legislature the ill-advised augmentation of the Corn-Duty. The course taken by Giovanni Dandolo and his brother more especially threw them naturally into hostile collision with the Government Party, at the head of which stood Lorenzo Tiepolo, the son of the Doge Giacomo, and a man whose superior parts fitted him to shine in the highest stations. Already, in his father's lifetime, Lorenzo had been created Count of Veglia. At a later period, he had filled several diplomatic and other trusts. The last post to which he had been appointed was the consulate at Negropont, which he held during some years, until he was replaced by Gilberto Dandolo, a politician of a widely different stamp from his predecessor. The son of a prince deservedly popular, and himself a person whose valuable services constituted a high claim to the gratitude and respect of his fellow-citizens, Lorenzo Tiepolo was generally thought to have an excellent prospect of succeeding to the next vacancy of the crown; and it was against such a man and his numerous following, that the two Dandoli formed a resolution to fight the people's battle, and to second their clamour for reduced taxation. The quarrel soon became a personal one; and every fresh circumstance had a tendency to aggravate

the mutual feeling of bitterness and irritation. At last the matter reached a climax. One day, the two Dandoli met or overtook Tiepolo in one of the streets of Venice, and a scuffle ensued, in which the latter received a dangerous wound, and was left on the ground in a state of insensibility.¹ The particulars of this scandalous outrage speedily reached the ears of the Government; the authors of the assault on Tiepolo were laid under a pecuniary fine of considerable amount;² and their rank and popularity probably furnished the only reason why the offence of the Dandoli was not visited with much greater severity.

These intestine disorders, and the dangerous symptoms, which continued to manifest themselves in the popular mind, combined to render the Venetian government exceedingly anxious to terminate the war, and prepared it to hearken to the pacific overtures which were proceeding from the Courts of France and Rome. Genoa, however, still offered obstacles to the settlement of the difference; the sittings of the Congress which, in deference to the joint wishes of Louis and his Holiness, had been opened at Viterbo³ for the purpose, were of the most unproductive kind; and there seemed to be every probability that the attempt to establish a treaty on conditions acceptable

¹ *Archivio Storico Italiano* (viii. p. 746); Dandolo (lib. x. p. 374); Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 564); *et alia*.

² Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 564).

³ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 376). The Venetian deputies on this occasion were Giovanni Dandolo of San Moisè himself, Nicolo Quirini, and Andrea Barbarigo.

to both the contracting parties, would be a work of time.

The Doge Zeno, at least, was not spared to witness the return of peace. Shortly after the suppression of the Bread-Riot, that prince breathed his last at Saint Mark's, after a brief illness, on Saturday the 7th of July, 1268. On the following day, according to custom, his Serenity was interred in the vaults of San Giovanni e Paolo;¹ the corpse was enveloped in a robe of cloth of gold, buckled and spurred. The sepulture was singularly imposing and magnificent. The whole body of the clergy, the members of the Government, the judges, the magistrates, the Patriarch, the bishops, and large numbers of the poorer classes, joined in the procession. Not a few ladies of quality were present at the ceremonial.² All orders were manifestly anxious to unite in paying the last tribute of respect to the illustrious deceased; and the circumstances attending the funeral of Zeno afforded an indication that he had quite outlived the acerbity and ill-will which the corn-tax question had created at the time in the popular mind.³ It is on the important law reforms, of which Reniero Zeno was the author, that his title to posthumous fame must principally rest. Notwithstanding the enormous labour which had been already bestowed on the digestion and codification of the *Statute* by other eminent legists, and the close attention which

¹ Sansovino (*Ven. Descritta*, lib. xi. p. 489); Dandolo (lib. x. p. 376).

² Da Canale (*Cron. Ven.* sect. 256).

³ Eight original letters of Zeno are found in Murat. (xii. 504-11).

had been given to every branch of the subject since the time of Malipiero, there still remained much to revise and consolidate. The whole body of the common, civil, and canon law presented a field far too vast to be traversed and explored by one individual or at one time; the task, which had been so ably commenced by Giacomo Tiepolo, was one which could be thoroughly accomplished only by a succession of labourers, all equally earnest and equally competent; and it was not too much to predict, that before it was brought to perfection, several generations of men would have passed away.

Among other useful measures which were projected by the Venetian Government of this day, may be noticed the paving of the *Broglia* with bricks or stones, chiefly to suit the convenience of the merchants, who frequented the place, and who transacted there a large portion of their business. About the same time, a bridge was erected to span the broad canal which divided the Capital into two parts, as well as into two procuratorial jurisdictions; the material which was employed in its construction was wood; and owing to the circumstance that passengers had been previously obliged to pay a fixed fare, a *quartarolo* or the fourth part of a *denaro*, to the boatman who ferried them over the water, the new structure received the appellation of the *Ponte de la Moneta*,¹ or the Bridge of Money.

The period during which the Republic was governed by Zeno was almost parallel with that disastrous

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 373); Sanudo (*Vite de Duchi*, p. 563).

episode in the history of France, known as the Ninth Crusade. In that unlucky expedition the Venetians took no active part. But in 1268, the King having treated with the Republic, through the Count of Bar and the Sire de Beaujeu, for a supply of convoys and necessaries, the Government of the Doge engaged to furnish, at a stipulated price, three large ships and twelve smaller, capable of carrying in the aggregate 4,000 horses and 10,000 men with their arms, accoutrements and victuals. Of the large vessels,¹ the *Roccaforte*, or *Rochfort*, and the *Santa Maria*, were to be 108 feet in length over all, having 70 feet of keel, and about 38 of beam. Their bows and sterns were similar, and contained several cabins; the two principal, one of which was at each end of the ship, were called the “paradise.” Besides the orlop, they had a second deck, six-feet-and-a-half high, above which were the *corridor* and the *pavisade*, the former being five and the latter only three-feet-and-a-half high. A short fighting deck, called the *Bellatorium*, or fore and stern castle, surmounted the extremities of the ship. The crew of each vessel consisted of 110 mariners; and the ships were estimated at 1400 marks (of pure and fine silver of Paris), or 933*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* each. The third, the *San Nicolo*, was only 100 feet long over all, having 75 feet keel, and 25 feet beam; she cost 1000 marks,

¹ I have here followed Sir H. Nicolas (*Hist. of the R. Navy*, i. 243–4). The author observes:—“Though the ships built for the King of France in 1268, were intended to have crews of from fifty to one hundred men, those of English vessels rarely exceeded half that number, and thirty seems to have been the usual average.”

or 733*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*, and had only 86 men. The twelve other ships were much smaller, cost only 700 marks, or 466*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* each, and carried 50 men in their crews.¹

¹ I have also compared Zanetti (*Dell' Origine di Alcune Arti pressoli Veneziani*, p. 38); Filiasi (*Ricerche Storico-critiche sulla Marina de' Veneziani*, p. 237; Sanudo Torsello (*Secreta*, lib. iii. part 12, cap. 8).

CHAPTER XII.

A.D. 1268–1280.

Changes in the Ducal Elections—Lorenzo Tiepolo, Doge (1268–75)—Alterations in the Constitution—Creation of a Grand Chancellor—Corrado Ducato, First Grand Chancellor of Venice—Festivities of Tiepolo's Coronation—Conclusion of a Truce between Venice and Genoa for Five Years (1270–5)—Famine at Venice—Venice declares herself Sovereign of the Adriatic (1270)—Imposition of the Gulf Dues—Considerations on the Claims of the Venetians to the Dominion of the Gulf—War between Venice and Bologna—Retreat of the Venetian Troops on Volano—Defeat of the Bolognese—Conclusion of Peace—Giacomo Contarini, Doge (1275–80)—War with Ancona—Revolt of Capo D'Istria—Chastisement of the Patriarch of Aquileia—Reduction of Almissa—Mission of Marino Pasqualigo to the Court of Rodolph of Hapsburg (1277)—Abdication of Contarini (1280).

ON Sunday afternoon¹, the 8th of July, 1268, the tolling of the great Bell at the Campanile announced to all Venice, that the mortal remains of Reniero Zeno were consigned to their final resting-place at San Giovanni e Paolo. According to constitutional usage, the Privy Council and the three chiefs of the Quarantia at once installed themselves in the palace, the authority and prerogative of the Crown being, by a custom which had originated in 1172, vested jointly in their hands, till the result of the approaching elections was made known.

The election of a new Doge amounted to the in-

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 256).

vestiture of a simple member of the commonwealth with an authority, not untrammelled, yet loosely defined, and in spite of many encroachments still very considerable, an authority which he might wield, for good or for evil, during a term perhaps of a quarter of a century¹. It presented a case, therefore, in which a false step could not be taken without the severest prejudice to the national interests; and, under such circumstances, it was no matter of wonder, that there should be an anxiety to secure the exercise of a mature and impartial judgment in the election of the chief magistrate of the Republic, and to minimize the liability of the process to corrupt practices. It was on this account, and ostensibly on this account only, that, in 1033, Domenico Flabenigo proposed to rescind the prescriptive right of the Doge to associate his children and to nominate his successor. It was with the same object that, a century and a half later, the universal suffrage had been abolished, and that an Electoral College had been called into existence. It was to this cause that the Great Council had owed, in some measure, its simultaneous institution.

Yet, notwithstanding many sound and beneficial changes which had been introduced, at successive periods since 1033, into the electoral system, that system was still pronounced too open to abuse; there still appeared to be several material points, in which it was susceptible of amendment; and an opportunity

¹ Pietro Tradenigo reigned from 836 to 864; Domenico Contarini reigned from 1043 to 1071.

had now arisen which might not soon recur, of removing some of the objections to the existing process. Hence sprang a fear, that there might be a longer delay than usual in supplying the place of Zeno ; and, it is not unlikely, that this formed the leading motive for departing from the ordinary practice of vesting the sovereignty, during an interregnal period, in the hands of commissioners, and for creating the senior councillor Nicolo Michieli, Vice Doge of Venice, till the succession was determined.

In due course, the Vice-Ducal government submitted, for the approval of the National Assembly, the revisions in the Constitution recommended by the Board of Correction. The Board advised, that clauses should be introduced into the Coronation Oath, binding the Doge, on his election, 1, to relinquish any commercial avocations, in which he might previously have been engaged, and to abstain from carrying on any trade on his own behalf, either directly or indirectly ; 2, to restrict himself to the exercise of the authority vested in him by the laws and the constitution ; and, 3, to communicate, without unnecessary delay, to the Privy Council any information, which might reach him through private channels, or which he might personally receive, touching treaties with foreign Powers, secret machinations against the State, and other matters affecting the public welfare and interests. Secondly, the Board proposed the creation of a new dignity, in the appointment of a Grand Chancellor of the Republic. The appointment of the Grand Chan-

cellor,¹ which was for life, and which was intended to supersede the old office of *Cancellarius Ducalis*, or Keeper of the Privy Seal, was to be made exclusively from the ranks of the Plebeians. Though not a Noble, the Chancellor was entitled to enjoy all the privileges of nobility, and to rank by virtue of his office as a member of the equestrian order. On public occasions, he was to take precedence of all senators and magistrates with the exception of the Privy Councillors and the Procurators of Saint Mark. Like the Doge himself and the College, he was to wear the robe of purple. The Great Seal of Venice was to be placed under his care; and no political secrets, no communications even of the most confidential character, from foreign embassies or courts, were to be withheld from his knowledge. He was to have a seat in the Great Council and the Pregadi. With all these powers and advantages, the position of the Chancellor presented one drawback. In allowing the *Cittadini* to choose so great a dignitary out of their own body, the organs of the aristocratic party conceived that they had made no ordinary concession; and, while they pronounced the new officer competent to attend every sitting of the Legislature, they denied him a vote in the assembly. He had liberty to offer his opinion, but he had no suffrage.² Again, although he was to be selected from the lower Estate, the nomination of the Chancellor was made to rest with the Great Council. The choice of the latter fell, in the first instance, on Corrado Ducato,

¹ Sandi (ii. lib. iv. ch. 5).

² Da Canale (p. 589).

who had formerly filled the position of Keeper, and whose appointment appears to have been ratified on or before the 15th of July, 1268, on which day the first mention of his name occurs in the Archives.¹

The next point, to which the Correttori directed attention, was the manner of the ducal elections. The Capitulary, embodying the reforms made by the Board subject to parliamentary sanction, was read to the Arrengo by the Chancellor, and approved by the national voice, which applauded "the things which those wise men had done."² The process was both solemn and ingenious. The youngest of the Privy Councillors having in the first instance proceeded to Saint Mark's, and having offered up a fervent prayer to the Almighty, invoking His Divine Blessing on the approaching ceremony, the Great Council was convened in accordance with the prescribed forms; and, the House having been counted, all who were ascertained not to have reached their thirtieth year, were required to withdraw. The rest resolved themselves into a Committee of Election. Thirty pellets of wax having then been deposited in an urn, a boy of tender years, who had been previously taken at random for the purpose among the youthful loungers of the Rialto, drew them out severally, and delivered one to each member in his proper turn. A strip of parchment, on which was written the word *Elector*, was attached to thirty of the balls. The Thirty thus indicated

¹ Da Canale, *ubi suprà*, note 321; Sandi, *ubi suprà*.

² Da Canale, *ubi suprà*.

retired into a private apartment, and reduced themselves by ballot to nine. By a majority of at least six votes, the Nine chose in their turn forty; the Forty were reduced to twelve. The Twelve next nominated by a majority of nine suffrages twenty-five, who were reduced again to nine. By a majority of seven suffrages, the Nine elected forty-five, who were reduced to eleven. Finally, the Eleven nominated the Forty-one, who formed the Electoral College. It was necessary, that the Doge elect should obtain at least five-and-twenty votes.

The electoral conclave proceeded, after taking the customary oaths before the vice-Doge Michieli, to acquit themselves of their task; their deliberations extended over several days; and they ultimately fixed their choice on Lorenzo Tiepolo, who had already gained a great name by his victory over the Genoese at Acre in 1256, and by other exploits. The election of Tiepolo was notified to the people on Monday, the 23rd of July, 1268,¹ a fortnight after the funeral of his predecessor. The announcement seems to have given general satisfaction: yet it is not quite easy to understand, how the elevation of a man who, like the successor of Zeno, was the acknowledged chief of the aristocratic party, could appear to the members of the Popular Opposition in any other light than in that of a defeat.

So soon as the choice of the College had been ratified by the people, a solemn deputation waited upon Tiepolo at his private residence at San Agostino, in the

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 257).

ward of San Polo, and escorted him to Saint Mark's. His Serenity was met at the doors by the vice-Doge, attended by the ministers of the Ducal Chapel, and was conducted to the principal altar, where he swore to the Promission, and received at the hands of the Procurator the Standard of the Republic. He was then led to the throne; and in the presence of a vast concourse of persons, who had assembled to witness the ceremony of the investiture, the youngest of the senators encircled his brow with the ducal berretta. This ceremony having been consummated, the chaplains of Saint Mark were despatched to San Agostino in quest of the Dogressa Marchesina, the daughter of Bohemond, Ban of Rascia; and her Serenity, having been conducted to the palace amid great pomp and rejoicing, was placed on the throne by the side of her consort. The Lady Marchesina was Tiepolo's second wife. In early life, that prince had been united to Agnese Ghisi, the member of a noble Venetian family.¹

The new reign was inaugurated by festivities² of an unusually magnificent kind. Among other amusements and attractions, was a Water-Fête, in which the galleys of a squadron, then about to proceed to the Mediterranean under Pietro Michieli for the protection of Venetian commerce, bore a principal share. The vessels, among which might be distinguished several belonging to private citizens of Burano and Torcello, were gaily and fancifully dressed with pennants; and, as they passed along the Canal in front of the Ducal

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 257-8).² Ibid.

palace, the choristers on board chanted verses composed for the occasion in honour of the Doge and his Dogaressa.

Another feature in the public entertainments was a Procession of the Trades. The procession, which traversed the principal thoroughfares of the metropolis, was opened by the Smiths who, crowned with chaplets and flowers, marched with flags in their hands to the sound of musical instruments. Next came the Furriers arrayed in ermine and miniver,¹ and the Skinners in robes of taffeta, displaying the choicest specimens of their own manufactures. The Skinners were followed in successive order by the Tanners, the Iron-Masters, the Barbers,² the Hosiers, the Drapers, the Cotton-Spinners, the Gold-cloth Workers, the Weavers, and the Tailors, the last of whom were sumptuously dressed in white, with mantles edged with fur. The Gold-cloth Workers were apparelled in their own precious commodity. Nor was the costume of the Mercers, the Glass-blowers, the Fishmongers, the Butchers, and the Victuallers less costly. Some were clad in suits of red, some in scarlet, others in yellow. The members of the Corporations mostly bore some token or badge of the calling, to which they belonged; the Drapers merely carried olive-branches in their hands. On the whole, the pageant was singularly brilliant und imposing; but where the diversity of dress was so infinite, and where

¹ Da Canale contemp. (sect. 267).

² At Venice, the barbers were a privileged body. Galliciolli (*Delle Memorie Venete*, lib. i. c. 10), quotes a law passed in March, 1306 (o. s.) i.e. 1307, by which no fires were permitted (after dusk?) except in the *Barberia*, or Barbers' Quarter. This Law points to the existence of a Curfew at Venice.

the variety of fashion and hue offered such violent contrasts, it was to be expected that it would wear a somewhat motley and incongruous aspect. To such a result the whimsical attire of the Barbers contributed in no slight degree. The deputies of this Company, four in number, appeared disguised as knights errant, of whom two were armed from head to foot and mounted on richly caparisoned chargers, while the other two walked at their side. They were accompanied by four damsels on foot, no less fantastically habited, whom they pretended to have rescued from some great and imminent peril. As they passed before the platform, from which the Doge and his Court were observing the show, one of the cavaliers dismounted, and, bowing profoundly, addressed Tiepolo in the following manner:—"Sir, we are knights errant, who have travelled far to seek our fortune, and have succeeded, at last, in making a conquest of these four maidens. We have now come to your Court; and if any here be disposed to gainsay our right, we are prepared to defend the prizes we have won with our utmost prowess." The Barbers having finished their speech, the Prince replied in suitable terms, that they were welcome, assuring them, that they and their fair charges should be treated with all honour, and that no one would presume to dispute with them so enviable a possession. The Barber-Knights then shouted: *Long live our Prince Lorenzo Tiepolo, the noble Doge of Venice*;¹ —and so moved forward.

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 268).

The festivities of the coronation presented many other novelties. When the procession of the Trades was concluded, ten of the Master Tailors, changing their habiliments, attired themselves in white suits sprinkled with vermilion stars, and paced the leading thoroughfares, singing scraps of favourite airs and popular ditties of the day; each of the jaunty and jocund crew carried in his hand a goblet of Malmsey; and occasionally they suspended their vocal labours to recover breath and to moisten their lips with a draught of the fluid. The picture was very Venetian in its colouring; and it is pleasant to find that the votaries of the needle, who supplied pantaloons to Doge Tiepolo and doublets of Alexandrine velvet to the fashionable loungers of the Rialto, were persons of such genial humour, and possessed so keen a relish for sack.¹

A people so passionately fond of music and melody assuredly possessed already certain standard tunes, to which such ballads as those recited in the streets by the Merchant Tailors, or such stanzas as the choristers chanted on the Canals, might be set; and it is possible that these airs being peculiarly traditional, and descending from generation to generation, differed little from those, to which the Venetian gondoliers of a later age were accustomed to sing the words of their countryman Tasso. There were games, besides, in which buffoons were introduced who, by their antic gestures, created huge merriment among the mob. There were men carrying cages full of singing and other

¹ Da Canale (sect. 271). Da Canale was an eye-witness.

birds, who, as soon as they came near the spot, where the Court happened to be, liberated the little prisoners, and let them fly amid the crowd. This proceeding drew a deafening shout of approbation. Nor was there any deficiency of sharpers who, observing the attention of the bystanders fixed on other objects, nimbly profited by the general hilarity and distraction to fill their own pockets.

The public entertainments closed with an Industrial Exhibition in the apartments of the Palace in honour of the Dogaressa who, as she passed in state through each room, was received by the Masters of the several Companies, and presented with comfits, which her Serenity accepted with kind expressions.

Thus, few Princes could be said to have ascended the Venetian throne under happier auspices than Lorenzo Tiepolo. It remained to see how far the favourable anticipations, which such a bright beginning might have tended to form, would be realised.

The opening of Tiepolo's ministry was pacific. In 1270, by the concurrent intercession of the Courts of France, Rome, and Sicily, which deplored the prolongation of hostilities between the two leading maritime Powers of Europe, a truce for five years was concluded at Cremona by the delegates of Venice and Genoa;¹ and even the proposition for an exchange of prisoners, which seems to have been combated violently on one side, and to have been abandoned in consequence, was finally embraced by the contracting parties at the

¹ Da Canale (sect. 328); Dandolo (lib x. p. 380).

earnest and repeated intreaty of the supreme Pontiff. Much as the temporary nature of the Peace of Cremona might be regretted by many, the armistice deserved to be hailed, under any circumstances, as an event of happy omen. So far as Genoa was concerned, the reconciliation with her mighty antagonist was undoubtedly most opportune. For the war, in which she had been for some time engaged with her other rival in commerce and prosperity, the republic of Pisa, was itself quite sufficient to occupy her attention and resources. Nor was it long before Venice herself found abundant reason to treat it as a fortunate circumstance, that all ground of apprehension was removed for the present in that quarter.

The late festivities had had the effect of attracting to Venice a large number of foreigners, and of increasing the consumption of all the necessaries of life to such an extent that the demand threatened at last to exceed altogether the means of supply. For this evil under ordinary conditions it would have been comparatively easy to find a cure, or rather perhaps it was an evil which, under ordinary conditions, would have never arisen. In a country without territory or agricultural resources, it had been early recognised as a cardinal point of policy to preserve a ready and constant communication with all the corn-producing countries accessible to her transports; the importance of such a communication became only the more manifest, as the floating no less than the permanent population of the Dogado was swollen gradually

by the institution of periodical Fairs and by the development of the national Marine ; and the government of the Republic had therefore been careful to secure from time to time, by treaty or otherwise, the privilege of exporting grain at the cheapest rate from those districts where it grew in the largest quantities. Hence it was that in the compacts, which the Islanders had formed at successive periods, though more particularly in those of more recent date, with the Byzantine empire, the kingdom of Sicily, the Mohammedan Powers of Barbary, the Patriarch of Aquileia, and the Count of Goricia, the representatives of the Doge stipulated almost invariably for the liberty to export corn, where the price exceeded not a certain amount the bushel. In Aquileia and Goricia, the Venetians appear to have possessed the faculty of taking as much wheat out of the country as might suit their immediate purpose, either without the payment of any duty whatever, or, at most, with the levy of one of nominal amount ; and even in other instances they succeeded in imposing their own conditions. So much, indeed, was this the case in Naples and Sicily that the native merchants had reason to complain, that the Venetians, who engaged in the export trade, were placed by the Government of Charles of Anjou on a more advantageous footing than themselves.

When, however, the Ducal government was thus apparently forearmed, it seems strange, that any difficulty should have been experienced in procuring supplies of corn and other grain to any given extent.

The fact was that, at the present juncture, several circumstances concurred to defeat the judicious precautions, which had been adopted against the possibility of a sudden pressure from unforeseen causes. The year, in which Lorenzo Tiepolo was called to the throne (1268), and in which the population of the Venetian capital was increased by the arrival of thousands, who flocked thither to be present at the Fêtes, was remarkable for an unusually short wheat harvest throughout Europe. In Sicily, Naples, Greece, Candia, and the Morea, the crop was almost equally poor. In Sicily and the south of Italy it was so bad, that the Government found it necessary to restrain, as a temporary measure, the export of all grain from the Neapolitan dominions. Lastly, Africa, generally an inexhaustible fountain of supply, still formed the theatre of the ninth Crusade.

The consequence of this unfortunate coincidence was that the year, which immediately followed the coronation of Tiepolo, was a year of extreme scarcity. The dearness of prices, which soon became unprecedented, affected all classes of society. It was too much to be dreaded that, unless the transports, which had been despatched some time since in search of grain, arrived speedily in the Venetian waters with stores, famine would lay its gaunt and desolating hand on the Dogado, and, by a sweeping process of extermination, do more in a few weeks than all the enemies of the Republic had been able to achieve in eight hundred years. So critical was the dilemma in which the Venetians found

themselves situated by an event altogether beyond the range of human foresight.

On the first symptom of danger, indeed, vessels were fitted out, and were sent to Dalmatia, to Greece, and even to Asia,¹ with instructions to buy all the corn which could be found; and at the same time a circular message was addressed to such of the members of the Lombard Federation, as might not be involved in a similar strait, applying for a contribution of corn and other necessities. Among those to whom such an appeal was directed, were the Paduans and the Trevisans. The former, more especially, were reminded how at a juncture, when *they* were chafing beneath the iron yoke of the Imperialists, Venice, responding to their call, had come forward, and had delivered them from the hands of a tyrant.² The memory of the Ferrarese³ and Trevisans was refreshed by a rehearsal of the services which the Republic had lent to the cause of liberty and independence in the course of the last Peninsular War, and which were acknowledged at the time to be of the utmost importance. In these reminiscences, the strict judgment of which might be questioned, it may be noted that the fall of Padua, and the restoration of Treviso to the Popular Party by the overthrow of the two Romani, received quite their due share of prominence.

The efforts of Tiepolo, however, were uniformly unsuccessful; and his representatives returned from their

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 300).

² Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 303).

³ Ibid (sect. 301).

respective missions without having been able to achieve anything. The truth was, that Venice was only experiencing in the hour of adversity the common fate of all those Powers, which become great at the expense of their neighbours ; she had raised against her a host of secret enemies, who merely waited an opportunity of declaring themselves ; and of these assuredly the most bitter in her jealousy and hatred was Padua. That antient Borough was too much inflated by her ancestral and heraldic pride to forget, that the Island Commonwealth owed its existence to a decree of her Senate, and that she was accounted the richest and most powerful of Italian Cities at a time, when the fisherman was still spreading his nets on the morasses, where the palaces of the Contarini now stood. Padua even boasted that, long after the invasion of the Huns, she had continued to give laws to the Venetians. In fact the two Powers stood in such a relative posture toward each other, that the services rendered by the Republic during the late War to the Guelphs of Padua, were apt to awaken a sense of injury, rather than a sense of gratitude. Nor could it be disguised, that there were two sides to the picture. If Venice adduced, on the present occasion, as a claim to grateful remembrance, the liberation of Padua from the hands of Eccelino, the Paduans were at liberty to recall the atrocities committed by the allies after the fall of the place ; and we may be assured that they did not fail to ascribe them, in principal measure, to their insular neighbours. This malevolence and bitterness

were shared by the other people of the Marches, who had joined in declining to comply with the requisition of the Doge. It was with no favourable eye, that the independent Communes of Northern Italy viewed the ascendancy of Venice; and there were not wanting some, who foretold that the interference of the Venetians in the affairs of the Peninsula would become in the course of time more and more frequent, until it resolved itself finally into the permanent extension of the Dogado to the Mainland.

The failure of the Italian missions, coupled with the continued absence of intelligence of the desired kind from other quarters, reduced the Ducal government to a state of the gravest uneasiness. The public distress increased from day to day; the means of alleviating it appeared to be quite as remote as ever. At last, when the pressure had reached a point at which it was all but intolerable, a few transports entered the Venetian waters from Southern Italy and Dalmatia; they were the bearers of a most welcome, though limited, consignment of corn and provisions purchased by Giovanni Dandolo *Cane*, Venetian Consul-General in Apulia, with the permission of Charles of Anjou,¹ from the merchants of that country, and by other agents of the Doge in the Illyric Provinces. These stores were immediately distributed with rigid impartiality by Officers specially appointed for the purpose; and the arrival in speedy succession of other

¹ Marin (v. 35).

vessels from various parts of Asia with more ample supplies dismissed all immediate cause of apprehension. The crisis, at least, had passed; and although the late pressure left unavoidably certain dark traces behind it, the Republic might be pronounced out of danger.

Misfortune was not without its use and instruction. The terrible ordeal which the Venetians had just suffered conveyed a severe lesson. To guard, by every available means, against a recurrence of such an evil, was the fixed determination of the Government. With this object a new Office was instituted, whose province it became to exercise a general superintendence and control over the Corn Trade, to take cognizance of all matters pertaining to the export and import of the article, and to apprise the Executive at the earliest moment of any circumstance which might render a scarcity of grain a probable contingency. The new Board of Trade consisted of three members, who were designated the *Magistrati delle Biade*.

Having thus extricated the country from this serious predicament, Tiepolo and his advisers felt themselves in a position to proceed to strong measures; and they now resolved to chastize the Lombards for their base and ungrateful conduct during the late Famine. With the approbation of the Great Council, a decree was published that henceforth all vessels, navigating the Gulf of Adria between Ravenna and Fiume should be subject to a Gabella or *ad valorem* duty¹ on their

¹ Sandi (ii. lib. iv. art. 8); Romanin (ii. lib. vii. ch. 1).

cargoes, payable to the Ducal Fisc ; every description of craft, and all Flags, were pronounced equally liable to the payment of dues ; and as it was most probable that the new regulation would meet with a warm opposition, proper means were taken to enforce its observance. For this purpose was established a Board of Customs, armed with exclusive powers, and of which the members, entitled *Governadori* or Comptrollers, were charged with carrying the act of the Legislative Body into full and immediate effect ; and to facilitate its operations, a certain number of men-of-war were placed at its disposal, under the command of a Captain of the Gulf. The instructions of the Captain of the Gulf were to allow no foreign ship to unload or even touch at any of the ports of Lombardy between Ravenna and Fiume, unless it was certified that its goods had been examined and cleared at a Venetian custom-house. The imposition of the gabella under these circumstances was tantamount to a declaration of a Right of Sovereignty over the Adriatic ; and the Republic meant it to be nothing less. The step was one which could hardly fail to create a general feeling of astonishment in the Peninsula ; and in the commercial towns that feeling amounted positively to consternation. The Lombards were completely taken by surprise. No one was prepared for such a contingency ; and, although it might be imagined by some that the project had been hastily adopted in a spirit of resentment, and might be allowed to drop on riper reflexion, it was quite plain to those who attentively considered

the subject, that the Venetians were in thorough earnest, and that there was no disposition on their part to abandon the newly occupied ground.

As a question of abstract right, the pretension of Venice was altogether indefensible. It is probable that no nice discrimination existed in that age between Coast and High Sea; but it was nevertheless obvious that a State, whose entire territory was comprehended in a cluster of islands and in a narrow strip of the adjoining *Terra Ferma*, could have no title to constitute itself the mistress of a sea, of which it held so small a portion, or to impose restrictions on the navigation of such rivers as the Adige, the Piave, the Brenta, and the Po. The claim of the Republic might have been more admissible at a time when the waters of the Gulf were infested by the Normans, the Narentines, and the Saracens, and when she was the only Power in Europe capable of resisting the encroachments of the Sea-Robbers. But privateering and piracy, though still pursued to some considerable extent, were no longer exercised upon the same gigantic scale as formerly; and it followed, that the necessity for protecting the subjects of the Republic in the pursuit of their commercial avocations from insult and outrage, was a plea which had lost a good deal of its validity. The fact was that the question was purely one of conventional legality, and that the title, if it existed at all, was of a derivative quality. It was from the unaided repression of the inroads of the pirates that the right of

protection had silently accrued; and this protective right resolved itself in the course of ages into the right of sovereignty. The latter claim solely rested, however, on the power to enforce it. It was only by employing the argument of the strong against the weak that Venice could hope to preserve her naval ascendancy in the Gulf. Her title could not be founded on first occupation or on first discovery for the most obvious reasons. It was not founded on prescription: for the prescription had been repeatedly broken.

It was not to be expected, however, under any circumstances, that the other free communities of Lombardy would tamely submit to what might appear the result of a mere act of volition on the part of the Venetian government. The arbitrary proceeding was, on the contrary, everywhere characterized as a monstrous and intolerable usurpation; and an example of active resistance was soon set by Bologna, which adopted the quarrel with considerable spirit and resolution. It was in the latter part of 1269, that the Executive Council of the Borough addressed a remonstrance to the Doge, in which they strongly represented the unjust and pernicious operation of the Gabella, and demanded the removal, so far as their commune was concerned, of all restrictions on commerce, more particularly on the trade, which it pursued with the ports of Romania in grain and salt.¹ Bologna was

¹ Da Canale (sect. 328 *et seq.*)

not so immediately the object of Venetian resentment as those Powers, which had invoked the aid of the Republic in their distress, and had deserted their Ally in the hour of her necessity. The Bolognese, besides, were a Power, whom it might be dangerous to offend, and whom it was certainly unwise to offend without sufficient cause. Their military resources were considerable; their influence in the political scale of Italy was great; and the government of Tiepolo thought it politic to make, with some reservations, the concessions required. In the same year (1269) a treaty was accordingly signed, by which mutual protection and security were guaranteed, and by which the gabella was relaxed, in certain instances, in favour of the Bolognese.

Shortly afterward, an arrangement, analogous to that which had been effected with the Bolognese, followed between the Republic and the little State of Forli, which had joined in the protest against the Right of Search and the Gulf Dues. The town of Forli is situated on a fertile plain, near the confines of the Rabbi and the Montone, fifteen miles from Ravenna, and forty from Bologna itself.

The prospect of a rupture between Venice and Bologna, which had at one time appeared not improbable, seemed to be removed entirely by the Treaty of 1269. Such, however, was very far from being the case. The Bolognese, notwithstanding their acceptance of the terms offered to their representatives by the Doge, still preserved their full share of indignation at the new fiscal system introduced by the Republic;

and they chafed even less, perhaps, at the measure itself, than at the arbitrary and tyrannical spirit in which it was conceived. The special modification of the Tariff in their favour, which they had affected to regard as a liberal and graceful concession appeared, on a more deliberate survey of the question, rather in the light of a compromise, with which the Venetian Senate had been only too glad to buy their silence and collusion; and, moreover, the alacrity of the Ducal government in complying with their representations, and with those of Forli, furnished a fair deduction that, if so much had been conceded on their simple remonstane, there would not be any considerable difficulty in winning back by another and a stronger effort, all the commercial liberties which they had lost. At the same time, the Bolognese were not unconscious of the expediency of masking their design, until the preparations for carrying it out were somewhat more mature. About a twelvemonth after the ratification of the treaty of 1269, a second embassy from Bologna waited on the Doge, to inquire whether any objection existed, on the part of the Republic, to the contemplated establishment of a Fort at Primaro, on the Po,¹ directly facing the old Venetian Castle of San Alberto,² for the better protection of Bolognese trade and navigation. The embassy had instructions to return with a specific reply.

But it happened, that the Doge and his advisers

¹ Da Canale contemp. (sect. 287).

² Ibid.

were already in possession of certain intelligence, which enabled them at once to penetrate the artifice, and to meet the enemy on their own ground. They knew that the work, of which the deputies spoke merely as in contemplation, was actually in progress, and that the podesta and municipal council of the borough had during some time been actively engaged in recruiting the Militia, as well as in forming alliances in several quarters inimical to Venice; it was even reported, that the troops levied, or to be levied, by the new League, would not fall far short of 40,000 men of all arms.¹ From these movements it was barely possible to make more than one deduction, and that deduction was not favourable to the sincerity of the Bolognese diplomats and their employers; and, indeed, it was quite manifest that the present negotiation had been opened simply as an expedient for misleading the suspicions of the Venetian government.

The Deputies were therefore desired by Tiepolo to acquaint their Commune that, “as the proposition, of which they were the bearers, was found to involve certain points, which demanded careful consideration, he must beg to take time to decide what answer should be given, and that such decision should be communicated at the earliest moment through the ordinary channel.”² With this message the envoys of Bologna were dismissed.

The Republic now perceived plainly, that it was time to make choice between two courses. On the one hand,

¹ Da Canale (sect. 288).

² Da Canale (sect. 318 *et seq.*)

she was at liberty to abandon the Right of Search and the Gulf Dues, and thus to renounce the sovereignty of the Adriatic, which she had so recently assumed. On the other, if she was disinclined to forego those claims and that sovereignty, it became absolutely necessary to prepare for war. Between these two courses the instinctive sense of honour and pride hardly left an option : yet the temper of the mercantile community was cautious and dispassionate ; and it was only at the close of a lengthened debate, that the Great Council chose the latter alternative.

So soon, then, as the deputies had gone, a small squadron of galleys and lighter vessels was prepared, and placed under the command of Marco Badoer, who was furnished by the Doge with instructions to proceed to San Alberto, to strengthen that position by placing the neglected fortifications in repair, so far as his time and means would admit, and to look upon it as a point, from which he might keep the enemy in check, or might direct more active operations. The troops, which accompanied the expedition of Badoer, consisted chiefly, if not entirely, of militia raised in the two wards of Santa Croce and Dorsoduro, and in the separate jurisdiction of Chioggia;¹ and although somewhat limited in number, they were amply provided with every implement of warfare and with a powerful artillery.

At the same time, in discharge of the promise which he had made to his late visitors, Tiepolo

¹ Da Canale, contemp. (sect. 288).

despatched Giovanni, the son of Gilberto Dandolo of San Moisè, and Nicolo Quirini to Bologna, to signify to that government, that the Republic was not disposed to depart from her original resolution in respect to the Tariff, and that she felt that she could not, compatibly with a due regard to her own interests, assent to the proposition of the Bolognese for planting a Fort at Primaro. Farthermore, Dandolo and his colleague were authorized to recommend the Podesta and his advisers to desist from any project which might have the effect of producing a breach between the two States. It is exceedingly doubtful, however, whether the Republic seriously anticipated any important result from this negotiation, and whether her rulers really expected, that their advice would have much weight with the Bolognese.

Indeed, if a peaceful settlement of the Tariff Question had ever been feasible, it was soon rendered hopeless by the turn of affairs on the Po, which too clearly portended the approach of a severe struggle between the Republic and her neighbours. On his arrival at San Alberto with the squadron and troops under his charge, Badoer found that the enemy were already occupying a position on the opposite bank of the river where, notwithstanding the late Ducal message, the new fort was in an advanced stage of progress. It was not less clear that the Bolognese had exerted to the fullest extent the vast influence, which they possessed in the peninsula: the militia of Forli, Ravenna, and other towns, which they held in

dependence, or which were fellow-sufferers from the Venetian gabella, were marshalled under the banners of their podesta Lanfranco Mallucelli, who had taken the field in person; and making every allowance for exaggerations or misstatements, it seems probable that their forces far exceeded those which the Republic had placed at the disposal of her general. The Podesta, however, was not emboldened by his numerical superiority to cross the river which separated him from his opponents, and to bring the latter to an engagement; and, during a period of two entire months, both armies lay inactive, with the exception of one slight operation in which Badoer attacked the enemy's position, and in which he met with a repulse. On the expiration of the second month, Badoer was relieved by Raffaello Bettano and Pancrazio Barbo, who divided the command: these officers brought considerable reinforcements from Venice. But still matters remained without any visible alteration, the belligerents exhibiting a mutual backwardness to measure their strength; and, in the Venetian camp at San Alberto, the only feature which tended at all to diversify the monotony of the scene, was the arrival, at regular intervals of two months, of fresh troops from some of the other wards, accompanied by a new generalissimo. In this manner the office, which had been filled, in the first instance, by Marco Badoer, passed successively into the hands of Jacopo Dandolo, Giovanni Tiepolo, and Gherardino Longo,¹ of whom

¹ De Monacis, lib. xiv. (Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 8574).

the first had already signalized himself at Trapani. These somewhat frequent changes did not imply that the government was dissatisfied with the conduct of its servants, although some degree of impatience and displeasure might not unreasonably have been excited by the slow progress of the War; they proceeded rather from the narrow jealousy, prevailing in the aristocratic communities of that age, of individual power and distinction, and from the fear, lest the personal merit of a general should win a dangerous influence over the hearts of his troops.

The circumstances in which Gherardino Longo found himself placed, on his arrival at head-quarters, were not a little trying. It was in the summer of 1272 that Longo joined the army; the weather, as was to be expected at that season, was hot and unhealthy; and, shortly after his assumption of the command, the plague broke out in the ranks. The sufferings of the soldiers were terrible; the epidemic proved itself fatal to large numbers; and those, who escaped its ravages, were enervated by sickness and disheartened by the loss of their comrades. The Podesta Mallucelli conceived that an admirable opportunity was thus presented for making a descent in boats on San Alberto, amid the general confusion and distress which were understood to prevail in the Venetian camp, and for attacking the enemy's position, before discipline was restored, or new reinforcements had been received. The project was at once carried out. Its success could hardly have been more signal.

The Venetians, absorbed by their own troubles, were seized by a panic; and Mallucelli had the satisfaction of seeing his foes retreat in precipitation on Volano, leaving behind them their baggage, arms, banners, and accoutrements.¹ Having achieved this exploit, the Bolognese and their Podesta re-embarked, and returned to Primaro with their trophies and plunder. Neither party seemed desirous of renewing the contest at present.

There is every probability that the preparations and expenses of the Bolognese were on a much larger scale than those of the Republic: yet, although they had commenced hostilities under the most favourable auspices, and had had an ample opportunity of maturing their plans, the only advantage, which the enemy had gained hitherto, consisted in the use they had made of the helpless condition of Longo, by driving him from his position; and that advantage was both ephemeral and unimportant. So far as the Venetians were concerned, their loss was chiefly material; morally, the reverse which they had sustained had had no damaging influence. On the contrary, it stimulated the Republic to fresh and more strenuous exertions.

It was to be expected, at the same time, that the news of the retreat on Volano would shake the equanimity of the Venetians. The retreat was both a slur on the national honour, and an unexpected blow to the hopes, more or less sanguine, more or less just,

¹ Da Canale (sect. 292).

which had been formed of the ultimate success of their arms on the Po. It was quite natural that Tiepolo and his Ministers should be anxious to ascertain at the earliest moment the true cause of the disaster, and to be in possession of all the circumstances which had produced such a disgraceful catastrophe; and whatever explanations might have been afforded by Longo in his Despatches, it seems perfectly clear, that they failed altogether to satisfy the government, or to remove a suspicion of something even worse than negligence and incapacity on the part of the general and his officers. In fact, on the first intelligence of the disaster, a special commission, consisting of Giovanni Dandolo of San Moisè and six other members,¹ was charged by the Doge to proceed to head-quarters, to institute the most searching inquiry into the facts, and to adopt measures for restoring confidence to the Army.

The report of the Commissioners of Inquiry confirmed the impression already formed regarding the origin and cause of the calamity. They went to shew that, if a little more circumspection had been exercised before the danger came, or if a little more courage had been displayed in meeting it, the evil now deplored would not have arisen; and the Commissioners went so far as to reprimand the troops and their commander in a public manner for that cowardice and faintheartedness, by which so much dishonour had been brought on the Venetian name. That this extreme course

¹ Da Canale, *contemp.* (sect. 293).

would have been taken without extraordinary provocation, and, in the absence of the strongest ground, is improbable; and while the fact furnishes convincing proof that the members of the Commission found every reason to condemn the conduct of Longo, of his officers, and of the army generally, it seems to exonerate the government from any charge of having acted with undue harshness.

But the vigour and nerve, which ordinarily belonged to the Venetian Government, did not desert it at a moment, when the display of such qualities had become so essential. Preparations were at once set on foot for the campaign of 1273; fresh levies were made in the Wards; and in the room of Longo, the Doge sent, to take command of the army on the Po, Jacopo Dandolo and Marco Gradenigo,¹ two officers of tried abilities and established reputation.

The resolution of the Venetians was soon apparent to employ every disposable means of concluding the contest, which had now had a duration of two years, in a speedy and satisfactory manner. The only forces, on which the Republic could place reliance, were the National Militia, and these troops were necessarily limited in point of number. Yet a strong hope was cherished of a successful issue. In the spirit of the soldiers themselves under better leaders, it was thought that confidence might safely be reposed.

The result of the new campaign was indeed brilliant even beyond anticipation; the arms of the Republic

¹ Da Canale (sect. 296).

were triumphant at every point; and the Venetian militia, anxious to efface the remembrance of the recent disgrace, vied with each other in patriotic devotion. Dandolo himself was more like a hero of chivalry than the responsible leader of regular troops; his desperate impetuosity carried all before it; danger and risk were contemned by him; and in conjunction with his colleague Gradenigo, this distinguished officer sought to win for his country an honourable peace. Under their new generals the militia of Venice and Chioggia recovered their confidence and energy; and, although greatly outnumbered by their foes, they maintained their ground with firmness, and performed prodigies of valour. It sounds rather like an episode in a tale of fiction than an incident founded on historical truth, when it is related how Dandolo at the head of a hundred of his followers, an elect band, resolute and undaunted like himself, boldly attacked the enemy in front, and, how after a sharp struggle, driving them from their position at San Alberto, he forced them to retreat in confusion to their ships.

The check given to the Bolognese by the Venetian troops was a splendid rather than a useful advantage. The victors were growing scarcely less tired than the vanquished of a contest, which had lasted during the greater part of three years, without bearing any adequate fruits, and which still presented a very faint prospect of conclusion. Yet both the belligerents hesitated to take the initiative in negotiation; and had not the Holy See, the general pacificator in those

unsettled times, seized the auspicious moment, the probability is, that the war would have continued, till one of the Powers sank from an utter exhaustion of its strength and resources. After some difficulty, Gregory X. succeeded in obtaining the adhesion of both parties to a definitive treaty of peace, which was signed at Venice on the 13th August, 1273,¹ by the syndics of Venice and Bologna. By this convention it was provided, that the Bolognese should at once demolish the Fort of Primaro, while the old Venetian fortress at San Alberto remained intact; that they should afford protection and security to all citizens of the Republic, travelling or resident in their territory; and that the Venetians should continue to enjoy without interruption or abatement, the commercial privileges which they had acquired in the Ravennate in the days of the Countess Matilda, and should have a free passage through every part of the Bolognese jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the Republic engaged to afford her late enemy advantages of safety and protection throughout the Dogado and its dependencies analogous to those, which she claimed for herself in the Bolognese; and (if it was viewed in the light of a concession) her government did not object, in the case of Bologna, to relax recent decrees so far as to sanction the importation annually from Cervia and from Romania, without payment of duty, of a certain quantity of salt and grain. This exemption was granted, however,

¹ Da Canale (sect. 309).

only on the understanding, that the salt and grain so imported were for home consumption ; and in order to give full effect to this condition, it was stipulated that all Bolognese vessels, before they ascended the Po with their freights, should undergo an examination at Primaro Custom-house.

The treaty of August enabled the Republic to concentrate her attention and resources on other threatening points, and the Anconese who had partly formed a design of imitating the example of Bologna, contented themselves with memorializing the court of Rome on the extravagant pretensions of the Republic. His Holiness, who very probably began to dread a revival of the contest which he had just been instrumental in terminating, responded with no ordinary haste to this call. In an epistle to the Doge, Gregory X. strongly deprecated the obnoxious and unfair measures, which the Republic had thought fit to enact with regard to the navigation of the Adriatic Gulf ; the pontiff dwelled on the injurious operation of such measures, as exemplified by the three years' war with Bologna and by the present difference with the Anconese, which, unless speedily and satisfactorily adjusted, threatened to develop equally deplorable results ; and he concluded by inculcating on his Serenity the propriety of submitting to the modification, if not to the removal of the hampering and vexatious restrictions, which his country had imposed on the commerce of foreigners between Lombardy and the Levant.

But the Venetian Government, while it departed not

from the tone of courtesy and respect which, from motives of the soundest policy, it habitually employed toward the court of the Vatican, positively refused to assent to any farther revision of the navigation laws at present in force on the Gulf, or to renounce, in any manner, the protectorate which it had pleased the Republic to assume over these waters; and Ancona was therefore constrained to tolerate an abuse, of which it was apparently futile to complain, and which it might be more than futile to resist. Foiled, however, in their attempt to shake off the burden of the gabella, the Anconese traders still endeavoured to elude the vigilance of the Venetian customs, and thus to avoid the Gulf Dues without obtaining their repeal. The fallacy of this expectation was soon apparent. The government of the Republic was not slow to mark its sense of the new practice by despatching a squadron to Ancona, which battered down a portion of the fortifications; the Municipal Council, seeing the danger of the City, gave under stress every pledge which was required; and the Anconese were compelled to acknowledge, that to the Venetians alone belonged the sovereignty of the Gulf.

On his abdication in 1261, Baldwin II. had made a cession of his imperial rights to Charles d'Anjou, King of Sicily; and this step was naturally viewed by the founder of the new Greek dynasty with extreme uneasiness. For it seemed to be hardly probable that Anjou would neglect such an important bequest; and Palæologus had every reason to fear that Charles,

dressing his ambition in a religious garb, might organize, in concert with his neighbours and allies, a fresh Crusade against the schismatists of Constantinople. In order to obviate this danger, the Greek emperor wrote in the course of 1274 to the Pontiff Gregory, lamenting all those dissensions between Christian princes, which retarded so much the propagation of the Faith, shewing how such feuds reflected disgrace on the Christian name, and promoted the success of the misbelievers, and volunteering an assurance that, so far as *he* was concerned, he was waiting merely till his power was more thoroughly consolidated, that he might turn his arms against the enemies of the true religion, and re-establish in his own dominions the supremacy of the Roman Church.

It required a very slight amount of penetration to perceive that the Byzantine court had some high object to attain in making these propitiatory overtures to the Holy See : nor was it difficult to divine, that this object lay in rendering the Papal influence at the Court of Sicily subservient to its immediate interests, by feigning a desire of reconciliation with the Court of Rome. But Gregory was not proof against the crafty hypocrisy of Palæologus and the insinuating address of his agents ; the hope, always so fondly embraced, and always abandoned so reluctantly, of the reunion of the two churches began to revive in the Sacred College ; and the emperor was permitted to indulge an expectation that, by working on the weakness and credulity of the pontiff and his advisers, he might oppose an impas-

sable barrier to the ambition of Charles of Anjou and of the other Western Powers. To improve the advantage which he seemed to have acquired, Palæologus sent representatives to the General Council convoked at Lyons (1274), who, in his name, signed a solemn act of Abjuration, and took an oath of obedience to Rome. By this step, however, the emperor lost instead of gaining ground. On the one hand, the Greeks were disgusted and incensed at a proceeding, on which they looked as an odious apostasy, while to the Latins it appeared in the light of a time-serving measure, dictated by policy and fear. The impression produced was in either case unfavourable. At length, the See itself awakened to a sense of the hollowness and scandalous insincerity of the whole transaction: for seven years later, Martin IV., a succeeding pontiff, annulled the instrument subscribed at Lyons, and excommunicated Palæologus as a promoter of schism. At the same time, the apprehensions of the Emperor regarding Charles of Anjou proved themselves to be chimerical. The latter, in fact, was surrounded by enemies, who left him little time to entertain plans of foreign conquest, or to support by arms his claim to the crown of the last of the Courtenays.

The career of the Doge Tiepolo was now fast drawing to a close. After a reign of seven years and a few days, that prince expired at the Palace on the 15th of August, 1275; and we are told by Da Canale, that "there was none in all that nation, who did not lament with reason the loss of so excellent a prince." The remains

of Tiepolo were deposited with the customary solemnities in the same vault at San Giovanni e Paolo, in which already reposed the ashes of his father, the Doge Giacomo, and of his brother Giovanni Tiepolo, Count of Cherso; and an epitaph was placed on the tomb, indicative of the honourable and satisfactory conclusion, to which the Doge had brought the Bolognese war.

The progress of territorial aggrandizement had proceeded at a steady pace during the reign of Lorenzo Tiepolo. On the 5th July, 1267,¹ Parenzo tendered to the Republic its submission, which was accepted by the Great Council in a House of 358 members, with 161 dissentient voices. On the 30th December, 1269,² Omago, which had been a fief of the Republic since the time of Orseolo II. (998), also engaged to take the oath of allegiance and to accept a Podesta appointed by the Doge, to whom it agreed to allow a salary of 250 *lire*, a free residence, and all official perquisites. On the 9th May, 1270,³ a nearly similar offer was received from Citta Nuova, or Emonia; and in a House of 192 members, ninety-seven balloted in a favourable sense. On the 10th November, 1271,⁴ the example was followed by San Lorenzo; and the few succeeding years witnessed the feudal annexation of Cervia in the Loredan and other places. The date of the incorporation of Cervia with the Dogado was 1274, the year before Tiepolo's decease.

¹ Sanudo (fol. 770).

² Ibid.

³ Sanudo *ubi suprà*; and Dandolo, (fol. 380.)

⁴ Sanudo, *loco citato*.

By his first wife, Agnese Ghisi, the late Doge left two sons, both of whom had been united, during the lifetime of their father, to princesses of Sclavonian blood. There can be no doubt, that these marriages, for which the annals of the Commonwealth afforded many precedents, were fascinating to the pride of the people. But that they did not produce an equally favourable impression in higher quarters, some judgment may be formed from the significant fact that, after the decease of Tiepolo II., and before the vacancy in the Crown was supplied, care was taken, through the medium of the Board of Correction, to insert in the Coronation Oath a provision, by which the inter-marriage of the family of the Doge with royal and noble Houses abroad, without the full and express sanction of the Legislative Body, was interdicted for the future. By a second article, the children of his Serenity were incapacitated henceforth from holding any office or appointment under the government, excepting foreign embassies and commands in the Navy. A third prescribed, that the Doge elect should, in no case, delay the liquidation of any private debts which he might have incurred, beyond the eighth day after his accession, and that he should cease thenceforward to engage in any transactions of a commercial or monetary nature. The fourth and most important clause, which was added to the Promission after the demise of Tiepolo, imposed an obligation on all the successors of that prince to keep themselves constantly informed, through their Notaries public, of the number

of prisoners in the cells of the ducal palace, and to cause steps to be taken for bringing to their trial all persons so confined, at least before the expiration of a month from the day on which they had been committed to prison. This humane regulation, which was admirably calculated to check judicial tyranny and legal corruption, was a feature in the Venetian law of criminal procedure, which did infinite honour to the Republic. It was a measure betokening a degree of civilization far beyond the comparatively rude age in which it was first adopted.

The short reign of Giacomo Contarini, the successor of Tiepolo (1275-80), was almost wholly occupied by the continuation of the war between Venice and Ancona. The latter, notwithstanding the wholesome example set by Bologna, Forli, Mantua, and other places, remained firm in her refusal to conform to any system of dues or any principle of maritime law arbitrarily enunciated by the Republic. Whatever their neighbours might do, it was not the intention of the Anconese to place themselves under Venetian tutelage; and after a long and tedious negotiation, it became apparent that the sole solution of the difficulty lay in an appeal to the sword.

A squadron of thirty-two sail was accordingly despatched by the Doge to the new Seat of War. But the fleet having been overtaken by a tempest near the Roads of Ancona, the greater part of the vessels were thrown away on the coast of Italy and Dalmatia. The absence of any means of communication necessarily kept the

home Government in ignorance of this disaster; and the Special Committee of twenty Sages (*Savii*), appointed for the management of the war, continued at intervals to send reinforcements which, entering the enemy's harbour without suspicion of danger, were at once made prizes. Such was the singularly inauspicious commencement of the struggle, which ushered in the reign of the Doge Contarini. The question which the contest involved was one of considerable importance; but, at the same time, it was a question which no treaties, however binding, or no war however decisive, could ever bring to a definitive settlement. There was no moment at which it might not revive, encompassed by new difficulties, and clothed in a new form.

The numerous towns on the Istrian and Dalmatian littoral, which the Republic acquired by cession or conquest at the close of the tenth century, had always distinguished themselves, since the period of their feudal annexation to the Dogado, by a seditious and refractory spirit and by the eagerness with which they had embraced every prospect which offered of recovering their independence, or, to speak more truly, of exchanging a Venetian for an Hungarian yoke. The maintenance and preservation of these unprofitable acquisitions cost the Republic infinitely more than the trifling amount of tribute which she drew from them in token of fealty; and it would have been well if she could have contented herself with concluding advantageous treaties of commerce with

the Dalmatians, instead of aspiring to number them among her subjects. But that safe and moderate course did not satisfy a Power which joined to the lust of gain the more dangerous lust of dominion. Besides, the Venetians were anxious to remove any stigma of ultra-commercialism ; they were solicitous to shew the world that they were more than a mere trading community or a community of fishermen, as they had often been called in derision ; and it is to be feared that the romantic and dreamy notion of establishing a Fifth Universal Monarchy, which should have its central government on the shores of the Adriatic or of the Bosphorus, was not quite abandoned by some of the occupants of seats in the Great Council. The characterization of this idea, to which one of the political sections in Venice appears to have clung for a considerable period, as an absurdity, was perfectly just. The Romans might have been able to rear on the ruins of other nationalities that vast fabric of military despotism which outlived twelve generations of men. Other peoples of antiquity, the Medes, the Persians, the Macedonians, might have accomplished the same result. But surely it was not by a similar process, that the Empire of the Venetians was to become great and durable.

In the present instance, Capo d'Istria, taking a bold advantage of the slight distraction of the Anconese war, openly renounced its allegiance, expelled the Venetian authorities, and, to shelter itself in some degree from the infallible consequences of so daring

a step, contracted an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Raymond della Torre, Patriarch of Aquileia, and with the Count of Gorizia. The former, who nourished an hereditary antipathy to Venice, responded with joy to the call of the Justinopolitans; joined to those of the insurgents, the troops of the Patriarch Raymond formed a somewhat formidable array of hostility, and the Republic found herself threatened unexpectedly by a danger which, though of secondary magnitude perhaps, was still sufficiently serious to demand prompt attention.

The Government of the Doge was far indeed from achieving with facility the twofold task of quelling the revolt and of shattering the Coalition. The small squadron which it had sent to Capo d'Istria under Andrea Baseio to recover the place, was unable to effect that object, until it had received considerable reinforcements from Venice; and the inhabitants were found to be reduced to the verge of famine, when they at last capitulated to Marino Morosini, called Beceda, Baseio's successor in the command of the fleet. Among those who fell into the hands of Morosini after the surrender, was the Patriarch Raymond della Torre. The manner in which the Republic marked her sense of the conduct of that warlike son of the Church, was sufficiently characteristic. Before he was suffered to leave Venice, Raymond was placed on a mule with his face toward the tail, and so paraded, in the midst of an unusually large concourse of people, through the principal streets of the capital, having

this inscription written on his back : “ *Ecce sacerdos pravus, qui in diebus suis displicuit Deo, et inventus est malus.* ”

The behaviour of the Republic toward her rebellious Fief was marked by lenity and forbearance. The walls and fortifications of Capo d'Istria were partly dismantled; the town was required to repeat its oath of allegiance; and its government was intrusted jointly to Ruggiero Morosini and Perazzo Gradenigo of San Polo, the former of whom was sent as podesta, the latter in the quality of *proreditor*, or military commandant. Perazzo Gradenigo was the member of an antient and illustrious family, and a young man of extraordinary promise. It may be safely concluded that Gradenigo had given some unmistakeable indications of a superior capacity: for, although scarcely in his six-and-twentieth year, he was chosen to fill a position which was at no time a sinecure, and which recent events had rendered peculiarly arduous and responsible.

It was during the reign of Contarini that the Republic at last succeeded, after many ineffectual attempts, in reducing the stronghold of Almissa, in Dalmatia, one of the principal haunts of the Corsairs. The difficulty of taking the place proceeded in great measure from the fact, that a wall was thrown across the river which led to the town, and that it consequently became an impossibility to gain access to the latter without a thorough acquaintance with the secret approaches.

The relations between Venice and Germany had always been on a tolerably secure and advantageous footing. But it is with more than ordinary satisfaction that the commercial world hails the report of Marino Pasqualigo, upon his return in 1277 from an embassy to the Court of Rodolph of Hapsburg. Pasqualigo is the bearer, among other despatches, of a complimentary letter from Rodolph to the Doge, dated Vienna, 18th of March, 1277. It expresses the pleasure with which his Majesty has received the representative of Contarini. It testifies his warm admiration of Venetian institutions in general, of the patriotic zeal of the people, of their industry and their resources. His Majesty does not harbour the slightest doubt that, in their assurances of friendship and esteem, the Venetians are most sincere; and the knowledge that they feel such a high interest in his successes, is to him, he confesses, a source of great gratification.¹ The Emperor concludes his epistle, the whole of which is couched in a similar strain, by declaring his readiness not only to accord the desired privileges, but to extend to the citizens of the Republic throughout his dominions every protection and security in the exercise of their peaceful callings.

In the early part of 1280, the infirmities of age began to weigh very heavily on the venerable Contarini, who had now entered on his eighty-sixth year, and who had been obliged for some time passed to leave the conduct of affairs almost entirely in the hands of

¹ Romanin (ii. p. 311).

Nicolo Navagiero, the senior Privy Councillor. The old man began to feel that his end could not be far distant; and it was naturally his desire, under such circumstances, to withdraw altogether from public life. To the wishes of the Doge the Great Council assented without comment, and passed a decree by which a life pension of 1,500 *lire piccole*¹ was granted to him from the Exchequer. Contarini formally tendered his resignation on Tuesday, the 5th of March; and on Thursday, the 7th, he retired to a house which had been hired for his occupation in the parish of San Luca, on the margin of the Grand Canal, and which belonged at that time to the Boccasio family.² Until the succession had been determined, the office of Vice-Doge was allowed to revive in the person of Navagiero.³

The Vice-Doge Navagiero remained in office three weeks. On the 24th March, Giovanni, the son of Gilberto Dandolo of San Moisè, the hero of Sette Pozzi,⁴ was elected by the Forty-One, and approved by the national voice, in the room of the Doge Contarini.

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 198).

² Ibid. *ubi suprâ*.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Sansovino (*Cronico Veneto*, p. 31).

CHAPTER XIII.

A.D. 1280–1289.

**Giovanni Dandolo, Doge (1280–9)—Treaty of Peace with Ancona (1281) — Earthquake at Venice (1283) — Coalition between Aquileia, Gorizia, and Trieste against Venice—Preparations of the latter for War—Siege of Trieste—Successes of the Venetian Arms—Sudden Reverse of Fortune—Sack of Caorlo and Malamocco by the Tries-
tines — Establishment of Peace between the Republic and the League (1284)—Preparations for a New Crusade—Triple Alliance between the Republic, the See, and Charles of Anjou (1285)—
Revolutionary Movements in Sicily—The Conspiracy of Giovanni Procida—His Secret Negotiations with the Courts of Arragon and Rome—The Sicilian Vespers—Dissolution of the Triple Alliance—
Excommunication of the Republic—Reconciliation with the Holy See, and Establishment of the Inquisition at Venice (1286)—
Restrictions on the Authority of the Holy Office—Concordat of 1289—The Death of Dandolo (November, 1289)—His Singular Character—First Introduction of the Gold Ducat (1284.)**

THE successor of Contarini had been elected in his absence. At the time that the College of the Forty-One recorded their suffrages in his favour (March 24, 1280),¹ Giovanni Dandolo was resident at Arbo, one of the Dalmatian Fiefs, in the quality of podesta. The usual steps were at once taken to notify to the Governor of Arbo the high honour which the representatives of the nation had conferred on him ; and the new Doge made his entry into Venice in the first week in April, 1280. The election of Dandolo was hailed as a great political triumph by the Democratic party.

¹ Dandolo (lib. x. p. 399).

Into whatever degree of odium the political quarrel in the time of Reniero Zeno between the Dandoli of San Moisè and the Tiepoli of San Agostino had thrown the present Doge, it is clear that it did not form a sufficient ground for excluding him from public employment. In 1266, Dandolo accepted the office of Podesta, which had been offered to him by the Bolognese, and in the succeeding year he obtained re-election. The latter portion of the period, during which his Serenity occupied this important post, was more than usually turbulent. In 1267, the seat of his Government fell a prey to a terrible feud between some of the leading families of Bologna, and the Podesta found himself placed in a situation of great difficulty and embarrassment. On another occasion, Dandolo, having imprisoned a shoemaker who had killed his wife's lover, the whole corporation of shoemakers rose, rescued their brother, set fire to the Prætorian palace, and obliged the chief magistrate to betake himself to flight. He was recalled, however, after an absence of three weeks. But at the close of June or the commencement of July, Dandolo finally tendered his resignation, and returned home. In 1271, he was sent to Tunis to arrange a new mercantile treaty with that Power. Dandolo subsequently sat on the commission appointed by Tiepolo and his advisers to inquire into the causes which had led to the disastrous and disgraceful retreat on Volano.

The first act of the Venetian Government, subsequently to its reconstruction under the auspices of

Dandolo, was the conclusion of a definitive peace with Ancona. The terms of this treaty, which was signed at Ravenna on the 3rd of March, 1281, after a negotiation of three or four weeks, were quite of a commonplace character.¹ 1. Perpetual peace was declared between Venice and Ancona. 2. A reciprocal guarantee was afforded for the safety and protection of the subjects of Ancona in the territories of the Republic, and of Venetian subjects in the territory of Ancona. 3. A restitution was to be made of all property, or prizes, taken on both sides during the war. 4. An exchange of prisoners was to be effected.²

The repose, which the Republic was now permitted to enjoy, was sufficiently ephemeral. Fresh troubles and difficulties soon arose. On the evening of the 17th of January, 1283,³ the islands were visited by a severe shock of earthquake, which threw down a large number of houses, occasioning an amount of damage which was not repaired without very considerable outlay to the government and to individuals, and which probably involved no slight sacrifice of human life. This domestic calamity, belonging to a class of evils with which the Republic had become in course of time only too familiar, was the forerunner of events of a still graver complexion.

Shortly after the pacification of Ancona, the Patriarch Raymond of Aquileia, still brooding over the recollec-

¹ The text is preserved by Romanin in his *Documentary History*.

² Romanin (lib. vii. ch. ii.)

³ *Historia del Governo Politico di Venezia*, p. 90 (Egerton MSS. 18,174); Sanudo (*Vite*, 574).

tion of the treatment which he had experienced at the hands of the Venetian government, formed in concert with his former ally, Albert, Count of Gorizia, a scheme for the conquest of Dalmatia, and for the complete severance of that country from the domination of Venice. The levies of the Confederates, embracing all persons capable of bearing arms between the ages of eighteen and sixty, did not fall far short of 36,000 men;¹ and the hands of the new Coalition were soon strengthened by the accession of the powerful City of Trieste which, though a fief and tributary of the Republic, had contrived down to the present time to preserve to a large extent the faculty of independent action. Her strongly fortified and commanding position, and the convenient proximity of her harbour to the probable theatre of operations, rendered her alliance of no slight value; by harassing the movements of the Venetians, by cutting off their supplies, and by making a well-timed descent on the islands of the Dogado, the Triestine Corsairs, so celebrated in those days for their extensive depredations, promised to be most useful auxiliaries.

The Republic viewed with well-founded apprehensions these concerted movements. It was determined to raise an adequate force by a conscription of thirty-three per cent. on the whole able-bodied population. The person selected for the post of commander-in-chief of the Army of Dalmatia was Marino Morosini,² who had distinguished himself during the war

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 575).

² Dandolo, *ubi supra*.

against the Patriarch Della Torre in the preceding reign.

The Government judged rightly, that it was of momentous consequence to gain possession of Trieste, before the Allies had an opportunity of effecting a junction under its walls, and of affording it relief; and Morosini was therefore instructed to lose no time in rendering himself master of the situation. The Venetian general having landed his troops in safety on the shores of Istria, in the immediate neighbourhood of Trieste, at once proceeded to make the necessary dispositions for the projected siege. Earthworks were raised; forts were erected; trenches were dug; an encampment was laid out. The result of the first assault was not favourable: the besiegers were repulsed. While the commander-in-chief was preparing to renew the attempt, a report reached the Venetian head-quarters that the arrival of the combined forces of Aquileia and Goricia might be hourly expected; and this intelligence was substantiated by the actual approach of the enemy. The Venetian trenches became the scene of several severe skirmishes between the van of the Allies and a portion of the troops of Morosini; in these skirmishes the latter generally had the advantage; and in one of them, the nephew of Raymond of Aquileia fell with four of his knights. In order to pay the last rites to his departed kinsman, the Patriarch solicited a temporary cessation of hostilities. The Venetian commander granted an armistice for twenty-four hours.

It was during this very day, that the existence of a

deep-laid and well-concerted plot was divulged to Morosini for betraying the cause of the Republic. The secret correspondence of an archer serving in the Venetian ranks, named Ghirardaccio di Lancialunga,¹ with the Confederates, ingeniously conducted through the medium of slips of paper fastened to his arrows, was happily intercepted at this particular juncture: it went to shew, that a plan was in course of formation, by which Lancialunga agreed, for a certain consideration, to afford the foe the means of taking the camp by surprise, and of overpowering, by a sudden attack, the entire army. Lancialunga was arrested and interrogated. Under torture he made a full confession of his guilt; and, being forthwith discharged alive from a mangonel into the hostile camp by order of Morosini, the mangled and quivering remains of the traitor came, almost in the midst of the burial ceremonies, to announce to the Patriarch Raymond and the Count of Gorizia the fate of their accomplice and the frustration of their scheme. It was under these circumstances, that hostilities recommenced on the morning succeeding the expiration of the truce.

Down to the present point, the arms of Venice had been uniformly triumphant, and in the petty, yet sharp actions which had taken place in the trenches or in their neighbourhood, the Islanders contrived not only to hold their ground against superior numbers, but in one instance at least, they drove the enemy from the field

¹ Dandolo, *ubi supra*.

with considerable loss. But it unfortunately happened that, instead of concentrating his whole force on Trieste, and applying his utmost endeavours to the reduction of that stronghold, Morosini had chosen to weaken his position by extending his line of operations, and detaching portions of his army on collateral expeditions to Pirano and other places along the coast. The Allies, on the contrary, had not ceased to recruit their ranks from the Frioul and other quarters; in Maynard, Duke of Carinthia, they found a new and valuable ally; and, so soon as the armistice expired, they returned to the contest with unflagging resolution.

Under these circumstances, the result was to be anticipated. The campaign was marked by the acquisition of Pirano and Isola; but Morosini, despairing of regaining the position which he had lost, and warned by the approach of winter, abandoned the hope of taking Trieste, which had once been almost within his grasp, re-embarked his troops at one of the Istrian ports, and returned ingloriously to Venice.

The conduct of Morosini was viewed by his Government with the strongest feelings of disapprobation, and a criminal process was at once instituted against that officer by the Advocates of the Commune for gross and culpable neglect of duty.¹ The general was sentenced by his judges to undergo a protracted term of imprisonment; but he did not long survive his disgrace.²

Meanwhile the Triestines, emboldened by a line of

¹ Sanudo (*Vite*, p. 576).

² *Ibid.* (p. 576).

conduct which appeared to spring from the pusillanimity of the Venetian troops and their commander, and freed from all immediate apprehension of the threatened siege, had been preparing to promote the interests of the Alliance, by hazarding an incursion into the Dogado. The pirates advanced unopposed, and indeed unobserved, so far as Caorlo. That island became an easy prey to the daring invaders; the inhabitants, completely taken by surprise, were unable to offer any effectual resistance. The Triestines committed dreadful devastations, and were guilty of the worst excesses. The house of the Podesta of Caorlo, Marino Selvo,¹ with a large number of other buildings, was burned to the ground. Selvo and his daughter fell into the hands of the enemy.² From Caorlo they penetrated without molestation to Malamocco, which underwent a similar fate; and thence, to the great discredit of the Republic, they succeeded in effecting a secure retreat to their own shores.

The indignation of Venice at these shocking occurrences was intense. The indifference to the best interests of the Commune, which the Doge had exhibited under the circumstances now made known, seemed to be barely credible; and the ferment in the popular mind greatly increased when it was reported that the Government, so far from hastening to demand redress, was debating the expediency of maintaining a passive attitude. Such a humiliation was

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, *Chronica di Venetia*, p. 82 (King's MSS., 148).

² Marin (v. p. 77).

not to be borne. The foul stain, which had been cast on the national honour, was only to be washed out in blood. So strong and so generally diffused was the feeling in favour of an appeal to arms, that Giovanni Dandolo thought it prudent to abandon the scheme, which he had formed for the peaceful solution of the difficulty, and to pledge himself and his advisers to the adoption of vigorous measures against the Triestines. The escape which Venice had just had from the horrors of a popular riot, was a very narrow one ; seldom had the mind of the nation been wrought to a higher pitch of excitement ;¹ and it was only by the concession of the Doge himself, seconded by the patriotic exertions of those who had weight in the Legislative Body, that the impending storm was averted.

The attention of the Great Council was now drawn without farther delay to the critical aspect of Foreign affairs. On the 2nd March, 1283,² that assembly passed a decree, clothing the Executive with unlimited powers, “until the war in Istria should have been brought to a conclusion ;” and, on the 20th April a *Bando* made its appearance, by which all persons, coming within the operation of the ballot, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate service.

Armed with this extensive and irresponsible authority, the Government addressed itself to its task with vigour and promptitude. In the course of the summer, a fresh expedition was despatched to Istria ; the siege

¹ Marin (v. p. 79).

² Romanin (ii. p. 314).

of Trieste was reopened; and, after a resistance which was somewhat protracted, the defenders of that place were forced to accede to the terms of capitulation offered to their acceptance by the Venetian commander. The moral effect produced by the fall of Trieste was strikingly powerful. All the other possessions in Istria which had joined the insurrectionary movement, yielded, on the receipt of the intelligence, without a struggle. Pirano had already (26th January) tendered its submission. These rapid and brilliant successes, however, did not appear to create in the breast of the Allies any leaning toward a reconciliation with the Venetians; and the war still continued to rage fiercely, when circumstances arose equally independent of the Republic and of her adversaries, which had the unexpected effect of terminating hostilities.

It was long since the empire of Christendom in the East had begun to exhibit unmistakeable symptoms of decline, and to shew that it bore within it the seeds of premature decay. In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the successive victories of the Emirs Yglasi and Balac, and the splendid triumphs of the Sultan of Egypt, Malek-al-Naser, had gradually shaken to its base the weak and ill-organized fabric, which was founded in Palestine by Godfrey de Bouillon and the first Crusaders. The disastrous issue of the pilgrimage of Saint Louis had naturally led the European Powers to imbibe a strong distaste for undertakings, of which the advantages were so doubtful, and of which the evils were so manifest. It might be

said that with that unfortunate prince had expired the last spark of genuine enthusiasm for the protection or recovery of the Holy Places; and it was a safe prediction that the hour was not far distant, when the flame, which was burning so low,¹ must be finally extinguished, and when the Christian possessions in the Holy Land must be irrecoverably lost.

Still the Court of Rome was unwilling to believe, that a cause in which it had always, on the most obvious ground, taken a considerable share of interest, was altogether hopeless. The Apostolic See cherished a confidence, that something might yet be done to ameliorate the position of affairs; and, in taking this sanguine view of the political prospects of Christian Europe in the East, the Pontiff was largely influenced by the expectation, that other Powers would be found prepared to contribute to the attainment of the object, which the Church itself had so much at heart. The Courts of France and Sicily were profuse, indeed, in their expressions of zeal and devotion; and Venice, while she studiously refrained from offending the reigning dynasty of Constantinople, proffered through her resident ambassadors at Rome, Marco Bembo and Nicolo Quirini, her powerful assistance toward the organization of a new Crusade against the Mohammedan Power. The Republic undertook to arm and equip, at the cost of his Holiness,

¹ Letter of Nicole de Lorgue, Grand Master of the Hospitallers, to Edward I., King of England (*Documents relatifs à l'Histoire de France:—Lettres des Rois, Reines, &c. de France*, No. 253).

twenty galleys of war, and to furnish at her own risk and charge five others, forming in the aggregate a fleet of five-and-twenty sail, to act in concert with any forces which should be now or hereafter raised by the Pilgrims. These terms, which were as liberal as could be anticipated, were accepted by the Pope; the Treaty was signed on the 4th of December, 1284; and the Bishop of Tripoli was appointed papal legate.

But, prior to the commencement of the new undertaking, the Holy See was naturally most anxious to close the bitter and unseemly feud, which had so long existed between Venice and Aquileia. The government of Dandolo stated that it entertained no objection to a pacification on certain specified conditions; and the Patriarch Raymond, deserted by his allies, fatigued by the long continuance of hostilities, and discouraged by the fall of Trieste and the other successes recently obtained by the Venetians in Istria, was also not disinclined to enter into negotiations. Accordingly, on the 8th of March, 1285, a Triple Convention was signed by the representatives of the Republic on the one part, and by the representatives of Raymond, Patriarch of Aquileia, Albert, Count of Gorizia, and the Commune of Trieste, on the other,¹ by which the three last-named Powers pledged themselves toward the members of the Privy Council of the Doge Giovanni Dandolo to restore all the possessions of the Republic, of which they had

¹ Marin (v. pp. 82-86).

entered into occupation, and to make restitution of all property belonging to Venetian subjects, under whatever form taken; and to throw open their ports to Venetian commerce. Della Torre engaged to confirm the mercantile charter concluded between the patriarchs his predecessors and the Doges Reniero Zeno and Lorenzo Tiepolo. The Triestines separately bound themselves through their Syndics and Procurators to discharge all arrears of tribute; to send to Venice a deputation, not exceeding four-and-twenty persons to be named by the Doge, who might take the oath of allegiance to the Republic, and be detained during pleasure; to demolish the fortifications, which they had constructed at the opening of the war; to surrender the projectile machines and other moveable artillery which they had employed during the siege of their town, that they might be burned on the Square of Saint Mark; to offer suitable indemnities for the losses sustained by the Venetians in the course of operations; and, lastly, to liberate any Venetian prisoners who might be in their hands.

The treaty of the 8th of March did not quite dispose, however, of all difficulties. There were a few other points of some importance, which still remained to be adjusted, but which it had been thought desirable to refer to a Mixed Committee of Arbitration.¹ The arbitrators, who were chosen by Venice and Aquileia, were four in number. The nominees of the Doge were Nicolo Faliero and Andrea Molini;

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But, while the Aquileian difficulty was making such fair progress toward an amicable settlement, other causes had arisen to delay the departure of the expedition from Venice, and to interrupt the fulfilment of the Treaty of December, 1284.² In order that these causes may be fully and properly understood, it will be necessary to glance at the events, which had been passing in Europe since the accession of Philip the Bold to the throne of Saint Louis, and the usurpation of the crown of Sicily by his brother Charles, Count of Anjou.

By her union with Peter of Arragon, Constance of Suabia, the last heiress of the House of Hohenstaufen, transferred all the claims she possessed to the sovereignty of Naples and Sicily to the Spanish crown.³ The pretensions of Constance were by no means unchallenged. In the brother of Philip the Bold who, on his part, embraced with intelligible eagerness the prospect of extending the French dominions beyond the Alps, Peter and his consort found a formidable competitor; and the Holy See, naturally anxious to seize so admirable an opportunity of crushing a family which, in the persons of the first and second Frederic, had rendered itself so peculiarly obnoxious to the Church, espoused with interested

¹ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

² Marino Sanudo Torsello, contemp. (*Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, lib. ii. part 4, ch. 18).

³ Sismondi (iii. ch. xxii. edit. 1809).

warmth the pretensions of Anjou. Under such auspices, the latter readily succeeded in obtaining a firm footing in Sicily ; and that Island did not long remain a stranger to the horrors of a government, of which the two constituent elements were a licentious foreign soldiery and an unfeeling foreign tyrant. The ambition of Charles was of the most selfish cast ; his own aggrandizement was the sole object of his conduct and policy ; and his exactions and cruelties soon weaned from him the affections of a people, whom a wise and moderate rule might have reconciled, in course of time, to their new master.

Among those, who were least disposed to tolerate the excesses of the French domination, and who were most acutely sensible of the grave reflexion which it cast on the national honour, apart from the practical evils with which it was fraught, was Giovanni, Baron de Procida, a Salernitan of antient family, of popular manners, and of considerable influence in the island. After the establishment of the French power at Naples, Anjou had proceeded to sequester the estates of a large proportion of the native aristocracy as a means of recompensing the services of the more meritorious of his followers, and of rendering the landed interest more pliable by the introduction of a certain number of French colonists. The property of Procida shared the common lot ; and that nobleman, stripped of his possessions, withdrew, breathing vengeance against the House of Anjou, to the Court of Arragon where the King and Queen received him with every mark of

condolence and friendship. To Constance¹ and her royal consort the illustrious exile gave a long and ornate recital of the troubles in Sicily; and he powerfully and solemnly reminded the Queen, that she was the sole legitimate heiress of the House of Suabia and of the kingdom of Sicily.

Procida, however, did not allow his exertions to be confined to the court of Arragon. In 1279, he passed over to Sicily, to ascertain the state of the island and the temper of the people; and, having satisfied his mind on these points, he proceeded in the course of the same year to Constantinople, with the object of interesting the Greek Emperor, Michael Palæologus, in a cause, which was also the cause of his country. In this endeavour he was far from unsuccessful; and, on a second visit which he paid to the Eastern capital in 1281, he even prevailed on the Byzantine Court to promise to him, under certain conditions, the sum of 25,000 ounces of gold. A portion of this money, on his return to Arragon, Procida lodged in the hands of the King, urging the latter to delay no longer in prosecuting the claims of his consort to the crown of Sicily. It was not difficult to divine the motive of Palæologus in lending such substantial support to Procida and his Spanish patrons. Since the publication of the Crusade against the Greeks, and the heterodox dynasty of the Palæologi, in which Anjou appeared as a leading party, the ill-feeling engendered between the two Courts had been constantly on

¹ Sismondi, *ubi suprà*.

the increase ; and the Byzantine Emperor thenceforth regarded Charles as his worst enemy. Should Charles succeed in planting himself at Naples, and in reconciling the Neapolitans to his sway, Palæologus felt that there was scarcely any moment, at which the soaring ambition of the French prince might not take a new flight, and at which the Western Powers might not be invited to bear their share in a second Holy War against the schismatical rulers of Constantinople. Such a contingency was not to be viewed without alarm ; and the Greek Emperor was easily induced to become instrumental in aiding the secret preparations which were being made at the Court of Arragon, as well as in some parts of the Neapolitan territories, for aiming a blow at the newly created power of the French in Sicily.

It still remained to procure the adhesion of the Holy See for which Palæologus, from an anxious desire to be on the best terms with the Head of the Church, had distinctly stipulated as the condition of the Loan ; and this consequently important object was effected in a personal and confidential interview, arranged between Procida and Nicholas III. at the Castle of Suriano. It afforded some indication of the impatience which the Sicilian patriot felt to overcome this last point of difficulty, that he made a journey to Rome for the express purpose of waiting on the Pontiff, and of explaining his wishes. For the sake of greater security, he adopted the character and garb of a disciple of Saint Francis ; it was a disguise,

which he had often assumed while he was engaged in the hazardous task of interesting the Powers of Europe on behalf of his oppressed countrymen.

Procida, however, was only on his return from Rome to the Court of Barcelona, when Nicholas III., with whom he had recently had so satisfactory a conference, was suddenly removed by death, the tiara descending to Martin IV., a firm ally of the House of Anjou. Moreover, he now became conscious that reasons of a cogent nature might not improbably debar Palæologus from rendering that important help to the cause of Sicilian liberty, on which he had so largely counted, and on which the issue of the present undertaking might be said to rest so much. For reports reached Barcelona in the course of July, 1281, that, after repeated solicitations, the Republic had been persuaded to enter into a treaty of peace and alliance with the Holy See and the King of Naples, by which she bound herself:—1. To provide a naval contingent of forty or more galleys-of-war under the command of the Doge himself to the large force, which Charles had, for some time passed, been fitting out in the ports of his dominions for the recovery of Constantinople from the Greeks; 2. To divide equally with her Allies any conquests, either by land or by sea, which they might effect conjointly thereafter; 3. To make no separate peace with the Greek Emperor; and, 4. Not to consider, in the event of either, or any, of the contracting parties dying before the terms of the agreement were fulfilled, those terms as in any degree

invalidated. The expedition, to which this treaty had reference, was appointed to sail in April, 1283; and Brindisi was named as the port of embarkation. Should such an event really take place, and should the French and Venetians actually join in a second Crusade against Constantinople, it was quite manifest that Palæologus would find ample employment for the resources at his command; it was equally certain that, until the expected subsidies from the Byzantine Court were received in full, the needy Arragonese would be in no position to carry out his views concerning Sicily.¹

Still, Procida did not suffer these discouragements to deter him from the prosecution of his project. Between the years 1279 and 1281, he was unceasingly employed in maturing his plans, and in organizing his resources. It was not without some difficulty that he succeeded in reassuring the King of Arragon, to whom the unexpected death of Nicholas III., and the consequent loss of a patron and ally in the Head of the Church, had been a severe blow; the supplies from Constantinople, the delay of which might seriously retard the preparations of Peter, or, at any rate, might furnish a subterfuge to a prince who was already flagging in his resolution, had not yet arrived. It was not till the early part of 1282, that Procida found leisure to pass once more into Sicily, for the purpose of preparing the mind of that island for the grand

¹ *Notizia di alcuni Documenti dell' Archivio Barcelonese spettanti a Giovanni da Procida e alla guerra del Vespro Siciliano (Archivio Storico Italiano, Appendice v. 233-58).* From these papers, it appears that Procida received several small advances from the king.

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change, which he had in contemplation. Nothing could be farther from his intentions than to give undue publicity to his visit; he therefore travelled, as he had done on the former occasion, under a close disguise; and every precaution was taken by himself and by those whom he had chosen to admit into his confidence, in order that the government of Anjou should be kept in ignorance of his arrival in the island. Bent upon rousing the national feeling by secret intrigues, and by winning over to his interest the more influential of his countrymen, Procida, now appointed by his royal master Chancellor of the Kingdom of Sicily,¹ had the wisdom to refrain from embarking in any wild enterprise, or from lending his name to any ill-planned movement, which could have the effect only of compromising his own position, and of ruining, perhaps irreparably, a cause which was dear to so many. From those vices, which commonly mark and disfigure the revolutionary character, the Sicilian patriot appears, indeed, to have been unusually exempt. He was calm, collected, patient, and circumspect, neither too precipitate nor too sanguine; and he was wont to counsel in others, who were his fellow-labourers and his fellow-sufferers, the exercise of that prudence and moderation, of which he gave them the example.

Procida had set foot on his native shores in strict secrecy. To obviate, so far as possible, the probability of detection, as he passed from hamlet to hamlet, in

¹ Documenti (*ubi suprâ*).

furtherance of his favourite object, he changed his dress often, and had recourse to various disguises. No one could comprehend better than himself the nature of the mission in which he was engaged. It was in the ears of a nation, embittered and alienated by a lengthened course of oppression, that he came to whisper words of hope and counsels of vengeance. He painted to the Sicilians in vivid and startling colours the horrors of their present situation. He brought home to them the wrongs which they had suffered, the miseries to which they had been subjected, the degradations which they were daily enduring. He appealed to every noble sentiment and to every generous impulse of their nature. Those whose term of military service was found to have expired, and who had retired from the capital to their rural farms or country estates, were secretly urged to return, as if of their own accord, to Palermo, where they might hold themselves in readiness to seize any opportunity which might be offered to them of retaliating on their tyrants, and of shaking off, by one powerful and united effort, a yoke which he told them, that they had borne too meekly and too long. Procida judged rightly, that to a nation whose temper had been so severely tried the cause of provocation could hardly be wanting; and the crisis indeed soon arrived.

It was Easter Eve (30th March), 1282; and there was a holiday in all Palermo. It was an occasion on which the citizens were accustomed to repair, with their wives and families, to the church of the Holy

Ghost at Mon-reale, three miles from the town, to pay their devotions, and to attend the evening service. The matrons and their daughters were attired in their gayest costume; and the latter, as they strolled leisurely toward the common destination, plucked flowers from the hedgerows by the wayside, while they gave utterance to their joy in songs to the incoming spring. The whole scene breathed pleasure, innocence, and contentment. The burgesses of Palermo had banished all care and sorrow, and had buried for awhile the remembrance of their wrongs. The French residents hesitated not to mingle in the throng, and to join in the procession. The members of the Government, and even the Vicar-Royal himself, who had impaired his popularity by prohibiting the Sicilians from wearing their arms at the approaching festival, were present.

The various arrangements of the evening were proceeding without any breach of order or decorum, and no circumstance had arisen which could serve to explain or justify the extraordinary precaution taken by the Vicar against the consequences of a tumult at Mon-reale or in Palermo itself, when an incident occurred which darkened the prospect. A young maiden of singular beauty, who was on her way to the church at Mon-reale, accompanied by the youth to whom she had plighted her faith and by several of her relatives, happened to be observed by a Frenchman, named Drouet, who roughly accosted her, and, advancing in an insolent manner toward her, dared,

under the frivolous pretence of ascertaining whether she carried weapons under her clothes, to place his hands on her bosom. This indecent and brutal affront proved itself too much for the feelings of the delicate and sensitive girl, who swooned in the arms of her lover. A loud burst of indignation followed this tragical catastrophe. A cry of *Death to the French ! Death to the French !* echoed in every quarter. Another instant elapsed, and the ruffian lay weltering in his blood, transpierced with his own sword. The fall of Drcuet became the signal for a general onslaught on his compatriots ; to arm themselves was for the Sicilians the work of a few moments ; 200 of the enemy were butchered on the spot ; and before the expiration of that memorable Easter Eve, 4,000 Frenchmen were numbered among the dead.

The example of active resistance which had thus been set unexpectedly by the Palermitans, was followed more or less promptly by other places in the island ; among the rest, the important city of Messina gave her adhesion to the revolutionary movement ; in almost every instance, the French were put to death without distinction of age or sex ; and this organization in Sicily of a league hostile to the reigning dynasty led the way, as a natural consequence, to a protracted struggle between the supporters of Charles of Anjou and the supporters of the Chancellor Pro-cida. The latter having thus, by a violent and sudden effort, succeeded in partially shaking off the hateful domination of the House of Anjou, lost no time in

sending a solemn invitation to Peter of Arragon to establish his pretensions to a throne which he claimed by right of Constance of Suabia.

The Sicilian Revolution not only wrought an entire change in the position and prospects of Charles of Anjou, but it relieved the Greeks from the apprehensions which they had, during some time passed, been led to entertain of a foreign invasion, by compelling Charles to renounce for the present all his projects of conquest, and left the Republic at liberty to adopt a course to which she had long secretly leaned, by resuming her former relations with the Byzantine Court. The Venetian Government went a step farther. It prohibited the Patriarch of Grado, the Bishop of Castello, and the clergy of the various dioceses, from preaching the Cross against the Spanish claimants of the Sicilian crown.

The surprise and wrath of the Holy See at the new change in the Venetian policy, which it might be disposed to treat as an act of tergiversation, were excessive. Under pontifical responsibility, an anathema was launched forthwith against the offenders by the Cardinal of Bologna. The Republic was laid under an interdict. The performance of holy worship and of the other offices of religion was strictly forbidden; the functions of the priests were declared to be in abeyance. Against this coercive proceeding, the Venetians did no more than address to the Court of the Vatican a dignified and respectful remonstrance; and under the new pressure, which was perhaps to some

extent alleviated by evasion, they behaved with equally admirable firmness and resignation. Not the slightest disposition was manifested by Venice to swerve from her purpose ; and the relations between the two Powers were still unchanged, when the sudden death of Martin IV. (1286) opened the way to an accommodation. It is generally supposed that it was a condition expressly involved in the reconciliation between the Republic and the Apostolic See, *that the Government of Giovanni Dandolo should consent to the introduction of the Holy Office into the Dogado.*

It has been properly observed that, at an epoch considerably anterior to 1286, a species of tribunal was established at Venice for the trial of heretics. But this tribunal had never existed, down to the present time, as a permanent institution ; it was merely called into existence, from time to time, for the investigation of cases of heresy, which had been pronounced too intricate and technical to come within the cognizance of the common ecclesiastical court. The Republic had hitherto deemed it inexpedient to sanction the admission of the Inquisition into her dominions ; ten successive pontiffs vainly endeavoured to overcome her repugnance ; and, indeed, so severe were the restrictions which the Venetian Government decided upon placing on the authority of the Office, that the triumph of the Court of the Vatican was even now more ostensible than real.

The earliest proceedings in regard to the proposed

institution were taken in the course of July, 1289.¹ On the 4th August was published the decree of the Great Council, in which certain fixed principles were laid down for the conduct of the Inquisition and of the officials connected with its management; and on the 28th of the same month, a Concordat with the Holy See of the following nature was signed and sealed.

1. In the capital, the tribunal of the Holy Office shall consist of the papal Nuncio, the Bishop of Castello, and another ecclesiastic; the two latter, although they receive their commission from the Pope, shall not be competent to act without the authority of the Doge. In the provinces, his Holiness shall likewise have the nomination of the Inquisitors; but should his nominees not be approved by the Government, it will become necessary for him to make a second choice.

2. At Venice itself, three senators, in the provinces, three magistrates, shall preside at each session of the Tribunal: and all measures which may be framed in their absence shall be withdrawn as void. It shall be in the power of these lay members to suspend deliberations, and to stay the execution of sentences, whenever they judge the same to be contrary to the laws or interests of the Republic. They shall be bound by a solemn oath to conceal from the Senate nothing which transpires in the Holy Office. It shall be obligatory on them to oppose the publication, or even the entry

¹ Sandi (*Storia Civile Veneziana*, vol. ii. p. 977 *et seq.*)

on the registers of the Inquisition, of any bull which may not have received the previous approbation of the Great Council. The lay-members of the Inquisition shall on no account be selected out of the number of those persons on whom the Court of the Vatican may have it in its power, either directly or indirectly, to exert undue or unfair influence.

3. No proceedings shall be taken against Venetian citizens, who may be open to a charge of heresy, at Rome or elsewhere. No claim for extradition shall be admissible.

4. The jurisdiction of the Holy Office shall be confined with the utmost strictness to the crime of heresy; and those who do not belong to the body of the Catholic Church, including Greeks and Jews, shall not be held amenable to its authority. Exemption may also be claimed for persons guilty of bigamy, blasphemy, usury, or necromancy, it being considered by the Government that, except in cases where a breach of the sacrament can be proved, these are merely secular offences.

5. The property of condemned heretics shall revert to their natural heirs.

6. The funds of the Office shall be placed under the charge of a Venetian treasurer, who must render his accounts, and become responsible for their correctness, to the civil authorities only.

Such were the important limitations which the Government of the Republic thought proper to impose on the Holy Office, and which tended greatly to disarm

an objectionable and dangerous institution of much of its inherent liability to abuse.

The establishment of a branch of the Holy Inquisition at Venice was the last act, which received the approval of Giovanni Dandolo. The measure in question was sanctioned by the Legislature early in September, 1289; the Doge breathed his last, after a reign which had embraced a term of nearly nine years, at the close of the following November. The remains of Dandolo found their final resting-place in the cloister of San Giovanni e Paolo; and to his tomb, which was near the door of the church, was attached a tablet with an inscription commemorative of his many virtues and accomplishments.¹

With rare intellectual gifts, the highest moral worth, incomparable firmness and energy of character, Dandolo united defects which would have dragged down less brilliant parts. The manners of his Serenity were forbiddingly uncouth. His temper was sour and crabbed to moroseness. He slouched and shambled in his gait to such a degree, that his oddity of demeanour carried with it sometimes an air of affectation; and all his ways were disagreeably eccentric. There was in him a little of the cynic and a good deal of the sloven. Nevertheless, he was a man of unquestionable genius; and his influence, not only over his own party but over his country, was almost unbounded. He was to the very last jealous of any encroachment on his

¹ Sansovino (lib. i. p. 57).

prerogative or on popular freedom; and the democratic principles, which he had brought with him to the throne, endeared him to the nation at large. Dandolo was an old public servant, and had passed, when he ascended the throne, through every grade of official life. Perhaps, in his lengthened experience he had caught a glimpse or two of human nature, which disgusted him with the world and made him less careful of appearances than was to be desired.

To the severe shock of earthquake, which was felt in the Islands in the beginning of 1283, and the disastrous consequences by which it was attended, notice has already been drawn. Two years later, the Republic was visited by a most fearful and destructive inundation. On the evening of the 20th of December, 1284, the inhabitants of the Islands became conscious of an unusual rising in the tide of the Adriatic. The waters continued to swell, until a considerable portion of the city had been flooded, and until even the Capital itself was incurring some danger of a similar fate. Nor did they eventually subside without leaving the deepest traces behind them, in desolate streets and deserted habitations, in the destruction of property and the ruin of families. The people had at once instinctively betaken themselves to their boats, where they found shelter, at least for themselves, from the fury of the sea. Their consternation at the unexpected catastrophe,¹ which had

¹ It was the season when the tides were generally lowest, the highest being in the summer and autumn.

reduced so many to misery and destitution, exceeded all description; and, in the bleakness of the season and the lateness of the hour, there was every feature which could lend additional horror to the scene.

Under these trying circumstances, it became the duty of the Government to lose no time in rendering the sufferers every assistance and consolation in its power. The Doge and his advisers addressed themselves, at the earliest moment, to the task of repairing the losses which the monasteries had sustained from the recent floods. For in that primitive age, the monks were the principal, if not the only Guardians of the Poor. It was to the monastic institutions, that the humbler classes, as well as persons of fallen or decayed fortunes, chiefly looked for the means of shelter and sustenance in their distress; it was seldom that the doors of those holy Foundations were closed against the unfortunate; and among the deserving the Brethren dispensed their alms with an unsparing hand. The monasteries were therefore regarded as the fountains of charity; and those fountains could not be suffered to remain dry.

To place the monasteries in a position to administer to the wants of the poor at this terrible conjuncture, a loan was contracted on the 31st July, 1285¹ on the public credit; and the proceeds were applied to the purpose for which the money was so urgently required. Already an order, bearing date the 8th April, 1285,

¹ Romanin (ii. 319).

had issued from the Doge, directing the delivery of 10,000 bushels of the best corn to the Chiefs of the Streets for distribution among the people at a nominal price; and, in truth, the government of Venice left nothing undone, which might inspire a renewed confidence in its paternal solicitude for the general welfare and happiness.

It was on the 31st of October, 1284,¹ that the first publication took place of a certain number of gold pieces, named *Ducati*, or *Ducats*. The Ducat which was a reproduction, with certain differences, of the *Redondo* of the 10th century,² was worth forty *soldi*, twenty *grossi*, or two *lire grandi*; it weighed seventeen 13-67ths carats, or nearly thirty-five grains;³ and in size it resembled an English crown. On the



GOLD DUCAT OF 1284.

reverse of the coin appears the Doge Dandolo, supported on his left hand by Saint Mark, who offers to

¹ Gallicioli (lib. i. c. 12); Romanin (ii. 320).

² Gallicioli, *ubi suprà*. The *redondo*, however, was = 40 *soldi*.

³ Quadri (*Compendio* 159).

him the standard of the Republic, with an inscription on one side of the field: SA MARCU, and on the other JOH. DANDULO DUX.¹ The obverse bore in an oval an image of the Saviour in the act of pronouncing his blessing, with the legend:—

“Sit tibi, Christe, datus, quem tu regis iste Ducatus.”

The purity and fineness of the Venetian gold, and its peculiar freedom from alloy, procured an immense circulation² for the money of the Republic throughout the Peninsula, in Europe generally, and indeed in every part of the civilized globe; and it was of essential consequence, that in the case of a piece which, like the Ducat, promised to create a revolution in the currency, its admission as a legal tender should be sanctioned by other Governments. At a time when the monetary system was not on that intelligible footing which it subsequently attained, and when the remarkable facilities of exchange which were afforded to the commercial world at later periods did not yet exist, nothing could be more thoroughly obvious or less open apparently to misconstruction, than the motive of the Venetians in seeking the recognition of their Ducat by the reigning Emperor of the West. It was a measure of the highest commercial expediency. The crudest politicians of that day were perfectly aware, that Venice was as much entitled to make money as to make laws or to make war. The Emperor might have been surprised

¹ Zanetti (*Della Moneta Viniziana*, plate viii).

² Zanetti (*De Nummis Regum Rasciæ ad Venetos typos percussis* 1750: p. 3).

if his attention had not been drawn to the new piece which was coming into circulation. But it is probable, that his surprise would have been infinitely greater, if the Doge had sought his opinion on the size, the weight, or the pattern of the Ducat, or had asked his permission before he stamped his serene image on the metal. On such points it was matter of notoriety that His Majesty had as little right to interfere, as he had to alter the Venetian system of testamentary jurisdiction, or to dictate a new law of divorce. It was no more the practice of the Republic to consult the Court of Pavia on questions of coinage, than it was her practice to consult the Court of Rome on questions of Naval Architecture or Prison Discipline. From the draped effigy of the Doge, which is to be seen on the Ducat of 1284 and its successors, many valuable hints may be collected for a History of the Ducal Costume with the innumerable, and often minute, variations which it underwent in the course of centuries.

CHAPTER XIV.

A.D. 1289-1302.

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part of the people, to dispense with the forms of election, was completely successful. But fundamental changes had taken place in the Constitution since the time of Domenigo Selvo. When the demonstration was made in his favour, Tiepolo happened to be staying in the metropolis at the mansion at San Agostino, in the ward of San Polo, which had been successively the residence of his grandfather Giacomo, and of his father Lorenzo. He at once became sensible that the position, in which he was placed, was one of no ordinary delicacy. If on the one hand, he should yield to the clamour, and bind his brows with the Corno, there was a certainty that a powerful spirit of jealousy and ill-will would be raised against him in the mind of that body, whom it was most dangerous to offend, and that the same spirit would accompany him to the throne. It was possible that the step might develope even graver consequences. On the other hand, to decline a crown which the nation proffered to his acceptance, was to do sore violence to his family pride and his personal ambition. It was a step calculated to compromise his party, and to injure his connexions. In his embarrassment, however, Tiepolo was not allowed much leisure for reflexion: for time pressed. From hour to hour, the crowd became more dense, and the uproar grew more portentous. Presently, a message was brought to San Agostino from the Privy Council. Tiepolo was urged, was intreated, to shew himself to the people, to pacify their excitement by disclaiming any intention of assuming the

Berretta, and to quit the city, until the elections had been completed in the accustomed form. The democratic chief hesitated no longer. On the whole, he entertained a doubt whether he should be able to command a majority on any question in the Legislature, or to preserve proper unity among the members of his own political section; the Quirini, among other families which gave him their support, threatened to be particularly troublesome by advancing their own pretensions; their kinsman, Marco Quirini di Ca Maggiore, was thought himself to have an eye to the Berretta; and under all the circumstances, the popular favourite determined to escape from the responsibilities of office, and to comply with the wishes of the Privy Council. Having accordingly hastened to exhort the people to respect the Constitution, and not to violate the tranquillity of the State by an abnormal course of proceeding, Tiepolo lost no time in leaving for Villa Marocco in the Trevisan March, near Mestra,¹ where he purposed to remain in retirement, until the crisis had passed away.

The conduct of Tiepolo completely disconcerted his party. Abandoned by the leader, on whose co-operation they had confidently reckoned, his supporters lost courage; and the people at large, silently receding from the lofty ground which they had taken up, rather perhaps from impulse than any definable motive, relapsed into their accustomed listlessness. Whatever might have been the precise cause which influenced

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, fol. 69 (King's MSS, 148); Caroldo, *Hist.*, fol. 90 (Harl. MSS. 5020); Sandi (iv. 9).

Tiepolo, when the messenger from the Privy Council was announced at San Agostino, it is to be believed that, by acquiescing so tractably in the wishes of the Provisional Government, he followed the only course consistent with his own and the public happiness. If that nobleman had been only in the slightest degree conscious of the temper of the upper class, it was impossible that he could have been a stranger to the difficulty of organizing, under such a constitution as that which his country possessed, an Executive which should have no other support than that derived from popular opinion and the influence of a comparatively small faction. He could not but be aware that his hereditary claims which, in the eyes of the mass, might form an additional ground of recommendation and an additional title to favour, tended rather to disqualify him for office in the eyes of the aristocracy, who saw in his election, among other points, a return to an obsolete and obnoxious principle. The government of the late Giovanni Dandolo offered the sole instance, in which such a task had been successfully accomplished. But Dandolo was a man of a very different calibre from the Count of Zara. He was a man of much bolder spirit and of far stronger nerve. He was perhaps of all the members of the party to which he belonged the one, of whom the opposite faction stood in chief awe. It may be allowable to look on Dandolo as an almost unique example of a peculiar type of Venetian Statesman. Although the representative of one of the oldest families in the oldest of European

aristocracies, he carried with him to the Throne that strong and politic attachment to liberal principles, which had distinguished him through life. He was among those few who learned to identify the preservation of popular freedom with the integrity of the Ducal Prerogative. Unlike Domenigo Flabenigo, the Reformer of 1033, he had no pledge to redeem, no pique to gratify, and he chose not to initiate or sanction changes, by which he would have been the first to suffer; and during nine years that illustrious personage governed Venice with all but regal power. After his death in 1289, there were some who attempted to follow in his footsteps; but Dandolo left no one who could be properly called a successor. In him the cause of political liberty sustained a loss, from which it never recovered.

During this byplay, the organs of the aristocracy were not idle. Immediately after the decease of his Serenity, the six members of the Privy Council united with the three Chiefs of the XL.¹ to form a Provisional Government during the interregnum. That the latter would have no lengthened duration, soon became sufficiently apparent from the anxiety, which was displayed by the temporary Executive to supply the vacancy of the Crown. The proceedings were accelerated by an apprehension lest the seditious spirit, which had manifested itself among the lower orders, and which was known to be fostered in certain high quarters, should assume a more dangerous form; and

¹ Dandolo, fol. 400.

while the Piazza still continued to present a scene of tumult and disorder, the customary steps were being taken at Saint Mark's to elect a new Doge. On Saint Catherine's-day (November 25) 1289, it was notified to the National Assembly in the usual manner that the suffrages of the College of XLI were given to Pietro or Perazzo Gradenigo of the parish of San Polo, Podesta of Capo d'Istria, and Proveditor of the Province.¹

The Doge elect, whose mother was a Giustiniani,² was a nobleman, who to every advantage of birth added a highly gifted mind. He combined great natural gentleness of disposition and equability of temper with unrivalled tenacity of purpose and strength of will. The talents and accomplishments of Gradenigo, coupled with his family influence, had opened for him the way to early distinction. In 1277, when he was no more than six and twenty, he was appointed by the Government of Giacomo Contarini Proveditor of Capo d'Istria, which had then been recently recovered by the Republic; here the future Doge had admirable opportunities of developing his administrative capacity; and, at an age when many of his countrymen had hardly left college, Gradenigo found himself in a position of the gravest responsibility. In 1280, he was appointed, on the abdication of the Doge Contarini, to the Privy Council of his successor; and he is believed to have been the prime mover in three

¹ *Chronica di Venetia*, fol. 30 (Harl. MSS. 3549); *Pietro Giustiniani, Historia*, fol. 69 (King's MSS. 148).

² *Litta, Celebri Famiglie Italiane* in voce *Giustiniani*.

attempts which were made during the lifetime of Dandolo (1286) to promote the views of the aristocracy. Whether it was that the politics of the Privy Councillor rendered him distasteful to the Doge, or from some other motive, Gradenigo was removed from the Council Board in the course of 1286, and was invited to return to his Proveditorship, which he retained down to 1289. The proposed successor of Dandolo was distinguished by the firm and consistent support, which he had lent to what was now generally recognised as the aristocratic party in the Republic ; and though absent, he was still regarded as one of the leading members of that party in the Legislative Assembly. The announcement of Gradenigo's election was consequently received by the multitude with a coldness and silence indicative of the strongest disapprobation : Marino Bocconio, one of the popular leaders and a man of large means, and, in his particular sphere, of influential character, remonstrated in unmeasured terms against the proceeding ; other speakers of the same political views followed his example ; and there is a probability that, had the anti-Patrician Faction been at all compact, or had it possessed any definite plan of operation, the attempted intrusion of the unpopular nominee of the College might have been resisted with some success. But the truth seems to have been, that that Faction had no longer any organization or any plan. The Patrician Tiepolo, in whom it had been thought by the Quirini and others, that the utmost confidence might be reposed, was found wanting at the critical moment ;

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² In 1071. See cap. vi.

part of the people, to dispense with the forms of election, was completely successful. But fundamental changes had taken place in the Constitution since the time of Domenigo Selvo. When the demonstration was made in his favour, Tiepolo happened to be staying in the metropolis at the mansion at San Agostino, in the ward of San Polo, which had been successively the residence of his grandfather Giacomo, and of his father Lorenzo. He at once became sensible that the position, in which he was placed, was one of no ordinary delicacy. If on the one hand, he should yield to the clamour, and bind his brows with the Corno, there was a certainty that a powerful spirit of jealousy and ill-will would be raised against him in the mind of that body, whom it was most dangerous to offend, and that the same spirit would accompany him to the throne. It was possible that the step might develope even graver consequences. On the other hand, to decline a crown which the nation proffered to his acceptance, was to do sore violence to his family pride and his personal ambition. It was a step calculated to compromise his party, and to injure his connexions. In his embarrassment, however, Tiepolo was not allowed much leisure for reflexion : for time pressed. From hour to hour, the crowd became more dense, and the uproar grew more portentous. Presently, a message was brought to San Agostino from the Privy Council. Tiepolo was urged, was intreated, to shew himself to the people, to pacify their excitement by disclaiming any intention of assuming the

Berretta, and to quit the city, until the elections had been completed in the accustomed form. The democratic chief hesitated no longer. On the whole, he entertained a doubt whether he should be able to command a majority on any question in the Legislature, or to preserve proper unity among the members of his own political section; the Quirini, among other families which gave him their support, threatened to be particularly troublesome by advancing their own pretensions; their kinsman, Marco Quirini di Ca Maggiore, was thought himself to have an eye to the Berretta; and under all the circumstances, the popular favourite determined to escape from the responsibilities of office, and to comply with the wishes of the Privy Council. Having accordingly hastened to exhort the people to respect the Constitution, and not to violate the tranquillity of the State by an abnormal course of proceeding, Tiepolo lost no time in leaving for Villa Marocco in the Trevisan March, near Mestra,¹ where he purposed to remain in retirement, until the crisis had passed away.

The conduct of Tiepolo completely disconcerted his party. Abandoned by the leader, on whose co-operation they had confidently reckoned, his supporters lost courage; and the people at large, silently receding from the lofty ground which they had taken up, rather perhaps from impulse than any definable motive, relapsed into their accustomed listlessness. Whatever might have been the precise cause which influenced

¹ Pietro Giustiniani, fol. 69 (King's MSS, 148); Caroldo, *Hist.*, fol. 90 (Harl. MSS. 5020); Sandi (iv. 9).

Tiepolo, when the messenger from the Privy Council was announced at San Agostino, it is to be believed that, by acquiescing so tractably in the wishes of the Provisional Government, he followed the only course consistent with his own and the public happiness. If that nobleman had been only in the slightest degree conscious of the temper of the upper class, it was impossible that he could have been a stranger to the difficulty of organizing, under such a constitution as that which his country possessed, an Executive which should have no other support than that derived from popular opinion and the influence of a comparatively small faction. He could not but be aware that his hereditary claims which, in the eyes of the mass, might form an additional ground of recommendation and an additional title to favour, tended rather to disqualify him for office in the eyes of the aristocracy, who saw in his election, among other points, a return to an obsolete and obnoxious principle. The government of the late Giovanni Dandolo offered the sole instance, in which such a task had been successfully accomplished. But Dandolo was a man of a very different calibre from the Count of Zara. He was a man of much bolder spirit and of far stronger nerve. He was perhaps of all the members of the party to which he belonged the one, of whom the opposite faction stood in chief awe. It may be allowable to look on Dandolo as an almost unique example of a peculiar type of Venetian Statesman. Although the representative of one of the oldest families in the oldest of European

aristocracies, he carried with him to the Throne that strong and politic attachment to liberal principles, which had distinguished him through life. He was among those few who learned to identify the preservation of popular freedom with the integrity of the Ducal Prerogative. Unlike Domenigo Flabenigo, the Reformer of 1033, he had no pledge to redeem, no pique to gratify, and he chose not to initiate or sanction changes, by which he would have been the first to suffer; and during nine years that illustrious personage governed Venice with all but regal power. After his death in 1289, there were some who attempted to follow in his footsteps; but Dandolo left no one who could be properly called a successor. In him the cause of political liberty sustained a loss, from which it never recovered.

During this byplay, the organs of the aristocracy were not idle. Immediately after the decease of his Serenity, the six members of the Privy Council united with the three Chiefs of the XL.¹ to form a Provisional Government during the interregnum. That the latter would have no lengthened duration, soon became sufficiently apparent from the anxiety, which was displayed by the temporary Executive to supply the vacancy of the Crown. The proceedings were accelerated by an apprehension lest the seditious spirit, which had manifested itself among the lower orders, and which was known to be fostered in certain high quarters, should assume a more dangerous form; and

¹ Dandolo, fol. 400.

while the Piazza still continued to present a scene of tumult and disorder, the customary steps were being taken at Saint Mark's to elect a new Doge. On Saint Catherine's-day (November 25) 1289, it was notified to the National Assembly in the usual manner that the suffrages of the College of XLI were given to Pietro or Perazzo Gradenigo of the parish of San Polo, Podesta of Capo d'Istria, and Proveditor of the Province.¹

The Doge elect, whose mother was a Giustiniani,² was a nobleman, who to every advantage of birth added a highly gifted mind. He combined great natural gentleness of disposition and equability of temper with unrivalled tenacity of purpose and strength of will. The talents and accomplishments of Gradenigo, coupled with his family influence, had opened for him the way to early distinction. In 1277, when he was no more than six and twenty, he was appointed by the Government of Giacomo Contarini Proveditor of Capo d'Istria, which had then been recently recovered by the Republic; here the future Doge had admirable opportunities of developing his administrative capacity; and, at an age when many of his countrymen had hardly left college, Gradenigo found himself in a position of the gravest responsibility. In 1280, he was appointed, on the abdication of the Doge Contarini, to the Privy Council of his successor; and he is believed to have been the prime mover in three

¹ *Chronica di Venetia*, fol. 30 (Harl. MSS. 3549); Pietro Giustiniani, *Historia*, fol. 69 (King's MSS. 148).

² Litta, *Celebri Famiglie Italiane* in voce *Giustiniani*.

attempts which were made during the lifetime of Dandolo (1286) to promote the views of the aristocracy. Whether it was that the politics of the Privy Councillor rendered him distasteful to the Doge, or from some other motive, Gradenigo was removed from the Council Board in the course of 1286, and was invited to return to his Proveditorship, which he retained down to 1289. The proposed successor of Dandolo was distinguished by the firm and consistent support, which he had lent to what was now generally recognised as the aristocratic party in the Republic; and though absent, he was still regarded as one of the leading members of that party in the Legislative Assembly. The announcement of Gradenigo's election was consequently received by the multitude with a coldness and silence indicative of the strongest disapprobation: Marino Bocconio, one of the popular leaders and a man of large means, and, in his particular sphere, of influential character, remonstrated in unmeasured terms against the proceeding; other speakers of the same political views followed his example; and there is a probability that, had the anti-Patrician Faction been at all compact, or had it possessed any definite plan of operation, the attempted intrusion of the unpopular nominee of the College might have been resisted with some success. But the truth seems to have been, that that Faction had no longer any organization or any plan. The Patrician Tiepolo, in whom it had been thought by the Quirini and others, that the utmost confidence might be reposed, was found wanting at the critical moment;

to supply the place of that nobleman, no second candidate appeared; and it followed that, in the presence of every disposition to oppose the election of the aristocrat Gradenigo, a recognition of the votes of the College in his favour was procured by dexterous management without much difficulty. The person, who was deputed on the part of the XLI to make known to the national assembly the result of their deliberations, pronounced the customary formula: "Pietro Gradenigo is your Doge, if it be agreeable to you,"¹ and, for the first time, immediately withdrew without waiting to receive the declaration of the popular will. No expression of dissent therefore having reached the ears of the Deputy, it was considered, that Gradenigo had been duly elected.

The election of Pietro Gradenigo which had thus taken place, like that of his predecessor, in his absence, the future Doge being still stationed in Istria in the quality of Proveditor, received the national sanction on the 25th November, a few days after the obsequies of Dandolo; on the 28th, the Provisional Ministry procured leave from the Great Council to despatch a small squadron of honour with a select legation of twelve noblemen to Capo d' Istria, to announce to the Proveditor his accession to power, and to invite him to return with them to the seat of his future government. The squadron was fitted out in readiness to sail on the following morning; and Gradenigo made his formal entry into Venice on the 3rd December,

¹ "Pietro Gradenigo e vostro Doge, se vi piacerà."

1289.¹ His first act was to pray the Great Council, that the day consecrated to the Blessed Virgin Saint Catherine (November 25) should be observed henceforth throughout the Dogado with peculiar veneration. This request was in other words to call upon the people to signalize in perpetuity their own defeat at the late election.

The reign of Gradenigo was inaugurated by the accession to the throne of Hungary, through the armed intervention of the Republic, of Andrew *the Venetian* (1290), the son of the former King Stephen, by Tomasina Morosini. That lady was the aunt of Tomasina Morosini, the Doge's consort,² and the sister of Albertino Morosini *il grande* of San Giuliano; and it was in the course of frequent visits to the house of the latter, during a residence at Venice in his earlier life, that Stephen fell in love with his future wife. Andrew III. the Venetian remained on the throne, which he principally owed to his connexion by the mother's side with the Ducal family of Venice,³ till 1301, when he died childless. The crown then passing to another branch, Tomasina returned with her brother to Venice, where she ended her days in the mansion which Albertino owned at San Giuliano,⁴ and which

¹ P. Giustiniani, fol. 69 (King's MSS. 148); Dandolo (fol. 401).

² P. Dolfino, *Annali Veneti*, p. 56 (King's MSS. 149).

³ Romanin (iii. 82).

⁴ It appears from Sanudo (fol. 771.) that this gentleman's granddaughter Constance afterward (1293) married Lladislaus, the son of the King of Servia. The "*Strumento di Matrimonio celebrato tra Madonna Costanza figliuola di Don Michele Morosini di Don Albertino e il Signore Lladislao, figliuolo del Re Stefano di Servia,*" will there be

still retains the name of *Corte della Regina*, or *the Queen's Court*.¹

This auspicious occurrence, which flattered the pride of the Republic without conferring on her citizens any substantial benefit, was speedily to be forgotten amid the distraction of succeeding events; and the new Venetian Ministry soon found itself thrown by the force of circumstances into a position, where its energy and judgment were called into the fullest exercise. Even in the eyes of statesmen who were no alarmists, the political horizon was at the present juncture by no means without its threatening symptoms; the relations of Venice with more than one of the Powers, with which she was nominally on friendly terms, were of such a character as inspired little confidence in their stability; Genoa, in particular, with whom the Islanders were under a formal treaty of peace, hardly cared to disguise her impatience of the restraint, which was imposed on her by this diplomatic engagement; and, as if European politics had not presented a sufficient degree of complication, the affairs of Constantinople and the East took about the same time a turn, which necessarily constituted them an additional source of solicitude and embarrassment.

The power of the Christians in the Holy Land was attenuated at the close of the 13th century to the

found entire. The marriage was solemnized at Venice at the house of Albertino Morosini, on the 14th August, 1293, in the presence of seven witnesses.

¹ Romanin (ii. 324—5).

shadow of an empire. Of their original possessions, many were already in the hands of the Musulmen ; and in those which they had still contrived to retain, their strength was insufficient to check for any length of time the triumphant arms of the Crescent. This weakness on the part of the Crusaders proceeded less from their poverty of resources, than from their want of union ; it was due to the pernicious principle of parcelling out towns into separate quarters, and of conferring on each its own peculiar institutions. The fall of Tripoli, which happened in the spring of 1289, and which was known indeed at Venice some months before the death of Dandolo, led the way to the loss, in the course of the two succeeding years, of Sidon, Beyrout, St. Jean d'Acre, and several other important places ; Acre itself, which formed one of the chief Venetian emporia on the coast, was taken, after an obstinate defence and great sacrifice of life on both sides, in May, 1291.¹ Thus, the Eastern dominions of the Cross were again reduced within the narrowest compass ; and once more the Holy See zealously addressed itself to the somewhat discouraging task of memorializing Europe on behalf of the cause, which had ever lain so near its heart. To this new call the Republic responded so far only as her sense of interest prompted her, and the more immediate pressure from other quarters seemed to warrant ; and the Pontifical Government merely obtained from the Doge Gradenigo, on reasonable terms, a force of twenty-five galleys in

¹ Marin (v. 89—90).

which 1,600 raw Italian recruits were shipped to the Seat of War under the charge of the same Giacomo Tiepolo, who had been so prominent in the affair of the recent Succession. But this succour was of the most inadequate and ephemeral character: while the Mohamedans were advancing with rapid strides to the total recovery of Palestine; and so feeble in a practical light had the enthusiasm for the Holy War at length become, that even the Court of Rome began now to awaken to the conviction long since embraced by the Republic, that the direct rule of the Western Powers in Asia was on the point of being terminated for ever.

The Venetians could not view with any genuine sentiment of regret the refluent tide of Mohammedan conquest. It was true that, in the earlier stages of the Crusades, the Islanders had entered with some degree of ardour into the exciting contest; and how, on one occasion too memorable to be forgotten, they had suffered themselves to be chiefly instrumental in changing the dynasty of Constantinople, was already matter of History. But, nevertheless, the character which they had (perhaps almost insensibly) imparted to their connexion with the Holy War from the beginning, was a commercial rather than a political or religious one. Whatever romantic or chivalrous aspirations might have at first actuated her citizens, or whatever deference the latter might have chosen to pay in a particular instance to the personal wishes of a great man, it is certain that the experience of two centuries was more than was necessary to bring the

Republic to the conclusion that her soundest policy lay in leaving the Mussulmen in the undisturbed enjoyment of their possessions in Palestine. In other words, it did not require any special penetration on her part to discover, that less was to be gained by retaining Acre and other places under the system of participation with rival Powers, than by obtaining advantageous charters from the Mussulmen to the exclusion of those Powers. Thus, perhaps, the heart of Venice could not be said to have been at any time entirely with the cause, which she had hitherto so effectually contributed to uphold. Venice was among the first to give her adhesion to the Crusades; and she was the first to proclaim their futility, and to adopt measures for establishing her relations with the Holy Places on a more substantial, though perhaps a less glorious, footing.

In June 1291,¹ shortly after the loss of Acre, the armistice subsisting between Venice and Genoa, which was then on the point of expiration, was renewed for the usual quinquennial term. The step, however, which might otherwise have passed unnoticed, was known in political circles at Venice to possess, in the present instance, more than its customary share of meaning. It pointed, in a manner which was unmistakeable, to a resolution on the part of Gradenigo and his advisers to enforce the satisfaction of certain large pecuniary claims which had been long outstanding between the Government of the Doge and the Byzan-

¹ Dandolo (403).

tine Court, and a consequent desire to detach the Greeks by an opportune stroke of diplomacy from their most potent ally. In short, it portended nothing less than a fresh rupture with the Lower Empire : nor was it very long before the meditated blow was struck. In the same, or in the early part of the succeeding year (1291-2), a small but efficient naval force was fitted out, and intrusted to the charge of an experienced officer, Pancrazio Malipiero, who was furnished with general instructions to coast along the shores of Romania, and to open hostilities on any point of the enemy's sea-board, which might appear to him favourable for attack. Malipiero, whose mission was undisguisedly of a piratical and buccaneering character, was not very fortunate in his operations. He made a descent, indeed, on the island of Lango ; but, in consequence of the sudden outbreak of a spirit of insubordination among his troops, he was compelled to retire. He returned without laurels to Venice, where the most uncharitable strictures were passed on his conduct by the Government and the people, both of whom entertained a suspicion, that the mutiny at Lango was ascribable to a want of firmness on the part of their commander. Shortly afterward, a second expedition was sent out with a similar object under Count Tiepolo, who was rather too popular perhaps at home, and on whom Gradenigo was therefore not indisposed to bestow such an appointment. The gallant behaviour of the troops under their new leader more than redeemed the discredit, which it was not

improperly conceived that their former misconduct had attached to their country; the maritime population of the empire felt once more the edge of Venetian steel; Lango, after sustaining a severe loss in killed and prisoners, was reduced to submission; and in a vindictory sense, at least, the result of Tiepolo's exertions was equal to the most sanguine expectations. His reception was accordingly as cordial as that of his predecessor had been frigid and mortifying; and so far perhaps the issue did not quite answer the calculations of the Ducal party, who might have nourished an unpatriotic hope, that the too popular chief of the opposite faction would meet with a fate similar to that of Malipiero.¹

The Greeks, who had long since become too feeble and pusillanimous to cope singly with their audacious and unscrupulous foes, endeavoured in their dilemma to enlist in their service the active sympathies of the Genoese. The latter were far from being disinclined to listen to such an invitation. But the five years' armistice, of the renewal of which the Imperial Government was possibly ignorant, here interposed; Genoa did not think it prudent, on the whole, to break faith with her rival; and it was not until the treaty of 1291 should have expired, or until some fresh ground of quarrel should have arisen to recall the two competitors for the dominion of the ocean to their belligerent attitude, that the Byzantine

¹ Marin (v. 94).

Court could expect to be able to resent the insults which had been heaped upon it.

It was not many years after the close of the fifth Crusade, that the Republic had been supplanted in her possessions at Pera and Galata by her commercial rivals ; and it was that circumstance which constituted the leading cause of the subsequent wars between Venice and Genoa. It was true that the Venetians still retained a quarter in Constantinople itself, and that they were still represented by their own Bailo ; but it was to be remembered that those privileges had been materially abridged, and that this magistrate was no longer the Protector of the Empire. It was true, again, that the Islanders had hastened to seek an equivalent for the loss of Pera and Galata by the formation of trading establishments at Trebizond, Tana (Azoph) and elsewhere ; but it was to be borne in mind that the Genoese had not omitted to follow their example by planting similar settlements at Caffa on the Euxine, and other places. Affairs were in this posture, when the almost complete recovery of Palestine by the Mohammedan arms had the natural effect of narrowing the ground over which the two great naval Powers had long been forced to distribute their strength and attention, and of bringing them closer to each other. The approximation was one which could not well fail to give to the heart of both peoples a throbbing pulsation.

Amid all their reverses, one feeble solace still remained to the Christians. In their new career of con-

quest, the Mussulmen had not yet reached Cyprus. In that island were now centred all the hopes of the Soldiers of the Cross ; and the Holy See was professing an intelligible anxiety to save so valuable a possession from the general wreck. In such an undertaking, the Venetians and Genoese, being still bound by the truce of 1291, were persuaded by the Court of Rome to join their arms ; and an adequate force was accordingly contributed by the two states for the defence of Cyprus. But a protectorate, formed on such a basis, contained within itself the seeds of its own early dissolution.¹ A collision was soon announced in the waters of Cyprus between four Venetian galleasses and seven armed traders of Genoa. The meeting had at first worn no particularly hostile aspect ; but, on some unknown ground, high words arose ; and from words to blows, among those choleric Italians, there was only one step. A sharp action ensued, the Venetians being apparently the aggressors ; and the advantage remained with the Genoese. The victorious commander, however, thought it his duty, as the armistice was still in force, to restore the prisoners and other trophies after the engagement, and simply to report the circumstance which had occurred to his Government. The latter, instructed that the Venetians had taken the initiative, and feeling itself in no way bound under the circumstances to view the check suffered by the Islanders as a set off against the first outrage, immediately despatched two Dominicans to Venice to demand

¹ Marin (v. 96-7).

redress. The deputies were received by Gradenigo with that respect which was rarely denied to persons of their order; and the Doge at once appointed two other Dominicans to concert with the Genoese Friars some arrangement for the remedy of the late mischance.

Meanwhile, both Powers were beginning to feel that the prospect of war amounted almost to a certainty. The provocation which the international hatred was daily receiving from various sources, above all from the marked bias exhibited by the Greeks and Venetians toward the Genoese and Pisans respectively, while the fatal Battle of Meloria¹ was still fresh in the memory of all, was too keen to be endured much longer; and no time was lost on either side in preparing for the worst which could happen. The sole object of a Conference, which sat upon a question, capable of being decided in three days, three entire months, was plainly therefore to gain time; and consequently, so soon as it was found inconvenient to retain the mask, or convenient to drop it, the solemn absurdity of a negotiation was brought to a close; the parchment of 1291 was unceremoniously crumpled up; and the gauntlet was once more fairly flung at the feet of Genoa.

The scene which passed daily under the eyes of the Genoese Dominicans in the latter part of their stay in the Capital, should have sufficed to shew what a grave illusion their errand was; it was a scene

¹ Fought in May, 1284. The Pisans were commanded by their Venetian Podesta, Alberto Morosini. It is said that they lost 5,000 in killed, and 11,000 in prisoners.—See Sismondi (iv. 24: edit. 1809).

that could hardly inspire confidence in the favourable result of the negotiation. At the Arsenal, and in all the offices where the business of the Government was transacted, the same air of activity was manifest. In every quarter were signs, which denoted a great deal more than mere ordinary precaution against contingencies. But any doubts, which lovers of peace might have persuaded themselves to entertain, were soon entirely dissipated. For the latest advices from Constantinople and elsewhere substantiated, in every particular, the rumours which had been for some time afloat respecting the menacing attitude and hostile designs of Genoa; it became evident that the latter Power had at length yielded to the intrigues of the Byzantine Court, or had allowed itself to be overswayed by its own passions; and the Ducal Government properly judged that a temporizing policy was no longer expedient or defensible. Accordingly, a conscription was at once ordered to commence. Two registers, one for the City of Venice, the second for the suburbs, were opened for the enrolment of the names of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, who were capable of service; and in the course of June, 1294, in pursuance of a resolution by the Doge in Council to proceed in raising the necessary supplies, according to precedent, partly by way of private levies, the Chiefs of the Streets were charged to lay before his Serenity within a fortnight an exact return of every family which was in a position to contribute its quota to the new armament. On the 13th

of the ensuing month, a Special Commission of thirty Sages was constituted for the purpose of carrying the return of the Capi into effect, by fixing the proportion of ships with their crews, munitions, and stores, which each large contributor, or association of smaller contributors, should be required to furnish, and of superintending all minor details. Three weeks passed in this manner, during which the election of Captains of Galleys was made, in conformity with the Rules of the 2nd February (1294),¹ by balloting them severally in the Great Council; and Marco Baseio of San Giovanni Crisostomo, was nominated to the supreme command. On Sunday morning, the 7th October, the fleet was under sail.²

In the meantime, all Genoese merchantmen, which happened to be stationed or to be trading in the Levant, had received directions from home to join at Pera where, agreeably to the usages of those times, they were speedily transferred, by process of unlading and partial refitting, into an effective force of mercantile marine. The command was assumed by Nicolo Spinola, resident ambassador at the Byzantine Court, but who, in common with the majority of his countrymen, possessed a competent knowledge of naval affairs.³

¹ Marin (v. 199).

² Romanin (ii. 332).

³ Dandolo reports that about this period the Genoese, counting somewhat too much on the disaffected spirit and vacillating temper of the Candiots, made an attempt to wean them from their allegiance by corrupting the fidelity of the celebrated popular chief, Calergi. But when the deputation, which was appointed to wait upon the latter with this object, announced the message of which they were the bearers, that great

The hostile squadrons came in sight of each other near the seaport of Aias, on the cognominal Bay, on the west side of the Gulf of Alexandretta. It was Saturday, the 22nd May, 1294. Spinola, who found himself inferior in numerical strength to his adversary, and who had been on that account loth to hazard an engagement, drew up his little force in the form of a crescent, linking the vessels together, and establishing a communication by a line of bridges which reached from one extremity to the other. He thus imitated the tactics which had been pursued by the Venetians themselves at the Battle of Durazzo in 1081. Baseio, observing this manœuvre on the part of his antagonist, and seeing that the wind was not at all propitious for an attack upon so strong a position, concurred with some of his officers in an opinion that the most judicious course would be to send forward a few fire-ships, in the first instance, to damage and weaken the Genoese line. The greater part of the Staff, however, held a contrary view, and derided this precaution as unworthy of the national honour and reputation ; and Baseio ultimately allowed himself to be over-persuaded or overruled.¹

man (says Dandolo) at once returned answer, "that although there had been in times passed certain unhappy differences between the Venetians and himself, and that such differences still subsisted in some measure, still, not only was there no disposition on his part to listen to the present overtures, but if he had had sufficient power on the sea, he should have been prepared to sharpen his sword against Genoa, and thus to shew that the enemies of the Venetian Republic were not less the enemies of Alexis Calergi."

¹ *Rime Istoriche di un anonimo Genovese*, contemp. (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* App. iv. 11.) "*De Victoriâ factâ per Januenses contra Venetos in Lagaccio Ermenia.*"

The activity of the rowers was now suspended; every canvas was spread; and the vessels, at the word of command, bore down gallantly on the foe. But the breeze, which was still blowing fresh, now began to make its influence felt; many of the galleys soon grew unmanageable; the full-set sails became an incumbrance; to recur to the oars was no longer practicable; the Venetians, unable to bring their ships under steerage, were driven broadside against the impenetrable line of the enemy; and their rout became complete. Of five-and-twenty vessels, sixteen were captured by Doria who secured a booty richer than he might have expected, as it happened that among the Venetian galleys were some armed traders bound for Aias. The vanquished sustained a considerable loss both in killed and prisoners; and in the number of the former was Baseio himself, who fell in a gallant attempt to retrieve the disaster which he had perfectly foreseen.

A short diplomatic interlude succeeded this serious collision.¹ The government of Gradenigo, on the first intimation of the disaster, hastened to address to that of Genoa a verbal message, in which it sought to shew that the latter, by taking the initiative at Aias, and thus setting the example of aggression, had flagrantly infringed existing compacts, and that the Republic did not consequently feel herself in any degree pledged to their farther observance. To this Note the Genoese returned a reply conceived in a

¹ Marin (v 100-1).

sarcastic and airy spirit of recrimination. "The Podesta and his Commune had received with unfeigned surprise," it was stated, "the protest of the Doge and the Signory; they had hitherto believed that the Venetians intended to adhere scrupulously to the treaty of 1291, so long as it remained in operation; they emphatically denied the charge, that they had initiated the attack at Aias; and in conclusion, as they understood that all Venetian vessels on foreign stations had been recalled in order to take part in a projected war against Genoa, they had sent Uberto Doria to the Mediterranean with a force, that would effectually demonstrate to such as might be on their way home the extreme impolicy of embarking on so long a voyage." The piece of grim pleasantry, conveyed in the closing paragraph, broke off this singular parley, which had merely helped to foment the reciprocal spirit of hatred and defiance. The disaster at Aias, although it had involved many classes of persons at Venice in severe loss and embarrassment, exercised no depressing influence on the courage of the nation. On the 26th of April, 1295, the Commission of Thirty was again called into existence, and was invested till the return of peace with unlimited and irresponsible control over the conduct of hostilities.¹ The powers of the Board,

Despatches were at the same time forwarded to all Consuls, Baili, and naval commanders in the various distant dependencies, acquainting them with the premature and abrupt termination of the treaty of 1291, instructing them to take every precaution against the not impossible contingency of a sudden attack from Genoese cruisers, and exhorting them to act vigorously on the defensive, should the necessity arise.

however, though extraordinary, were quite special : for its members were to be permitted on no pretence to extend their authority to any other branch of the Executive.

The Thirty applied themselves with earnestness to their appointed task. A new registration was opened forthwith of all male persons between the ages of fifteen and forty ; and, in the present instance, the conscripts were arranged in three classes according to their more or less immediate liability to serve ; letters of marque were granted to two privateering captains, Domenico Schiavo and Jacopo Barozzi, to make prize of the property and goods of Genoese subjects, wherever they found them ; and, in the course of the summer, the Commissioners were able to announce the completion of a new fleet of sixty sail. The command was committed jointly to Matteo Quirini and Nicolo Barbaro.

The fleet under Uberto Doria, to which the Genoese Government had so pointedly referred in its recent message to the Doge, consisted of no fewer than 165 sail, of which 105 were vessels newly launched ;¹ and the whole squadron mounted a force of 45,000 men, among whom was counted the flower of the Genoese nobility. To such overwhelming numbers Quirini and his colleague were in no position to offer an effectual resistance ; and the Venetian commanders were therefore instructed to confine themselves to a cruise of observation, and on no account to run the risk of an action.

¹ Dandolo (p. 405).

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of the ensuing month, a Special Commission of thirty Sages was constituted for the purpose of carrying the return of the Capi into effect, by fixing the proportion of ships with their crews, munitions, and stores, which each large contributor, or association of smaller contributors, should be required to furnish, and of superintending all minor details. Three weeks passed in this manner, during which the election of Captains of Galleys was made, in conformity with the Rules of the 2nd February (1294),¹ by balloting them severally in the Great Council; and Marco Baseio of San Giovanni Crisostomo, was nominated to the supreme command. On Sunday morning, the 7th October, the fleet was under sail.²

In the meantime, all Genoese merchantmen, which happened to be stationed or to be trading in the Levant, had received directions from home to join at Pera where, agreeably to the usages of those times, they were speedily transferred, by process of unlading and partial refitting, into an effective force of mercantile marine. The command was assumed by Nicolo Spinola, resident ambassador at the Byzantine Court, but who, in common with the majority of his countrymen, possessed a competent knowledge of naval affairs.³

¹ Marin (v. 199).

² Romanin (ii. 332).

³ Dandolo reports that about this period the Genoese, counting somewhat too much on the disaffected spirit and vacillating temper of the Candioti, made an attempt to wean them from their allegiance by corrupting the fidelity of the celebrated popular chief, Calergi. But when the deputation, which was appointed to wait upon the latter with this object, announced the message of which they were the bearers, that great

The hostile squadrons came in sight of each other near the seaport of Aias, on the cognominal Bay, on the west side of the Gulf of Alexandretta. It was Saturday, the 22nd May, 1294. Spinola, who found himself inferior in numerical strength to his adversary, and who had been on that account loth to hazard an engagement, drew up his little force in the form of a crescent, linking the vessels together, and establishing a communication by a line of bridges which reached from one extremity to the other. He thus imitated the tactics which had been pursued by the Venetians themselves at the Battle of Durazzo in 1081. Baseio, observing this manœuvre on the part of his antagonist, and seeing that the wind was not at all propitious for an attack upon so strong a position, concurred with some of his officers in an opinion that the most judicious course would be to send forward a few fire-ships, in the first instance, to damage and weaken the Genoese line. The greater part of the Staff, however, held a contrary view, and derided this precaution as unworthy of the national honour and reputation ; and Baseio ultimately allowed himself to be over-persuaded or overruled.¹

man (says Dandolo) at once returned answer, "that although there had been in times passed certain unhappy differences between the Venetians and himself, and that such differences still subsisted in some measure, still, not only was there no disposition on his part to listen to the present overtures, but if he had had sufficient power on the sea, he should have been prepared to sharpen his sword against Genoa, and thus to shew that the enemies of the Venetian Republic were not less the enemies of Alexis Calergi."

¹ *Rime Istoriche di un anonimo Genovese*, contemp. (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* App. iv. 11.) "*De Victoriâ factâ per Januenses contra Venetos in Lagaccio Ermenia.*"

The activity of the rowers was now suspended; every canvas was spread; and the vessels, at the word of command, bore down gallantly on the foe. But the breeze, which was still blowing fresh, now began to make its influence felt; many of the galleys soon grew unmanageable; the full-set sails became an incumbrance; to recur to the oars was no longer practicable; the Venetians, unable to bring their ships under steerage, were driven broadside against the impenetrable line of the enemy; and their rout became complete. Of five-and-twenty vessels, sixteen were captured by Doria who secured a booty richer than he might have expected, as it happened that among the Venetian galleys were some armed traders bound for Aias. The vanquished sustained a considerable loss both in killed and prisoners; and in the number of the former was Baseio himself, who fell in a gallant attempt to retrieve the disaster which he had perfectly foreseen.

A short diplomatic interlude succeeded this serious collision.¹ The government of Gradenigo, on the first intimation of the disaster, hastened to address to that of Genoa a verbal message, in which it sought to shew that the latter, by taking the initiative at Aias, and thus setting the example of aggression, had flagrantly infringed existing compacts, and that the Republic did not consequently feel herself in any degree pledged to their farther observance. To this Note the Genoese returned a reply conceived in a

¹ Marin (v 100-1).

sarcastic and airy spirit of recrimination. "The Podesta and his Commune had received with unfeigned surprise," it was stated, "the protest of the Doge and the Signory; they had hitherto believed that the Venetians intended to adhere scrupulously to the treaty of 1291, so long as it remained in operation; they emphatically denied the charge, that they had initiated the attack at Aias; and in conclusion, as they understood that all Venetian vessels on foreign stations had been recalled in order to take part in a projected war against Genoa, they had sent Uberto Doria to the Mediterranean with a force, that would effectually demonstrate to such as might be on their way home the extreme impolicy of embarking on so long a voyage." The piece of grim pleasantry, conveyed in the closing paragraph, broke off this singular parley, which had merely helped to foment the reciprocal spirit of hatred and defiance. The disaster at Aias, although it had involved many classes of persons at Venice in severe loss and embarrassment, exercised no depressing influence on the courage of the nation. On the 26th of April, 1295, the Commission of Thirty was again called into existence, and was invested till the return of peace with unlimited and irresponsible control over the conduct of hostilities.¹ The powers of the Board,

Despatches were at the same time forwarded to all Consuls, Baili, and naval commanders in the various distant dependencies, acquainting them with the premature and abrupt termination of the treaty of 1291, instructing them to take every precaution against the not impossible contingency of a sudden attack from Genoese cruisers, and exhorting them to act vigorously on the defensive, should the necessity arise.

however, though extraordinary, were quite special : for its members were to be permitted on no pretence to extend their authority to any other branch of the Executive.

The Thirty applied themselves with earnestness to their appointed task. A new registration was opened forthwith of all male persons between the ages of fifteen and forty ; and, in the present instance, the conscripts were arranged in three classes according to their more or less immediate liability to serve ; letters of marque were granted to two privateering captains, Domenico Schiavo and Jacopo Barozzi, to make prize of the property and goods of Genoese subjects, wherever they found them ; and, in the course of the summer, the Commissioners were able to announce the completion of a new fleet of sixty sail. The command was committed jointly to Matteo Quirini and Nicolo Barbaro.

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the feeling, though scarcely stronger, was, as it usually happened, more demonstrative; and, the news of the affair having gained publicity before the arrival of the deputies, whom the Emperor had sent instantaneously to mollify the wrath of the Republic by exonerating him and his own subjects from any share in the catastrophe, it was with the greatest difficulty that the Government rescued them from the mob on landing. When the Greeks at length were admitted to an audience, Gradenigo sharply interrogated his visitors respecting the complicated atrocity which had been so recently perpetrated. "Is it to be believed," demanded his Serenity, "that this event has taken place in the absence of any collusion on the part of your imperial master? Was not the wholesale butchery of my compatriots a sufficiently gross iniquity; and was it necessary to add crime to crime, and tragedy to tragedy, by desecrating, in the person of the hapless Bembo, the inviolable character of an ambassador? Will not Europe view with horror so flagrant an infraction of justice and humanity? Has the Republic afforded a precedent for such a class of proceeding? Is a single instance on record in which she has been known to behave with similar treachery and cruelty toward the strangers who have chosen to seek the hospitality of her shores, or toward the accredited representatives of other Powers? No! The Venetians are more scrupulous of breaking the laws of God and man; and the Venetian Government knows better,

it seems, than his Majesty, how to protect the lives of good citizens and to curb the passions of bad men." Gradenigo concluded by an intimation that, unless the most ample redress was given forthwith by the Byzantine Court for the injury which his fellow-countrymen had sustained, the Emperor might rest assured, that a declaration of war would issue without farther warning. The indemnity was fixed at 15,000 gold *perperi*.

The Emperor, in whatever direction his inclinations might lie, despaired of being able to raise so large an amount; and he was brought by the help of Genoese counsels to the conviction, that it was a minor evil to bear the consequences of refusal than to satisfy the terms of compliance. The Republic, which had by a foregone conclusion anticipated such a result, did not delay, in the meantime, to prepare for a new Greco-Genoese war.¹

Somewhat late in the spring of 1296, Ruggiero Morosini called Malabranca, left the Venetian shores with a heavy armament of forty sail. At Modon, in the Morea, he was reinforced by Marco Michieli with thirteen of the twenty galleys which had so lately formed the escort of the lamented Bembo; and off Scio, the remaining seven, which had been accidentally separated from their companions in a recent encounter with a Genoese force, joined Morosini's squadron. The latter, however, finding no immediate occasion

¹ Johannes Trithemius, contemp. *vulgò* Voragine (*Chronicon Genuense*; Murat. ix. 15).

for this large addition to his strength, confided to Michieli the defence of Negropont, and at once directed his own course toward Constantinople. Having passed the Dardanelles, and entered the Sea of Marmora, the Venetian commander found twenty of the enemy's ships, to which he gave chase so far as Largiro; and he thence proceeded to lay waste the whole coast down to Pera. On his arrival at that point, Morosini was not slightly vexed and disappointed to discover, that the Genoese Quarter had been entirely abandoned, and that its late occupants, forewarned of his approach, had procured leave from the Emperor to take shelter in the Capital. The Venetians vented their spleen by desolating the whole suburb; and, then once more moving forward, the Admiral advanced on Constantinople itself, of which he opened the siege in the neighbourhood of the Palace of Blachernæ (July, 1297).¹

While the gallant Morosini, whose emulation might be aroused by the traditions of the martial achievements of the Venetians of a former age on that soil, was spreading dismay along the whole littoral from Pera to the Chrysoceras, Domenigo Schiavo was carrying out another branch of the instructions of the Thirty, by keeping the sea with a few light vessels, intercepting stragglers, and operating on any point of the enemy's territory where he might chance to find the opportunity; and a force of five-and-twenty

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galleys under Giovanni,¹ the son of Antonio² Soranzo, having about the same time sailed into the Euxine, accomplished the almost total destruction of Caffa. The issue of Soranzo's expedition, which aimed purely at retaliating on the Genoese their proceedings at Canea in 1295, was far less prosperous, however; than its commencement had seemed to augur. It was already somewhat late in the season when the Venetian commander laid siege to Caffa; and before he was prepared to leave those waters the northern winter had set in with such unwonted severity, that he not only found himself weather-bound, but actually imprisoned in the ice. The intense frost proved fatal to a large number of the seamen and soldiers, whose clothing and appointments had not been calculated for a winter residence in so bleak a latitude; seven of the five-and-twenty ships which Soranzo had brought to Caffa, were, in the end, completely disabled; and the Venetians returned home in the spring of 1297 with the most dejected and forlorn air.

Morosini himself, having inflicted considerable damage on the imperial capital in the precincts of Blachernæ in spite of the efforts which were made by the Greeks and their Genoese allies to repulse him, had, with better judgment than Soranzo, suspended hostilities before the cold weather set in, and had retraced his steps in safety. The admiral was accompanied by a certain number of Genoese prisoners; but

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In the succeeding campaign (1297) operations of an important character were not attempted by any of the belligerents. The Thirty confined their exertions to the equipment of two small squadrons,¹ of which one counting fifteen galleys under Matteo Quirini swept the Sicilian waters, and made a few unimportant captures: while the second, consisting of nine vessels under Eurosio Morosini, took the direction of Cyprus, entered the harbour of Famagosta, where the commander burned to the keel a large Genoese man-of-war under the very eyes of the Cypriots, and in spite of a warm attack from the Genoese owners, who attempted to save their property, and then shaping his course for Armenia, took and demolished the enemy's trading station on that coast. Having concluded his cruise, Morosini, who in deeds of daring vied with his kinsman Malabranca, returned to the Adriatic, and rejoined Matteo Quirini with whom, in obedience to the instructions of the Thirty, he remained in charge of the Gulf.

At the close of this year (1297) the Apostolic See, inspired by some faint hope of peace, prevailed on the

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two belligerents to hold a Congress at Rome, in which an attempt might be made to accommodate the present difference.¹

The question which was to be submitted to the Conference had already begun, however, to wear a somewhat complicated aspect; both parties had numerous heads of grievance and ample room to recriminate; and no difficulty could be anticipated on either side in answering each accusation, which might be made, at least by a counter-accusation. If any balance might be struck, it was certainly on the whole in favour of the Venetians. Their rivals, with an audacity which was too shallow and transparent, urged, as a set-off to their excesses at Canea in 1295 the retribution exacted at Caffa for those very excesses by Soranzo in 1296. With hardly greater felicity, they sought to palliate their acknowledged enormities at Constantinople by pleading, that the Government was not responsible for the crimes of private citizens, of which it had neither foreknowledge nor cognizance, and that the countrymen of Marco Bembo had given provocation by striking the first blow. A third ground on which the Genoese diplomatists essayed to build an argument was the affair at Aias; and there they equally failed to establish priority of attack on the part of their opponents and the sequence of their own freedom from blame. The only field, from which it became possible for them to glean anything really apposite to their purpose, was

¹ Marin (v. 114-15-16); and the authorities there quoted.

the campaign of 1297 just brought to a close, in which the Republic, following the dictates of passion, had proceeded to the commission of acts which were not to be justified. The destruction of the Armenian Factory by Eurosio Morosini was fairly pronounced to be an indefensible outrage.

At the same time, both parties claimed the credit of a disposition to be tractable. The Venetians were perfectly prepared to treat on the basis of adequate compensation for the losses which had accrued to them at Canea, Constantinople, and elsewhere. The Genoese were not disinclined to come to terms, saving the suggestion for an indemnity which, in the face of the demolition of their Black Sea Factory in 1296, and of their Armenian Factory in 1297, they declined absolutely to entertain. Such was the impediment which now presented itself: yet the Pope did not quite despair of success. Having his own particular object in view in coming forward in this instance as a peacemaker, Boniface VIII. even offered to pay half the amount of the Venetian claims, if Genoa would consent to defray the residue. But to this liberal and equitable arrangement, to which the latter was not disinclined to accede, and which could hardly have been expected to find demurrers, the Venetian Syndics unaccountably declared themselves opposed; they affirmed that they had no powers to accept any compromise. Hereupon Boniface, losing patience and heart, desisted from the attempt, exclaiming with an emotion which he was unable to

disguise, "that since, although Genoa, in deference to his wishes, had agreed to forget the past, and to terminate even at a sacrifice a war, which she was known to be thoroughly capable of maintaining, by sharing with him the burden of satisfying the terms named by the Republic, the latter, obeying no law but a capricious and perverse pride, now chose to desert her own ground, and to ignore her own propositions, he would wash his hands of the affair, and the consequences must rest on her own head!"

The early part of 1298 was marked by a successful cruise, made by a Venetian fleet under Andrea Dandolo *Calonato*, the son of the late Doge Giovanni, and the grandson of Admiral Gilberto, along the Mediterranean so far as the Barbary coast.¹ In this expedition, Dandolo who, by a union with the Gulf Squadron under Matteo Quirini and Eurosio Morosini, had carried the force at his disposal to sixty-four sail, made a considerable number of important captures; and in the neighbourhood of Tunis a Genoese galleon was secured, of which alone the cargo was estimated at 100,000 ducats. The Venetian commander, having thus satisfactorily executed the plan of operations laid down for his guidance by the Thirty, returned home in triumph with an enormous booty, including between five-and-twenty and thirty prizes.

The return of the Admiral was possibly accelerated by the reports which had reached him of the movements and designs of the enemy; and on his arrival,

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¹ Marin (v. 114-15-16); and the authorities there quoted.

the campaign of 1297 just brought to a close, in which the Republic, following the dictates of passion, had proceeded to the commission of acts which were not to be justified. The destruction of the Armenian Factory by Eurosio Morosini was fairly pronounced to be an indefensible outrage.

At the same time, both parties claimed the credit of a disposition to be tractable. The Venetians were perfectly prepared to treat on the basis of adequate compensation for the losses which had accrued to them at Canea, Constantinople, and elsewhere. The Genoese were not disinclined to come to terms, saving the suggestion for an indemnity which, in the face of the demolition of their Black Sea Factory in 1296, and of their Armenian Factory in 1297, they declined absolutely to entertain. Such was the impediment which now presented itself: yet the Pope did not quite despair of success. Having his own particular object in view in coming forward in this instance as a peacemaker, Boniface VIII. even offered to pay half the amount of the Venetian claims, if Genoa would consent to defray the residue. But to this liberal and equitable arrangement, to which the latter was not disinclined to accede, and which could hardly have been expected to find demurrers, the Venetian Syndics unaccountably declared themselves opposed; they affirmed that they had no powers to accept any compromise. Hereupon Boniface, losing patience and heart, desisted from the attempt, exclaiming with an emotion which he was unable to

disguise, "that since, although Genoa, in deference to his wishes, had agreed to forget the past, and to terminate even at a sacrifice a war, which she was known to be thoroughly capable of maintaining, by sharing with him the burden of satisfying the terms named by the Republic, the latter, obeying no law but a capricious and perverse pride, now chose to desert her own ground, and to ignore her own propositions, he would wash his hands of the affair, and the consequences must rest on her own head!"

The early part of 1298 was marked by a successful cruise, made by a Venetian fleet under Andrea Dandolo *Calonato*, the son of the late Doge Giovanni, and the grandson of Admiral Gilberto, along the Mediterranean so far as the Barbary coast.¹ In this expedition, Dandolo who, by a union with the Gulf Squadron under Matteo Quirini and Eurosio Morosini, had carried the force at his disposal to sixty-four sail, made a considerable number of important captures; and in the neighbourhood of Tunis a Genoese galleon was secured, of which alone the cargo was estimated at 100,000 ducats. The Venetian commander, having thus satisfactorily executed the plan of operations laid down for his guidance by the Thirty, returned home in triumph with an enormous booty, including between five-and-twenty and thirty prizes.

The return of the Admiral was possibly accelerated by the reports which had reached him of the movements and designs of the enemy; and on his arrival,

¹ Dandolo (fol. 407); Marin (v. 118).

he found the Government already in receipt of information which placed beyond doubt the intention of Genoa to resume the offensive without delay on an extended scale. The preparations of the Venetian War Department soon assumed a corresponding character. The equipment of fifty-five additional galleys, of which ten were contributed by the Chioggians, and five by the Zaratines, was completed in the course of the summer, making with the Mediterranean fleet of forty sail, a total of ninety-five; and the Government, having reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Dandolo, allowed him to retain the post of Commander-in-Chief. But on the present occasion he was accompanied by a Council of civilians, who were empowered to tender their advice to the admiral in any matter of exigency. Under his orders was commissioned a suitable staff of captains, or *Sopra-Comiti*, of tried courage and experience, among whom we recognise the already familiar names of Matteo Quirini and Eurosio Morosini. Moreover, there were several persons of large property, who had come forward in a patriotic spirit, and offered their ships and their services to the Republic. Among others, the case was particularly noticed of a gentleman of fortune, popularly known as *Messer Marco Milioni*, who had just then returned from his travels in the country of the Grand Khan, in Kamschatka, Persia, and the Indies,¹ and who, imbued with an irresistible desire

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Dandolo sailed from Venice in the beginning of August, 1298, shaping his course for the Illyric Islands; and in the neighbourhood of Curzola he fell in with the Gulf Squadron under Matteo Quirini. Directions were then given to heave anchor; and the Captain-General, not thinking it probable that the services of Quirini would be required in the forthcoming contest, authorized him to return home. That officer, however, had hardly reached Zara, when the intelligence overtook him, that the Genoese, seventy-eight strong, under Lampa Doria, were reported to have just entered the Adriatic. Transported with delight by the news, and perfectly unable to repress his ardour, the gallant soldier unhesitatingly transferred his present charge to other hands, and with three of his largest vessels hastened to rejoin his chief, whom he found already preparing for battle.

Doria arrived at Curzola during the first week in September; and he had already advanced sufficiently far to render retreat impracticable, before he observed that the enemy in superior force had taken up a position immediately above the Island. Although, however, it was true that the Venetians were more numerous, the galleys of Doria were of much heavier draught and burden, and their complement of men

was larger; and the latter had therefore no just cause to dread the result of an engagement. Notwithstanding this advantage, coupled with the fact that the wind and sun were at his back, the Genoese commander was so strongly possessed by a consciousness of the indomitable spirit which animated the breasts of the Islanders, and he felt the responsibility of hazarding a battle to be so grave, that he resolved on the whole to resort to a parley. In his overstrained caution, Doria went so far as to offer, on condition of being permitted to withdraw from the contest, the delivery into the hands of his adversary of all his magazines and stores. If Dandolo was surprised at Doria's ignoble proposal, Doria was, in all probability, far more surprised at Dandolo's haughty reply. Not satisfied with the terms which had been submitted to his acceptance, the latter demanded *unconditional surrender*. This step, which elicited many an angry and bitter comment on the insufferable arrogance of Venice, restored in a moment the wavering courage of the Genoese, and brought them instantaneously to a sense of their duty and honour: while it served to inspire their Falstian leader with a determination to risk an action, and to brave consequences.

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The two natural causes,¹ which promised so materially to second the efforts of the Genoese, threatened of course to cramp and impede proportionably those of their opponents; and so striking indeed became this truth at the last moment, that even the intrepid Dandolo, seeing that his troops must necessarily fight, under existing circumstances, with the sun in their eyes and the wind in their teeth, seriously hesitated to commit himself to an engagement, or to do more than act on the defensive, until the wind had shifted, or at least until the intensity of the solar rays had somewhat abated. At any rate, the Venetian Admiral, who was perhaps already beginning to blame himself for his summary dismissal of the Genoese proposition, was not willing to be personally responsible for the consequences of such a step; he judged most properly, that the difference between the circumstances, in which the enemy and himself were placed, rendered what was mere cowardice on their part only common prudence on his own; and he decided upon laying the point before his civil councillors. The latter thought fit to dissent from the views of Dandolo; with arrogant self-sufficiency, the civilians took upon themselves to combat and set aside the opinion of an officer of long experience and high reputation; and the admiral was compelled against his judgment and convictions to engage the enemy. He hastened, therefore, to prepare for the attack; and those who

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The decisive action took place at length off Curzola, on Sunday, the 8th September.¹ The result of the first encounter was eminently discouraging to the Genoese: ten of their galleys fell almost instantaneously into the power of the enemy. The Venetians pursued this advantage with considerable success; their foes were reduced to the necessity of giving way at every point: and Doria already began to tremble for the final issue. But Fortune soon came to the succour of the desponding admiral. The followers of Dandolo, distressed by the sunshine, and seriously incommoded by the wind, had hitherto sustained the contest with honour; and the advantage, if there was any, inclined to their side. But, after several hours' hard fighting, some of the Venetian ships were by a sudden gust driven ashore and completely disabled. This incident changed the whole prospect. It is in vain now that the Chioggian and Zaratine contingents hotly dispute every inch of water with their adversaries, and perform prodigies of valour. It is equally in vain that the gallant Quirini, that Marco Polo and a few others, with the vessels under their immediate control, behave with truly patriotic devotion. It is to no purpose that Dandolo himself,

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Of ninety-five fine vessels, which Dandolo had proudly marshalled at Curzola, those twelve only, which bore the flags of the fugitive captains, were saved from the wreck. The remainder, with the exception of five or six which had foundered in the course of the action, were made prizes by the victor, by whom they were for the most part dismantled and committed to the flames. The loss of the Republic in killed was large, but uncertain:¹ the Venetian prisoners exceeded 5,000. Among the former, were counted Matteo Quirini, Pietro

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Giustiniani, and several other *Sopra-Comiti*, who had cheerfully sacrificed their lives to their country. Among the captives were Dandolo himself and the volunteer Polo, who had paid the forfeit of their impetuous daring and fearless exposure to danger. The latter had fought with unrivalled gallantry in the advanced division of the Fleet, and had already received a slight wound, when he was taken prisoner.

The spectacle, which presents itself at Curzola on that terrible 8th of September after the action, can be pictured more easily than described. In the evening, the followers of Doria are seen in a dreamy and trance-like posture, holding with tremulous hands the palm which they have so dearly won, and thinking of the reply which they must give when, on their return, mothers ask for their children, and children for their fathers, who have lost their liberty or their lives on that too eventful day. Curzola hears no shouts of victory, no songs of triumph; several thousand Genoese have felt the edge of Venetian steel; several thousand Venetians see before their dim and feverish vision the horror and ignominy of a Genoese dungeon; and as the sun goes down on the conquerors and the conquered, its serene effulgence affords a striking contrast to the deep lurid hue which has been imparted to the sky for several miles round by the gradual immersion of sixty galleys in a sea of belching fire.

Such was the fatal Battle of Curzola, which Lampa Doria had gained under circumstances so accidentally

auspicious. The battle was one, in which the losses of both parties were almost equally balanced, and in which, all points considered, hardly so large a share of credit was due to the Genoese as to their fallen rivals. For the former, more than compensating by the superior character of their vessels for their deficiency in numerical force, the two squadrons were to be fairly regarded as evenly matched; and previously to the untoward disaster which crippled their strength, and the infamous desertion of the twelve captains, the advantage had been wholly on the side of the Venetians, notwithstanding the formidable difficulties with which they had to contend: nor could there be much question that if, even after the first stage of the catastrophe, the heroic conduct of the Zaratines and Chioggians, of Dandolo, Polo, Quirini, and others, had been at all seconded, the tide of success might have remained in the same channel. The Genoese historians themselves do not pretend to believe that the victory of Curzola was otherwise than fortuitous; and more than one pious writer, in sharing this view, has traced in the defeat of the Republic merely the evidence of Divine wrath for her presumption in declining the intercession of the Holy See in the preceding year, as well as the terms offered by Doria immediately before the engagement.¹

No joy-bells or other manifestations of popular enthusiasm awaited the return of Doria to his country.

¹ Dandolo (fol. 407); Sanudo (fol. 579); Marin (v. 118—24); Sismondi (iv. 250); Romanin (ii. 335—6).

Too many among the multitude which thronged the quays to witness the landing of the troops, were doomed to retrace their steps to a bereaved home and to hearths made desolate by war ; and in the extremity of their affliction, the Genoese were almost tempted to forget their glory, and to check their unbecoming exultation at the abasement of Venetian insolence and purse-pride.

But there was one, who was expected to be in the crowd of Venetian prisoners, and whom the Genoese displayed the greatest eagerness to see in chains. *He was not there.* Unable to support the galling thought, that the son of a Doge of Venice was about to grace a Genoese triumph, to be paraded in fetters before a Genoese mob, and then to rot in a Genoese dungeon, the brave and unfortunate Dandolo took an opportunity of dashing his head against the gunwale of the vessel which was conveying him to his new destination, and thus miserably terminated his existence.

The stronger moral sense of Polo, perhaps, shrank from the commission of suicide ; and he suffered himself to be carried to Genoa, where he shared the lot of his countrymen. His high reputation, however, his winning address, and his extraordinary faculty of relating amusing stories and anecdotes, soon gained him favour, not only in the eyes of his companions in captivity, but in those of his enemies themselves, many of whom procured leave from their government to visit him in his confinement ; and, through their instru-

mentality, he obtained from time to time not a few indulgences which materially alleviated the rigour of his fate. Among these visitors was a Genoese citizen, named Rustichelli, who took peculiar pleasure in the society of the Venetian prisoner; and at length he even went so far as to propose, as a means of beguiling the tedious hours, that his friend should dictate to him a methodical account of his travels in Tartary, China, and India. This proposition was accepted; the rough and undigested memoranda, which Polo had left at his father's house at San Giovanni Crisostomo, were transmitted with the concurrence of the Genoese Executive from Venice; and the work was henceforth continued from day to day, until it was brought to completion. It seems probable that about three months were occupied in the composition of the narrative; and it is said that copies of it were already circulating among the curious in 1298.¹ "The Travels" of the Great Venetian in the autograph of the excellent Rustichelli would now be purchased cheaply at a hundred times their weight in gold; the contents of the original, gathered from numerous transcripts, have been rendered into many of the languages of Europe; its author has been acknowledged as the Herodotus of modern times; and the name of the contemporary of Dante and Petrarch has become a household word to not a few, who never heard perhaps of Bruce or even of Wilkes.

¹ Filiasi (*Ricerche*, 126) states that he presented a copy to the Court of France.

At the same time, the influence of his Genoese acquaintance was being exerted in the ineffectual attempt to restore him to freedom: a large ransom was offered by his family with this object to no purpose; and an advantageous marriage, which the elder Polo had had in view for his son on the return of the latter from abroad, was in consequence indefinitely postponed. Nor is it known with certainty, either in what year he was ultimately liberated, or, which may appear still stranger, in what year he died. His will, which forms the sole clue, was made in 1323;¹ and from this circumstance an inference may be drawn, that his decease did not occur much later than 1324 or 1325. Polo was a lad of thirteen when Dante Alighieri was born at Florence in 1265: but he survived by several years, the author of the *Divina Commedia*.

There is a tale that, on his death-bed, he was exhorted by certain foolish persons to expunge from his Travels many passages upon which discredit had been cast in some quarters, and that the dying man treated the insulting proposition with merited scorn, exclaiming, that “so far from being fairly chargeable with exaggeration, he had omitted to record countless extraordinary matters, to the truth of which he could have borne ocular testimony.” Nevertheless, Polo’s fondness for dwelling on the prodigious wealth of the regions which he had visited, and his fashion of estimating it by *millions*, procured him the nick-

¹ Marsden (Travels of M. P. Preface: xxvii).

name of Messer Marco Milioni; and an historian (Ramnusio) relates, that the family mansion in the street of San Giovanni Crisostomo was still known, when he visited the spot in the 16th century, as *La Corte del Milioni*.¹

The news of the Battle of Curzola reached Venice about the 11th of September, 1298; and the twelve recreant captains, who had alone escaped to bring home the tidings of this stunning disaster, were committed forthwith to close custody by the authority of the Avogaria, preparatory to their trial for treasonable and cowardly desertion. By an act of the Great Council, passed on the 10th August, 1293, this offence had been made capital;² and the Avogadors proceeded to demand the execution of that decree in the present instance. But the Government, not willing on political grounds to aggravate the public distress and excitement, decided, under the very peculiar circumstances, upon treating all the culprits with leniency.

The Venetians submitted to their defeat, on the whole, with all that admirable fortitude and serenity, which so prominently characterized their institutions. After all, some solace still remained. In the first place, the victory was proved to have been purely accidental; secondly, Genoa was even a greater sufferer than themselves;³ and their own losses being

¹ Marin (v. 222.)

² Marsden, xxvii.; Formaleoni *Sulla Nautica Antica de' Veneziani*, 18.

³ Marin (v. 122-3), and the authorities cited by him.

chiefly in prisoners, there was a rational hope that, on the conclusion of peace, those prisoners would recover their liberty.

At the same time, the XXX, acutely sensible of the extreme jeopardy in which the country was placed by the recent reverse, directed the immediate organization of a new fleet of one hundred galleys; and, meanwhile, the unconquerable Schiavo, having provided himself with two of the swiftest vessels which were to be procured, proceeded (March 1299) under the sanction of the Government to make reprisal for certain outrages committed with impunity by a Genoese privateering expedition¹ in the neighbourhood of Malamocco. On his outward course, Schiavo met near Majorca with a Genoese trader, of which he secured possession without difficulty. Thence pursuing his voyage direct to Genoa, he entered the port unhesitatingly, burned to the keel all the craft which fell in his destructive path; and refused to relinquish the position, until he had, in a spirit of audacious and scornful defiance, planted the standard of St. Mark, and struck a piece of money impressed with the arms of the Republic on one of the quays.² Retracing his steps without molestation amid the confusion which still reigned in the City, the Buccaneer swepted the Sicilian waters; and on the 25th May, 1299,³ he made prizes of no fewer than ten of the enemy's ships, which he conducted exultingly to the Lagoon.

¹ Dandolo (fol. 408).

² Varese (*St. di Genova*, lib. v. 114.)

³ Dandolo (fol. 408).

Schiavo was a member of the *Cittadinanza* who, without any adventitious advantages, had during five or six years passed, contributed at least as largely by his small privateering expeditions to strike terror into the enemies of his country, as the commanders of well-appointed, heavily-armed, and expensive fleets. Such a man was a host in himself; and it seems unaccountable except on the ground of the most fatuous aristocratic jealousy, that the Commission of War, in making its selection of officers for the squadron which had been so lately annihilated at Curzola, should leave entirely overlooked so faithful and important a servant as Domenico Schiavo. Had Dandolo had on his right hand one who laughed at defeat, and who was never known to have failed in any of his undertakings, it is not too much to say, that the result would have been very different. The 8th of September, 1298, might have been registered as a white day in the Venetian annals: while the *Travels of Marco Polo* would have been possibly lost to literature and science!

The social and political aspect of Italy was at present supremely deplorable. The whole country bled profusely from the wounds of civil war; every place of note was split into Guelphic and Ghibelline divisions. Despotism and anarchy exercised alternate domination; and the transitions from faction to tyranny, and from tyranny to faction, were unusually violent and spasmodic. In some quarters, the Guelphs contrived to gain a shortlived ascendancy, and expelled the Ghibellines. Elsewhere, the Ghibellines triumphed and drove out

the Guelphs. In Tuscany, the latter were divided against themselves under the denominations of the *Neri* and the *Bianchi*. The Pontiff was at strife with the Colonna. At Milan, a lengthened struggle for power between the Torriani and the Visconti had terminated not long since in favour of the latter; and Matteo Visconti, the head of the family, was at present Captain-General and Imperial Vicar of Milan. At Genoa, in a similar manner, the Ghibellines had recently succeeded in obtaining a temporary advantage over their political adversaries.

Whatever strictures, indeed, the Battle of Curzola might provoke, and to whatever extent the accidental character of its issue might diminish the credit due to the conquerors, it remained a source of wonder that, under the circumstances of internal distraction in which the latter found themselves placed, they were able to make any preparations whatever on an extended scale. The close of 1298, however, witnesses a constitutional phenomenon of no ordinary significance. It beholds Venice rising with Antæan power from a great defeat; and it beholds her rival prostrated by a great victory.

The first step, which the Genoese Ghibellines took on their accession to power, was in the direction of peace. The amazing report of the extensive and costly preparations which were being set on foot by the Thirty, and the rumour that large commissions had been already sent by the Doge to Spain for the purchase of new artillery, coupled with the crippled

state of her own strength and finances, demonstrated to Genoa the positive impracticability of sustaining the war ; and it was with more genuine satisfaction than they cared perhaps to own, that her rulers acceded to the offer of a third Power to negotiate peace with the Republic on honourable terms. This intercessor was no other than the Captain-General of Milan. Visconti, having prevailed on one of the belligerents to accept his mediation, hastened to seek the cohesion of the other ; and the Venetians, while they were perfectly prepared to resume the offensive, were reluctant on more than one account to oppose an adjustment on equal terms. For there were other quarters, in which circumstances might arise of sufficient gravity to engage their undivided attention ; and there was unfortunately too little ground for the apprehension, that the large outlay to which the Government of Gradenigo had already proceeded would be superfluous. The relations of the Republic with the Lower Empire were still, as they had long been, on a most insecure basis ; and there were some of her Dalmatian colonies, which were once more evincing a disposition to falter in their allegiance.

After the nomination of two Powers on each side, therefore (Padua and Verona for Venice, Asti and Tortona for Genoa), to see the provisions of the Treaty carried into execution, and to hold the guarantees, perpetual peace was concluded at Milan on Monday, the 25th May, 1299, the very day on which Schiavo secured the ten Genoese galleons in the Mediterranean,

between the contracting parties, in the presence of Visconti himself, by the ambassadors of Gradenigo, Romeo Quirini and Cratone Dandolo on the one part, and the deputies of Genoa on the other. The treaty embraced eight articles :

1. There shall be perpetual peace between the Venetians and the Genoese, both parties abstaining from all ulterior hostilities, and granting an amnesty of all passed causes of offence.¹

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4. The captain or master of every vessel leaving Venice and Genoa shall take an oath, prior to his departure, not to commit any aggression on the Genoese and Venetians respectively.

5. The two contracting Powers shall, with all convenient despatch, mutually complete their sureties and other guarantees.

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6. The Communes of Venice, Padua and Verona, on the one part, and of Genoa, Asti and Tortona on the other, shall give pledges reciprocally; and the Imperial Vicar (Visconti) shall be competent to enforce the exchange of the same within a definite period.

7. The Communes aforesaid bind themselves to the observance of all the conditions of the present compact, and the same shall be ratified by their respective Governments, failing which, a forfeit of 40,000 marks of silver (80,000*l.*) shall attach to the defaulter or defaulters.

8. The private claims which any Genoese or Venetians may design to prefer for indemnity or other satisfaction of injuries sustained, shall be presented within the space of forty days at Venice and Genoa respectively, all rules and orders to the contrary notwithstanding.

In this document is missed any mention of Polo and his fellow prisoners. The general theory of capture in those days was similar to that which has prevailed at almost every epoch. The freedom of the captive was considered merely as subject to restraint, until an adequate ransom and the cost of his maintenance in the detaining country was paid. Still, whatever the theory might be, the practice was in many cases totally different; and the example of Polo himself, whose family would have cheerfully laid down purchase-money to any amount, furnishes evidence that the faculty of redemption was not accepted as a ruling principle by the medieval law of Maritime Warfare.

The first objects which the eye of Polo encountered, on entering his Genoese prison in 1298, were some of the Pisans who had been taken at the fatal battle of Meloria in 1284, and who, at the distance of fourteen years, were still pining in a hopeless captivity. The spectacle was one, from which the Venetian might have drawn a conclusion sadly unfavourable to his own prospect of release. It is certain, however, that Polo at least, if not his companions, had already returned to Venice in 1301 or 1302.¹

The true meaning of the second clause of the late Treaty was, that the Republic entertained certain ulterior views in connexion with the Byzantine Court, and that her Government did not choose any hostile measures which they might think proper to direct hereafter against Constantinople, to become a pretext to Genoa for creating a diversion in the Adriatic or the Mediterranean. This object, however, did not at once become apparent; and Venice was content for the present with the tolerably successful negotiations of May last, being partly actuated by an impression that the Emperor might be induced, without complicating existing difficulties, to concede an adequate indemnity, and in other respects to come to terms. After various delays, it was not till 1302, that the Ducal Government determined to resort to a more stringent course, and to send a more effectual diplomatist to the Chrysoceras in the person of Belletto Giustiniani, who went, sword in hand, to enforce compliance with the

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CHAPTER XV.

A.D. 1286–1309.

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Matteo Visconti, but which it was, perhaps, backward in avowing, was that the object which it had partly in view in protracting the war, existed no longer. While, by the artful management of Gradenigo and his aristocratic advisers, the attention of the people at large was turned from domestic concerns to the progress of foreign affairs, a new revolution was being accomplished without much opposition, the magnitude and importance of which were, as it had happened in former instances, by no means sufficiently appreciated, and to the true principles and workings of which all, save a few political circles, were comparative strangers.

Among the remarkable changes which were introduced into the Venetian system before the election of Sebastiano Ziani in 1173, the most notable was the institution of the Great Council. This Body was properly composed of 480 members, who were chosen by twelve nominees from the six Wards, or *Sestieri*, two nominees representing each ward. The day of election was the 29th September, and the members, though virtually re-eligible for the second and succeeding years, held their seats only from the Michaelmas current to the Michaelmas ensuing. No property qualification was demanded. No distinction of class was ostensibly recognised. At first, no limitation in point of age was specifically made. The attendance of members remained optional. Those who did not choose to vote against a particular measure, or in favour of a particular amendment, freely absented themselves; and the consequence was, that though the

number of the Council was nominally carried nearly to 500, it was considered a full House when 350 or 360 could be counted.

In another and more leading respect, while the theory was strict, the practice was lax and informal. Instead of the system, which had originated in 1172, of renewing the Great Council at Michaelmas, from year to year, through the medium of twelve electors, an usage gradually sprang up,¹ from a desire, perhaps, to diminish the tumult inseparable from such occasions, of distributing the process over two half-yearly periods, and of returning at each a moiety only of the full complement; and it not unfrequently occurred that the number in the Legislative Assembly fell short of 250. In 1296, there were 210 only. In the preceding year, 260 had been counted on the benches: while in 1294 as many as 350 were present. In 1293, a totally different plan was pursued, and additions were made to the Great Council, from time to time, without the slightest apparent deference to constitutional practice. Thus, 100 members were elected on the 27th September: 60, on the 4th November: 68, on the 22nd December: 41, on the 23rd February; representing an aggregate of 269 new members in rather less than five months. There were some cases in which, by a still bolder departure from the general routine, the *procuratorial* division of the City into *Di Cà* and *Di Quà Canale* was substituted for the more usual method of distribution into Wards, and

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a majority in the ballot ; and the trifling innovations, which had been ingeniously introduced at intervals in the method of election or nomination, were admirably calculated to prepare the mind of the people at large for ulterior changes of a more sweeping and fundamental description.

So far back as the seventh year of the late reign (October, 1286),¹ a returning disposition had shown itself to Reform. On the 3rd October, 1286, a proposition was laid before the Legislature by the three Chiefs of the Forty (*Capi Della Quarantia*) to the following effect — “ That all such as are elected to seats, either in the Council of Pregadi (*Rogati*), or in the Great Council itself, shall be balloted by the Forty one by one ; and such as obtain a majority of suffrages shall be confirmed, while such as do not, shall be rejected.” On a division, this retrospective motion was lost.

The organs of the aristocracy were not disheartened. Two days later (October 5) a second resolution was submitted by the Forty for adoption, namely : “ Whereas it was formerly proposed by the Forty that none should be eligible for any Council, unless his father or paternal ancestor should have sat there before him, but that, in the latter contingency, he should in all respects be so eligible, it is now moved, that no person whosoever be admitted, save with the previous approbation of the greater part of the Privy and the Great Councils.” In this instance, the Doge

¹ Sandi (part 2, vol. i. ch. i.)

himself, from whose democratic tenets such a course was to be anticipated, proposed as an amendment, that the mode of election should remain without alteration ; and, on a division, the amendment of Dandolo was carried by a majority of thirty-four.

On the 17th of the same month, after a pause of somewhat less than a fortnight, the Chiefs of the Forty returned undaunted to the contest. A new reformation had in the interval been prepared to the ensuing purport : “ That three electors be at once nominated from the ranks of the Great Council, who shall remain in office till the 1st April, 1287, and shall then present a list of candidates to be balloted severally by the Privy Council and the Forty ; and that, on the 2nd April, three other electors be named, who shall proceed in a similar manner.” This proposition met with no better fate than its predecessors ; on it being negatived, directions were given that the three reformations should be formally cancelled in the minutes of the Great Council ; and it seems that these successive failures sufficed to convince the aristocratic party of the futility of expecting any other result, so long as the will and influence of Dandolo opposed themselves to the accomplishment of their ambitious designs. Their tentative schemes therefore silently dropped.

The transfer of the Ivory Sceptre to other hands in December, 1289, wrought an important change in the position of parties ; and although it might be true, that the democratic element survived in considerable

strength, the Voice from the Throne, which had lent to it so much moral and material force, was now mute; and the commanding influence, which it had enjoyed under the late administration, was buried for ever in the grave of Dandolo. But a variety of causes supervened to retard the progress of legislation in the direction of Reform; and it was not till 1296, that the great subject was again seriously broached. On the 6th March in that year,¹ while the Græco-Genoese war was occupying a leading share of the public attention, the Chiefs of the Forty, deeming the moment auspicious for agitating the question afresh, laid before the Great Council the outline of a new reformation. The lesson of caution and patience, inculcated by the three signal repulses sustained in 1286, had not been lost upon the Forty. In the interval of five years and a quarter which had elapsed from the decease of Dandolo to the present time, that mysterious tribunal, in concert with the Doge Gradenigo and the Privy Council, had been feeling its way, maturing its plans, and watching its opportunities; and the hope of a triumphant issue was now generally embraced by the Party, of whose principles the existing Government was the accepted exponent. To their extreme disappointment and surprise, however, the attempt once more miscarried; the democratic side of the Assembly coalesced with admirable firmness and unity against the project, which was found to be of a cognate nature to its predecessors; and the motion for the

¹ Romanin (vol. ii. ch. 3.)

amendment of the Constitution was negatived for the fourth time.

Between March and September, 1296, all allusion to the subject appeared to be studiously avoided. The Tiepoli, Quirini and other members of the popular party, were content to repose on their victory: while the Doge and his supporters thought it politic to postpone any farther discussion on the question until the time came round for the elections (Michaelmas, 1296), when the latter had determined, as a last resource, to test the result of a skilfully-conducted canvass. It was their confident expectation that by weakening the democratic element, which had lost less at the elections of 1295 than they were led to anticipate, and by a powerful admixture of new aristocratic influence, the Great Council would be rendered much more pliant and amenable.

The Elections of 1296 were conducted on the Procuratorial principle. On Michaelmas day, the four electors, two for Di Cà and two for Di Quà, were nominated in the usual manner; and the list of members presented by them in due course, as returned to serve in the new Assembly, contained only *two hundred and ten* names.¹ The amount of money expended in bribery and corruption on this occasion was immeasurably above the average; and the almost unexampled smallness of numbers, which the benches of the Legislative Body for 1296-7 exhibited, stamped upon it the character of a packed assembly. Even its predecessor,

¹ Romanin, *ubi suprâ*.

which had just dissolved, and which shewed a decrease of ninety from the returns of 1295, and of fifty-three from those of 1293-4, counted as many as 260 members. It was clear that Venice had a Government not very scrupulous of the means by which it attained the favourite object of its ambition.

It was not till the 29th February, 1297, that Leonardo Bembo and Marco Badoer,¹ Chiefs of the Forty, deemed their plans sufficiently ripe to invite a return to the debate on the delicate topic of *Self-Reform*. The draught of a reformation in the ensuing sense was laid on the table of the Great Council on that day.

“In the year 1296 (1297),² on the last day of February, in the Council of the Forty, and afterward in the Great Council. The motion of the Forty is that—

“1. The election of the Great Council, which is appointed to take place on Michaelmas day (next), shall be conducted in the following manner:—

“2. All such as, during four years passed, may have formed part of the Great Council, shall be balloted severally in the Forty; and as many, as may obtain twelve suffrages or upward, shall be thereby admitted to the Great Council on Michaelmas day next for one year.

“3. If any person (otherwise qualified) happen to miss his election by absence in foreign countries, he may have the option, on his return home, to require

¹ Sanudo (fol. 580).

² Marin (v. 149-50-51).

the Chiefs of the Forty to put it to that Council, whether he may be a member of the Great Council or not; and the Chiefs of the Forty shall be bound to originate such a motion, and if the candidate obtain twelve suffrages or upward (by ballot in the Forty), he shall be allowed to sit in the Great Council.

“ 4. Moreover, three electors¹ shall be chosen, who may have power to nominate, in conformity with directions to be given to them by the College, others (*De Aliis*), who may not have formed part of the Great Council within the prescribed period; and their nominees shall in like manner be put by the Forty to the ballot, and such as acquire twelve suffrages (or upward) shall be also invited to sit in the Great Council.

“ 5. Such three electors shall form part of the Great Council till Michaelmas day ensuing, when three successors with similar functions shall be appointed, who shall belong to the Assembly for an equal time.

“ 6. The present resolution shall not be revoked, save with the concurrence of five Privy Councillors, of five-and-twenty members of the Forty, and of two-thirds of the Great Council itself.

“ 7. At the opening of the year, it shall be put on *fifteen consecutive days* to the Legislative Body on the part of the Privy Council, whether the present resolution be confirmed or not; and the decision of the

¹ Giustina Renier Michiel (*Or. de Feste Veneziane*, iii. 49 *et seq.*: edit. 1832.)

Great Council shall be binding. And a clause shall be introduced into the Capitulary of the Privy Councillors, rendering it obligatory on them to put such motion under a penalty of ten pounds (*lire*) each; and the Advocates of the Commune shall be charged to enforce the said penalty.

“ 8. It shall be imperative on the chiefs of the Forty, whenever they may design to elect any one to the Great Council, to notify the circumstance to the Forty three days previously, and the Forty shall not presume to proceed to such election, unless three-fourths of them at least be present. And this clause shall be added to the Capitulary (of the Forty); but the Council (of Forty) or their Capitulary withstanding, it is liable to be revoked.”

The measure embodied in the foregoing resolution was avowedly and strictly experimental. The seventh paragraph vested in the Great Council during a fortnight the power of revocation. This was the most conspicuous among the points in which it differed from its predecessors, and it was the one which alone saved it, perhaps, from sharing their fate. There were many voters who, in the absence of any strong convictions on either side, were possibly induced to give their adhesion by a feeling that it would be perfectly competent for them to reconsider their decision; and the measure was ultimately carried.

In this famous resolution, which had now passed provisionally into law, there appeared, even on a close scrutiny, to be nothing which was otherwise than

equitable and ingenuous. In the first place, the Government of Gradenigo sought ostensibly only to introduce a certain change into the composition of the Great Council and into the method of admittance to that body, which they conscientiously believed to be beneficial to the constitution. Secondly, they demanded for such change no final legislation at present, but a fair trial merely. It was emphatically declared that, in September, 1298, it would remain in the power of any member of the Legislature to propose from his seat a relapse to the old system. How far any foregone conclusions, at which the Doge and his advisers might have arrived touching the perpetuation of this temporary change, might be treated by some political circles as a subdolous feature in the measure, was another question.

The allotted term of trial, during which the supplemental seats were filled agreeably to the principles indicated in the fourth and fifth paragraphs, soon passed away; and at length arrived the day, on which the Privy Council was pledged to take the sense of the Legislative Chamber on the resolution of September last.

It was not on Michaelmas day, however, but on the 11th September,¹ when the whole city had been thrown into the last extremity of distress and perplexity by the reports just received from Curzola of the battle fought off that island on the 8th, and when the public mind

¹ Dic XI. Septembrio, 1298, Capta fuit Pars, de C. M. fiendo, sit deinceps sicut est modo.—Marin (v. 155).

was therefore by no means disposed to pay attention to irrelevant matters even of such magnitude, that the Government, with greater adroitness than honesty or strict constitutional decorum, took occasion to put the question finally to the Great Council, whether the resolution of February, 1297, should become permanent or not? The decision unavoidably involved one of two results: on the one hand, it involved the defeat of the Gradenigo Ministry, on the other, the triumph of aristocratic institutions. There were certain leading members of the popular party who were not without hope of the former issue: while the Doge and his supporters looked sanguinely, under the circumstances, to the latter consummation. Upon a resort to the ballot, the resolution was confirmed; and the experimental principle, which it sought to establish, was approved in due form. On Michaelmas day, 1299, the same operation was repeated with similar consequences.

From 1297, the date of the first resolution, till 1317, the tide of Venetian legislation flowed strongly in the direction of reform.¹ On the 30th September, 1298, the Forty procured the sanction of the Great Council to an act, by which no member was qualified to take his seat in the latter assembly or in the Pregadi, until his election had been *finally* ratified by seven votes at least in the Forty; on the 22nd March, 1300,² a decree passed the Legislative Chamber, which laid the College under a disability to propose the admission of any *new man* (*uomo nuovo*) to the Great

¹ Romanin (ii. 3).

² Marin (vi. 234-5).

Council, until the step had obtained the previous concurrence of the Quarantia; and by laws passed in 1307 and 1317, additional vigour was imparted to the system, and the seats in the Deliberative Body were rendered still more difficult of access. These measures, which went far to neutralize the liberal operation of the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the resolution of 1297, completed the process, which is known as the SERRAR DEL GRAN CONSEIO, or *the closing of the Great Council* against new families. The Serrar presents a feature of high importance in the constitutional history of this epoch, which has been more than once, and more than slightly, misunderstood. While some, by applying a literal construction to the term, have supposed that it signified merely the first instance in which the Great Council deliberated with closed doors,¹ others have erroneously concluded that it indicated a measure of which the primary effect, as regarded the Legislature, was numerically restrictive. The nature of the Serrar was, however, directly opposite. The authors of the project were far indeed from pretending to impose limitations on the numbers returnable to the Council; they did nothing more than determine from what class of the community candidates were henceforward with unvarying strictness to be selected. That its tendency was to expand, not to compress, is proved by the fact that, while in 1296 the Deliberative Body counted, exclusively of persons who occupied seats by virtue of

¹ This custom can be shown to have originated at least so early as 1288.

their official rank, such as the Doge, the Privy Council, the Forty, and a few others, 210 members only, in 1311 the figures had risen to 1017, and in 1340 they reached 1212.¹

Thus, then, while the arms of the Republic were experiencing reverses, to which her passed annals hardly furnished a parallel, while thousands of her population were pining in the dungeons of Genoa, a great Social and Political Revolution was being enacted in the heart of her capital without riot or tumultuous demonstration, though not without bloodshed, and not without crime.

Of members of the middle class (*cittadinanza*), who ventured to approach the subject of Reform with any manliness of spirit, or who appreciated indeed to any large extent the importance of the actual crisis, the number was exceedingly small; and the voice of complaint or remonstrance was therefore all but unheard. In revolutions, there are rarely wanting, however, reckless and misguided spirits who, inspired by a vague instinct of opposition, and by a blind and presumptuous confidence, essay to divert the tide of political progress from its deeply marked channel; and the Venetian crisis of 1297–8 was not without a few examples of such devoted infatuation. The most conspicuous were Giovanni Baldovino² and Marino Bocconio, the latter, a person who had already attracted attention by the violent manner in which he inveighed in 1289 against the election of the present Doge, and

¹ Michiel (iii. 61); Romanin (ii. 347).

² Sandi (lib. v. c. 2).

who had since that time gained a certain notoriety by his consistent denunciation of oligarchical principles. Bocconio does not appear to have been a man of any brilliancy of parts, or of much vigour of understanding. Possibly he was little more than a noisy declaimer. But, nevertheless, he enjoyed that kind of influence among the lower classes, which earnestness of purpose, community of sentiment, and the possession of a more than usually ample fortune, coupled with a winning address and a voluble tongue, might be expected to confer ; and there was room to suspect that in a higher quarter, where Bocconio's disgust at the elevation of Gradenigo met with unqualified sympathy, his intrigues and declamations were more than countenanced.

It appears that one day in the beginning of 1301, Bocconio and some of his following presented themselves without notice at the doors of the Great Council, and demanded admittance, in order that they might have an opportunity of recording their protest against the series of measures which had been lately carried. The Doge, who happened to be present at the debate, affected neither surprise nor displeasure at the proceeding ; and his Serenity, after some hesitation, desired that they should be invited to enter. Of what subsequently passed in the Council no particulars are known to have transpired. But, on the morrow, the adventurous intruders were secretly condemned to death upon a charge of seditious machinations against the Government and the Republic ; and, within a few hours from the delivery of the sentence, they were

hanged to the number of eleven between the Red Columns. At the same time, no fewer than forty-two persons, who were suspected of complicity, were banished for ever from their country; and it is a circumstance which has its significance, that among the exiles were members of the Ducal Houses of Polani and Malipiero.

To men who, like the late Giovanni Baldovino and Marino Bocconio, penetrated the crafty designs of the Ducal faction, the complete success, which mainly in consequence of the peculiar and painful situation of the Republic at that juncture, had crowned the efforts of Gradenigo and his supporters, was singularly irritating and mortifying. It was then that the advocates of popular government felt most severely the want of a leader who could bring to their cause the commanding influence of a great name and a master-mind; it was then, and, perhaps, hardly till then, that they became sensible to the full extent of the loss which they had sustained in the death of Giovanni Dandolo. By his manly tone of independence, however, Bocconio had engaged the respect of many; by his martyrdom he had won the sympathy of more; and it was possible that his example and his fate might, at no distant date, stimulate the remaining friends of liberty to more united and more effectual exertions.

The Revolution of 1298 is to be viewed both in relation to the influence which it exercised proximately on the Ducal authority, and with respect to the ulterior

operation which it had on that of the Great Council. Yesterday the sovereign of the Republic was the Doge ; to-day it was the Council of Forty which really swayed her destinies. From the hour at which an assembly of patricians incautiously suffered the task of remodelling itself to devolve on a committee of patricians, the authority and weight of the Great Council began to decline ; and it was in the Quarantia that the sovereignty then began actually to reside.

Assuredly it was not the personal interest of Gradenigo to co-operate in strengthening the hands of a body, whose influence was prejudicial to his own prerogative. It could not be the spontaneous or unconstrained policy of the Doge to act a prominent part in the creation of a power greater than his own. In fact, it is difficult to account for the active support which his Serenity had lent to the recent changes, without resorting to the supposition that his conduct was swayed by motives of a special character. A notion was prevalent at that day in more than one quarter, that Gradenigo was solely actuated by a rancorous antipathy to *the Commons* ; it was alleged, that he neither forgot nor forgave the affronts which he had experienced at the hands of Bocconio and men of a similar school, both anterior and subsequent to his entry into office in 1289 ; and the numerous party, which had arrayed itself almost from the commencement in hostility to his administration, were fond of repeating and spreading the scandal, that such recollections formed with him a more powerful impulse in

later life, than either the sense of public duty or the calls of private ambition. It is well-known how, in all history, how in Italian history especially, passion and policy are ever found playing against each other the game of government, and how actions, ostensibly inspired by the highest motives, spring in reality from underlying sources. It is readily conceivable that the spiteful attacks upon the somewhat youthful successor of Dandolo by his opponents, apart from any share which they might have had in moulding his political creed, would rankle deeply in his mind, and contribute to engender those vindictive sentiments, with which he was so freely and mercilessly taunted by Bocconio and others ; but the truth was, that Gradenigo, by his very acceptance of the throne, had, constructively at least, laid himself under an obligation to adopt the traditions of the faction to which he was indebted for his advancement, and that, even if he had been willing, he was in no position to ignore that pledge. On the whole, the fact may have been that, while the party ties of Pietro Gradenigo led him to yield his assent to certain extreme reforms, which the Doge of Venice might, in the absence of such pressure, have not been disinclined to defer, the selfish instincts of the man concurred in reconciling him to a sacrifice of the interests of the Crown to the interests of the Aristocracy.

Fundamental as the constitutional tendency of the Republic to aristocratic, or rather, oligarchical government might be, and unavoidable as the great organic

reforms, which had been effectuated at three distinct epochs between the middle of the 11th and the close of the 13th century, might be confidently pronounced, it appears to be clear that, in the ordinary course of events, each of these changes would have been more or less delayed, and that the crisis in each case was accelerated by adventitious causes. The disputed succession to a See, the dagger of an assassin, the loss of a battle might be truly said to have been instrumental in hastening the three Revolutions of 1033, 1172, and 1298.

The execution of Bocconio and his accomplices was followed by a moment of profound tranquillity, happily contrasting with the distracted state of the adjoining peninsula, where an internecine war was supplying a pretext for the march of a French army across the Alps. With all the great Powers of the Terra-Firma the Republic was now at peace. With the Byzantine Court her relations were cemented by the Treaty of Constantinople, with Genoa, by the Treaty of Milan. None of the minor Italian States afforded her any ground of anxiety. Aquileia, with whom she had, through the intercession of Padua, made terms in 1291, was quiescent. This calm, supervening at a season, when the last spark of democratic opposition to the Gradenigo Ministry seemed to have been extinguished with Bocconio on the scaffold, and when, besides, external distractions had lost to a large extent that charm which they secretly possessed in the eyes of the aristocratic reformers from 1295 till 1298,

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The quarter from which a recommencement of hostilities was to be foreboded, was Padua herself, the peacemaker of 1291. With the alleged object of protecting their salterns, the Paduans prepared to construct a fortress on the skirts of the Lagoon, between Chioggia and Monte-Albano, at Peta-de-Bo¹ without the concurrence of the Republic, which should have unquestionably had a voice in the matter; the latter consequently lodged a formal protest against the measure; a conference and an explanation ensued, without bringing any satisfactory result; and the Government of the Doge ultimately proceeded to defeat the obvious manœuvre by throwing a fortified dyke across the boundary line in such a manner as to intercept the sea-water in its progress to the Paduan Salterns. To defend the approaches to this work, a body of troops was despatched under Roberto Morosini and Filippo Belegno; and the violation of the territory of Padua shortly afterward by a larger force under Giovanni Soranzo, the Hero of Caffa, was treated as tantamount to a declaration of war. The movements which followed the decisive step of Soranzo belonged to that class of hostilities, which were constantly recurring in a country split up into a large number of powerful and jealous municipalities. The contest was unattended by material loss or gain on either side. The Venetian government, upon whose mind the

¹ Sanudo (fol. 581).

memory of recent domestic events remained deeply imprinted, displayed on the present occasion more than ordinarily keen distrust of its servants; Soranzo was replaced by Eurosio Morosini, who had fought at Curzola, and by several other officers at unusually frequent intervals; and this policy, which was manifestly designed to guard against the organization of a conspiracy between the disaffected spirits in the Capital and the Chief of the Army at Padua to overthrow the existing Ministry, chilled the zeal, and paralysed the exertions of the troops. At the close of a year or eighteen months, however, a reconciliation was effected between the two Powers, through the instrumentality of Mantua and Treviso; and a treaty of peace was concluded on the 5th of October, 1304, on the basis of mutual restitution and indemnity, with exchange of prisoners.¹

An unexpected incident soon assisted the Government in effacing the remembrance of an unpopular war. In the summer of 1304, the son of the King of Portugal paid a visit to Venice. The Doge and a suite of five-and-twenty Senators advanced so far as Malghera to meet the Prince; the progress of his Highness to San Giorgio Maggiore was attended by an unusually large concourse of persons of every condition; the public rejoicings extended over two or three days; the visitor inspected the Arsenal, which had then been recently enlarged, and all the other features of interest in the City; and, on his departure,

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he was accompanied by Gradenigo and his retinue to Malamocco.

In the succeeding year, the affairs of Candia, which had long worn a doubtful and changing complexion, were brought to a satisfactory settlement by a treaty concluded between Alexis Calergi and the Venetian Governor, Vitali Michieli (April, 1305). The generous instincts, which had prompted Calergi to repel with indignation the advances made to him by the enemies of Venice in the last Genoese war, did not lessen the repugnance to the yoke of the Republic, which he shared with the majority of his countrymen; the Cortazzi, the Melisini, the Scordilli, and several other great Candiot families, who had never ceased to brood over their wrongs and to sigh for their lost liberty, still continued to swell the ranks of the rebels; it was known that a slight breath only was sufficient to rekindle the smothered flame of insurrection; and there was no lack of political prophets at Venice, who saw in that unfortunate territorial acquisition an everlasting source of embarrassment and outlay. Nevertheless, all immediate ground of apprehension was removed by the Treaty of 1305, by which, among other conciliatory measures, Calergi himself was placed in possession of the temporalities of certain episcopal sees in the Island; and there can be little doubt, that these concessions were intimately connected with the difficulties, which Governor Michieli stated in a dispatch to the Doge, that he had experienced at the outset of the negotiation.

The policy of the Republic toward the Byzantine Court, during the same period, was remarkable for its trimming and vacillating character : nor was it particularly hard to divine the cause. The fact was, that public opinion at Venice still remained in the same divided and fluctuating state upon the Eastern question, in which it had been during the negotiations with Michael Palæologus under Tiepolo the Second ; the antipathy to the Greeks, and the disposition to promote the restoration of the Latins, which had manifested themselves in so unequivocal a manner in 1261, so far from having lost strength, existed in 1305 in increased force ; and the ambitious hope of achieving the second conquest of Constantinople, which had been suspended by the fall of the House of Courtenay, experienced a revival on the rise of the House of Valois. By the recent union of Charles of Valois, or Charles Lackland (*Sans Terre*), the brother of Philip the Fair, with Catherine, sole daughter and heiress of Philip Courtenay, Count of Namur, the last male representative of that imperial stem, these two illustrious families were merged ; and pretensions, which it was not likely that he would neglect to prosecute, were acquired by the French prince to the throne of Andronicus Palæologus. It consequently occasioned very slight surprise in European political circles, when it became known as a certainty that, notwithstanding the renewal of the truce between the Greeks and Venetians, in October, 1302, for a decennial term, a treaty, setting its predecessor totally aside, had been

concluded in December, 1306, between Charles of Valois and Pietro Gradenigo, of which the leading and undisguised aim was to wrest the sceptre of the Lower Empire from its present incapable hands,¹ and to place upon the throne of Baldwin of Flanders the royal husband of Catherine Courtenay. The signatories pledged themselves mutually to pursue the objects with which the undertaking was to be set on foot, to their full attainment. France agreed to furnish men; Venice agreed to furnish ships. It remained at the option of the Doge to command the fleet in person, or to name a lieutenant. The cost was declared to be equally divisible between the contracting parties; and the proposed expedition was appointed to sail from Brindisi in March, 1307.

At Constantinople itself, where the utmost dismay prevailed at the prospect of this new coalition, and at Genoa, the sensation produced by the report of its existence was alike profound. It was possible that the ulterior consequences of such a movement might hardly yet be foreseen in their full extent; but its operation on the Treaty of Milan (1299) was too self-evident to be misunderstood.

But, in the end, the convention of 1306 between the Doge Gradenigo and Charles of Valois was as barren of result as the convention of 1281 between the Doge Dandolo and Charles of Anjou; and the alarm created at Genoa and elsewhere by the Franco-Venetian League proved itself, as in a former instance,

¹ See Daru (iii. 117, edit. 1853).

wholly chimerical. The disordered and embarrassed condition, in which the French nation found itself at the opening of the 14th century, and the inability of Valois to meet his engagements, coupled with the sudden death of his wife, through whom alone he could advance any claim¹ to the Lower Empire, rendered the recent compact a virtual nullity; the barons of France in truth, the bosoms of whose grandsires had glowed in 1202 with enthusiasm for a similar expedition, were more intent in 1304 on watching their own affairs and defending their own interests; the gentry, who in 1204 had hardly existed as a class, were now sensible that they had privileges to secure and liberties to advance; France under Philip the Fair was no longer what she had been under Philip Augustus; and after repeated messages of an exhortatory character from the Venetian government, and a series of evasive replies from the Court of Paris, the matter was suffered to drop. Almost immediately afterward, the suspended relations with Andronicus II. were resumed by a mutual effort of dissimulation. Whether the conduct of Valois was to be attributed to an unpardonable recklessness in subscribing conditions which he had never been in a position to ratify, or whether it proceeded simply from an insolent perfidy, the Republic had equal right to be indignant at her treatment in a transaction in which, so far as she was concerned, the risk and outlay would have been at

¹ Sanudo Torsello, contemp. (*Secr. Fidel. Crucis*, lib. ii. part 4, chap. xviii. p. 73).

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The policy of the Republic toward the Byzantine Court, during the same period, was remarkable for its trimming and vacillating character: nor was it particularly hard to divine the cause. The fact was, that public opinion at Venice still remained in the same divided and fluctuating state upon the Eastern question, in which it had been during the negotiations with Michael Palæologus under Tiepolo the Second; the antipathy to the Greeks, and the disposition to promote the restoration of the Latins, which had manifested themselves in so unequivocal a manner in 1261, so far from having lost strength, existed in 1305 in increased force; and the ambitious hope of achieving the second conquest of Constantinople, which had been suspended by the fall of the House of Courtenay, experienced a revival on the rise of the House of Valois. By the recent union of Charles of Valois, or Charles Lackland (*Sans Terre*), the brother of Philip the Fair, with Catherine, sole daughter and heiress of Philip Courtenay, Count of Namur, the last male representative of that imperial stem, these two illustrious families were merged; and pretensions, which it was not likely that he would neglect to prosecute, were acquired by the French prince to the throne of Andronicus Palæologus. It consequently occasioned very slight surprise in European political circles, when it became known as a certainty that, notwithstanding the renewal of the truce between the Greeks and Venetians, in October, 1302, for a decennial term, a treaty, setting its predecessor totally aside, had been

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At Constantinople itself, where the utmost dismay prevailed at the prospect of this new coalition, and at Genoa, the sensation produced by the report of its existence was alike profound. It was possible that the ulterior consequences of such a movement might hardly yet be foreseen in their full extent; but its operation on the Treaty of Milan (1299) was too self-evident to be misunderstood.

But, in the end, the convention of 1306 between the Doge Gradenigo and Charles of Valois was as barren of result as the convention of 1281 between the Doge Dandolo and Charles of Anjou; and the alarm created at Genoa and elsewhere by the Franco-Venetian League proved itself, as in a former instance,

¹ See Darn (iii. 117, edit. 1853).

wholly chimerical. The disordered and embarrassed condition, in which the French nation found itself at the opening of the 14th century, and the inability of Valois to meet his engagements, coupled with the sudden death of his wife, through whom alone he could advance any claim¹ to the Lower Empire, rendered the recent compact a virtual nullity; the barons of France in truth, the bosoms of whose grandsires had glowed in 1202 with enthusiasm for a similar expedition, were more intent in 1304 on watching their own affairs and defending their own interests; the gentry, who in 1204 had hardly existed as a class, were now sensible that they had privileges to secure and liberties to advance; France under Philip the Fair was no longer what she had been under Philip Augustus; and after repeated messages of an expostulatory character from the Venetian government, and a series of evasive replies from the Court of Paris, the matter was suffered to drop. Almost immediately afterward, the suspended relations with Andronicus II. were resumed by a mutual effort of dissimulation. Whether the conduct of Valois was to be attributed to an unpardonable recklessness in subscribing conditions which he had never been in a position to ratify, or whether it proceeded simply from an insolent perfidy, the Republic had equal right to be indignant at her treatment in a transaction in which, so far as she was concerned, the risk and outlay would have been at

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least on a par with any accruing advantage. For in the first place, her Government had pledged her to share the cost of the Crusade against Constantinople with her French ally ; it had bound her to maintain at her own expense a fleet of observation in the Mediterranean ; and it had committed her to a contest which, notwithstanding the express provision in the second clause of the Treaty of Milan, would have assuredly made that treaty within a month after the departure from Brindisi as worthless as the parchment on which it was written. It was also to be considered that by the contemplated war Valois proposed to acquire a crown, to which he had the feeblest of titles, and that the Venetians sought merely to recover legitimate privileges, of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed.

While the twin questions of the breach of the Treaty of 1306 and of the abandonment of the Greek Crusade were still continuing to occupy French and Venetian diplomatists, the affairs of Lombardy remained as distracted as ever. The peninsula was divided against herself ; her cities and towns, with very few exceptions, groaned under the oppressive rule of a factious and turbulent nobility ; and instead of emulating Venetian progress, the Lombards were suffering their civilization to retrograde. It signified little that, to the Attilas and the Alarics had succeeded in the course of time the Gonzagas, the Eccelini, the Estes. The cycle of the Huns and the Goths might have passed away, but the reign of tyranny and persecution was perennial ;

and in the wrongs of the Italians, who fought at Basentello and at Legnano, there was only too close an affinity to the wrongs of the men whom Dante knew, and of the contemporaries of Petrarch and Boccaccio.

On the last day of January, 1308, Azzo X., Marquis of Este,¹ whose family had exercised sovereign power in that part of the peninsula since the beginning of the tenth century, died somewhat suddenly at Ferrara. The departed nobleman was the second in descent from that Azzo d'Este, whom the Republic had restored to his possessions in 1240 after the defeat of the Imperialists under Salinguerra Torelli; by his will, his grandchild Fulco, the offspring of his illegitimate son Frisco, was named, in exclusion of his brothers Francesco and Aldrovandino, his successor; and during the long minority of Fulco, his father, who is said to have been the fruit of an amour with a Venetian lady of better family than reputation, was tacitly approved by the Ferrarese as his guardian and their Regent. Francesco d'Este, however, a man of ambitious, cabaling character, did not appear disposed to allow his bastard nephew to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of his vicarious office. But, being in his own person hardly capable of preferring a superior claim, and the authority of Frisco being already too firmly established to be overthrown by his unaided exertions, the idea opportunely occurred to the uncle, that his objects might be equally served by resuscitating an

¹ *Chronicon Estense*, apud Murat. (xv. 364-5-6-7.)

obscure and obsolete right of the Apostolic See to the Este property. To Clement V., who had then lately transferred the seat of the Papacy to Avignon, he unfolded his scheme for seizing such a matchless occasion for enforcing the imprescriptible pretensions of Rome to the possession of Ferrara; and he declared, on his own part, a perfect willingness to hold the City in fief of his Holiness. The assertion of a dormant title to such a temporality was a proposition, which the Pope embraced with avidity; the suggestions of Francesco were met by Clement V. in a corresponding spirit; and injunctions were transmitted forthwith to Cardinal Arnaldo Pelagrua, Legate of Bologna, to second the Guelphic cause to the full extent of his resources. Pelagrua lost no time in departing for the new Seat of War with a considerable body of troops; and the Regent, apprehensive that his strength might be overmatched, and distrustful of the constancy of popular favour, threw himself into the Citadel of Tedaldo, which commanded the City. His departure was closely followed by the arrival of Francesco and his ally, the Cardinal Legate, who duly entered into military occupation of Ferrara, and were favourably received by the Ferrarese, who hoped to find the Government of Rome milder than that of Venice.¹

Meanwhile, upon the first intimation of the illness of Azzo X., which reached Venice about the first week in January, 1308, the Republic, anxious to secure her

¹ Sanudo Torsello, *Letter to the Archbishop of Ravenna*, March, 1326; (G. I). per Francos (ii. 305).

immunities in that municipality, had accredited to the Marquis an embassy, composed of Giovanni Soranzo and two other noblemen. This embassy was sagaciously furnished with a double set of instructions. If on the one hand, upon its arrival at Ferrara, the Marquis still lived, its duties were understood to be confined to a condolence with him on his malady, an inquiry, in the name of the Doge and the Signory, respecting his actual state of health, and a general offer of friendly service. Should it happen, on the other hand, that when they reached their destination, the Marquis was no more, or even was in his last moments, the Deputies were directed to avoid the acknowledgment of any successor, to ascertain the temper of parties, with the extent of the popular bias toward each, and to report the result of their observations from time to time to their Government. It was fortunate that Soranzo and his colleagues were prepared to meet either contingency. For when they entered the city, the 31st January had passed, and Azzo had already expired. The mission resolved itself, therefore, into a reconnoitring tour; and, under the circumstances, its stay was as brief as possible.

A story was current at this time that, on his death-bed, Azzo X., too truly anticipating that his brother Francesco, in whose character no one was better read, would dispute the succession to his estates, and bearing in mind the friendship which had subsisted between the Republic and his grandfather, Azzo IX., commended Ferrara and his grandson to

the Venetians, and that the latter, by a solemn act of Council, accepted the weighty and delicate trust. It was to the Venetians, at all events, his reputed countrymen on his mother's side, that Frisco, baffled in his calculations by the dexterous manœuvres of his relative, and unexpectedly driven from a position in which he had thought himself secure, now applied for help and sympathy. He omitted not to inculcate on the Republic the interest, which she had in the preservation of the Ghibelline power at Ferrara. He depicted the hazard which she would incur of losing her local privileges, or of being constrained to enjoy them, at least, under certain obnoxious and hampering restrictions, if the City should be allowed to fall under the Pontifical Government. On being reinstated through her instrumentality, he not only guaranteed the integrity of her antient charters, but he promised many additional franchises. Of general professions of amity and devotion the Regent was lavish; and he concluded by suggesting that the strategical movements of any troops, which the Ducal Government might decide on sending up the Po to his aid, would be facilitated by placing them in possession of Tedaldo, of which he remained master at present.¹ This fortress was of high value to the Republic, inasmuch as it commanded the Po, which flows between it and the City of Ferrara.²

The result of this appeal, to which collateral influences might be expected to bring some additional

¹ *Chronicon Estense*, 365 et seq.

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force, was awaited by Frisco and his rival with almost equal anxiety. To the former it was highly material to know, how far the Venetian policy might have changed with the change in the state of the Peninsula. It was notorious that the object of the Republic, in giving her adhesion to the Lombard League, and on several other occasions in upholding the pretensions of the Guelphs, had been the subversion of the imperial power rather than any predilection for popular institutions ; this object for which she had, in 1177, made common cause with the Apostolic See, and had afforded to Alexander III. an asylum on a soil untrodden by the foot of a conqueror, was for the present, at any rate, thoroughly accomplished ; and it was now to be tested, whether the Government of Gradenigo would consider the attempted encroachment of the Papacy on the Po a sufficient ground for embracing the Ghibelline cause, and for plunging into a war, of which it was alike impossible to limit the theatre and duration.

The case appeared to the Great Council to be one of those in which a false step could not be taken without involving the most serious consequences. It was competent for the Republic either to observe a strict neutrality, or to second by armed interference the claim of Frisco d'Este. There were many in the Legislative Body who, when the question was formally submitted for deliberation, argued with vehemence against a course of policy which was not less invidious than costly. They deprecated any participation in a quarrel, where they would have a bastard, and not

impossibly a parricide,¹ as a confederate, and as an enemy the Church herself. But the views, which the Doge and his immediate following thought proper to entertain, were different. The Ducal party imagined, that none who had the greatness and glory of their country at heart could desire to neglect such an excellent opportunity of gaining a permanent footing in the Peninsula by the consolidation of the Venetian position at Ferrara; vigorous resolution and skilful management alone were requisite to transform that municipality into an integral though outlying portion of the Dogado. They conceived that, apart from any schemes of annexation, the scene of the disputed succession lay too immediately in the neighbourhood of the Lagoons to warrant them in suffering the overt aim of Clement at temporal aggrandizement in such a direction to remain unchecked: nor did they allow either that the See had any legitimate claim to Ferrara, or that there was any just cause why they should not prosecute their own right, "inasmuch as the Veronese or the Mantuans would be too happy to have Ferrara for themselves, if they had the chance."² These considerations, in which there was no want of soundness or force, were suffered to be final; and the Opposition, whose repugnance to the war might be fairly suspected of springing, to some extent, from factious or personal motives, found itself in a defeated minority.

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About the first week in July, Giovanni Soranzo, whose talents were now fully appreciated, was sent to Ferrara with the first draught of troops; and the Venetians did not long delay to open a vigorous and well-sustained assault upon the city itself. The Venetian main position was at Francolino, between the two arms into which the Po divides itself above Ferrara.²

Meanwhile, Pelagrua had been ripening his plans in concert with Francesco, and had received reinforcements from Florence, Lucca, Ancona, Padua, and various other quarters, in which the papal influence was paramount, or in which a disaffection existed to Venice. But the preparations of the Cardinal were still imperfect, and he continued to be desirous of gaining time. Upon being apprised of the significant proceedings in the Great Council on the 25th June last, his Eminence therefore immediately

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Upon being opened at the Palace, in the presence of the Grand Chancellor and the Ducal Notary, on the 3rd September, the new papers were found to raise points of such gravity, that it was deemed necessary to refer their decision to an extraordinary Giunta, which was convoked on the 5th.² His Holiness insisted on the immediate evacuation of Tedaldo, on the recal of all the Venetian troops, and on the award of full redress for injuries sustained. But the Republic was impassable; and the answer with which the papal envoys were dismissed by the Giunta was that, "Ferrara, released by the arms of the Republic from the

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that, by a solemn act of the Legislature (October 7), the Doge was enabled by an enlargement of his prerogative to declare war against Ferrara, and to exercise, by the advice and with the concurrence of the Privy Council, the three Chiefs of the Forty, and the War Department or Zonta (Giunta), all other acts of sovereignty. The Legislative Body merely reserved to itself the right of concluding peace.

Disconcerted in its attempt to intimidate the Venetians, the Papacy, smothering by a painful effort its wrathful sensations, determined to resort to another species of tactics. It was not more than a week subsequently to the dismissal of the propositions of Clement himself, that Pelagrua, on behalf of His Holiness, announced his readiness to cede Ferrara to the Venetians, on the condition that the latter should acknowledge the seigniorial rights of the Apostolic See, and should consent to pay into the Roman treasury, as the Feudatories of the Church, an annual sum of 20,000 ducats. This sudden and unexpected shifting of ground appeared to be symptomatic of growing alarm on the part of the Cardinal, his supporters, and of the Ferrarese generally, at the probable result of the Siege; it seemed quite within the limits of possibility, that a few more days would bring an unconditional surrender; and it was under such an impression that the Government rejoined somewhat evasively¹ that “as the ordinary revenue of the municipality was by no means considerable, and as there was no method, except by

¹ Romanin, (iii. 15.)

recourse to vexatious and unjust imposts, of raising so large an amount, it was not in their power to meet the suggested arrangement."

That rebuff, which denoted conclusively the resolute persistence of the Venetians in their design, exasperated the Papal party beyond measure. A few days only after the receipt of the answer, Pelagrua forwarded (October 16) an excommunicating Bull. By that instrument the City of Venice, the Doge, the Privy Council, the Podesta of Chioggia, and all who, in contempt of repeated admonitions had aided, advised, or countenanced the defence of Ferrara against the arms of the Church, were laid under civil and religious disabilities. The sequestration was decreed of all property acquired and held by the Venetians in Ferrara; all treaties, leagues and covenants whatsoever between the Republic and other Powers were annulled;¹ all intercourse with the Dogado, even to the supply of the necessaries of life, was prohibited; and any privileges accorded in times passed by the Holy See to the Church of Venice were cancelled or revoked. A space of ten days, however, during which the operation of the Interdict was suspended, was still vouchsafed to give the Venetians leisure to weigh with due care the question before them, to appreciate the extreme gravity of their situation, and to retract their ill-advised ultimatum. But a voice from Avignon sternly declared that if, on the expiration of that term, after all the gracious indulgence extended to the Republic, she exhibited the same

¹ Muratori, *Annali*, viii. 41.

callous and unchristian obduracy, the sentence, which had been pronounced, would be infallibly executed.¹

This was indeed a widely different step from that, on which the Venetian Government had been led partly to count. Well as the members of that government knew the firmness and violence of Clement's nature, they had hardly conceived that His Holiness would allow himself to proceed to such an extremity. The threatened launch of the Bull was calculated, however, to inspire the utmost alarm. It was not so much from their own estimate of this comparatively novel class of weapon, which was unusually qualified, that the Venetians formed their judgment, but from the character of the notions which they knew to be received respecting ecclesiastical censures by less sceptical communities. It was that they were too intimately conversant with the tone of religious feeling in other countries toward the Edicts of the Vatican, as well as too familiar with the latent or underlying tendency which existed to make obedience to Rome a subterfuge for more worldly motives, to treat with levity the danger which hung over them; and while the Government, echoing perhaps the personal sentiments of Gradenigo, professed an inclination to persevere in their aggressive policy, the Doge and his advisers concurred on the whole in the expediency of submitting the Ferrarese question in its present phase to the Great Council.

A special sitting of that august Body was held accordingly for the express purpose. The Doge who

¹ De Monacis, lib. xiv. (Add. MSS., 8574).

opened the discussion, premised by tracing the question from its origin down to the point, which it had now reached. He afforded the Assembly a detailed exposition of the actual posture of affairs. The course which he had pursued in favouring the pretensions of Frisco d'Este against his uncle and the Apostolic See, His Serenity vindicated on the ground that he had felt it to be his duty not to neglect such an opportunity of aggrandizing his country. He sought to impress on his auditory that such opportunities were of very unfrequent occurrence; and it still more rarely happened that governments *knew how to use them*. He then proceeded to explain the nature of the right which they had acquired over Ferrara by virtue of its spontaneous cession to them by their ally for a valuable consideration.¹ In assuming an hostile attitude toward their Commune, and in directing against her a measure so excessively harsh, Gradenigo declared his persuasion that the Pontiff had been influenced by bad councillors and false information; and the Doge thought they might rest assured that, so soon as His Holiness could be brought to a correct view of the circumstances, he would soften his resentment, and rescind the anathema. He reminded his listeners in conclusion how the Apostolic See, so far from having any pretext for regarding them with animosity, owed a debt of the deepest gratitude to the Venetians for the affec-

¹ The Doge here must be understood to have referred to the pension which Frisco was to receive, to indemnify him for the loss of his revenue at Ferrara.

tionate zeal which they had exhibited for its welfare in times passed. History bore the Republic testimony, that she was a dutiful daughter of the Church, and, when necessity pressed, the unflinching champion of the Christian Faith.

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During the remainder of the winter, and the early spring of the following year (1309), the Venetian Government continued to cement and consolidate its power at Ferrara. With this object the War Commission, which already promised to become a new element in the administrative system, was twice confirmed (December 31, 1308, and March 17, 1309); and for some time, even in the presence of the violent and traditional repugnance of the Ferrarese to the Venetian yoke, the Republic preserved the ascendancy which she had acquired, without interference on the part either of Clement himself or of Pelagrua. But in the latter half of March, 1309, this prospect was overclouded by the receipt of advices from Avignon, that his Holiness was in no mood to swerve from his declared resolution, and that the publication of the Bull might be daily expected.

At length, on the 27th of the month, the blow which had been suspended over the Republic since the 16th October last, was struck.¹ On that day, the dreaded Bull was published. The Republic, the Doge, his Councillors, and all who had rendered her any aid, countenance or advice, were placed out of the pale of the Church. The property, goods, and chattels² of the Islanders at Ferrara and elsewhere were declared to be sequestrated. Their treaties were dissolved. They were released from their oath of fealty to the Doge. It was declared unlawful to trade with them, eat with them, or converse with them. Every one was at liberty to take them and sell them into slavery; they became incapable of giving testimony, of making wills, of succeeding to benefices. Their clergy were commanded to leave the Dogado within ten days from the expiration of the month of grace, which was still vouchsafed.

The moral force which the condition of society lent to such a measure was immense. The obsequious blindness, with which Europe followed the dictates of Rome in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, elevated the papal interdict into an engine of fearful potency. It paralysed trade; it dried up the sources of industrial wealth; it laid a country under every civil and religious disability; it shed over society an atmosphere of gloom; it affected every relation of life.

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It blanched the cheek, checked the pulsation of the heart, and caused the lip to quiver. At home, it fomented agitation, gave colour and pretext to the worst motives, and evoked all the latent distempers of the public mind. Abroad, it legitimized rebellion, imparted to moribund antipathies a new vitality, and transformed wavering allies into open enemies. Of such a character was the weapon, which Clement V. had launched against the Republic; and such was the posture in which Venetian affairs stood in May, 1309.

The thirty days, which were still extended to the offending State to enable it to arrive at a final and binding decision, passed away, as might have been foreseen, without bringing any change in the relative position of parties. The Signory, on her part, contented herself with pleading for the second time a misconception of circumstances, and demanding a review of the Ferrarese question on a modified basis; but the embassy, which was sent to Avignon on this errand on the 26th March, one day anterior to the publication of the Bull, was dismissed by the irritated Pontiff without an audience; and on the 7th May, the interdict came into full operation. The clergy soon declined to celebrate mass, to administer the sacrament, or to perform Divine worship; and many at once quitted the Dogado. The churches were for the most part closed. All religious observances were suspended. Abroad, as the Government had not failed to anticipate, the licence conferred by the Bull was ignobly abused. Everywhere, the same jealousy was betrayed

of Venetian prosperity, and the same disposition evinced itself to unite in crushing a State, which was guilty of being too thriving and too powerful. The Kings of England, France, Arragon, and Sicily, had the weakness to participate in the atrocious plot. All the Venetian residents in those countries were despoiled and maltreated. Their property was seized; their counters were pillaged; an embargo was laid on their ships. They were excluded from the Christian communion. They were disqualified from executing any civil contract whatever. It was unlawful to buy with them or to sell with them. In several parts of Italy, the Venetians were put to death; and at Genoa, a large number of the prisoners of Curzola were shipped as slaves.

It was idle to disparage the gravity of the crisis.¹ The peril to which the Doge and his countrymen were exposed was indisputably of the highest magnitude. In any other European Power, indeed, resistance to the Pontifical will would have been madness. The England of Edward II. would have soon bowed her neck to the storm. The France of Philip the Fair would have yielded, perhaps, a still prompter submission. Even the Emperor, warned by more than one signal example, would have paused before he entered on a fresh struggle with the Holy See. Yet the Republic, single-handed, unbefriended, encompassed by enemies who envied her greatness, and were plotting

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Venetian hierarchy was so widely governed, possessed a powerful tendency of a counteractive kind. Venice was a Power, whose civil and ecclesiastical institutions were blended in a manner which was almost to be regarded as anomalous. There was probably no country where the political and everyday life of the people breathed so thoroughly a spirit of religion, or where religion was at the same time so thoroughly secularized. There was no country where the Roman Catholic Faith was symbolized by more splendid rites, and none where the Roman Catholic Priesthood was so complete a cipher. The influence over clerical discipline and preferment, which the *Jus Patronatûs* vested in the laity, more especially in the parochial districts, was enormous. That influence had its drawbacks and its vices. It was very liable to abuse. It was too apt to place the clergy at the arbitrement of personal or party caprice. But there is ample room to believe that it was exerted, in the present instance, to a highly salutary end, and that the Republic was rescued from an impending convulsion mainly by the resistance of lay patrons in the Ghibelline interest to the injunctions of the Holy See. Such contumacy ran small hazard of being treated with intolerance, or of being viewed otherwise than with complacency, by the Ghibelline Government of Gradenigo.

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exercise of his functions as Podesta ; and, at the same time, a despatch was addressed to Soranzo himself, now Military Commandant at Ferrara, in which he was told : “ On this day has been received an intimation that on Holy Thursday the Pope pronounced the threatened sentence against us, unjustly and precipitately, without waiting for our ambassadors.” “ Ascertain therefore,” concluded the letter, “ the precise extent of your force and efficiency ; and if any expedient or plan should occur to you, communicate it : since we have resolved to do all that is in us, manfully and energetically, to maintain our rights and our honour. In the meantime, you will not fail to keep a watchful eye on our possessions, and on the naval equipment intrusted to your care.”¹

But an object, in which one of the most hotheaded and resolute of Pontiffs had thus signally failed, was destined to owe its accomplishment to a totally distinct agency. With the return of the warm season in June came malaria, and malaria bred dysentery and pestilence. The sufferings and losses of the Venetians, whose numbers were loosely calculated at this point of time at between 15,000 and 20,000, were considerable. Among the victims of the distemper was the Podesta himself.

Michieli was replaced by Marco Quirini della Casa Maggiore, the brother of that Jacopo who has been already introduced to notice. The selection of Quirini was more intelligible than Quirini's acceptance of the

¹ Romanin (iii. 21).

post. He was the Leader of the Opposition. His antipathy to the Doge and his party was proverbial. He had voted against the election of Gradenigo in 1289, and he took every occasion to attack his government. Unlike his brother who, though no friend to those in power, was known to shrink too much from violence and bloodshed to be a dangerous antagonist, Marco was of a caballing and restless disposition ; his rank was exalted ; his personal character stood high ; and by the recent marriage of his daughter with Bajamonte, the son of Giacomo Tiepolo of San Agostino, he had not only cemented the old friendship between the two great Guelph families, but had improved his own position in the Great Council. He was at present, perhaps, the most influential member of that assembly. The Government felt that to buy such a man was a hazardous and compromising experiment ; its only plan was to remove him from the sphere of his intrigues by conferring upon him the honourable but peculiarly perilous appointment of Podesta at Ferrara. The advantage of that step was twofold. It was highly probable that the term of his absence would be prolonged : and there was a possibility that he might share the fate of his predecessor.

The order of the 9th April last, in obedience to which the late Vitali Michieli had transferred the seat of his jurisdiction from Ferrara to the Citadel, was designed by the Signory, perhaps, as a spontaneous and dignified concession to the Holy See, as well as a

propitiatory measure toward the Ferrarese themselves. But the step, which was certainly susceptible of more than one construction, was viewed by Pelagrua and his minion Francesco d'Este quite in an opposite light; and at any rate it resulted in a rupture of the negotiation. Subsequently to the entry of Quirini, however, upon his functions as Podesta, the movements of the besiegers were languid and indecisive; the epidemic, which had not yet abated, continued to thin the numbers of the soldiers, to warp their energies, and to depress their spirits; and although an attempt on the part of the enemy to cut off the retreat of the small Venetian flotilla on the Po, which was supplying the garrison with provisions, by throwing a strong boom across that river, was gallantly repulsed by Soranzo, it began to be painfully apparent that the mere operation of natural causes would render the lengthened maintenance of their position absolutely impracticable. Nevertheless, the Venetians continued with undiminished perseverance to hold their ground through June, July, and the following month. It was not till the close of August, when the mortality among the troops of Soranzo had assumed frightful proportions, when their frames were enervated by sickness, and when their fortitude was at last shaken by extreme physical suffering, that the enemy ventured to open a general attack upon the fortress; and on the 28th, after some resistance, Tedaldo was stormed, and the garrison, with very few exceptions, was put to the sword. The troops of the Church were guilty of the

most barbarous excesses. The carnage of the Venetians was terrible. Their corpses were thrown into the Po. Those whose lives were spared were exoculated. The fleet was dismantled. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Podesta and Soranzo themselves effected their escape, and regained Venice (August-September, 1309).

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
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
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and interest, were his two brothers, Pietro and Jacopo. Pietro Quirini, *detto* Pezzagallo, was a person who had hitherto attracted a comparatively slight degree of attention, and of whom the little that was known was not to his credit. During a certain time, he had officiated as Bailo of Negropont, one of the twelve principal colonial appointments¹ in the gift of the Government; and it was during his continuance at this onerous post that he was guilty of nepotism and neglect, in suffering his son Nicolo to maltreat with impunity one of the Jewish population of the island. For this misdemeanour the Bailo was, upon his return, cited by Marco Dandolo of San Moisé, one of the Advocates of the Commune, before the proper tribunal, and fined in the sum of 500 ducats.² To this grievance, as it was naturally interpreted, a second was soon superadded. After the crisis of March, 1309, the Government had thought fit to renew, for the sake of the more effectual preservation of the peace, an existing prohibition against the practice of wearing arms in the capital; and the Signori di Notte were charged to enforce with increased strictness the observance of this wholesome regulation. One evening, late in the autumn of the year, as Marco Morosini, one of the Signori, was making his circuit, he encountered somebody muffled in a cloak, and traversing in solitude one of the thoroughfares; and “the devil,” to borrow the

¹ Sandi (lib. v. c. 1).

² Caroldo, *Congiura Domini Boemondi Tiepoli*, 15 Junii, 1310 (Add. MSS. B. M. 8595). Caroldo was Secretary to the Council of Ten. He is highly commended as an historian by Apostolo Zeno (*Lettere*, v. 416).

expression of an old historian,¹ “put it into the head of Morosini to confront the stranger with the formal challenge, ‘Let us search.’” That stranger was no other than Pietro Quirini: and the latter, disgusted at the indignity, instead of complying with the requisition, tripped up the heels of the magistrate, and left him sprawling on the ground. For this gross misconduct the offender was for the second time prosecuted by the Avogadors, and, for the second time, was mulcted in a heavy amount.²

Jacopo Quirini, Marco's remaining brother, was a nobleman of strict integrity, of immaculate fame, and of great moral rectitude. As a rhetorician, he was hardly ambitious to excel. His eloquence was of that school which sought to convince without aspiring to dazzle; and he was indebted for such political influence as he enjoyed to the soundness of his sense, and to a certain conscientious earnestness of style, rather than to any impassioned fervour in his delivery, any aptitude for metaphor, or any fecundity of wit. Quirini was a declared enemy to all revolutionary projects, and from extreme measures of every kind he was insuperably averse. The independence of his views disqualified him from following a party, while their singularity unfitted him to lead one. He therefore found himself placed in a somewhat anomalous and isolated situation. For the politics of his brother Marco, and of Marco's nephew Bajamonte, he avowed little relish; the politics of the Government excited the

¹ Marco Barbaro.² Caroldo, *Congiura* (Add. MSS. 8595).

strongest emotions of hatred of which his nature was capable. The consequence was, that much of the weight, which his sage and patriotic counsels might have otherwise carried with them, was lost. He had opposed the election of Gradenigo in 1289; he had opposed the constitutional changes of 1297; he had opposed the war of 1308. But, nevertheless, Gradenigo mounted the throne, the third Venetian Revolution was compassed, and the Siege of Ferrara was decreed.

A remarkable event, in which Jacopo Quirini was prominently concerned, had lately occurred. Doimo Da Canale,¹ Count of Veglia, having returned from Ferrara in the beginning of September, 1309, with Marco Quirini, under whom he had served at Tedaldo, was brought forward as the candidate for a recent vacancy at the Privy Council Board. The Doge himself assented to the appointment; but it was necessary to procure the concurrence of the Great Council. The introduction of the matter into that assembly became unexpectedly the signal for a debate of unusual animation. The point having been raised, Jacopo Quirini was the first to speak. He remarked that, by their Minute of the 27th January, 1267, the Counts of Dalmatia were expressly disqualified from sitting at any board or any tribunal excepting the Great Council itself and the Pregadi; and he demanded to know on what special ground a departure from that rule was to be sanctioned in the present instance? To Quirini

¹ Litta, fascicolo 18.

replied one of the connexions of Da Canale, and a partizan of the Government, Ugolino Giustiniani; and the argument of Giustiniani was in its turn combated by Quirini's kinsman, Badoer Badoer. Each succeeding orator displayed increased warmth and incoherence; the most alarming symptoms began to be discernible; the dignified composure, which usually reigned in the Hall, was being gradually lost in a confusion of loud and angry voices; and a repetition of the disgraceful spectacle, which had followed the Ferrarese debate a few months before, was too much to be dreaded. Nor was it long before the storm burst with fury. The scene of anarchy and disorder was terrible. The uproar even exceeded that on the previous occasion; and the salutary prohibition against the use of side-arms alone saved the effusion of blood, and precluded the affray from assuming a highly dangerous form. After a short scuffle across the benches, and some displays of a pugilistic kind, the indecorous exhibition was allowed to terminate; and Da Canale was ultimately installed in the office. The recollection of the incident, however, remained for some time vividly impressed on the minds of such members of the Council as had taken a leading share in the brawl; and during the few following days, collisions between the two parties, who had divided on the question, continued to be of frequent occurrence.

Exclusively of his son-in-law and his two brothers, Marco Quirini reckoned among his adherents Nicolo Quirini, Rector of the Church of San Basso, Canon of

Castello, and a Poet of some celebrity,¹ and several other branches of his own family; two or three more Tiepoli; two or three Badoeri; a Barozzi, Andrea Doro, a Privy Councillor, who had thought proper to change sides, two Florentines, four or five Ferrarese, and about twenty persons of more obscure name, who had been induced to range themselves among the Opposition by various considerations of more or less weight, and of more or less validity.

The circumstances of a private nature, which have been detailed, operated more powerfully than any ostensible motives in riveting the links, which bound the leading members of the Quirini-Tiepolo Cabal to each other. To that party, which Marco Quirini supported by his influential connexions, by his energy of character, by his firmness and consistency of purpose, and by his distinguished talents as a parliamentary speaker, his brother Jacopo brought his rare moderation, and his son-in-law lent his matchless popularity. The recognised necessity of redressing the abuses of the Government furnished an ample pretext to those, who were now meditating nothing less than its subversion.

It was by a process, of which the successive stages were barely perceptible even to themselves, that the Venetian Opposition lapsed into a **SECRET SOCIETY**. During the first week in June, 1810, a private meeting

¹ Agostini (*Notizie degli Scrittori Viniziani, Prefaz*). Some of his rhymes are said to be preserved in the Barberina Library, at Rome. See Allacci, *Antichi Poeti*, p. 55; Napoli, 1661.

took place at the Casa Quirini at San Matteo near the Rialto, for the purpose of debating the general question of *reform*, and of arranging certain preliminaries. The attendance was not numerous; but among those present were Bajamonte Tiepolo, Badoer Badoer, and Jacopo and Pietro Quirini.¹ Marco Quirini, who presided, opened the discussion.

Quirini represented that, although any one who should seek the gratification of his private resentment by embarking in a movement of a seditious tendency against Gradenigo, would forfeit the name of a good citizen, it was hard to contemplate the manifest symptoms of the ruin of a country, of which they all prayed for the prosperity, without concerning themselves with the question of providing some salutary remedy for the evil. They all knew how many persons of virtue and desert had been excluded by the reform of the Great Council from its deliberations. It was impossible to conceal from themselves how severe a blow that step had inflicted on the patriotic spirit of a large proportion of the population, of men whose love of their country had persuaded them on former occasions to sacrifice their fortunes and their lives to her safety and her greatness. What, again, was to be thought of that ill-omened undertaking against Ferrara, which had been prosecuted with so much obstinacy by the present Doge, and which had had such a pitiful termination? How could a second opinion be formed

¹ Caroldo, *Conjiura* (Add. MSS. 8595); Romanin (iii. chap. 4).

of the terrible Interdict, which Gradenigo had, by his stubbornness, drawn upon them, and by which so many Venetians had been dispossessed of their patrimony, had been put to death, or had been sold as slaves? Could it be necessary to point attention to the arbitrary acts, which the Doge was daily committing, and in which he was encouraged to persevere by a too tame submission to his authority? Had not the time come for vindicating their rights? Was it not expedient, before the evil rooted itself too deeply in the soil, and spread too widely, to adopt a decisive line of conduct? “Fortunate we may esteem ourselves,” concluded the speaker, “if we succeed in our object without bloodshed; but if it becomes a necessity, it is surely better that a few should fall, than that all should be lost.”

While Quirini was resuming his seat, his son-in-law rose. The latter rehearsed the various wrongs and indignities which individuals had sustained, and his own family in particular, at the hands of the actual Government. He complained of the false and damaging construction which had been set upon the conduct of his father-in-law in regard to the abandonment of Tedaldo. He dwelled on the certainty of their success, if they employed secrecy and circumspection in maturing their plans, and celerity in executing them. He exhorted them to waste no time in vain words, but to proceed at once to practical measures. He pronounced it to be their object *to obtain a good prince, who might preserve the national liberty, and under whom*

the Republic might revert to her former greatness and prosperity.

The next, who broke silence, was Jacopo Quirini, who had lately accepted the appointment of ambassador to the Byzantine Court, and who was at present on the eve of his departure for Constantinople. That virtuous and excellent nobleman, perceiving at a glance the perilous direction, in which his relatives were allowing their thoughts to drift, and trembling for the fate which might befall his own children, and all who were endeared to him by consanguinity, laboured with his accustomed intrepidity, and with more than his accustomed eloquence, to dissuade his brother and Tiepolo from embarking in an undertaking fraught with so much danger and uncertainty. "There is nothing," he admitted, "more just and more holy than the vindication of the rights and liberties of one's country; but we ought not to suffer passion to oversway reason and judgment. It is far from me to defend the Doge or his policy; but it behoves us to bear in mind that all his acts have been sanctioned by the Councils, and that the bribery, the corruption, the contrivances and manœuvres of every kind, which were formerly employed to obtain seats in the Great Council, loudly called for reform. It is incumbent on us to remember that the Ferrarese war itself formed the subject of a lengthened debate in the Assembly, and that the resolution committing the Republic to that undertaking was carried by a majority of suffrages. To what purpose then are you about to raise a

tumult? What legitimate pretence exists for exposing to hazard the lives and property of so many? How can you justify yourselves in rekindling civil war? You hope, perhaps, to carry the people with you; but the people, as everybody should know, are fickle and volatile; and all who repose confidence in them, prepare the way to their own fall and destruction. I recommend you to profit by the example of Marino Bocconio. I counsel the immediate abandonment of the proposed scheme and a perseverance in the path of order and justice, which presents a more appropriate and even more efficacious medium for the fulfilment of your wishes and for the satisfaction of your wants, than violence or agitation.”¹

No labour, no arts, were spared by his connexions to coax Jacopo Quirini into their views.² But the latter was neither to be cajoled nor to be over-persuaded; and he not only remained unalterably firm in his determination to keep aloof from any rash political adventure, but he protested that, unless he received an assurance that the enterprise which his brother and his nephew appeared to have concerted between them, was from that moment entirely and unreservedly relinquished, he should instantly place the resignation of his embassy³ in the hands of Gradenigo. For this step even Marco Quirini and his son-in-law were hardly prepared. The proposition astounded even those who knew the speaker best. It was not that

¹ Caroldo, *Conjiura* (Add. MSS. B. M. 8595).

² *Ibid.*

³ Sandi, lib. v. c. 2.

they greatly valued the co-operation of Jacopo : for he was a troublesome and almost an impracticable ally. It was not that they suspected his honour : for that was universally believed to be alike above impeachment and beyond corruption. But they were now haunted by an apprehension lest in the first place, by his continual presence in the Capital he should mar the whole scheme by sowing division in their ranks, and by making converts of known waverers ; and secondly, lest, in a moment of weakness and indiscretion, or from an impulse of misjudging zeal, he should betray their confidence, and ruin the cause.

These reasons prompted them to simulate compliance. The required pledge was given with feigned reluctance and sincerity ; and the new ambassador was no sooner ascertained to be beyond hearing, than his kinsmen returned to their task with an enthusiasm which was equally deaf to the voice of prudence and to the whispered reproaches of conscience. The two Chiefs of the Opposition were apt indeed to conceive, that they had gone too far to draw back. The die was cast : on the issue, they elected to stake their fortunes, their existence.

At the subsequent conferences between the conspirators, satisfactory progress was reported to have been made in extending their confidences and in enrolling fresh accomplices ; and the scheme gradually assumed a definite form. It was now understood to be the common aim of the association of noblemen, of which Quirini and his kinsman had become the

nucleus, to render themselves masters of the Rialto and its environs, to secure the person of the Doge at all hazards, to proclaim the restoration of the Old Constitution, and to place upon the throne the son of the legitimate Doge. There was a time, when Marco Quirini might have dreamed of encircling his own brows with the berretta; but he was now willing to waive his personal wishes in favour of one who was younger than himself, and more popular than himself, and whose elevation would make his daughter a Dogaressa.

This stupendous plot, of which the conception and details were due to the daring and fertile genius of Tiepolo and his father-in-law, was already advancing toward maturity; even the date of its execution was approximately fixed for the middle of the current month of June; and such excessive caution was exercised by each of the confederates in his allotted sphere that, in the absence of any extraordinary fatality, it was extremely improbable that the Government would become aware of its danger, until the blow was actually struck.

END OF VOL. II.





of the terrible Interdict, which Gradenigo had, by his stubbornness, drawn upon them, and by which so many Venetians had been dispossessed of their patrimony, had been put to death, or had been sold as slaves? Could it be necessary to point attention to the arbitrary acts, which the Doge was daily committing, and in which he was encouraged to persevere by a too tame submission to his authority? Had not the time come for vindicating their rights? Was it not expedient, before the evil rooted itself too deeply in the soil, and spread too widely, to adopt a decisive line of conduct? “Fortunate we may esteem ourselves,” concluded the speaker, “if we succeed in our object without bloodshed; but if it becomes a necessity, it is surely better that a few should fall, than that all should be lost.”

While Quirini was resuming his seat, his son-in-law rose. The latter rehearsed the various wrongs and indignities which individuals had sustained, and his own family in particular, at the hands of the actual Government. He complained of the false and damaging construction which had been set upon the conduct of his father-in-law in regard to the abandonment of Tedaldo. He dwelled on the certainty of their success, if they employed secrecy and circumspection in maturing their plans, and celerity in executing them. He exhorted them to waste no time in vain words, but to proceed at once to practical measures. He pronounced it to be their object *to obtain a good prince, who might preserve the national liberty, and under whom*

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